Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Nozick Vs Kant | II 12 Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible. How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible. One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant). II 110 Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution: II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! II 318 Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance). What are actions to be connected to? Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best"). Then we need to know the relevant facts as well. II 319 Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions: (1) Action A is correct (2) S does A on purpose (intentionally) (III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally. (IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A. Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar: "Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger. Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others". then: correctness: (3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A (4) if A were mandatory, S would do A. "the best": (1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum) (2) S does A intentionally (3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A (4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A. II 320 So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present. Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway. NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4). In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different. E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods). Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness. Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions: A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4). II 352 Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result. How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation? II 353 Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused. 2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason 3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source, II 354 but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature. Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature? Could external sources not be as binding for us? Why should I want to be moral? Do I have to wish to be happy? Why should I want to be rational? "Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature". Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult. "Your nature, that is you." If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah? "But you have no choice, you had to be what you are." So, that is what you offer me as freedom. Objective morality seems to be something inevitable. Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows: "Do this if you wish to be rational" "Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command). Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us. II 355 Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature. Nozick: but does that not bind us, too? Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives? NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear. Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?" Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good. Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part! Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.). |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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