Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Justice Steiner Gaus I 127
Justice/Hillel Steiner/Gaus/Mack: Steiner's conception of liberty, rights and the compossibility requirement supports his entitlement account of justice. (>Freedom/Steiner.)
Justice involves a division of the world into various domains, each person possessing rights over some of it, this defining his sphere of freedom. Since, Steiner insists, rights protect our ability to choose, we are free (while alive) to transfer our holdings to others; the justice of a system of
holdings will thus crucially depend on its history - whether it has been brought about by a series of
legitimate, non-exploitative, choices. >Property/Hillel Steiner.
GausVsSteiner, Hillel: Consider: (1) if justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal; (>Property/Steiner) and (2') because of thorough-going scepticism about public reasons, it cannot be shown that people are equal in any relevant way; then (3') justice doesn't demand treating everyone
Gaus I 128
equally.

1. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Property Steiner Gaus I 127
Property/Hillel Steiner/Gaus/Mack: SteinerVsLocke:(...) while Steiner(1) insists that we own our bodies (though not our 'germ line genetic information'), he rejects the simple version of Lockean theory, according to which simply by mixing our labour with an unowned resource we appropriate the resource. But if we cannot justly appropriate nature that way, how do we generate just claims over natural resources?
Egalitarianism: Steiner is attracted to a quick route to egalitarianism. This quick argument for equality requires two premises:
(1) justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal, and treating unequally those who are in relevant respects unequal; and
(2) in these matters there are no relevant differences; so
(3) justice demands equality.
Gaus: This argument leads Steiner to the claim that everyone is entitled to equal freedom and so to some sort of equal share of natural resources (1994(1): 216, 235).
This equality of ownership may also be depicted as a version of the Lockean theory, in which we originally hold the world in common (Otsuka, 1998)(2).
GausVsSteiner, Hillel: Consider: (1) if justice involves treating equally those who are in relevant respects equal; and (2') because of thorough-going scepticism about public reasons, it cannot be
shown that people are equal in any relevant way; then (3') justice doesn't demand treating everyone
Gaus I 128
equally.

1. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
2. Otsuka, Michael (1998) 'Self-ownership and equality: a Lockean reconciliation '. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27 (Winter): 65-92.


Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Various Authors Black Vs Various Authors III 135
Lie/Creativity/George Steiner: Thesis: in lies, we can discover the "creativity of falsehood". (After Babel, NY, 1973, p 220). This was supposedly a "deep intuition of the Greeks". Steiner quotes Nietzsche approvingly: the lie, not the truth is divine. He seems to endorse the view according to which the "lie is a necessity of life". BlackVsSteiner: Bentham would have called that "nonsense on stilts". That is the academic version of humbug
III 136
which says more than you can mean at all. ((s) Without changing the meaning of words).
III 62
Knowledge/Black: this term is very difficult to grasp.
III 63
The verb is used in many contexts like "knowing how" hunger feels, or how to drive a car, etc. Truth: E.g. "I know that it is Monday" implies truth. There is a logical connection between knowledge and truth.
Science/Black: It cannot simply pursue truth. The truth must be accessible to us!.
Science skepticism: E.g. J. Ravetz: Thesis: "the pursuit of truth as the goal of science is outdated". Truth is not just inappropriate here, but irrelevant.
III 64
Ravetz: "... tomb stone of academic science ..." (Ravetz, Scientific knowlede and social problem, Oxford 1971, pp. 20, 21, 28). BlackVsRavetz: I see no difference between academic science and just science. With friends like Ravetz science does not need enemies like Roszak!.
III 42
Def Rational/Rationality/K. Mannheim: (London 1940 p. 53): "substantial rationality": "intelligent behavior based on one’s own insight into the connections between events". Intelligence/BlackVsMannheim: is an obscure concept.
Rationality/BlackVsMannheim: here we have the same problematic reference to the "own intelligence" as in Ginsberg.
Rationality/Reason/Reasonableness/Black: thousands of authors have suggested ratings for this. This is reminiscent of the dictum of Peirce:
"High priori" way/Terminology/Peirce: here you are invited to see things as self-evident that would precisely need a lot of argumentative support.
III 117
Humbug/Black: E.g. Mary McCarthy about the writer Lillian Hellman: "Every word she writes is a lie, including the words"and" and "the". BlackVsMcCarthy: with that, Mary McCarty did not lie, because:
III 118
she meant it, because she used the words that she wanted to use.
III 128
E.g. Veblen/Theory of the gentlefolk: MenckenVsVeblen: Gibberish, humbug, would fit on a postage stamp, no need to fill a whole book with it.
III 73
Science/T. H. Huxley: is nothing but a common sense which is more trained and better organized. Like an old veteran differs from a young recruit.
III 74
The weapons are just sharper. BlackVsHuxley: that was plausible for the biology of his time. Today, it seems exaggerated, e.g. you cannot say that driving is a "more trained" manner of walking.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
God Steiner, G. Seel III 58
George Steiner These "Jede logisch stimmige Auffassung dessen, was Sprache ist und wie Sprache funktioniert muß letztlich auf der Annahme einer Gegenwart Gottes beruhen". (Von realer Gegenwart). (SeelVsSteiner: mehr literarisch als logisch).

Seel I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Seel II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Seel III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001