Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 41 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Field | I 229 Anti-Realism/Field: many forms (which have nothing to do with our purpose) are reductionist: (E.g. reduction of the external world to human experience) or quasi-reductionist (e.g. theories that match in statements about human experiences must be cognitively equivalent, i.e. have the same understanding of "true"). >Truth definition. I 249 Truth Definition/Anti-RealismVsTarski/Anti-RealismVsKripke - Anti-RealismVsModel Theory: VsOntology of sets (Anti-Platonism dito). - ((s) Model-theoretic statements for the anti-realism are trivially true, because they have no references.) >Reference, >Models, >Model theory, >Antirealism/Dummett, >Platonism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Clauses | Searle | V 120 Clause/subordinate sentence/SearleVsFrege/SearleVsTarski/Tarski: subordinate clauses are not names of sentences. Words in quotation marks are not names of words. Otherwise there is "regress". >Names of sentences, >Regress, >Clause/Frege, >Clause/Schiffer. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Convention T | Davidson | Glüer II 37 Convention T/Davidson: says that a theory must be translating (translational). ((s) Problem: sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" are equivalent.) >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 38 Convention T allows only extensional language. >Extensionality. II 22 Def " Convention T " /Tarski/Glüer: "A definition of "true" formulated in the metalanguage is factually correct if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema follow from it. S is true, just when p is obtained by inserting a name of any sentence in the object language for the symbol "S" and the translation of this sentence into the meta language for the symbol "p". The convention T tests whether a definition of truth for a language L correctly determines the extension of the predicate "true in L". Neither the convention T nor the "T-equivalences" may be confused with the definition of truth itself. >Truth definition. II 28 Def T-equivalence/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer : simply true exactly when the linked propositions have the same truth value under all circumstances. The right side does not have to be a translation of the left side. If, on the other hand, a translation would be required, then 1. the circumstances under which the W-equivalences are true are not arbitrary, and 2. the searched meaning would already be presupposed. Def Convention T*/new/Davidson/Glüer: A T-theory formulated in the meta language for an object language L is appropriate if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema (T) S is true gdw. p is obtained by using for the symbol "S" a designation of any proposition of the object language and for the symbol "p" a proposition of the meta language, which is true exactly when S is it. Glüer: here are equivalences, which are not required to translate the sentence on the right the sentence on the left, true iff. II 29 the linked sentences have the same truth value under all circumstances. DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Whoever wants to apply Davidson's reinterpreted convention T* must therefore know when T equivalences are true. TarskiVsDavidson: with Tarski, you need to know the meaning of both object and meta-language sentences. ((s) To be able to judge whether there is a correct translation). T-predicate/Davidson/Glüer: for Davidson, on the other hand, the T predicate must be interpreted. Davidson/Glüer: thus presupposes a prior understanding of the concept of truth. Truth/Interpretation/Translation/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: a G-theory that fulfils the (new) convention G* can be read as an interpretation theory: it implies for each proposition S of the object language L a T-equivalence derived from its structure, the right side of which indicates the truth conditions under which S is true. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Convention T | Putnam | I (b) 66 Truth/PutnamVsTarski: Tarski's convention T does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the concepts of the "designation" of a sentence and of "following from something". These are (too?) closely related to truth and reference. >Truth definition. PutnamVsSellars: his analysis of the designation is not helpful: "wheel" plays the role of "Rad" (German for "wheel") in English. This is not a description of the role, but the name of the role! --- II 89f Def Convention T/Tarski/Putnam: the requirement that all sentences from the language S are equivalent with the corresponding sentence of the metalanguage (MS). >Meta language, >Object language. Putnam: this only determines the extension of "true" when the connectives are interpreted classically and not intuitionistically. Intuitionistically it would be about "provable". Tarski: "electron refers" is equivalent to "there are electrons". Intuitionistically: there is a description D, so that "D is an electron" is provable in B1. That could be true with the appropriate theory, even if there are no electrons. Intuitionism: here, existence is intra-theoretical. >Intuitionism, >Tarski. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Conventions | Davidson | I 113 Language/Convention/Davidson: conventions and rules do not explain the language. - The language explains the conventions. Glüer II 50 Language/Davidson: two radical consequences: 1. understanding: for understanding it is basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks. (DavidsonVsTarski). >Understanding. II 51 Each language is accessible through causal relations. 2. It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a question of social practice. DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language must be abandoned in the radical interpretation! >Radical Interpretation. II 52 Even the idiolect of a nonconformist, freed from all conventions, can in principle be interpreted as long as we can find access to it via causal hypotheses. Conformism facilitates interpretation, but is not a condition of the possibility of understanding. Malapropisms are misused or mispronounced foreign words or technical terms. II 150 Communication/Davidson: is unconventional. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Deflationism | Rorty | VI 32 Def Deflationism: the view, Tarski’s work encompasses all the essential features of truth. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. VI 39 WrightVsDeflationism/Rorty: (like Davidson, but for different reasons) Wright not even mentioned the duty to achieve the truth. That leads to renewed inflation - because one standard need not be met with the other. >Crispin Wright. VI 40 WrightVsTarski: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. >Norms, >Truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Denotation | Field | II 6 Primitive denotation/Field: a theory T1, based on primitive denotation, has compositionality - i.e. that the truth values of the sentences depend on the truth values of the non-logical parts. Primitive Denotation: Problem: E.g. - "He takes drugs": here only one token has a meaning, but not the type. ((s) Primitive denotation/(s): without descriptions) >Descriptions. II 6f T1/Field: with primitive denotation; each name denotes what it denotes, a predicate denotes what it applies to, etc. - No composite expression has a primitive denotation.Compositionality. Def truth/primitive denotation: when a speaker says something true - hence we have tokens on certain occasions, not types of expressions. Expressions like "John", "I", "You" are always only tokens. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Advantage: diachronic theory of language. II 8 T1 uses semantic terms: "satisfy", "denote", "apply" (unlike Tarski). VsT1: "John", "I" or "You" - problems with expressions like T2: without semantic expressions (E.g. satisfy, denotate, apply). >Satisfaction, >true-of, >Tarski-scheme, >Truth/Tarski. II, 18f Denotation/T-Theory/Language/Field: for different languages at the same time: one could define "denote": E.g. E (English) to say the name N denotes an object a is the same as to demand that either a is France and N is "France" or "a" is Germany and "N" is "Germany" ... then for another language, e.g. German: corresponding "... a is France and N is "France"...". II 21 Problem: So one could define magic physically acceptable by simply setting up a list of pairs of magic/object. Names/Denotation/FieldVsTarski: Tarski's definition boils down to mere lists - and also lists for applying predicates and for satisfaction. >Lists, >Possible world semantics/Field, >Properties/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Idiolect | Davidson | Glüer II 51 DavidsonVsTarski: the actually spoken language is ultimately irrelevant. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect is principally interpretable (via causal hypotheses). Frank I 626 Truth/language/Davidson: because of the sincerity condition, truth is relativized on language of the speaker, otherwise the behavior provides no evidence. >Sincerity condition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Indexicality | Logic Texts | Sainsbury V 189 Indexicality/BurgeVsTarski: (1979) Burge uses the term in a narrower sense than Tarski's: in a way that it only relates to circumstances - there are then different levels of truth and which is the relevant level, is not determined by the meaning of the sentence, but by the statement which is made during an occasion. Sainsbury: this avoids many difficulties associated with Tarski's hierarchy. Vs: it is hard to justify that "true" would be indexical. ((s) Cf. The fixed-point theory of truth by Saul Kripke(2). >Fixed points/Logic Texts. 1. Tyler Burge: (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. 2. Saul Kripke (1975). Outline of a theory of truth. In: R.L.Martin (Ed.) Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox Clarendon Oxf/NY 1984. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Individual Constants | Bigelow | I 101 Names/Individual Constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time. >Ontology, >A. Tarski, >Reference, >Identification, >Individuation. We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia. >Possibilia, >Modalities, >Modal realism, >Possibilism. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Interpretation | Davidson | Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle). Therefore: DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. Glüer II 29/30 Def interpretative/Glüer: a theory is interpretative if all theory equivalences are to be obtained from the schema T are true. Because truth conditions are given in the recursion to the structure of the sentences. Meaning holism: a sentence only has meaning in the context of the language. >Meaning holism. Thus the problem is "Snow is white iff grass is green is excluded, because such a theory could not imply at the same time a true T-equivalence for the sentences "This is white" or "That is snow". >Meaning Holism. Glüer II 117/8 Interpretation/action/explanation/Davidson/Glüer: an action is only interpretable if it can be described as part of a rational structure - this also applies to speech action - therefore, actions are linked to propositional attitudes - each action is an interpreted action. N.B.: therefore it is no empirical question whether an acting person is rational. - ((s) Because it is presupposed). An event that cannot be described in the language of the propositional attitudes is not an action - (because it is not interpretable). Frank I 645 Mental states/proposition/self-attribution/external-ascription/Davidson: we have to start from sentences or utterances instead of propositions or meanings - otherwise, different types of sources are suggested. Instead: relationships between actors and utterances. There is no different knowledge and no different criteria. Solution : If someone knows that I think of a sentence as correct, he knows what I believe - it would be circular to explain the basic asymmetry by an asymmetry of certainty. >Interpretation. I 648 Interpretation/mental states/external-ascription/Davidson: also the speaker can problematize his sentences. - He can also be wrong about the meaning of his words. - He also needs the Tarski-theory. Asymmetry: the listener/interpreter cannot be sure that the Tarski-theory is the best method for external attribution. The best thing the speaker can do is to be interpretable. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Graeser I 167 Interpretation/Davidson: utterances are verifiable, without the individual propositional attitudes of the speakers being known. Radical interpretation: equality of meaning cannot be assumed, otherwise there is circularity. >Truth conditions/Davidson. Davidson V 139 Truth/Interpretation/Davidson: the contrast between truth and falsity can only occur in the context of interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Intersubjectivity | Davidson | Glüer II 122/123 Truth/intersubjectivity/Davidson/Glüer: intersubjective understanding of truth: this is third way between correspondence theory and coherence theory. Successful linguistic communication is always about recognizing exactly those entities from one's own language that the speaker recognizes from his or her own. > Common world ("shared world") >triangulation. Communication/DavidsonVsTarski: it is only by understanding truth that can we give the objects a place in the public world. Cf. >correspondence theory, >coherence theory. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Meaning | Davidson | I (c) 64 Meaning/Davidson: Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: Senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingently. (VsScepticism) >Causal theory of reference, >Skepticism. I (c) 47 Def Meaning (interpretation): The meaning of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language. This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning theory. