Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phenomenalism | Ryle | I 322 ff PhenomenalismVsSubstance, Vs "higher unity" in the object -> sense-data theory. I 321ff We do not have a "pure" vocabulary of sensations. We can indicate our sensations only by mentioning ordinary objects, including people. I 322 A goalpost is permanent, while sensations are fleeting. It is a unity, while sensations are a multiplicity, so there is a tendency to say that "behind" the sensations there is a higher unity of the goalpost; important features, namely, that it is a continuing substance, a thing in itself a source of causality, an objective unity... Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of theory but does not recognize the disease. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less laudable motive: he assumed that having a sensation is itself a determining of something, or that something is "revealed" in the sensation. >Sense data theory. It seemed to follow that we can't really observe things and therefore can't find out by observation those things that we know very well about goalposts. I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: The truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is also meaningless. >Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mentalism. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it is false to see sensation as something to explore (Vs "sense objects"). "Indirect monitoring": sensation is not describable without reference to objects. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Qualities | Hume | I 97 Qualities/HumeVsLocke: VsDistinction primary/secondary qualities: perception does not allow the distinction (HumeVsSubstance). >Substance. I 105 The negation of the >principle of sufficient reason corresponds to the negation of the >primary qualities. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Locke, J. | Hume Vs Locke, J. | I 97 Mind/Hume: the mind is delirious! It is demented! Closed systems, synthesis and cosmologies are only imaginarily possible. I 98 Here, principles are not exceeded subsequently, but in principle! Ancient philosophy: would have made use of the 'substance' to secure long-term survival, HumeVsSubstance. Modern philosophy: has its own phantoms: it distinguishes primary and secondary qualities, which is no less crazy (HumeVsLocke). I 105 HumeVsLocke: perception allows us no distinctions between primary and secondary qualities. ((s) because perceptions are individual.) --- Quine I 235 'Nothing' and 'nobody' is an indefinite singular term whose ambiguity has caused a lot of confusion. HumeVsLocke: supposedly, Locke succumbed to the same confusion ('nobody overtook me'). Locke: if a process had no cause, then it would have nothing as its cause, and nothing could not be a cause. Quine: this is 'quite humorless' (also Heidegger, PlatonVsParmenides) of the indeterminate singular term. 'Nothing' has the unfortunate tendency to pose as a determinate singular term. Cause: parallelism to 'everyone', which already reminds us of the indeterminacy by sheer manifold, this reminder is absent in 'no'. --- Stegmüller IV 347 Religion/belief/theology/HumeVsLocke: (Hume, Treatise, 10th Sect.): the Christian religion cannot be believed by any rational person without seeing in this belief itself a miracle (Mackie pro). --- Vollmer I 20 Hume: (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748) (Vollmer: much more astute than Locke). HumeVsLocke: these are innate ideas. In particular, the reasoning from experience, the inferring from the past to the future, is based on a habit that cannot be equated with rational deduction. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Substance | Kant Vs Substance | Danto I 254 Substance/Danto: ... each of these teachings is completely useless if you give up the substance itself. The idea that any underlying I-do-not-know-what holds the world together, that keeps things from flying apart into fragments. But it’s almost breathtaking to observe how little happened when you gave up the substance. KantVsSubstance/Danto: Proposed to no longer understand the substance as an objective necessity but as an inner necessity of thinking. NietzscheVsSubstance/Danto: Substance is only fiction. The question of what characterizes the spirit was still absolutely not explained by the substance. A question that only then could follow, which would also exclude the function of the mind, that a mental state of affair can be physical. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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