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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Beauty | Gadamer | I 481 Beauty/Gadamer: Philosophy: The concept of the beautiful, which in the eighteenth century had to share the central position within the aesthetic problem with that of the sublime and which was to be completely eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century by the aesthetic criticism of classicism, was, as is well known, once a universal metaphysical concept and had a function within metaphysics, i.e. the general doctrine of being, that was by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense. >Metaphysics, >Aesthetics, >Being. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: It will be shown that this old concept of beauty can also serve a comprehensive hermeneutics, as it has grown for us from the criticism of the methodologism of the intellectual world. >Hermeneutics. Etymology: The Greek word for the German "schön" is kalon. Admittedly, there are no complete equivalents in German, even if we use the mediating pulchrum. But Greek thought has exercised a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with word combinations such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautifully intellectual/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses, the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon. Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the how of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. One cannot ask about the purpose they serve. I 483 Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any kind of contrast here, which of course means that the primacy of nature is undisputed, especially with regard to beauty. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way perfect the beautiful nature of the order of being. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. (...) it is only with the 19th century that the aesthetic problem (...) is transferred to the standpoint of art (...). (...) this [is] based on a metaphysical process (...). Such a transfer to the standpoint of art ontologically presupposes a shapelessly conceived mass of being or a mass of being governed by mechanical laws. The human artistic spirit, which forms useful things from mechanical construction, will ultimately understand all that is beautiful from the work of its own spirit. I 484 Order/Measurement/Rationality/Aesthetics/KantVsSubjectivism: As unsatisfactory as the development towards subjectivism initiated by Kant seemed to us in the newer aesthetic, Kant has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of aesthetic rationalism. >Aesthetics/Kant. GadamerVsKant: It is just not right to base the metaphysics of beauty solely on the ontology of measure and the teleological order of being, on which the classical appearance of rationalist rule aesthetics ultimately refers to. The metaphysics of the beautiful does not actually coincide with such an application of aesthetic rationalism. Rather, the decline to Plato reveals a quite different side to the phenomenon of the beautiful, and it is this side that interests us in our hermeneutical questioning. >Beauty/Plato. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Phenomenology | Nagel | I 49 NagelVsRorty, NagelVsSubjectivism: seeks a phenomenological reduction of thoughts, to get out of them - can not succeed - conceptual schemes fail for the same reason: I can not say "p, but I do not know if it s true". NagelVsQuine. > |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Production Theory | Sraffa | Kurz I 14 Production theory/Sraffa/Kurz: (…) we reflect upon the development of input–output analysis from Leontief’s 1928 essay(1) to his 1936(2) and later contributions and compare them with Piero Sraffa’s early work on the theory of production. >Input-Output Analysis/Leontief. Sraffa: Since the opening of Sraffa’s papers at Trinity College Library in Cambridge, UK, we have been able to study in detail Sraffa’s independent, but parallel attempt at elaborating an economic approach that proceeds exclusively in terms of magnitudes that can be observed and measured. Also, Sraffa saw his analysis as rooted in the contributions of the classical economists from William Petty to David Ricardo and he too equated his scheme with the Tableau Economique. However, while in the years 1927–1928 Leontief and Sraffa may be said to have been independently pursuing similar lines of thought, they soon afterwards, apparently again without knowing of each other’s work, parted company, with Leontief turning to the practical application of a stripped-down version of the new instrument, and Sraffa relentlessly seeking to solve the intricate problems the approach posed in the course of its elaboration. Objectivism/VsSubjectivism/Sraffa/Leontief/Kurz: Interestingly, both Leontief and Sraffa were disenchanted with the marginalist doctrine as it had been handed down by Alfred Marshall. They despised the subjectivist character of the explanation of value and distribution given and explicitly sought to elaborate an objectivist alternative to it. Both authors saw their own work as firmly rooted in the contributions of the physiocrats and the English classical political economists. >Alfred Marshall, >Physiocrats. Kurz I 21 Production theory/Sraffa/Kurz: Sraffa quite naturally first analysed an economy that produces just enough, neither more, nor less, to recover the necessary means of production used up in the process of production and the necessary means of subsistence in the support of workers – a situation reflected in what he called his ‘first equations’. He emphasized that this amounts to considering workers’ remuneration ‘as amounts of fuel for production’ (D3/12/7: 138)(3) and identified the situation as the realm of pure necessities, or ‘natural economy’. In this case the concept of physical real costs applied in an unadulterated