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial nature of meaning: Idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam/Kripke: causal theory: correct link between word and object. DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences. >Use theory, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation. Rorty VI 419 DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: Davidson rejects the notion of "stimulus meaning": this would be like Newton’s attempt to climb to the "Newton of the mind". Instead: distal theory of meaning. There is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology. >Proximal theory. Davidson I 95 Causal theory of meaning: Meaning does not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsSkepticism). I 99 DavidsonVsPutnam: that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds, but due to broad social character of language. >Natural kinds, >Communication. Glüer II 50 Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: The interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - (multiple languages = truth - theories) possible - Def Meaning/Davidson: then consists in being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language. Glüer II 51 Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities (pro Davidson : Meaning is not fixed ultimately) - consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language becomes ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned. Frank I 672 Sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not only external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings are not in the head, but rather simple propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Meaning | Putnam | I (a) 16 Meaning/Putnam: meaning is not in the head. Proof: the linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others). PutnamVsTarski: understanding of the reference must be added. This must be independent of recognition (realistic position). >Reference/Putnam. I (g) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning. Otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered. Positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. >Theory, >Additional assumptions, >Prediction. I (e) 141ff Meaning/Putnam: meaning results from the deletion of quotes. >Disquotation. I (k) 258 Term Transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper". >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Meaning Theory | Putnam | I (e) 145f Meaning Theory/Putnam: Def non-semantic/Putnam: the descriptive words of the object language and logical vocabulary are non-semantic. >Object language, >Logical constants, >Junctions, >Semantics. Quotation/Tarski: these non-semantic words can be used to explain the meaning of "true". (Along with a set theory that is stronger than that of the object language). Putnam: any meaning theory, i.e. every finite description is implicitly a truth theory for a language. I (e) 146 Theory of Meaning/meaning theory/DavidsonVsTarski: you should proceed vice versa: instead of taking the object language as understood and wanting to explain "true", one should take the object language as what is to be explained and "true" as what is already understood. Thus, every definition of truth in the Tarskian sense can be regarded as a theory of meaning for this language. The reversal goes even further: Every theory of meaning for a language, i.e. every finite description is implicitly a definition of truth for language. >Truth theory. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Modalities | Bigelow | I 101 Modality/Necessity/Possibility/Modal/Montague/Bigelow/Pargetter: Montague is extreme by Thesis: attributing modal operators (MO) to referents. >R. Montague, >Operators, >Modal operators, >Reference, >Objects, >Facts, >Platonism. Bigelow/Pargetter: instead, we can assume functions. >Functions. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: our strategy will be an intermediate position: we only assign referents to names and open sentences. (Not to the modal operators "possible" and "necessary"). >Modalities, >Possibility, >Necessity. Name/individual constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time. >A. Tarski. We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia. Camps: Possibilia: Bigelow per Possibilia. Against: QuineVsPossibilia, TarskiVsPossibilia. >Possibilia, >Possibilism. Possibilia/Bigelow/Pargetter: Things that are not located anywhere but could have been. They are not universals at first! In the end, however, we will argue that they are universals after all. >Universals. Def predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: at the end we will say that predicates refer to sets constructed from universals and possibilia. Modality/Modal Operator/Bigelow/Pargetter: for "possible", "necessary", "likely" we do not introduce referents, but rules. >Predicates, >Rules. I 290 Necessity/Modality/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: although we do not define causes with necessary and sufficient conditions, there are connections between causes and necessity. In one sense, the effect is more than just a coincidental consequence. There are two ways that leads causation to modalities. 1. This comes from two terms of "cause", we call them "fat" and "thin" in analogy to Armstrong's "thick" and "thin" single particulars. (Armstrong 1978)(1) >D. Armstrong. a) Def thin cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply the complex of particulars, properties and relations that are causally related to the effect. b) Def thick cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: additionally the external properties, including all force relations. Modality/Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: comes into play, because there is certainly a necessary connection between thick causes and their effects. This is because a relation cannot exist if its Relata does not exist. >Cause, >Effect, >Causality, >Causal relationship. Forces/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this means that forces must be active. >Forces. I 291 Cause/effect/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this trivial statement explains why causes are necessary for their effects. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also consider it the rest of all causal interaction when everything else is eliminated. Conversely, if we are the only ones to remove the effect from the interaction, the effect must follow. 2. Necessity/Modality/Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the second way in which causation leads to modality has more to do with thin causes: We have seen that thin causes are not always sufficient and necessary conditions for an effect. >Sufficiency. Sometimes, however, thin causes are quite sufficient and necessary for the effect. Modality: comes into play when we modify Lewis' analysis to say that the next possible worlds are where the cause has this or that effect. This is true for most of the causes, and so we also have counterfactual conditionals again. Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the proximity of possible worlds is determined by the individuals, properties and relations (1st and higher level) they have in common. >Counterfactual conditional. Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the greater weight should have properties and relations of a higher level. That is, the next world will generally be the one that has most relations in common. If we then have the thick cause, the effect must also set in (necessity). >Similarity metrics, >Possible worlds, >Levels/order. I 292 Effect/Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the effect will occur in the majority of the next possible worlds. I 383 Modality/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the hardness of the mathematical "must" is something that has to be foreseen. Science: reveals necessities in nature. But these are only relative, conditional necessities. Natural necessity/natN/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always only relative, a conditional necessity. >Nature. Absolute necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: only arises from mathematics. >Absoluteness. I 384 Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: imposes restrictions. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: Science also shows us possibilities that we would never have seen without it. Mathematics again plays a key role here. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: derives from mathematics, which cannot be separated from science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter. Problem: must also be realism in relation to mathematical objects, and thus it becomes platonism. >Platonism, >G. Frege. Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: as a scientific realist, you can also be a nominalist. However, he must then either reject parts of the mathematics or take a strongly instrumentalistic view. >Nominalism, >Instrumentalism. I 385 Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: was driven away from nominalism by his scientific realism. Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: much of his modal realism was formulated within a nominalist framework. His later preference for universals does not alter the fact that his central theories are based on individuals and sets. >W.V.O. Quine. Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only committed to antirealist consequences if he nourishes "worldly" presuppositions. >Antirealism, >Presuppositions. Scientific Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be a scientific Platonist at the same time. That means he needs mathematical entities and universals Bigelow/Pargetter pro. >Mathematical entities. Combinatorial theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: the world contains a collection of particulars and universals. This also gives us modalities. In this way, we obtain a world book that corresponds to a complex property that either instantiates the world or not. I 386 We call these possible worlds. 1. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Paradoxes | Prior | Cresswell II 110 Paradox/liar/Cretans/Prior/Cresswell: thesis: the Cretan must, so that he can have expressed anything , have said more than one sentence. ((s) Otherwise the sentence refutes itself and thus logically expresses nothing). Cresswell II 180ff Paradox/Cohen/Prior/Cresswell: (Cohen 1957, p. 225)(1), (Prior 1962)(2). Cohen: E.g. When the policeman testifies that everything that the prisoner says is wrong, and the prisoner explains that something that the policeman testified is true, then something that the police officer testified is wrong and something that the prisoner explains, true. Notation: d1: "the policeman testified that:" d2:" the prisoner explains". Logical form: (d1 p(d2p> ~ p) u d2Ep(d1 p up))> (Ep (d1P u ~ p) u Ep (d2p up)) Liar/Prior: d: "was told by a Cretan": dp (dp> ~ p)> (Ep (dp up) and Ep (dp u ~ p)) (ii) dp (dp> ~ p)> Ep Eq(p unequal q) u dp u dq). (ii) states that the Cretans must have said at least two things. --- Prior I 81 Prior/(s): tautology p > pq. Prior reads it like this: p E.g. Say, q: adverb. E.g. CpAKpqKpNq: if it is the case that p, then either it is the case that p-and-q or it is the case that p-but-not-q. Moore's paradox: the same device can be used for it, I believe that it is raining, but of course it does not rain. Philosophers have found it remarkably difficult to explain what is wrong with it - but that happens all the time. Prior I 2 Moore's Paradox/Prior: we only need normal truth and error (error or dishonesty as the only options). >Truth, >Truthfulness, >Error. Prior I 85 Preface paradox/Prior: thesis that something is in the book, is not the case, can only be claimed outside of the book. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Variant: book with only one sentence: something in this book is wrong: sequence of theorems: 1. then something is wrong 2. the say that something is wrong in the book is true 3. which in turn is true 4. then something is wrong in the book and something is true. ((s) But only a statement). Prior: But then at least two different things are said in the book - by contraposition: if nothing is wrong in the book, except that it is said that something is wrong in the book, then this is not said in the book. Prior I 88 Preface paradox/Prior: in the book there is something wrong just cannot be the only assertion - but self-reference is not the problem. >Self-reference. Prior I 96f Preface Paradox/Prior: Parallel/Cohen E.g. If John has a brown cow which is then and only then pregnant if any animal of John is not pregnant, then any animal of John is not pregnant - Proof: e.g. hypothesi : when an animal of John is not pregnant, the cow is pregnant so if the cow is not pregnant, the other animal is pregnant - and therefore (because the cow is only pregnant, when another animal is not, then an animal of John is not pregnant. - He must have at least two animals - Prior: oddly enough, not essential that the pregnant animal must be a brown cow, just so: for x, x means that the sky is blue and x is true, iff grass is green. Both elements are quite irrelevant for each other - Even for the preface paradox. Prior I 98 Preface paradox/PriorVsTarski: my concept of truth here non-Tarski: truth is not property of sentences, but of propositions. - That means, Quasi properties of quasi-objects. - Rather adverbs than adjectives. - E.g. truthfully and incorrectly. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Truth/Tarski, >Truth Definition/Tarski. 1. L.J. Cohen (1957). The Diversity of Meaning. London, 1962. 2. Arthur Prior (1960). On a family of paradoxes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2 (1):16-32 |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Paradoxes | Putnam | I (i) 232f Paradoxes/truth/PutnamVsTarski: the paradox of his theory is that you have to stand outside the whole hierarchy to say that the hierarchy exists. Charles Parsons: thesis: statements about truth values are made in a higher language - a speech act 'sui generis'. Cf. >Liar Paradox. I (i) 234 PutnamVsParsons, Charles: a speech act is not more 'sui generis' than a sentence in red ink. This is a merely formalistic trick to say, they could then not contain paradoxes. The problem is only shifted: the language in which we express that sentences in red ink ... Solution/Putnam: some forms of discourse can be understood without a prerequisite concept of truth. Rorty: proposes this for all discourses. Some: these things could not be "said, but shown". PutnamVs: the notion that there was a discursive thought that could not be said is incomprehensible. Gödel: takes set-theoretic paradoxes to be solved; semantic paradoxes for not solved. