Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Prior | I 64 "Extensional abstraction"/Prior: Extensional abstraction says that it is not about real entities but only surrogates. - E.g. identity of "nothing φ-es" with "everything that φ-es is not identical with itself." >Non-existence, >Identity, >Extensionality, >Extensions. I 133 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the vernacular requires a.: E.g. Cook Wilson: instead of "Jones is musically talented": what is predicted, is musicality. >Everyday language, >Predication, >Attribution. PriorVs: "-ty" or "-ness" is always just a trick. Vsuniversals; > |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Constructivism | Quine | XIII 33 Constructivism/Mathematics/Quine: (VsUniversals). Thesis: theorems that can be shown constructively should be preferred. Def Constructivism/Mathematics/Quine: Thesis: any abstract object is specifiable. Against: Predicative Set Theory: is too weak to prove that there must be unspecifiable classes and unspecifiable real numbers. Quantification/Variables/Quine: the quantification is different if it is certain that every object in the domain is specifiable. For example, the natural numbers are such a domain. This is because there is an Arabic number for each of them. Def Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Quine: (Universal Quantification (x)): the formula preceding the quantifier becomes true under any grammatically permissible substitution for the letter "x". Referential Quantification/refQ/Substitutional Quantification: For example, natural numbers: here both are the same. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. On the other hand: If not all objects can be specified: If not all objects in a domain can be specified by singular terms of the language used, then the two types of quantification diverge. For example, if the universal quantifier is fulfilled by all specifiable objects, but not by the non-specifiable ones, then the substitutional quantification is true and the referential quantification is false. Existential Quantification/EQu/Substitutional Quantification/refQ/Quine: behaves accordingly. XIII 35 Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification: diverge in the case of existential quantification if the formula is satisfied by some unspecifiable, but not by any specifiable one. Substitutional Quantification/Quine: is unrealistic for concrete objects. Specifiability/Name/Namability/namable/Quine: Question: is each concrete object individually specifiable? For example every past or future bee, every atom and every electron? Yes, by numerical coordinates with rational numbers. But unlimited referential quantification is simply more natural here. Predicative set theory: here substitutional quantification is more attractive and manageable because abstract objects are parasitic in relation to language, in a way that concrete objects are not. Abstract/Charles Parsons/Quine: abstract objects are parasitic in relation to language, concrete objects are less parasitic. Substitutional Quantification/Quine: does not simply eliminate abstract objects from ontology, but grants them a "thinner" kind of existence. Abstract/Quine: expressions themselves are abstract, but not as wild as the inhabitants of higher set theory. Substitutional Quantification/Quine: is a compromise with militant nominalism. Abstract Objects/Quine: are then classes, like those of predicative set theory (RussellVs). >Abstractness/Quine. Substitutional Quantification/Referential Quantification/Parsons: has shown how both go together (Lit). By using two kinds of variables. Then you can also link them together (intertwine). Problem/Russell: predicative set theory is inadequate for the classical mathematics of real numbers. XIII 36 Real Numbers/Russell/Quine: their theory leads to unspecifiable real numbers and other unspecifiable classes. Substitutional Quantification/Quine: this problem did not lead to the substitutional quantification by itself. Constructive Mathematics/Constructivism/QuineVsBrouwer: heated minds developed and still develop constructive mathematics that are suitable for all sciences. Problem: this leads to unattractive deviations from standard logic. Standard Logic/Constructivism/Quine: Experiments with standard logic: Weyl, Paul Lorenzen, Erret Bishop. Hao Wang, Sol Feferman. These are solutions with predicative set theory together with artistic circles. Problem: you do not know exactly how much mathematics scientists need. Nominalism/Quine: we probably do not need nominalism through and through, but an attractive approach to it. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Empiricism | Barrow | I 36 Empiricism/positivism/Barrow: both empiricism and positivism claim that there are only individual facts, not universals. EmpirismusVsUniversals; PositivismVsUniversals. >Universals, >Facts, >Individuals, >Individuation, >Identification, cf. >Individual causation, >Causality, >Causation. I 42 Both Vsoperationalism/Vsinstrumentalism: theories can only be discovered, they cannot be invented. >Operationalism, >Instrumentalism, >Theories. I 39 VsEmpiricism/Barrow: a theory of elementary particles is more than a mere list of their properties. - It excludes useful terms because they are not observable. - So that it forbids any law of nature! >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Observability, >Unobservables, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Concepts. