|History||Nietzsche||Höffe I 375
History/Nietzsche/Höffe: Nietzsche(1) gives a basic phenomenon of the political, the striving for power, a broader, yet deeper meaning. For he subjects the entire human culture, here exemplarily the consideration of history, to the principle of the enhancement of life: As the will to power, life must constantly overcome itself and productively grow beyond itself. With the principle: "Only as far as history serves life do we want to serve it" (Preface), Nietzsche introduces three kinds of a life-serving history: the "monumental history" (2. Chap.), which provides "models, teachers, comforters" to the "active and striving"; the "antiquarian history" (3. Chap.), which allows "the preserving and revering" to look back "with faithfulness and love" to his/her origins; finally, the "critical history", which gives "the suffering and the liberation of the needy" the strength to condemn a past after an embarrassing test at the end (ibid.). In terms of the tacit motive of the will to power
Höffe I 376
Nietzsche warns against oversaturation with history, since it is harmful to life in five ways: (1) Through the contrast between inside and outside it weakens the personality;
(2) it nourishes the illusion, the most rare virtue, justice, possesses the present to a greater degree than any other time;
(3) it disturbs "the instincts of the people, whereby both the individual and the whole are "prevented from maturing";
(4) the harmful "belief to be late and epigone" is planted; and
(5) implicitly NietzscheVsHegel: an epoch gets into the glorification of the present as the completion of world history.
Höffe: Nietzsche does not deal with Kant's idea of history as a legal progress open to the future.
1. F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: «Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der
Historie für das Leben» (1874)
Ries II 36
History/NietzscheVs: VsHistorism VsTeleology, VsTeleological Meaning
Ries II 38
History/NietzscheVsStrauß, Friedrich David: Strauss' "Life of Jesus" (1835) had once inspired the young Nietzsche. The first piece of outmoded consideration is directed against him.
Ries II 39/40
History/outmoded considerations/Nietzsche: The second piece: "On the benefit and disadvantage of history for life": the immediacy of life is opposed "right inside" historical knowledge. That "immediacy" is guaranteed in oblivion.
History/outmoded considerations/NietzscheVsHistorism: against the unreflected ideological implication of a philosophy whose scientific-theoretical postulate of a separation of theory and practice obscures adaptation to the actual.
Ries II 42
It is impossible to prove a necessity of the event from history as the mere sequence of its events. The scientific claim to the recognition of a path must be abandoned. Also the thought of progress!
Ries II 43
Historical construction tries to eliminate the senselessness of death.
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009
Beyond Good and Evil 2014
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990
|Liberalism||Sandel||Brocker I 668
Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls.
Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all.
A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia),
Brocker I 669
are usually called teleological. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them.
B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. example.
HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself.
Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life.
Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom.
State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good.
Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself.
SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. (1)
Brocker I 676
SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. (2)
1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x.
2. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996.
Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Teleology/RawlsVsTeleology/Rawls: the problems of hedonism show how problematic teleological theories are in principle. (See Hedonism/Rawls). The teleological view will necessarily move towards a kind of hedonism in order to form a coherent theory when it comes to an applicable method of offsetting and weighing objectives. The weakness of hedonism is the impossibility of defining a superior maximum goal. Problem: it is a misunderstanding from the outset to relate the right and the good in a wrong way. We cannot align our lives with a previously independently defined good. It is not our goals that reveal our nature, but the principles that we recognize. Our self has priority over our goals.
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Aristotle||Descartes Vs Aristotle||Esfeld I 209
DescartesVsAristotle: 1) VsTeleology, 2) VsEssentialism. No hierarchical order of forms that culminates in God. >Essentialism, >Teleology.
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
|Deontology||Mackie Vs Deontology||Stegmüller IV 227
Deontology/Stegmüller: does not lead to objectivism! DeontologyVsconsequentialism: Moral imperatives may not be of the form: "Act so that you will achieve a specific outcome" ((s) without regard to the means).
MackieVsDeontology: no morality can do without consequentialist considerations.
Morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: gives up the nowadays customary separation between the morally good and the non-morally good. "moral fairness".
When it comes to the introduction of principles that curtail the negative consequences of the limits of human sympathy, then these principles should be eligible to be endorsed by any position. Even if no agreement on the content of ideals can be achieved, what should be achievable is an agreement on the method of the settlement of differences.
Rights/Mackie: difference. 1. viewed from the outside: securing spaces of freedom.
2. viewed from the inside: results in a diversity of objectives, choice.
MackieVsTeleology/MackieVsDeontology: both unsatisfactory.
Morality/ethics/Mackie: Thesis: primacy of rights over duties and objectives.
Ethics/life/Mackie: there is no "fix life plan". There is a right to a flexible behavior of choice. Rights/Mackie: cannot be absolute, since they may conflict with each other. Rights prima facie need not be identical to those that evolve over time.
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989