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Picture Theory | Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. --- Hintikka I 67 Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter... I 68 ...then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation. - ((s) The relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter. - This is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus. - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. I 127 Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. I 131 Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 132f ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics. - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. >Correspondence theory. I 134/35 Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. >Truth, >Truth conditions. I 135 Can be described as theory but not expressed. (structural equivalence, isomorphism). I 141 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. I 161 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). >Reflection, >Picture. I 183 Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection, VsWiderspiegelung. I 184 Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) > Phenomenology/Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. >Ordinary language. --- III 144 Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it. >World, >Reality, >Thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Satisfaction | Putnam | I (c) 91 Satisfaction/Tarski: satisfaction is the terminus for reference. Putnam: there is a relation between words and things, more precisely, between formulas and finite sequences of things. Tarski: "The sequence of length only existing of x, satisfies the formula "electron (y)" iff x is an electron". The sequence Abraham: Isaac meets the formula "x is the father of y". If there are more binary relations one does not speak of Reference. > Correspondence Theory, -> picture theory. Putnam: Tarski's theory is not suitable for the correspondence theory because satisfaction is explained by a list (instead > meaning postulates: "electron" refers to electrons, etc.). "True" is the zero digit case of fulfillment: a formula is true if it has no free variables and if it meets the zero sequence. I (c) 92 Zero Digit Relation: e.g. Tarski: "true" is the zero digit case of satisfaction: that means, a formula is true if it has no free variables and if the zero sequence is met. Zero Sequence: converges to 0. Example 1, 1/4, 1/9, 1/16, ... I (c) 92 Satisfaction/Putnam: criterion T can be extended to the criterion E: (E) an adequate definition of fulfilled-in-S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1 ... xn) is only fulfilled by the sequence y1. ..yn when P (y1 .... yn). Reformulated: "electron (x)" is then and only then fulfilled by y1 when y1 is an electron. This is determined by truth and reference (not by provability) and is therefore even preserved in intuitionistic interpretation. PutnamVsField: Field's objection fails: for the realists the Tarski schema is correct. FieldVsTarski: this is similar to a "definition" of chemical valence by enumeration of all elements and their valence. The causal involvement in our explanations is lacking. PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms, we still need them for formal logic, even if scientific theories are wrong. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tarski | Davidson | Rorty VI 32 Davidson/Rorty: Tarski's "true in -L" specifies extension and thus no reference to future or general cases. >Extensions, >Disquotation scheme. Rorty VI 123 ff Truth Theory/Davidson/Rorty: Theory of truth for a Language: simple: "a theory that makes it possible to predict with some success what noise a speaker will make in what situation". >Truth theory. Rorty VI 193 Rorty: Fact/Davidson/Rorty: Tarski's great merit is, to have shown that we can do without the concept of facts. >Facts. Glüer II 50f Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-like theories do not refer to meaning as fixed entities. (Davidson pro: meaning ultimately not fixable) - Consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language is ultimately irrelevant. 2. the trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned. >Meaning/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Tarski | Field | I 33f Tarski/Field: According to Tarski the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities like quantities. ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology/Field, >Tarski-scheme. --- II 124 Tarski/Truth: Tarski's truth theory is unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. >Disquotationalism/Field. Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. >Quantifiers. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). >Generalization. DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. >Deflationism. Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) >Compositionality. Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or". >Logical constants. II 125 Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. >Reference, >Denotation. Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: Reference and danotation is not important for it. >Compositionality). II 141 Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. II 142 Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. --- Soames I 477 FieldVsTarski/Soames: Tarski hides speech behavior. Field: Tarski introduces primitive reference, and so on. >language independence. SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms. >Semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Tarski | Soames | I 481 VsTarski/Soames: two kinds of critique: 1st: FieldVsTarski: semantic properties should be dependent on speakers in a way that Tarski's are not. 2nd: Other authors VsTarski: Importance and truth conditions should be contingent, but analytically connected, characteristics of a sentence in a way that it is incompatible with Tarski. SoamesVsVs: both can be rejected. >Truth definition, >Quote/Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory, >Semantic properties, >Semantic facts, >Language dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Circumstances, >Logical constants/Soames. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Tarski | Wright | Rorty I 38ff WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Wright: there are two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. >Truth, >Assertibility. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other. --- Wright I 85 VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable. (Vs Platitude: assertion = putting something forward as true). >Bivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Decidability. WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme). >Deflationism, >Disquotation. There are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps. >Multivalued logic, >Truth value gaps. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | Austin | StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth is no property - Tarski: Truth is a property. >Truth/Strawson, >Truth/Tarski. I 20 Def truth/Austin: statements are true, if they are connected to things, events, etc. of the type of a given situation by descriptive conventions concerning the words (sentences). >Correspondece theory, >Conventions. Austin: per correspondence theory, but with convention. I 230 A state of affairs must be similar to certain other state of affairs, so that a statement can be true. >Facts, >States of affairs. I 237 "True"/Austin: is not logically superfluous as well as "vague". >Redundancy theory. I 240 Truth/Austin: "true" is used when talking about statements, not sentences. (Strawson ditto). >Statements, >Sentences. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Truth | Ayer | I 21 Truth/Circle/Ayer: true statements are determined by relation to facts - facts determined with true statements - Circle: broken by actions and observations - Ayer separates between truth definition and truth criterion. >Criteria, >Circular reasoning, >Truth definition, >Actions, >Observation. I 297 VsCorrespondence Theory: confuses a method for interpreting the symbols with a truth criterion. >Correspondence theory. I 276 Truth/AyerVsTarski: should not be property of sentences but of propositions (statements expressed by sentences) - E.g. time ratio is relevant. >Propositions. I 278 Truth/Tarski/Ayer: analysis of use (use, no criterion of truth). >Use. III 101 Truth/Ayer: adds nothing to a statement. >Redundancy theory. Truth/Falsehood: their function is to replace negation and assertion signs. >Negation. I 102 They themselves are not real concepts. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Davidson | I (c) 56 Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me. The truth predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true". >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and meta-language should contain the predicate "true". >Expressiveness, >Richness, >Truth theory. Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "truth theory". DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) - Convention: truth is not sufficiently empirical. >Convention T. The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world. Glüer II 131 VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism". Rorty VI 51 Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional". A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensional concept. Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. >Interpretation theory. Horwich I 443 Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 189 Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Feyerabend | I 296 Truth/Feyerabend: the word truth hypnotizes people, but otherwise does not do much. II 18 Truth/Tarski/FeyerabendVsTarski/Feyerabend: Tarski's concept of truth assumes a world whose properties are fixed independent of the process of research. But such a world has special properties! It does not exist with Homer. >Truth theory/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Truth | Goodman | I 31 Truth/Goodman: provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and an obedient servant, no severe master. >Reality, >World, >Nature, >Correspondence theory. I 34 The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false). I 147 GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: "'Snow is white' is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white". >Truth definition/Tarski, >Disqotation scheme. I 149 Truth/Goodman: truth is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. I 146 ff GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman: Goodman suggests high acceptability as an accuracy scale. >Acceptability. --- III 242 The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: we should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form. --- IV 208 Accuracy/Goodman: accuracy does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. IV 205 Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement 'snow is white' can sometimes be incorrect. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Truth | Prior | I 21 Truth/belief/Prior: Truth cannot only be applied to propositions, but also to belief: logical form: "(X thinks that) p and p" (bracket). - But determination of truth does not ascribe a property to any proposition (always facts are decisive). >Propositions, >Facts. A fact is possible without a believed proposition. >Beliefs, >Thinking. Problem/Moore: if no one believes that the belief must be false, even if it would be correct if someone believes that! ((s) This is due to non-existence). PriorVs: this is a misconception of belief as a relation to facts. >Relation theory. I 98 Truth/PriorVsTarski: you could also see it as an adverb (quasi-property) instead regarding it as a property: E.g. "when someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully". Cf. >Truth/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski. Prior: with me there is no mention, only use. >Quotation marks, >Quotation/disquotation, >Disquotation scheme, >Mention/use. Prior: the sentencenly >snow is white" is only about snow, not about truth. - There is no metalanguage. >Metalanguage. PriorVsTarski: for me the truth is as much about the things that someone thinks, fears, etc. - Then you can also think that you think something wrong. >Thinking, >Self-reference. I 106 Truth/meaning/Buridan: every sentence means that it is true itself (in addition to what else it means). Prior: we have to admit that a sentence can have several meanings at the same time. >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Ambiguity. Then the sentence is non-paradoxically wrong (contradictorily) if it is to mean that it is wrong. - But there is no "secondary meaning" and "principle B". Cf. >Paradoxes. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Truth | Rorty | II (e) 116f Truth/Rorty: love of truth not as love for something non-human, but as relation to the fellow human beings. Love of truth as affable willingness to talk made the quasi-object as the target of a search (Platonic idea of the natural order or universally valid convictions, Habermas) entirely superfluous. III 100 Truth/Art/ethics/Rorty: with Davidson, I believe that the distinction true/false can also be applied to sentences of the type "Yeats was a great poet" and "democracy is better than tyranny". V 32 Semantic theory of truth/Tarski: Truth leads back to justification. VI 8f Truth: absolute concept: in the following sense: true for me, but not for you... in my culture, but not in yours, true back then, but not today such statements are strange and pointless. It makes more sense: justified for me but not for you. >Truth criterion, >Justification. VI 11 Justification: relative! Justification is a criterion for truth. VI 199 Truth: not a goal of research! A goal is something of which you can know if you are heading towards or coming away from it. >Goals. VI 327 Truth/Rorty: is a property of sentences. Truth/existence/Rorty: Of course it was true in the past that women should not be suppressed, just like the planetary orbits were true! Truth is ahistorical, but this is not so because true statements are made true by ahistorical entities. >Truthmakers. Horwich I 444 Pragmatism/James/Davidson/Rorty: 1) Truth is not used explanatorily. - 2) beliefs are explained by causal relation. - 3) There are no true-makers. - 4) If no true-makers, then no dispute between realism and anti-realism that accepts this true-makers. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of satisfaction or something else. - We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. - So we are rid of the correspondence theory. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Horwich I 456 Truth/Putnam: if they were not a property, the truth conditions would be everything you could know about them. Putnam pro truth as a property. Putnam: Then our thoughts would not be thoughts. >Truth conditions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth | Tugendhat | I 263 Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation. >Timeless sentence. I 267 Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason. - Otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. >Deception. I 285 Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use. >Reference. VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. --- III 190 Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - >Verification, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Tugendhat VsMetalanguage >Metalanguage. Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. III 196 Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. >Judgments. III 208 The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio. >Given, >Correspondence theory. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Truth Definition | Davidson | Glüer II 29 Truth Definition/Tarski-Schema/Contents/Interpreting/Translation/Tarski/Davidson/Glüer: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green. - Such a theory would not be interpretive. The right hand side truth conditions have nothing to do with the truth conditions from the left. Problem: the equivalence is purely formal because the truth value is always the same. >Equivalence. solution: menaing holism: a sentence has only meaning in the context. Solution/Davidson: truth predicate three-digit: for sentence, speaker, point of time. >Meaning holism, >Semantic holism. Glüer II 37f DavidsonVsTarski: should be empirical instead of formal - empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) ("faked theory"). The convention truth is not sufficiently empirical - ((e) because it's only providing equivalences.) Glüer II 65 Truth-equivalences/Davidson/Glüer: equate belief content with belief cause. Glüer II 40/41 E.g. (TR") for all speakers x, for all t: "It is raining" expressed by x to t is true iff it is raining at t in the surrounding of x. - ((s) That specifies the truth conditions). Glüer II 67 Truth/Davidson: intuitive - meaning: non-intuitive - truth: unanalysable basic concept. >Basic concepts. