Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Substantivalism | Field | I 13 Def substantivalism/Field: asserts that literal speech about space can be taken at face value, even without physical objects. Then it is also useful to say that the space is empty. >Space, >Empty Space, >Relationism. I 14 FieldVsSubstantivalism: is forced to answer a relationist in his own terms. I 47 Substantivalism/Field: (the thesis that there are empty spacetime regions). Space time regions are known as causally active: e.g. field theories such as classical electromagnetism or the general relativity theory or quantum field theory. Resnik: we should not ask "What properties of the spacetime points ..?" but "What is the structure of space-time?" FieldVsResnik: that's wrong. The theory of the electromagnetic field is also that of the properties of the parts of the space time that are not occupied by objects. I 171 Definition Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. - Definition Relationism: Thesis: there is no empty space. Part-of-relation: exists in both. >Part-of-relation. I 181 Substantivalism/Field: favors the field theory. >Field theory. I 184 Substantivalism/Newton pro: E.g. bucket experiment: shows that we need the concept of absolute acceleration and the one of the equality of place over time - (space that exists through time). --- III 34f Field pro substantivalism: there is empty space time. - Spacetimepoints are entities in their own right. - Field: that is compatible with the nominalism. - VsRelationism: this cannot accept Hilbert's axioms. VsRelationism: cannot accept physical fields. - Platonism: assumes at fields spacetime points with properties. - VsRelationism: this one cannot do it. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field, H. | Resnik Vs Field, H. | Field I 47 Field: Raumzeit-Regionen sind bekannt als kausal aktiv: Bsp Feldtheorien wie der klassische Elektromagnetismus oder AR oder Quantenfeldtheorie. Eigenschaften/Struktur/ResnikVsField: (1985): die Frage des Physikers war nie "welche Eigenschaften der RZ Punkte sind verantwortlich für dieses Phänomen?" sondern eher: "was ist die Struktur der Raumzeit?". FieldVsResnik: das ist falsch: die Theorie des elektromagnetischen Felds ist genau die Theorie der Eigenschaft auch der Teile der Raumzeit, die nicht von physikalischen Objekten besetzt sind. ((s) Frage: ist Field nun pro oder VsSubstantivalismus?). VsField: man könnte das nun (Field: rein verbal) umdrehen und sagen, daß Felder dann eben eher Entitäten als Moden seien. FieldVs: aber das bringt nichts: was ich mit Raumzeit Region meine, ist dann genau das, was der andere mit "Teil eines Felds" meint. 3. VsField: einige haben eingewendet, daß meine Annahme von Punkten als Regionen der Größe Null falsch sei, selbst wenn man eine anti platonistische Perspektive einnimmt. Denn Regionen sind einfach Mengen von Punkten. |
Resn I M. D. Resnik Mathematics As a Science of Patterns Oxford 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Field Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g. (DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history. (DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
| Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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