Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Proof of God’s Existence Hume Fraassen I 212
Proof of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas: the universe instead of God - if God's will would be crucial how should we understand this will? - ((S) God's will would always be identical with the factual.) ---
II 253
Cosmological proof of God: there must be a cause for every thing and thus an explanation of its existence. - This is something necessary existent. - HumeVs: the existence of God would be a fact - facts are never necessary. - Hume: the necessary existing could be the universe instead of God. ---
II 256
Teleological proof of God/Hume: the teological proof of god is the only one he takes seriously, because it does not require a priori assumptions. - Here: variant: the amazing reconciliation cannot be a coincidence - an intelligent creator is necessary. HumeVs: 1. It lacks the repetition which is necessary for connection.
2. The analogy to humans is questionable.
---
II 257
3. If yes, then they would make a) the unity of God -) b the immateriality and endlessness questionable. ---
II 259
4. order is not evidence of conscious planning - E.g. animals have no less order than a clock , but are not begotten by a watchmaker, but by parents. ---
II 260
Principle: The production of plants and animals is always herbal or animal - in human inventions, there is an understanding of the causes - but not in divine inventions. 6. (Anticipating the theory of evolution ): Matter is in constant motion and eventually reaches a certain stability.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Shoemaker, S. Martin Vs Shoemaker, S. Armstrong II 86
Properties/MartinVsShoemaker: the image of a property as a mere ability to produce other properties is absurd even in a realistic view of properties. Just as it is absurd to state something purely dispositional and not categorical as the perceiver of a counterfactual conditional, so it is absurd to state something purely categorical and not dispositional. Something that Thomas Aquinas calls a "pure act".
MartinVsThomas Aquinas: this is a logical fiction.
"Pure"/Martin: nothing is pure.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Thomas Aquinas Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas Fraassen I 212
Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: Our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume. HumeVsThomas Aquinas. Even though regress in causation or explanation must end.
I 213
There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counter-argument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: microstructure (MiSt).
MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding it does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence. E.g. That cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to the QM has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism.
FraassenVsVs:
Explanation/Regularity/Fraassen: Thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained!. Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities:
a) there is another, still unexplained regularity or.
b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified.
In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Thomas Aquinas Wessel Vs Thomas Aquinas I 221
Identity/Thomas Aquinas: "merely ideal relation, since there is only one thing, caused by our language. Wessel: pro: Identity is indeed a linguistic phenomenon,
WesselVsThomas Aquinas: but it is not a "mere ideal relation" but an ontological assertion. The relation exists when there is the object and the two modes of designation.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999