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Law Statements | Armstrong | Place IV 157 Law statement/PlaceVsArmstrong: Goodman (Goodman Facts, Fiction, Forecast, German, p 39): Law statement must make only generalizations over single time-limited individuals - these are laws on the temporal nature of an object, then you need no natural law as a truth maker - only interaction of a reciprocal dispositional property - reciprocal: only our language forces us to attribute the suitability to one side - causal laws are then universally quantified over individuals. PlaceVsUniversals. Cf. 1. N. Goodman (1988). Tatsache, Fiktion, Voraussage, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. p.39. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Law Statements | Place | Place IV 157 Law statement/PlaceVsArmstrong: Goodman (Goodman Facts, Fiction, Forecast, German, p 39): Law statement must make only generalizations over single time-limited individuals - these are laws on the temporal nature of an object, then you need no natural law as a truth maker - only interaction of a reciprocal dispositional property - reciprocal: only our language forces us to attribute the suitability to one side - causal laws are then universally quantified over individuals - PlaceVsUniversals. Cf. >Laws/Goodman. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Psychological Needs | Psychological Theories | Corr I 441 Psychological needs/psychological universals/psychological theories/Deci/Ryan: Psychologists have long agreed that human beings have basic physiological needs such as hunger, thirst and sex. These needs have played a role in general theories of behaviour (e.g., Hull 1943)(1) as well as in more specific theories related to behavioural domains more directly linked to the needs. There has been far less agreement, however, about whether people also have basic psychological needs – that is, needs of the psyche that are essential for psychological wellbeing and thriving. VsPsychological needs/VsPsychological Universals: Most motivational psychologists do not acknowledge psychological needs as a fundamental aspect of human motivation, instead arguing that the cognitive concept of goals is more useful in explaining motivated behavior. >Psychological Universals. VsUniversals: those who do use the concept of psychological needs have tended to treat them as individual differences in the degree to which people desire such things as achievement (e.g., McClellan 1985)(2) or cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982)(3). Pro psychological needs/pro psychological universals: White (1959)(4) argued for the concept of effectance as a basic need; De Charms (1968)(5) proposed that the experience of personal causation is a psychological need; Baumeister and Leary (1995)(6) suggested that belongingness is a need fundamental to all humans. Deci and Ryan (1985(7), 2000)(8): have postulated that human beings have three basic and universal psychological needs: the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. >Competence, >Autonomy, >Socialization. 1. Hull, C. L. 1943. Principles of behaviour: an Introduction to behaviour theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 2. McClelland, D. C. 1985. Human motivation. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman 3. Cacioppo, J. R. and Petty, R. E. 1982. The need for cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42: 116–31 Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. 4. White, R. W. 1959. Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence, Psychological Review 66: 297–333 5. De Charms, R. 1968. Personal causation: the internal affective determinants of behaviour. New York: Academic Press 6. Baumeister, R. and Leary, M. R. 1995. The Need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation, Psychological Bulletin 117: 497–529 7. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum 8. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychological Universals | Psychological Theories | Corr I 441 Psychological needs/psychological universals/psychological theories/Deci/Ryan: Psychologists have long agreed that human beings have basic physiological needs such as hunger, thirst and sex. These needs have played a role in general theories of behaviour (e.g., Hull 1943)(1) as well as in more specific theories related to behavioural domains more directly linked to the needs. There has been far less agreement, however, about whether people also have basic psychological needs – that is, needs of the psyche that are essential for psychological wellbeing and thriving. VsPsychological needs/VsPsychological Universals: Most motivational psychologists do not acknowledge psychological needs as a fundamental aspect of human motivation, instead arguing that the cognitive concept of goals is more useful in explaining motivated behavior. VsUniversals: those who do use the concept of psychological needs have tended to treat them as individual differences in the degree to which people desire such things as achievement (e.g., McClellan 1985)(2) or cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982)(3). Pro psychological needs/pro psychological universals: White (1959)(4) argued for the concept of effectance as a basic need; De Charms (1968)(5) proposed that the experience of personal causation is a psychological need; Baumeister and Leary (1995)(6) suggested that belongingness is a need fundamental to all humans. Deci and Ryan (1985(7), 2000)(8): have postulated that human beings have three basic and universal psychological needs: the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. >Competence, >Autonomy, >Socialization. 