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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Stigler | Rothbard III 326 Action/Stigler/Böhm-Bawerk/Rothbard: (…) the mathematics of simultaneous equations, dealing in physics with unmotivated motion, stresses mutual determination. In human action, however, the known causal force of action unilinearly determines the results. This gross misconception by mathematically inclined writers on the study of human action was exemplified during a running attack on Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, one of the greatest of all economists, by (…) George Stigler: StiglerVsBöhm-Bawerk: „. . . yet the postulate of continuity of utility and demand functions (which is unrealistic only to a minor degree, and essential to analytic treatment) is never granted. A more important weakness is Böhm-Bawerk’s failure to understand some of the most essential elements of modern economic theory, the concepts of mutual determination and equilibrium (developed by the use of the theory of simultaneous equations). Mutual determination is spurned for the older concept of cause and effect.“(1) RothbardVsStigler: The “weakness” displayed here is not that of Böhm-Bawerk, but of those, like Professor Stigler, who attempt vainly and fallaciously to construct economics on the model of mathematical physics, specifically, of classical mechanics.(2) 1. George J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1946), p. 181. For Carl Menger's attack on the concept of mutual determination and his critique of mathematical economics in general, see T.W. Hutchison, A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 195 3), pp. 147-48, and the interesting article by Emil Kauder, "Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School," Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie XVII, 4 (1958), 412 ff. 2. Stigler appends a footnote to the above paragraph which is meant as the coup de grace to Böhm-Bawerk: "Böhm-Bawerk was not trained in mathematics." Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories. Mathematics, it must be realized, is only the servant oflogic and reason, and not their master. "Training" in mathematics is no more necessary to the realization of its uselessness for and inapplicability to the sciences of human action than, for example, "training" in agricultural techniques is essential to knowing that they are not applicable on board an ocean liner. Indeed, training in mathematics, without adequate attention to the epistemology of the sciences of human action, is likely to yield unfortunate results when applied to the latter, as this example demonstrates. Böhm-Bawerk's greatness as an economist needs no defense at this date. For a sensitive tribute to Böhm-Bawerk, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, 1851-1914" in Ten Great Economists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 143-90. For apurely assertive and unsupported depreciation of Böhm-Bawerk's stature as an economist, see Howard S. Ellis' review of Schumpeter's book in theJournal of Political Economy, October, 1952, p. 434. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Coase Theorem | Stigler | Kiesling I 24 Coase Theorem/Stigler/Kiesling: While [Ronald] Coase(1) focused on the pervasiveness of transaction costs, his colleague George Stigler interpreted Coase’s emphasis differently (see Posner’s (2017(2)) discussion). >Social cost/Coase, >Transation costs/Coase. Stigler articulated what he called “the Coase Theorem”: when transaction costs are zero, the specific assignment of legal liability or the definition of property rights does not change the ability of parties to achieve the most efficient outcome, although it will change the distribution of realized costs and benefits. In a situation where there are no transaction costs, the precise definition of property rights does not affect the ability of the parties to find the efficient distribution of rights and efficient use of the resource. Kiesling I 25 Problem: In that setting, the only effect that the specific property rights definition has is on the distribution of costs and benefits, not on the ability to achieve the most efficient outcome. Using the paper mill and water treatment plant example, if the efficient outcome is for the paper mill to install a filter, if they face no transaction costs then discovering that efficient outcome through bargaining is easy and costless. What the court’s definition of rights and liabilities does in this case is to determine who pays for the filter that the paper mill installs. VsStigler: Although Stigler’s Coase Theorem has gathered considerable attention over the past four decades, it rather misses Coase’s point that courts and legal precedent are important precisely because transaction costs are pervasive and often high enough to prevent mutually-beneficial exchange. >Law/Coase, >Information/Coase. “The So-Called Coase Theorem” (McCloskey, 1998)(3) also misses the point to the extent that Coase’s emphasis was not on idealized models with transaction costs assumed to be zero, but was entirely on real-world situations where coordination has to create feasible institutional frameworks to manage conflict resolution in the presence of positive transaction costs. Although it the Coase Theorem provides a concrete theoretical benchmark, focusing on the unrealistic zero transaction cost case is a bit too close to the “blackboard economics” that Coase so criticized. >Law and economics. 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 2. Posner, Eric A. (2017). Coase Theorem. In Bruno Frey and David Iselin (eds.), Economic Ideas You Should Forget. Springer: 101-103. 3. McCloskey, Deirdre (1998). The So-Called Coase Theorem. Eastern Economic Journal 24, 3: 367-371. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 |
| Preferences | Stigler | Mause I 170f Preferences/Economy/Stigler/Becker: The standard theory assumes (...) constant preferences of all market players.(1) VsBecker, Gary S./VsStigler, George J.: There are adaptive preferences, i.e. those that change depending on previous consumption patterns. (2) e.g. sensitization for social misdevelopments, new environmental awareness. >G. Becker. 1. Stigler, George J., und Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. American Economic Review 67 (2), 1977. S. 76– 90. 2. Weizsäcker, Carl Christian von. Adaptive Präferenzen und die Legitimierung dezentraler Entscheidungsstrukturen. In Behavioral Economics und Wirtschaftspolitik, Hrsg. Christian Müller und Nils Otter, Stuttgart 2015, S. 67– 99. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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