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Truth Definition | Putnam | Soames I 480 Truth Definition/T-Def/truth/PutnamVsTarski: Tarski's definition of truth has nothing to do with understanding or meaning. Otherwise, it would be absurd: e.g. if "Ws" would have meant in L that snow is black, then it would have been the case that the snow would have been white iff. snow would have been black. DummettVsTarski: ditto, otherwise we would have e.g.: if x knows that it is not the case that snow is white iff. snow is black, then x knows that "Ws" in L does not mean that snow is black. Davidson: tries to eliminate the concept of meaning in favor of the truth. Meaning Theory/Soames: meaning theory must not appeal to more semantic concepts. >Truth theory/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Truth/Tarski, >Truth theories, >Tarski, >Meaning theory/Davidson. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Truth Definition | Stalnaker | I 46 Truth/T-Def/Tarski/BenacerrafVsTarski/Reference/causal theory/Stalnaker: a Tarski-style truth definition is not sufficient to assert the fact that we are really talking about truth. Stalnaker ditto. ((s) Problem: homophony does not guarantee any causal connection to abstract or concrete objects). Solution/Stalnaker: the solution here is the connection to practice. >Practise, >Tarski scheme, >Abstractness, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Truth. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Truth Predicate | Davidson | Rorty VI 20 "True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true. >Truthmakers. "True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world". --- Glüer II 27 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. >Expressiveness, >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Truth theory. The truth predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: does not set up a truth definition at all. Instead: Truth Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention truth as a criterion of appropriateness for truth-theories of natural languages. Glüer II 28 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a truth-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth. Glüer II Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The truth-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - Truth-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interpreted/(s): know what a word means. Rorty IV 22 True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence. Cf. >Correspondence theory. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Truth Theory | Davidson | II 34 Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. >Truth values. Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. II 35 FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson ditto). >Meaning theory. II 37 Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that the ability to interpret does not equal translation. >Interpretation, >Disquotation scheme. I (e) 111 Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. l (e) 111 Tarski: proceeds formally, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable). Glüer II 28f Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition Truth-Equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truth value under all circumstances. Glüer II 29 Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention truth (provides only true equivalences) when truth-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and meta-language sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the meta-language must be known - truth-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his truth-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the truth theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a truth-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. Glüer II 45 Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). >Truth conditions. Glüer II 54/55 Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. >Intensions. Glüer II 56 Truth Theory: in principle, only for certain occasions correct - problem: for a theory of competence: there is no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Truth Theory | Field | II 21 Truth-Theory/Truth-Definition/TarskiVsField: semantic concepts are not necessary and not philosophically interesting for a T-theory. >Semantics. FieldVsTarski: Tarski has only lists for denotation: (e)(a) (e is a name which denotes a) ⇔ (e is "c1" and a is c1) or (e is "c2" and a is c2) or ... II 24 Truth-Theory/utterance conditions/Truth/T-theory/Quine: (Quine, 1953b(1), p. 138) the conditions of expression are all that is needed to make the concept "true" clear. - (Field dito). E.g. Alabama-Example: a friend says that in the southern state of Alabama is snow which is a foot high. - Therefore, utterance conditions are important. Question: why do we need causal theories of the reference beyond the Truth-schema? - That does not work anyway, since we are on Neurath's ship. ((s). That is, meanings change in the course of language development). >Language evolution, >Meaning change, >Meaning. Still: Solution/Field: psychological models about the (inner) connection to reality. - (Do not attach a theory from the outside). - This psychological connection is still physical. 1. W.V.O. Quine 1953. "Notes on the theory of reference". In: From al Logical Point of View. New York: Harper. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Theory | Peacocke | II 162ff Truth theory/PeacockeVsDavidson/VsTarski: actually empirical - relativise a T-sentence to persons and times - a criterion of acceptance of a truth theory for arbitrary languages already presupposes a general concept of truth. >Truth, >Truth definition, >Language use, >Acceptability. Vice versa, we do not know which interpreted language the community uses, if we only know the truth conditions of the sentences. >Truth conditions, >Language community. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Understanding | Davidson | Glüer II 121/22 We can understand because we always know what truth is. Glüer II 50 Language/Davidson: 1. understanding: for understanding it is basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks. (DavidsonVsTarski). Glüer II 51 Each language is accessible through causal relations. 2. It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a question of social practice. DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language must be abandoned in the radical interpretation! >Radical Interpretation. Glüer II 52 Even the idiolect of a nonconformist, freed from all conventions, can in principle be interpreted as long as we can find access to it via causal hypotheses. Conformism facilitates interpretation, but is not a condition of the possibility of understanding. Malapropisms are misused or mispronounced foreign words or technical terms. Glüer II 150 Communication/Davidson: is unconventional. Horwich I 459 Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is detecting the inferential relations between sentences and other sentences of the language - E.g. "that is red" and "there are transfinite cardinal numbers": DavidsonVsDummett: here there is no difference. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Understanding | Dummett | I 150 ff Frege: Understanding comes before truth. - Truth is undefinable (FregeVsTarski). Dummett: in earlier works thesis: the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. Today: the relationship is more subtle. Neither of the two can be explained by the other respectively. We can also express our understanding by means of other words. (Replacement, interchangeability.) Husted IV 457 On the other hand it cannot apply generally that the understanding of expressions has the form of explicit knowledge and consists in the ability to explain expressions with other expressions. For this would result in a circle. Husted IV 458 ff Understanding: there are limits: we can only attribute an understanding to ourselves if we can show how to express it. The (metaphysical) realist must therefore show how our understanding (ultimately behavior) discloses that sentences are either true or false (even if we cannot decide). And that’s not possible. Husted IV 463 Understanding: the linguistic understanding of a person cannot include a component that could not be expressed in the use of the language. ((s) Cf. >Gavagai). II 69 Understanding/Dummett: knowing the corresponding fact is not sufficient to understand a sentence. II 69 For knowing the truth conditions of a proposition, knowing the corresponding fact is not sufficient. This condition is too weak. What we need is the speaker's understanding of the language. What does it mean to know a language? And this is derived from the understanding of the individual words. What does the speaker know when he knows a language and especially when he knows a certain sentence? That is of course practical knowledge. But that does not mean that it is not propositional knowledge! Mastery of procedures can always be presented propositionally. So we are looking for a theoretical representation of a practical skill. II 111 Understanding/Meaning Theory/Dummett: what would be a verification of the sentence - important argument: we need not be able to decide the sentence in order to understand him - 1) Two Dogmas Vs: most sentences involve inferences - 2) Vs: if truth is a basic concept, then there is no reason why we should know enough to deduce the meaning of a complex sentence from the constituents. III (b) 70/71 Understanding/Truth/Dummett: in order for a sentence to be used for communication of information it must be possible to understand it before you know whether it is true - Transparency: if you attribute one meaning to two words each, one must know whether these meanings are the same - but: someone who grasps the sense (meaning) of two expressions, does not need to know that they have the same reference. III (b) 83 Language/Meaning/Dummett: E.g. exchange "table" with "eagle": then sentences such as "female tables lay eggs" etc. So the hoax is uncovered - Prerequisite: we already know sentences that do not contain "table" and "eagle"! -((s) > Löwenheim-Skolem.) - You cannot assume a theory (collection of true sentences at a time) without an additional meaning theory. III (c) 96 ((s) If all sentences contained "table" and "Eagle", then the meaning of the other words in these sentences could depend on these two words). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Carnap, R. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would the logical semantics reject in the lump, because it cannot be articulated according to the conception of language as a universal medium. I 194 ff WittgensteinVsCarnap/Wittgenstein/Bio/Hintikka: accuses Carnap, he had used his idea of physicalist base language without permission and without reasonable notice. Neurath has demanded, as the first in the Vienna Circle, one should no longer speak of "experience content" and the "comparison between sentence and reality", but only of sentences. (> Coherence theory). II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: the attempt to construct a logic that should be prepared for any situation, is an absurdity of great importance, such as Carnap's construction of a relation system, but which leaves it open whether something fits to what gives it content. VI 94 WittgensteinVsCarnap/Schulte: one cannot assume a priori that elementary propositions should consist of binary relations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Carnap, R. | Soames Vs Carnap, R. | 478 Set Theory/Truth-Definition/Tarski/Soames: ["snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessarily equivalent in elementary set theory. ((s) > Redundancy Theory). Truth-Predicate/Tarski/Soames: Tarski would not accept a predicate as a truth predicate if [ a is T] would not be material equivalent I 480 to any meta-linguistic paraphrase of the object-language sentence named by a. On this basis, Tarski can be interpreted as implicitly assuming that instances of (19) are necessary or a priori. (Soames pro). (19) If "T" is a truth-predicate for L and "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is quite different from claiming that "T" in (20) is replaced by a T-predicate for L, that then the resulting instances of the scheme would be necessary and a priori: (20) If "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is what it takes to claim (17) and (18)! PutnamVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (17/17 Tarski). DummettVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (18/18 Tarski). Putnam/Dummett/Soames: both show that Tarski's truth definition has nothing to do with understanding or semantic interpretation. Davidson/Soames: is best understood as not trying to analyze meaning in terms of truth, but to eliminate the concept of meaning in favor of the concept of truth. Then the defender of Davidson of "Truth and Meaning" would have the following instead of (i): (i) If x knows that what is expressed by the relevant instance of "S" is true in L iff p, for each sentence of L, then x is a competent speaker of L. Soames/Problem: if now "true in L" is understood as an abbreviation for the definition provided by Tarski, then (i) is as absurd as (18Tarski). SoamesVsCarnap: exactly this kind of absurdity lies in the following (which would allow Tarski's definitions to be the central concept in a meaning theory): (T) S is T iff p. Carnap/Soames: this occurs in Carnap in Meaning and Necessity p. 5/6 and section 7 of his Introduction to Semantics). Meaning Theory/M.th./Soames: must not appeal to other semantic terms. Truth-Predicate/Soames: the concept of truth does not play an ostensible role in our original problem. The refinement of the problem leads to the view that an adequate meaning theory must characterize a predicate that fulfills certain conditions. Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true propositions. ((s) That all true propositions have in common). |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Church, A. | Sellars Vs Church, A. | Putnam I 66 Description/PutnamVsSellars: nor does the analysis of the description help Sellars: (1) "wheel" describes a wheel in English. Putnam: that means that "wheel" plays in English the role that "Rad" has in German. ChurchVsTarski: (1) is not statement on the German word "Rad". SellarsVsChurch: introduces a special means: the "point mention" (as Frege's "oblique sense"): A word in point mention denotes its own linguistic role: "Rad" and "wheel" are then both names for a certain role, namely the same! Important: wheel is not synonymous to a description of this role: it is rather a name of that role! That concludes: (2) "wheel" has in English the role "Rad". Then the extension of described is a class of ordered pairs (word/role), not (word/thing). (> Description). Sellars: no relation word world but word role. I 66/67 Description/Sellars: this is not a big restriction for him as nominalist as "roles" are not abstract entities for him. PutnamVsSellars: but this does not cast a particular light on the problem of reference. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Davidson, D. | Dummett Vs Davidson, D. | Dummett I 28ff DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth. DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!. I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing. I 146 Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use. Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so. I 187 DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions. Avramides I 8 DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability). I 9 This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning. I 87 Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist. DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered. Solution: "Translation without end". II 108 Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom. Putnam I 148 Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in. Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously. VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Deflationism | Brandom Vs Deflationism | I 467 Deflationism is in danger to undermine itself. Fact: Snow is white No fact: no fact is claimed when we say "It is true, that snow is white". NS I 163 Truth Meaning/BrandomVsDavidson: the return from meaning to truth could only succeed with a stronger concept of truth that is not available. (BrandomVsDeflationism, BrandomVsTarski). Conclusion relations/Brandom: three types of conclusions that illuminate meaning: 1. those that commit to further beliefs (e.g. deductive conclusions). 2. those that allow (inductive and deductive) 3. those that exclude. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Deflationism | Davidson Vs Deflationism | Horwich I 457 Reduction/Reductionism/Rorty: all authors who try to strike a balance between reductionism and anti-reductionism like Davidson are constantly attacked by both sides. Davidson: One must distinguish: standards are one thing and descriptions are another. This assumes the following form: I 457/458 Truth/DavidsonVsDeflationism/Rorty: we get to know infinitely more about what truth is if we say that we now know more than tomorrow, than we learn from Tarski’s disquotation scheme. Rorty: this parallel between Dewey and Davidson is exacerbated by the NI of Leeds: Naturalistic instrumentalism/NI/Leeds/Rorty: (see above): the combination of the view similar to Quine that the only objective relative to which our methods can be rational, is the objective of predicting observations - with the assertion that the world literally consists of the entities of current science. The NI has to do with: Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain the success of predictions. That would be circular. The circle comes from attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. That leads to: Action theory/Davidson/Rorty: you do not need to choose between these two descriptions (external/internal), we just have to distinguish them consistently. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 32 Def Deflationism/Rorty: the view that Tarski’s work encompasses all essential characteristics of the truth. DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: Tarski’s "true in L" is the extension and thus no indication of future or general cases! >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Field, H. | Tarski Vs Field, H. | Field II 142 T-Theory/TarskiVsField: its variant is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: approach with schematic letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1. we have the same advantage as Feferman for schematic disquotation and schematic meta language: extensions of the language are automatically considered. 2. the use of ""p" is true iff p" (now as schema formula as part of language instead of axiom) seems to better grasp the notion of truth. 3. (most importantly) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of the language. While this is important, it is not omitted by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to get for beliefs. Horwich I 484 TarskiVsField/Soames: Tarski's semantic properties are not dependent on facts about speakers, thereby nothing gets lost. One should approach semantics abstractly and leave the interpretation of speaker behavior to pragmatics. Advantage: you get a T-predicate for metatheoretical discussion, and you keep the opportunity to ask philosophical questions in other areas.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Leeds Vs Field, H. | Field II 304 Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership. LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory. Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility). Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed. The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.) Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context. Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth. II 305 Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class" and ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language. Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language. Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation. FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found. Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language. Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30). Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear. FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms! e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two". FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.) Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) : II 306 e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true. Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value). Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation. 1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory. 2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true. FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum. The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness. FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better. I 378 Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) . Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField). Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....) Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness! Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction! Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language. Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end. LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable? I 379 This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way. Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction. Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English. Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list. Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English. Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law. LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory). And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization. Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)). Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction. I 386 Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted. I 380 Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important. Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world. Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation! The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world". I 381 We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard. Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic. LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI: a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned). Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation! This is an elder form of the correspondence theory. I 491 He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt. Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world. If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it. LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order. Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability). |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Field, H. | Soames Vs Field, H. | I 467 Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth. Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things: (i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages. (ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically (iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes. Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example (1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true. b. Church's theorem is true c. Everything he said is true. I 468 SoamesVsPropositions. Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists. Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example). Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say: (6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all.... I 470 SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise: (7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S. I 472 Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar. 2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation. The result is a sentence of the metalanguage: (8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S). FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong! Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions I 474 of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation. Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct. FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient. "Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9): (9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only) c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent) Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now. Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage). Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different! N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts. Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept. Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses). I 475 Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages: 1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above) 2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory. Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent. Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts). 2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference. SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)! Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1). Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except: L1: here "R" applies to round things L2: here on red things. Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages: (11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red. Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list. FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers. SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski I 476 in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true, L2: ...if A and B are true. FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning). FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior). Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts: (13) the term of a name referring to an object The term of a predicate that applies to an object. The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms ... I 477 Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b: (14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s). b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is .... Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary. SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price. Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition). New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories. SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms. Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either a) define about truth, or b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms. SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now! a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular. b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s]. Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing. Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent. Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable. SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough. I 478 It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior). Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer). (15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals). (16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc. ((s) Both times reference) Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16) that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition. I 481 Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms. Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories. Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects. ((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence). Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language). I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions. I 483 SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities. I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example Negation/Field (21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence). SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts). Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have. Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar: Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage. Solution/Soames: (22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence). "Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Frege, G. | Searle Vs Frege, G. | II 285 Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions. II 286 Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege! Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for. II 301 The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation. 2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification. 3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress). Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress.. II 303 Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words. II 228 Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement. III 229 Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not. 2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements. Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation. V 116 SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too). V 117 Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself. E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound! V 144 SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition! V 152 Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions. Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic). V 155 Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b). Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms. V 156 Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property! V 172 Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression. V 173 2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals. 4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals. 5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions. V 256 Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions. To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star. They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hilbert | Tarski Vs Hilbert | Horwich I 127 Truth/Philosophy/Mathematics/HilbertVsTarski: (only "philosophical" objection at all, from a mathematician!): the truht definition would have nothing to do with the "philosophical problem". But that should not be a criticism. Term/TarskiVsHilbert: I never understood what the "essential" of a term should be. ((s) >Frege: terms have features that can be regarded as necessary, because otherwise it is another term, in contrast to objects that can also turn out to have other properties, but are still the object under consideration.) Truth/Tarski: I do not think there is any "philosophical problem" here.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Inflationism | Ramsey Vs Inflationism | Horwich I XIII Truth/Tradition/Inflationism/Horwich: acknowledges Tarski's idea, but considers it insufficient. Example PragmatismVsTarski: this does not explain the usefulness of truth. Inflationism/Horwich: requires attributing truth to additional attributes: "X is true iff X has the attribute P". With this one should be able to specify what truth is. (e.g. usefulness). RamseyVsInflationism: (> Redundancy TheoryVsInflationism): (Chapter 4, AyerVsInflationism, Chapters 8 and 15, StrawsonVsInflationism Chapter 13): Truth needs no additional specification. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Juhos, B. | Tarski Vs Juhos, B. | Horwich I 139 Truth Definition/JuhosVsTarski: (Juhos does not know the truth definition himself): he claims to have proved that such a definition is not possible in principle. I 123 TarskiVsJuhos: mistakes the scheme (T) for the definition itself. JuhosVsTarski: this is inadmissibly short and incomplete. Instead one has to take: (T') X is true iff p is true. Or (T' ,) X is true iff p is the case (i.e. what p determines is the case). I 124 "Exactly when"/equivalence/TarskiVsJuhos: Juhos does not see that the expression "iff" ("when and only when", "exactly when") does not express any relation between sentences, because it does not combine names of sentences. I 124 TarskiVsJuhos: constantly confuses sentences with names of sentences. His schemata (T') and (T' ,) are "inadmissibly long". Def "invalid long"/TarskiVsJuhos: is an expression when (i) it is meaningless, and (ii) it is composed of meaningless expressions by inserting superfluous words.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Antirealism Vs Kripke, S. A. | Field I 249 Antirealism/AR/Metalogic/Field: can the antirealism do anything with metalogical terms like conservativity and consistency? He also wants to assert this from a mathematical theory. Problem: Consistency is normally defined as "having a model", conservativity also in model theoretical terms ((s) assumes an ontology of sets, which antirealism rejects). N.B.: if the antirealism uses these terms, then it cannot emptyly distinguish between consistency and inconsistency or conservatism and non-conservatism ((s) since all statements are trivially false because of bearer-less terms). Conservativity/Consistency/Antirealism/Field: so the antirealism must not define the two terms model-theoretically. Just like: Truth/AntirealismVsTarski/AntirealismVsKripke: the antirealism should also reject the truth definition of the two. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metalanguage | Prior Vs Metalanguage | I 100 Metalanguage/Prior: must contain: a) a systematic method for naming sentences b) a translation of every sentence of the given language. Easiest method for b): the object language should be part of the metalanguage (!), then its sentences are their own translation. Truth Definition/Tarski/Prior: general form: x is true iff. p "x": represents the name in the metalanguage. "p": represents the translation. Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski/PriorVsMetalanguage: in our own system, we do not need any metalanguage. That gives us certain ways of self-reference that are not provided in Tarski. In Tarski, no sentence can say anything about its own truth, nor about other sentences of the object language. Prior: with us it is possible under favorable circumstances that people think, speak or fear about the truth or falsity of their speech, thinking, fearing, etc. This then also counts among the things that he thinks, fears, etc. ((s) absurd: someone would have to fear something, but not that the corresponding sentence is true, because that is not part of the object language.) Prior: but that is a difference with Tarski, not a conflict with his theory. Because we do not use "true" and "false" in his sense. We have only roughly outlined such a language and said nothing about the means it may have to refer to its own sentences. I 144 Belief/Relation/Theory/Prior: the second theory we are considering says that a relation only comes about if the believer infallibly knows that the object exists: Russell: knowledge by acquaintance. Names/Russell: mainly resorts to Mill. Names/Mill: a) singular ones b) general ones each α. "connotative ones", β. not connotative ones. General names: nouns and adjectives all connotative. PriorVsMill: better "apply to" than "denote". Meaning/Names/Mill: the objects attribute nothing to meaning! We can understand a name in principle without knowing the object. (However, with reductions with e.g. "red"). But here the meaning is not changed either when the word is applied to different things. I 145 Thus a noun or adjective retains its meaning even when it is applied to non-existent things. Understanding/Mill: to understand a word we need to know which attributes a thing must have so that a word can be applied to it. Connotation/Mill: are the attributes that fix the meaning of the noun or adjective by determining whether the noun or adjective can be applied to a thing. Singular Term/Mill: may be connotative, but not necessarily. Proper Names/Mill: meaningless signs. We may have information previously, and the name may invoke it, but it does not carry it. Prior: his Platonist "attributes" are not essential to his theory. Information/Connotation/Mill: connotative expressions bring information with them. Noun/Predicate/Verb/Peirce: nouns and adjectives might be banned from the language. There is nothing that could not be accomplished better and less ambiguous by verbs. Denote/Peirce: nouns, verbs and adjectives have in common that they do not denote, but are merely applied to objects. The word "chair" is applied to x if x is a chair, and accordingly to white if x is white, or the verb "smokes" if x smokes. Noun and Adjective: are always implicit parts of verbs! E.g. "every man runs': I 146 here "man" is not explicitly part of "is a man", but the verb "to be a man", "is a man" is implicit. Reason: "Whatever is a man runs". E.g. adjective: "X is a bad person": "bad" is not explicitly part of the verb "is bad", but implicitly: "X is bad and is a person". Connotative Names: we might say they are not names at all, but "predicative". Connotation/Mill: E.g. "The Chimborazo is white": subject: not connotative, predicate: connotative. The individual thing denoted by the subject has the attributes connoted by the predicate. E.g. "All men are mortal": both connotative: whatever has the attributes connoted by the subject, also has those connoted by the predicate. Point: in both cases, the analysis shifts the connotative expression to the predicate position. (>Verbs). |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel, E. Vs Metaphysics | Horwich I 128 Ernest NagelVsTarski: (among others) his truth concept (or the whole theoretic semantics) had something metaphysical. (Ernest NagelVsSemantics). I 129 Metaphysics/TarskiVsVs: the concept as such is too vague. Some cynics say Z, this is how the philosophers called their unborn children. VsMetaphysics: some think it crept in on the way through the definitions, namely, if the definition does not provide us with criteria for deciding whether an object falls within the definition or not. VsTarski: and the concept of truth is simply too general to prevent that. I 130 Truth Criterion/Criteria/TarskiVsVs: it's true, we will probably never find a truth criterion. (see above, Kant ditto). But this is not how the truth concept differs from almost all other concepts, especially in theoretical physics (TT). Metaphysics/Tarski: the concept is used in such a broad sense that it certainly encompasses methods of logic, mathematics or the empirical sciences, and thus a fortiori also semantics! |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Positivism | Fodor Vs Positivism | II 107 Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages can be constructed so that they have any desired property. II 108 When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem. II 109 Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica(1). This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic. II 110 FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply. II 112 Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally. II 113 Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously. II 117 Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before. Fodor/Lepore IV 49 Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Possibilia | Tarski Vs Possibilia | Bigelow I 101 Names/Individual Constants/BigelowVsTarski: as a referent he only allowed things that can occupy a place at a time. We, on the other hand, will also allow possibilia. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Putnam, H. | Brendel Vs Putnam, H. | I 70 Truth-Definition/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is contraintuitive from the start: this also applies to the model-theoretical variants. They do not do justice to our intuitive concept of "true". I 71 His truth concept is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" is itself quite unclear. I 105 Disquotation Theory/Disquotation Theory/Disquotationalism/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: is only a variant of redundancy theory. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: this is an error: because redundancy theory assumes an operator and a concept of truth based on disquotation theory cannot be a propositional operator and thus not a redundancy theory. I 278 Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: the statement that we are brains in a vat cannot turn out to be true because representations have no intrinsic connection to their representatives ("magic reference") - is independent of causation. I 279 SkepticismVsPutnam/Brendel: Skepticism does not have to be impressed. It can classify Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument: it refers to the premises of the possibility of formulating the sentence "We are brains in a vat". StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: such transcendental arguments already presuppose certain verificationist assumptions. I 280 Problem: one cannot yet conclude from this that the world actually exists. One would also have to assume that principles constituting knowledge necessarily describe the world as it actually is. StroudVsTranscendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii. I 281 BrendelVsStroud: Solution: Semantic Truth/Brendel: the skeptical hypothesis is not a meaningful truthful statement in the sense of semantic truth. Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam himself admits that brains in a vat is physically possible. But what does that mean, except that there is such a possible description? I 282 BrendelVsPutnam: no physical possibility is shown at all, only a black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). He should show the possibility or impossibility of thinking. ((s) Because he himself ultimately proceeds from an argument of the impossibility of thinking (impossibility of reference). Thought experiment/Brendel: that something is physically possible is not yet an argument for the legitimacy of thougt experiment either. I 283 Conceptual Analysis/Brendel: can only be confirmed or refuted by conceptual possibilities. I 284 BrendelVsPutnam: the world of brains in a vat is not so closed to us, we have an idea of what it would be like. I 285 Understanding/Skepticism/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: therefore the skeptical hypothesis is not incomprehensible to us at all. And then also truthful. "Everything different"/Brendel: but this is where the limits of our imagination come in. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Tarski Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Field II 25 Truth/QuineVsTarski/Field: the scheme (T) is all we need. (Or additionally a translation theory). TarskiVsQuine/Field: that was not Tarski's view! FieldVsTarki: attached too much importance to pseudo-theories like D2, A2 and F2. Field thesis T1 adequately represents Tarski's real contribution to the truth theory. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Austin Vs Tarski, A. | I 240 Thread: StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth is no property - Tarski: Truth is a property |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Tarski, A. | Ayer Vs Tarski, A. | I 276 AyerVsTarski: there are objections against making truth a property of sentences instead of a property of statements or propositions: sentences expressing a time ratio can be used on several occasions for various statements. In any case where we can define truth as a property of sentences, we can define it also as properties of statements. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Davidson Vs Tarski, A. | Glüer II 28 Tarski tests his definitions through that they only imply -equivalences where the sentence on the right side translates the one quoted on the left. The T-predicate used may remain uninterpreted. Because: Def T-predicate: every predicate that provides correct translations is a T-predicate. Tarski assumes meaning in order to explicate the truth. Davidson: vice versa! It is not required of T-equivalences that the right side translates to the leftd. Glüer II 29 Def T-equivalence: true iff. the linked sentences have the same truth value in all circumstances. Those who want to apply Davidson’s "Convention T" need to know when T-equivalences are true. With Tarski, one must know the meaning of both object-language and meta-language sentences. Davidson’s T-predicate, however, must be interpreted. Glüer II 29 Vs: Why should T-equivalences indicate truth conditions if there needs to be no substantive connection between the linked sentences? Translation: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff. grass is green. How could T-equivalences be prevented from implying such equivalences?. Answer: Such a theory would not be too interpretive. Right has nothing to do with the truth conditions of left. DavidsonVsTarski: empirical rather than formal - empiricism excludes false law amendments (> Goodman).