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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nudging | Sunstein | Morozov I 198 Nudging/Behavior/Regulation/Sunstein/Morozov: What Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler call "Nudges" are clever manipulations of standard settings - what the authors call "Choice Architecture" - to make you eat healthy food or save money for retirement.(1) For manipulation, nudging is what public relations work is for advertising: it makes things run smoothly while making all the background, implicit and invisible, disappear. The most effective nudges give the actors the appearance of independence without offering them a wide choice. Roger BrownswordVsSunstein/BrownswordVsThaler/Morozov: this kind of regulation appeals to our self-interest, but in a democratic society such attitudes should be discussed publicly. For example, it is not unproblematic to assume that the right reason to drive an energy-efficient car is to save money. It could also be that you want to protect the climate. (2) >Democracy, >Society, >Actions, >Behavior, >Autonomy, >Subjects. Morozov I 199 MorozovVsSunstein/MorozovVsThaler/Morozov: Transforming something into a nudge by a mere technocratic commandment requires a social consensus - on both, goals and means - where this consensus may not yet exist. While the nudges are multiplying, divergent views on what needs to be done (and how) could actually vanish, but this should not be understood as an indication that the nudge in question has worked. Its presumed effectiveness is more likely to be the result of a forced consensus than of real deliberations. Morozov: in addition, the only thing that counts as nudge is what actually has the result that the regulator wanted. Brownsword: this makes it more difficult to challenge and change laws and standards if they are woven into (nudging) technology.(2) 1. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 2. Roger Brownsword, “Whither the Law and the Law Books? From Prescription to Possibility,” Journal of Law and Society 39, no. 2 (2012): 296– 308; Brownsword, “Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological Management,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 26 (2011): 1321– 1366; and Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Nudging | Thaler | Morozov I 198 Nudging/Behavior/Regulation/Thaler/Morozov: What Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler call "Nudges" are clever manipulations of standard settings - what the authors call "Choice Architecture" - to make you eat healthy food or save money for retirement. (1) For manipulation, nudging is what public relations work is for advertising: it makes things run smoothly while making all the background, implicit and invisible, disappear. The most effective nudges give the actors the appearance of independence without offering them a wide choice. Roger BrownswordVsSunstein/BrownswordVsThaler/Morozov: this kind of regulation appeals to our self-interest, but in a democratic society such attitudes should be discussed publicly. For example, it is not unproblematic to assume that the right reason to drive an energy-efficient car is to save money. It could also be that you want to protect the climate. (2) Morozov I 199 MorozovVsSunstein/MorozovVsThaler/Morozov: Transforming something into a nudge by a mere technocratic commandment requires a social consensus - on both, goals and means - where this consensus may not yet exist. While the nudges are multiplying, divergent views on what needs to be done (and how) could actually vanish, but this should not be understood as an indication that the nudge in question has worked. Its presumed effectiveness is more likely to be the result of a forced consensus than the result of real consultation. Morozov: in addition, the only thing that counts as nudge is what actually has the result that the regulator wanted. Brownsword: this makes it more difficult to challenge and change laws and standards if they are woven into (nudging) technology. (2) Mause I 178f Nudging/Thaler: A nudge must be avoidable - easily and without much effort. It is just a push, not an order. For example: Draping the fruit at eye level in the canteen counts as nudge. Taking junkfood from the offer however not. (3) For example, banning or taxing smoking because it is harmful to health would be a very traditional compulsion, but putting warnings ("smoking kills") or banning tobacco to the farthest corner of the shop would be a nudge. Costs/SchnellenbachVsNudging: the counter-financing of the costs of nudging would hardly be possible other than through the traditional forcing instrument of taxation of completely uninvolved third parties. 1. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 2. Roger Brownsword, “Whither the Law and the Law Books? From Prescription to Possibility,” Journal of Law and Society 39, no. 2 (2012): 296– 308; Brownsword, “Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological Management,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 26 (2011): 1321– 1366; and Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 3. Thaler, Richard H., und Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Wie man kluge Entscheidungen anstößt. Berlin 2009, S. 15. |
