Fiction/Verstehen/lifeworld/Habermas: when we conceive of society as a lifeworld, we assume a) the autonomy of the actors,
b) the independence of culture,
c) the transparency of communication. These three fictions are built into the grammar of narratives and return in a culturally biased Verstehen. (HabermasVsUnderstanding).
Force/informality/freedom/communication/understanding/Habermas: from the internal perspective of members of a socio-cultural environment, there cannot be a pseudo-consensus in the sense of beliefs that have been violently forced on someone; no violence can be established in a fundamentally transparent communication process that is transparent for the participants themselves. >Coercion, >Violence, >Governance.
HabermasVs: we see through this fiction(s) as soon as we dissolve the identification of society and lifeworld.
They are only mandatory as long as we assume that the integration of society takes place solely under the premises of communication-oriented action. In fact, however, their target-oriented actions are not only coordinated by processes of understanding
but via functional connections, which are not intended by them and which are usually not perceived within the horizon of everyday practice. >Agreement, >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas,
>Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas,
>Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas,
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
|Understanding||Nagel||Frank I 148
NagelVsUnderstanding - (empathy only with mental states). VsSolipsism: is the result of interpreting the empathic imagination as sensual.
Understanding/Nagel: we can have evidence for the truth of something that we do not understand - individuals of radically different genera (scientists from Mars) can both understand the same physical events in objective terminology. For this they do not need to understand the phenomenal forms.(1)
1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450
Nagel I 75
Understanding/Wittgenstein: communication through language consists not only of a match in the definition, but in the judgments. >Judgments, >Language, >Vocabulary.
Logic seems to abolish this, but it does not - congruence in language use and judgment is necessary, but not sufficient for meaning (intending).
Nagel: if the application conditions do not appear to be sufficient, it may be that one misinterpreted the concept - but also that we misunderstood the conditions.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994