- Convention T insufficiently empirical. Glüer II 50 ff Tarski-like T-theories include no reference to meanings in the sense defined clearly assignable entities. Davidson: two radical consequences: 1) Understanding: for understanding it’s basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks (DavidsonVsTarski). Glüer II 51 Every language is accessible via the causal relationships. 2) It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a matter of social practice. DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language has to be abandoned in the radical interpretation. Glüer II 122 DavidsonVsTarski: The radical interpreter can only develop a T-theory for his L if he uses an interpreted T-predicate for the construction of his T-equivalences, i.e. his own, intuitive concept of truth. While Tarski’s T-predicates provide a structural description of a language whose translation is known, and precisely do not make a contribution to a truth theory, because for that it would be interesting to see what T-predicates in different languages have in common. Dummett I 25 DavidsonVsTarki: presumes, however, that the concept of truth must already be understood! If we knew nothing about it, except that it applies to sentences of the language concerned, according to the definition of truth, we cannot learn anything about the meaning of a sentence by stating the truth conditions. Therefore, you need a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! because this knowledge will be determined by the truth theory. Frank I 633 Truth/Meaning/Interpretation/DavidsonVsTarski: without interpretation the assertion that a particular physical entity has truth conditions or meaning remains an empty presumption. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Field Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 68 T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics"). Bre I 69 FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc. Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is. Bre I 70 Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is. Field I 33 Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences. a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities. That does not look as contradictory as Fie I 34 John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms. VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation". FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction. Field II 141 T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more. Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands. Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory. Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks. Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences. Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above). II 142 TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages: 1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered. 2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better. 3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach. FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences. Putnam I 91 Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form "Electron" refers to electrons "DNS" refers to DNS "Gene" refers to genes. etc. this is similar to (w) "Snow is white" is true iff.... (s)> meaning postulates) Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because: Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it). Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ... Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment): Def Criterion F/Putnam: (F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn). Then we reformulate: "Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron. PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F. This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically. Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Tarski, A. | Frege Vs Tarski, A. | Dummett I 25 Understanding / Frege / Dummett: understanding before truth - truth is indefinable (FregeVsTarski) I 105 FregeVscorrespondence theory: any attempt to define truth is a headless undertaking. If the truth of a proposition were a property, in order to decide its truth, one would have to decide the truth of another sentence! (> regress). FregeVstruth-definition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Tarski, A. | Kripke Vs Tarski, A. | III 337 Expansion/Language/Kripke: Here we need Set Theory, at least the sets of the expressions of L. (As Tarski, who is dealing, however,with referential language). DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: he needs less ontology and less richness of metalanguage. III 367 Substitutional quantification/sQ/KripkeVsTarski: substitution quantification together with the formula Q(p,a) solves Tarski’s problem to define a "true sentence". III 410 Language/Kripke: When a language is introduced, an explicit definition of W is a necessary and sufficient condition that the language has mathematically defined (extensional) semantics. Otherwise, the language can be explained in informal English. The semantics is then intuitive. Before Tarski, semantics have generally been treated that way. Convention T/DavidsonVsTarski/Kripke: for Davidson the axioms must be finite in number. Kripke: his work is much more controversial than that of Tarski. Field I 245 Def disquotational truth/dW/Field: can be defined with the help of substitution quantification (∏/(s): for all sentences, not objects .... is valid) for all sentences, not objects") definiert werden. S is true iff ∏p(if S = "p", p). where "p" sentences are substituents. But which sentences?. Konjunctions/Understanding/Paradoxies/Field: Konjunctions of sentences: makes only sense if the sentences have been understood beforehand, i.e. that the conjunctions themselves (and sentences constructed from them) are not allowed as conjuncts. (>Semantic Paradoxes, (s) >Everything he said is true). Solution: Tarski similar hierarchy of T-predicates. Predicates: then the definition of the dW by substitutional quantification (sQ)is typically ambiguous: each element of the hierarchy is provided by the corresponding sQ. KripkeVsTarski: (Kripke 1975): he is to restrictive for our aim: as such we do not obtain all ueK that we need. Solution/Kripke: others, quasi imprädikative Interpretation von dW. Analog für Field I 246 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Kripke: Authorizes sentences to be a part of themselves and things, which are build from those sentences, to be conjuncts. However, the truth value of those quasi impredicative conjuncts are to be objectively indeterminate until the truth value is assigned to a certain level. sQ/Field: Allows then ueK without semantic ascent. If we want to talk about the non-linguistic world, why should we use sentences which we do not need?. → sQ: Could then be used as a basic term. → Basic term/Field: This means that a) the basic term is not defined by even more basic termini. → b) the basic term does not try to explain even more basic terms in theory (Field for each a) and b). → If we accept a), we need, however, to explain how the term obtains its meaning. Perhaps from logical laws which regulate its use. If we accept a), it is not a problem to accept b) as well. → Explanation/Field: e.g. the issue regarding mentalistic terms is not to give a meaning, but to show that the term is not primitive (basal). The ideology in logical terms does not need to be reduced that much. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tarski, A. | Prior Vs Tarski, A. | I 98 Truth/Falsity/PriorVsTarski: the concepts of truth and falsity discussed in the last chapter are not the concepts of Tarski. Prior: ours could be described as properties not of sentences, but of propositions. I.e. quasi-properties of quasi-objects! Not adjectives "true", "false", but rather adverbs "correctly" (accurate, truthful, rightly) and "falsely". I 99 PriorVsTarski: (A) If someone says that snow is white, he says it truthfully iff. snow is white. Tarski: (B) The sentence "snow is white" is true iff. snow is white. The truth of all true sentences of a language can be derived from Tarski's definition with normal logic. And that is for him the criterion of satisfiability of the truth definition. Quotation Marks/Truth/Truth Definition/PriorVsTarski: for me there are no quotation marks. But in Tarski, these belong more to informal preparation than to strict theory. Use/Mention/Tarski/Prior: left: the sentence is mentioned (by the name of the sentence) right: used. Prior: in my version () there is no mention, only use. (A) is not about sentences from start to finish, but about snow. (B) is about the sentence "snow is white". Self-Reference/Foreword Paradox/Tarski/Paradox/Prior: it remains the case that it looks as if self-reference were involved when we speak about people and what they say, think, fear, etc., which seems to exclude Tarski's semantics. But we must take a closer look: In Tarski, the predicates "true" and "false" do not belong to the same language as the sentences by which they are stated. I 103 PriorVsTarski: we say instead "x says something true if..." Or: "x says during the interval t t'that __" If we abbreviate this last phrase as "Sx!, "Sxp", then we could insert it in theorems like: CSx∑pKSxpNp∑pKSxpNp. Problem: (see above) If I says that he says something wrong between t and t', then it cannot be the only thing he says. This is a problem for very short intervals. How about if poor old x had to express theorems, and only had such a short time available for it? To the above theorem he would also have to express the consequent ∑pKSxpNp, and for that he might not have time! Above all, it may be that I will not do it ex hypothesi! Metalanguage/Point: this means that the language in which these theorems are expressed cannot be the same language that is used for that at some other occasions! |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Tarski, A. | Putnam Vs Tarski, A. | Brendel I 70 Truth Def/theory of truth/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is counterintuitive from the outset: this also applies to the model theoretical variants. They do not do our intuitive concept of "true" justice. Brendel I 71 His concept of truth is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" itself is quite unclear. Brendel I 72 "True-in-L"/PutnamVsTarski: doesn't consider the speaker nor their use of expressions. It depends only on syntactic features. Problem: Then "snow is white" is also true in such possible worlds in which the words have an entirely different meaning! Then they correspond to another issue. Then what is semantic about it? And what does it mean that in a counterfactual situation a sentence is true-in-L, but not "true"? It must then be said, in what language the phrase is "not true". Brendel I 73 It should also be explained why such a "counterfactual situation" shows that "truth" was not analyzed conceptually. E.g. I1: "Snow is white" here means that snow is white (L1). I2: here that water is liquid. I2: in a trivial sense "snow is white" is also L1-true! This is the case even if in a world "snow" and "white" are interpreted in a way that they express a false sentence in this possible world. Ex ""The earth is at rest" is true in a geocentric worldview" is true also in the heliocentric worldview. Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: here, the expressions are supposed to have a different meaning, and the issue to continue to hold that snow is white. Brendel I 73 Counterfactual situation/Putnam/Brendel: expressions have a different meaning, but the SBV are equal. I (a) 16 PutnamVsTarski: it must be added a certain substantial understanding of reference and truth, in which both are not made conditional on the possibility of human knowledge. (That would be the case of instrumentalism which thinks a sentence must be true if certain criteria are met, such as "sensations xyz are present."). Truth has to go beyond basic recognizability according to realism. I (b) 66 PutnamVsTarski: many think that he has completely and precisely defined reference, I do not. Truth/reference/Field: (1972) has shown that the "definitions of truth" and "definitions of reference" of logic did not do their job at all. PutnamVsTarski: his "Convention T" does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the terms of the designation of a sentence and "following from something". These concepts are closely related to truth and reference, but need to be clarified. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Tarski, A. | Strawson Vs Tarski, A. | Austin I 240 Thread: StrawsonVsTarski, AustinVsTarski: truth is no property - Tarski: Truth is a property of sentences. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Tarski, A. | Tugendhat Vs Tarski, A. | III 191 TugendhatVsTarski: his scheme is too narrow. Also VsMeta Language. Somehow reality and subjectivity (intersubjectivity) have to be taken into account in the truth view. Question: whether criteria must not be incorporated into truth theory, since judgments refer beyond themselves to reality. III 197 TugendhatVsTarski: his implicit use of equivalence conceals the reference to the truth of judgment. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tarski, A. | Wittgenstein Vs Tarski, A. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would reject the logical semantics as a whole, because according to the view of language as a universal medium it cannot be articulated. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Tarski, A. | Wright Vs Tarski, A. | Rorty VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he did not manage to set a norm. Wright: two norms: legitimate assertiveness and truth. Difference: striving for one is necessarily striving for the other, but success in one is not necessarily success in the other. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Tarski, A. | Verschiedene Vs Tarski, A. | Eigen VII 303 v. WeizsäckerVsTarski: for the description of the meta language one needed again a meta language. Recourse. Sainsbury V 180 Tarski: the ordinary everyday concept of truth is incoherent: it must be replaced by a hierarchical series of predicates of truth. The object language must not contain a predicate that applies exactly to its true sentences. SainsburyVsTarski: some authors think that our everyday language is not really deficient, but already contains the required hierarchy. e.g. with turns like "What you just said isn't true." It seems too radical to reject our ordinary concept of truth. On the other hand, it is probably not correct to assume that our everyday concept already contains the whole separation. Reinforced LiarVsTarski : (L2: "L2 is not true"). Despite Tarski we could formulate: LN: LN is not trueN Version 1: If that is flawed because it does not respect the separation of levels, then it is not trueN. But that is what it says, it has to be trueN! Version 2: A sentence that breaks through the levels is semantically flawed and therefore not true. So you can always construct an amplified liar sentence to disprove an approach about levels! Horwich I 122 Truth Definition/T-Def/VsTarski: Objections about alleged lack of correctness are directed against the semantic T-concept in general. VsTarski: the T-Def is circular, because in the form "p iff q" truth occurs implicitly: namely, because the equivalence applies when either both sides are true or both sides are false. TarskiVsVs: if this objection would be valid, there would be no formally correct T-Def at all, because we cannot form a composite sentence without the help of connections and other logical terms defined with their help. I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (truth value tables). I 123 Solution/Tarski: a strict deductive development of logic is often initiated by an explanation of the conditions under which propositions of the form "if p then q" etc. are considered true. (Truth-value-tables). Horwich I 127 VsTarski: because of his scheme, which obliges him to facts, he is committed to realism. (GonsethVsTarski). TarskiVsVs: that the expression ... Snow is "actually" white...was wrongly inserted by my critics. Truth conditions/T-Def/Tarski: the reference to facts is deliberately missing in the T-scheme! It is not about truth conditions. T-Schema/Tarski: only implies that if we use the sentence (1) Snow is white we claim or negate that we then also have the correlated sentence (2) The sentence "snow is white" is true we have to claim or negate it. I 128 N.B: with it we can keep our respective epistemological attitude: we can remain realists, idealists, etc., if we have been before. Realism/Tarski: the semantic T-concept does not commit us to naïve realism. ((s) If truth is disquotation, then the "disciplines" must be distinguishable by sentences that are disquotationally true instead of "immanently true"). TarskiVsVs: reductio ad absurdum: if there were another T-concept (according to the will of these critics, then it would have to be somehow different and then it would ultimately come out that "snow is white" is true, iff snow is not white! Otherwise it would not be another T-concept but the same T-concept! Nevertheless, such a "new" T-concept would not necessarily be absurd. In any case, any T-concept that is incompatible with the semantic T-Def would have such consequences. Tarski I 160 VsTarski: Question: Is the semantic conception of truth the only "right" one? TarskiVsVs: I must confess that I do not understand this question because the problem is so vague that no clear solution is possible. I 162 VsTarski: in the formulation of the definition, we necessarily use statement links like "if..., then...", "or" etc.. These occur in definitions. However, it is well known that the meaning of propositional connections in logic is explained by the words "true" and "false". (Circle). TarskiVsVs: it is undoubtedly the case that a strictly deductive development of logic is often preceded by certain statements that explain the conditions under which statements of the form "if, then..." are true or false. However, these findings are outside the system of logic and should not be regarded as a definition of the terms in question! I 163 These findings influence in no way the deductive development of logic. Because here we do not discuss the question whether a statement is true, but whether it is provable! (Truth/Proofability). I 163 Logical Connection/Statement/Tarski: the moment we are in the deductive system of logic (or semantics based on logic), we treat the propositional connections either as undefined terms, or we define them with the help of other propositional connections. However, we do not define the connections using terms such as "true" or "false". (p or q) exactly when (if not p, then q). This definition obviously does not contain semantic terms. Error: the schema (T) X is true exactly when p. for a definition of truth! VsTarski: a critic, who commits this mistake, considered this alleged definition to be "inadmissibly short", i.e.: "incomplete". I 164 It is not necessary to decide whether 'equivalence' means a logical formal relationship or a non-logical relationship. He suggests to add: (T') X is true exactly when p is true. ((s) Vs: here "true" occurs twice). (T'') X is true exactly when p is the case. TarskiVsVs: this is a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the statement connections. (Confusion of name and subject matter/confusion of statements and their names, mention/use). ((s) p (right) is the statement itself, not the assertion of its truth. This has nothing to do with the correctness of redundancy theory). I 168 VsTarski: but the formal definition of truth has nothing to do with the "philosophical problem of truth". It gives necessary and sufficient conditions, but not the "essence" of this concept. TarskiVs: I am not able to understand what the "essence" of a term should be. ((s) FregeVsTarski: Terms have necessary characteristics.) I 172 Criterion/criterion of truth/VsTarski: some argue that definitions do not provide us with general criteria for deciding whether an object falls under the defined terms. And the term "true" is of this kind, since no universal criterion of truth emerges directly from the definition. (> criterion of truth). ((s) RescherVsTarski). Tarski: this is completely correct, but it does not distinguish the term from many terms of science such as theoretical physics. (> term). I 174 Semantics/Tarski: Semantic terms are actually contained in many areas of the sciences and especially empirical sciences. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Tarski, A. | Loar Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 149 LoarVsTarski: there is an intensionalist counterpart to his theory: semantic concepts are completely definable in terms of abstract correlations between expressions and certain intensional entities. Assuming that we should understand language as a function of sentences on sentence-like intentions (which in turn we can identify with functions of possible worlds on truth values). Would we define a semantic concept in this way? Is it the case that everything that gives meaning to a sentence can be mapped to an intension by an abstractly defined function? |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Tarski, A. | Peacocke Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 162 T-Sentence/PeacockeVsTarski: logical form for a language with index words: ApAt (true (s,p,t) ↔ A(p.t)). s: "structurally descriptive name" of a sentence A(p,t) is a formula that does not contain "true" and "fulfilled". p, t: people, time points. (s) this takes circumstances into account, unlike Tarski, thus making it empirical. Truth/PeacockeVsTarski/PeacockeVsDavidson: Point: i.e. we must assume a certain access to the concept of truth already! When we omit this empirical tendency, the question is what makes one language the language of a community instead of another language. (>Meaning theory/Loar). EMD II 163 Then we do not know what "true in L" means for a particular population P. Demanding an answer here does not mean to criticize Davidson's program. We merely sought to fill a gap. Vs: it could be argued that this gap is already closed by the requirement that every truth definition must satisfy convention T. (Convention T: right side must be a translation of the left, material equivalence, extension is not enough). Davidson: himself speaks of the assimilation of a translation manual. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Tarski, A. | Brendel Vs Tarski, A. | I 49 Truth-Def/Tarski/Brendel: contains no object constants and only one relation expression for class inclusion. Testimony/Property/Name/Model Theory/Brendel: compared to Tarski we need some changes: 1. Statements no longer result from the fact that free variable n AF are bound by universal quantification, but e.g. that object constants are assigned property or relation expressions. Example "Hans loves Paula". 2. Property/Model Theory: here you also have to specify for each property what it means that I 50 a sequence of objects satisfies this property or relation. 3. Naming/Model Theory: a semantic relation of the naming of objects by object constants must be formulated. Interpretation/Model Theory/Brendel: (instead of fulfillment) new: now the constants as well as the variables and the property and relation expressions can be used as descriptive signs. This is done by a function of assignment. (Assignment function). Variables/Model Theory: new: now also variables are interpreted semantically. Therefore also formulas with free variables are truthful statements. Truth-Def/Modell Theory/BrendelVsTarski: new: now also a recursive truth definition about the structure of statements is possible. Example for the language L with countable infinite property and relation expressions ...+.... I 51 Model Theory/T-Def/BrendelVsTarski: this model theoretical truth definition is more general than Tarski's definition, since it cannot only make statements about set-theoretical entities. Semantic: but it is also because "truth" is defined by "interpretation in an area of objects", i.e. a function is described that connects linguistic entities with non-linguistic ones. I 58 Semantic Truth/T-Concept/Brendel: should be ontologically neutral in relation to truth value-bearers. VsRealism: should the T-concept force a realistic position, it could not function as minimal consensus of all knowledge conceptions. VsTarski: he is often accused of his T-concept being based on an uncritical realism. (Because of the existence of state of affairs as truth makers.) TarskiVsVs: no realism is implied, but only that if a statement is rejected, then also the assertion of the truth of this statement. (Tarski 1944, 169). I 59 JenningsVsTarski: his T-term is ambivalent: a) semantic, as relation between statements and the state of affairs b) that only an equivalence of two statements (e.g. "snow is white" and, "sn..."is true") (Jennings 1987). I.e. the assertiveness conditions are the same. But then the semantic dimension is abandoned! Brendel: Thesis: we should keep the semantic T-concept, which however is not ontologically neutral. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Tarski, A. | Hilbert Vs Tarski, A. | Horwich I 127 Truth/Philosophy/Mathematics/HilbertVsTarski: (only "philosophical" objection at all, from a mathematician!): the truth definition would have nothing to do with the "philosophical problem". But that should not be a criticism. Term/TarskiVsHilbert: I never understood what the "essential" of a term should be. ((s) >Frege: Concepts have characteristics that can be considered necessary, because otherwise it is another concept, in contrast to objects that can turn out to be something else, but are still the "object considered". Truth/Tarski: I don't think there is a "philosophical problem" here. |
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| Tarski, A. | Barcan Vs Tarski, A. | Quine X 124 Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Truth Conditions//tr.cond./Barcan-MarcusVsTarski/Quine: the truth conditions for quantification where names replace the variables ((s) truth conditions: i.e. that names exist) were accepted by Ruth Barcan. They are in an interesting contrast to Tarski's truth conditions. (5) (see above X 67) (5) For all x, y and i: x satisfies the existential quantification of y in which variant (i) is quantified iff. y is fulfilled by an n tuple x', for which applies: xj = x’j for all j unequal i. The new truth conditions also have the circularity described in the middle of Chapter 3: the existential quantification is true if at least one of its cases is true ((s) "true" appears twice). old: the big difference is that (5) speaks only of the values of variables and uses no names. ((s) analogous to constructivism: the method of proof must be known like the objects here, which is to be proved by assigning names). (5): Is much more complicated than the new form (SQ). SQ: so far, we do not have any deviation, only different descriptions of the same quantification, as long as all objects have a name. Problem: in a not too limited world, there are never enough names for all objects, never as many names as there are objects. Even if there are infinitely many names. E.g. If a set is not determined by an open sentence, it does not have a name: otherwise, if the name was "a", for example, the name of the corresponding open sentence would be "x ε a". X 125 E.g. we cannot have many different names for the irrational numbers, because we cannot assign them to the integers. E.g. we cannot form Gödel numbers for each irrational number. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein | I 55 CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. --- Hintikka I 133 ... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege. Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski) CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that). --- I 134 But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Truth Definition | Versus | Frege IV 19/20 Truth / definition / FregeVsTarski: can not be defined! Reason: in a definition we indicate certain features. When applied to a specific case, it then comes down to whether they have been met. So came round in a circle on the definition of truth. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Truth Definition | Versus | Horwich I 213 StrawsonVsTarski - |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tarski | Field, Hartry | II 3 Truth Theory/Tarski/Field: he did not use any undefined semantic terms. Many say: he thus made the concept of truth suitable for the scientific discourse of his time. FieldVs: Thesis: this is all wrong. In reality, Tarski has managed to trace the concept of truth back to other semantic concepts. II 141 Truth Theory/Tarski: Thesis: We do not get an adequate truth-theory if we only take all instances of the scheme as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens gets the truth. FieldVsTarski. Horwich I 358 Truth Definition/Tarski/Field: (Field 1973): Tarski's thesis: truth definition was partly motivated by the desire to support physicalism. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: Thesis: the world has the same form as language has. Without the world itself being somehow linguistic in its structure, i.e. more reflection. Sellars II 318 Def Picture/Tractatus: Relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. Hintikka I 131 Hintikka Thesis: the "picture theory" is in reality an anticipation of the first condition of Tarski's truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 136 Picture Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka Thesis: Wittgenstein's picture conception is little more than a particularly vivid formulation of the same idea, which also underlies the usual truth condition for atomic propositions. VII 72 Model/Tractatus/Tetens: For example, the relationship between record and score is a model for the picture relationship between language and reality. This is the thesis of the picture theory by Tractatus. ((s) So not the score as a model of the symphony, but a model of a relation or an isomorphism). |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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