1. Hull, C. L. 1943. Principles of behaviour: an Introduction to behaviour theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 2. McClelland, D. C. 1985. Human motivation. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman 3. Cacioppo, J. R. and Petty, R. E. 1982. The need for cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42: 116–31 Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. 4. White, R. W. 1959. Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence, Psychological Review 66: 297–333 5. De Charms, R. 1968. Personal causation: the internal affective determinants of behaviour. New York: Academic Press 6. Baumeister, R. and Leary, M. R. 1995. The Need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation, Psychological Bulletin 117: 497–529 7. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum 8. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Universals | Chisholm | Frank I 261 ~ Vsuniversals: how can we know anything about them? - False, circular: from the importance of attributes - solution Chisholm: attributes as the fundamental concept. >Attributes, >Basic concepts. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Use Theory | Chisholm | Frank I 261ff Use theory: nominalist position Vsuniversals: meaning is not mentalistic. - ChisholmVs: everything semantic has its origin in the thinking. >Nominalism, >Thinking. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Universals | Armstrong Vs Universals | Armstrong II (b) 46 VsUniversals/Armstrong: what if the nominalist (Conceptualism) continues to treat properties as particulars (P) (with respect to laws of probability): its situation is not too bad: Laws of Nature will still need to be regularities that summarize classes of similar prop. But that which bestowes the prop. F on a particular could be an isolated case propensity of acquiring the prop. G. Isolated cases: Place has to deal with isolated case dispositions anyway. But that does not cause additional problems in probabilistic cases. Arm III 82 Nominalism/Armstrong: Naturalists are normally committed to nominalism (i.e. VsUniversals). ArmstrongVs: but both things together have too narrow an ontological base. Many philosophers have therefore called for "extra entities", e.g. "abstract" volumes and/or possible worlds. But if we limited ourselves to instantiated universals, then naturalism can be combined with a rejection of nominalism. With the PI U can be brought into the spatiotemporal world: Def Universals/Armstrong: they are simply the repeatable properties of the spatiotemporal world. III 83 It is wrong to say that any general predicate corresponds to a universal. Namely, because then one would also have to assume uninstantiated universals. It may be ture that some general words cannot be explained without universals, but we should not think that it would be semantically determined which universals exist and which do not. That would be a priori. Instead: a posteriori: it is to be decided a posteriori which repeatable properties particulars have (after the discovery). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Universals | Cavell Vs Universals | I (b) 203 CavellVsUniversals: each new context brings new needs, new relationships, new items. Learning is never finished. There is no authority ((s) beyond society). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Universals | Nominalism Vs Universals | Frank I 261 Nominalism/VsUniversals/Attributes/Properties/Quine: ontological: attributes have no clear identity conditions. Epistemic/Heckmann: our cognitive approach to attributes is unclarified. In the end, they are entities which elude the natural world of creation and decay whose mode of being therefore excludes that they have a causal influence on us (or we to them). Question: Why should we be able to know anything about such entities at all? Solution/Chisholm: attributes as undefined basic concept. (>Ontology). Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contrast to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the meaning of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but this is no approach to universals of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first before expressing it with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate, use it in compliance with the rules. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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