way. The means of subsistence in the support of workers are an indispensable part of physical real costs, because only their (recurrent) consumption ‘enables’ workers to perform their function. The periodic destruction of such commodities is a necessary condition the economic system has to meet in order to realize a ‘self-replacing state’, but it is not also sufficient. The system must be able to restore periodically the initial distribution of resources in order for the (re) productive process to continue unhampered. With a division of labour and in the absence of a central coordination of economic activities, this coordination must be achieved in terms of interdependent markets. Commodities must be exchanged for one another at the end of the uniform period of production. But which exchange ratios guarantee the repetition of the process? Sraffa showed that the sought ratios, or what in his interpretation Ricardo had called ‘absolute’ values, were uniquely determined by the socio-technical conditions of production and could be ascertained by solving a set of linear homogeneous production equations. Whether actual markets led up to the same solution was a different question. Kurz I 22 Prices/equations/Sraffa: (…) setting the price of one of the commodities (or of a bundle of commodities) equal to unity allows one to determine the prices of the remaining two commodities in terms of it. (…) relative prices (or ‘absolute values’) can be ascertained exclusively in terms of the physical input–output quantities given: there is no need to have Kurz I 23 recourse to demand and supply schedules and the like. As Sraffa stated in a related note: ‘It is clear at once that these technical relations of production leave no room to play with: the values are rigidly fixed, and neither preferences nor … [the punctuation mark is Sraffa’s] can have any influence unless they change these relations. – It must be noted that they do not represent only the cost of production: they equally show the use, or disposal, of each product’ (D3/12/2: 31)(3). Second, Sraffa emphasized that a system of such algebraic equations is non-contradictory only in the case in which there is no surplus (see, for example, D3/12/6: 16 and D3/12/2: 32–35)(3). 1. Leontief, W. (1928) Die Wirtschaft als Kreislauf, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60, pp. 577–623. 2. Leontief, W. (1936) Quantitative input and output relations in the economic systems of the United States, Review of Economics and Statistics, 18, pp. 105–125. 3. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Subjectivism | Weber | Habermas III 317 Subjectivism/Weber/Habermas: Weber assumes an argumentation determined by the positivism of his time, according to which ethical value judgements merely express subjective attitudes and are not capable of an intersubjectively binding reasoning. >Positivism. VsSubjectivism/Habermas/HabermasVsWeber: His own arguments for the superiority of responsibility ethics over ethics of conviction, which have their limits in religious ethics of brotherhood, contradict this. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Functionalism | Newen Vs Functionalism | I40 Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech. NS I 16 Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology. NS I 27 Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Objectivism | Verschiedene Vs Objectivism | Stegmüller IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he must explain how such systems can arise at all! 1 Which human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of these artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Subjectivism | Nagel Vs Subjectivism | I 127 NagelVsSubjectivism: if you argue against subjectivism, you are not dealing with a suggestion of mere possibilities, but with a positive interpretation of our thoughts. We do not commit a petitio principii, provided we rely on the thoughts themselves, and not on the two-stage thesis that it should be interpreted objectively. The subjectivist proposal does not mean that we do not know whether our views are correct, but that it is wrong to interpret them as beliefs about a consciousness-independent natural order. They should be a feature of our perspective. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Subjectivism | Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism | Stegmüller IV 177 VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words. IV 178 VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness. IV 216 Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation. Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable. VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones: 1. Hierarchy of objective norms 2. The impossible changeability of human nature. IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all! 1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? IV 304 VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls). IV 305 VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists. Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands. IV 306 Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time. IV 307 Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations, from the outside they are causes. Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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| Subjectivism | Versus | Newen / Schrenk I 12 Semantic Realism / Realistic Meaning Theory: Frege / Russell / early Wittgenstein / Carnap thesis: meaning of expressions is the designated object - VsLocke, VsSubjectivism |
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| Semantic Realism | Pro | Newen / Schrenk I 12 Semantic Realism / realistic meaning theory: Frege / Russell / early Wittgenstein / Carnap thesis: meaning of expressions is the designated object - VsLocke, VsSubjectivism. |
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