EconThaler I Richard Thaler Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics New York 2016 Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Paternalism | Thaler | Mause I 177f Paternalism/Thaler/Sunstein: Thesis: Paternalism is not avoidable in all situations. In many cases, an actor or organization must make a decision that necessarily influences the decision-making options of other individuals. (1) For example, the canteen management influences the choice of food. It is not the case that paternalistic intervention must be associated with coercion. Def Liberal Paternalism/Thaler/Sunstein: a paternalism without coercion, which is also acceptable to liberals. Liberal paternalism is intended to improve the position of those affected, whereby this improvement is measured under the following conditions (or assumptions): 1. unlimited cognitive abilities 2. no weakness of will 3. perfect information. See also Subsidiarity/Thaler. VsPaternalism: liberal paternalism differs from traditional paternalism: 1) it does not limit the freedom of choice between existing options; 2) It is based on the preferences of the individual and not on those of an external regulator. See Nudging/Thaler. (s)VsPaternalism: Problem: where is the line to be drawn between paternalism and liberal paternalism in the case of opting-in and opting-out? E.g. Organ donation: a) The acceptance of tacit consent or the demand for an explicit objection to organ donation - b) The demand for an explicit declaration of consent. Mause I 179 SchnellenbachVsThaler/SchnellenbachVsSunstein/SchnellenbachVsPaternalism: 1) it is not about reducing alternatives, because even in traditional paternalism the number of alternatives is not reduced. Only the opportunity costs of the alternatives will be different. 2) Liberal paternalism can only assume what the preferences of a conditional individual will be. See Hayek "pretense of Knowledge", See Paternalism/Hayek. 1. Thaler, Richard H., und Cass R. Sunstein. 2003. Libertarian paternalism. American Economic Review 93, (2), 2003, S. 175– 179. 2. Jan Schnellenbach, Wohlwollendes Anschubsen: Was ist mit liberalem Paternalismus zu erreichen und was sind seine Nebenwirkungen? Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 12 (4) 2011, S.445-459. |
EconThaler I Richard Thaler Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics New York 2016 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Preferences | Thaler | Mause I 178 Preferences/Thaler/Sunstein: Thaler and Sunstein's thesis of liberal paternalism: it does not limit the freedom of choice between existing options. (1) >Paternalism. SchnellenbachVsThaler/VsSunstein/VsPaternalism: Problem: preferences, especially long-term preferences, are difficult to identify. They may only be "expressive" ((s) non-linguistically expressed) or the result of little informed consideration. Ultimately, liberal paternalism is based on the same fictitious average individual as traditional paternalism. Another problem: people without self-management problems are prevented from freely forming their preferences. (2) 1. Thaler, Richard H., und Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Wie man kluge Entscheidungen anstößt. Berlin 2009 2. Jan Schnellenbach, Wohlwollendes Anschubsen: Was ist mit liberalem Paternalismus zu erreichen und was sind seine Nebenwirkungen? Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 12 (4) 2011, S.445-459. |
EconThaler I Richard Thaler Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics New York 2016 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Social Norms | Sunstein | Parisi I 471 Social norms/Sunstein: Sunstein (1996)(1) considers convergence to one stable norm as a “bandwagon” or “cascade” effect. People hide their true preferences for fear of getting a social sanction if their belief is different from the social norm. >Preferences, >Norms, >Coordination, >Social behavior, >Society. CarbonaraVsSunstein: Carbonara et al. (2008)(2) consider instead a theory encompassing more possible outcomes, and explaining a wider variety of possible reactions to legal innovation. Instead of converging to a single social norm, another possibility is that different groups of people converge to different social norms. Here there are different stable equilibriums, and individuals in one group proceed towards one of them, while individuals in another group proceed towards another one. Individuals cluster around different beliefs and multiple social norms coexist in the community, one for each cluster. At the limit, society may end up very polarized, with people clustering around opposite social norms. >Group behavior. 1. Sunstein, Cass R. (1996). “On the Expressive Function of Law.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144: 2021–2053. 2. Carbonara, E., F. Parisi, and G. von Wangenheim (2008). “Legal Innovation and the Compliance Paradox.” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 9: 837–860. Emanuela Carbonara. “Law and Social Norms”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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