Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synonymy | Carnap | Quine XII 36 Def Equality of properties/Carnap: (Meaning and Necessity)(1): two propositions ascribe the same property if they not only have the same truth value for each choice of x, but if this is necessarily and analytically the case by virtue of equality of meaning (synonymy). >Attribution, >Truth value. QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsSynonymy: Problem: it is already difficult to be sure in a foreign language (or in the language of the child) what an object should be there. Also: Synonymy/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of synonymy is unclear at all. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Synonymy | Cresswell | II 59 Synonymy/Reality/World/Language/Cresswell: the knowledge of some synonyms does not tell us anything about the relation between language and the world - and it is about that when we study meaning. >Language, >World, >World/thinking, >Reality, >Foundation, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence. Equality of meaning is not suitable for definition. >Meaning. II 106 Synonymy/Cresswell: is language-relative - therefore, we cannot say for the attribution of propostional attitudes: "He expressed a sentence that is synonymous with ...". >Language dependence. II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: is attractive for people who do not want any language-independent meanings - But that would not be a real semantic relation. No one has hitherto attempted a recursive specification of a synonymy relation. Synonymy: is always relative to a particular language - ((s) That means you cannot assume any more propositions.) >Propositions. QuineVsSynonymy: you cannot create identity criteria for language. >Synonymy/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Quine Vs Descartes, R. | I 56 The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method. Stroud I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects. Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts. Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) science is true and gives us knowledge or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 183 Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions. Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology. I 184 The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense. I 223 Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience. Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli). StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory! Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two? Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope. Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information. Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain, I 224 how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically. Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal. StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that. "Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem. Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness. Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection. QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science. I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies. Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms. Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge. I 230 Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense. Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously. Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that. StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here. I 231 Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow. I 233 Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630! I 234 Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input. I 240 Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief. I 245 Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Synonymy | Davidson Vs Synonymy | Cresswell II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: Problem: it involves a relativation on languages. That’s the reason for DavidsonVsSynonymy: (Davidson 1969, 161-167). QuineVsSynonymy: (1960): it is impossible to establish identity criteria for languages. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Synonymy | Quine Vs Synonymy | II 65 Stimulus situations in which I would use the word would constitute the meaning the word has for me now. The range of the relevant sentences and stimulus situations, however, is frighteningly comprehensive and disorderly. Synonymy: The behavioral theory of meaning does not mind. What it claims to clarify is synonymy itself. It says: synonymy is nothing other than the equality of use. QuineVsSynonymy: The method is convenient, but limited. It only explains a small minority of the entries in a dictionary. Lexicon: The lexicographer will often rely on a so-called "sense distinction": he will name several partial synonyms, some of which fit into partial contexts, others in others. The contexts then must be distinguished with reference to the subject matter. Use can be also determined by other methods: by paraphrase, if all words are known in a sentence except for one, a sentence must be found in which all the words are known, and which corresponds to the first sentence. II 66 More important is therefore the relationship of the semantic equivalence of whole sentences. And when are two considered equivalent? Common Answer: when their use is the same! Or, if the stimulus situations are the same. However, apparently it does not work like that! The two sentences cannot be expressed at the same time. The utterance of one must exclude that of the other! Furthermore, at every opportunity where one of the two possible sentences was expressed there must be an ever so trivial reason for the utterance of one instead of the other! We are obviously asking too much when we demand that the stimuli in question should all be identical. In any case, a criterion would be illusory in practice if it demanded that the stimulus conditions are indeed compared. Because all in all, expressions are practically unpredictable. The motives for the utterance of a sentence may vary inscrutably: comfort, instruct, bridge silence, deceive, impress... Def cognitive: without regard to the circumstances III 257 Meaning/Reference/Quine: most words have a meaning without designating anything: e.g. "and", "sake", etc. Meaning: of words: must not be confused with the designated thing ((s) other authors: in case of names: meaning = carrier). E.g. Gaurisankar/Mt. Everest/Quine: the discovery that both are the same took place in the world, not in the minds. The object is the same, but that does not mean that Gaurisankar and Everest are synonyms. (QuineVsSynonymy Quine pro Putnam: meaning not in the mind, e.g. Evening Star/Morning Star: natural science, not investigation of meaning). Meaning/Quine: unsolved problem of semantics. Perhaps the meaning of a word is best summarized as the associated idea, but in a still unexplained sense of "idea". Upper as a system of implicit rules ((s) >use theory), Quine: but then we still need criteria for rules. III 258 In any case, meanings are not entities. |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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