Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definability | Quine | VII (g) 131 Def Ideology/Quine: what ideas can be expressed in a theory? I.e. what is definable? Example: the theory of real numbers has infinite ontology, but finite ideology: addition, division, multiplication, rationality, algebraicity, etc. Two theories can have the same ontology and different ideologies. Example: (1) The real number x is an integer That can be expressed in one theory, but not in another! >Ideology, >Ontology, >Definitions. VII (g) 132 Due to Goedel's incompleteness theorem for the integers, we know that Tarski's performance would have been impossible if (1) could have been translated into the notation of T. Ontology/Theory/Quine: the ontology of a theory can even include objects that are indefinable in this theory. For example it can be shown that the theory T includes the whole real numbers, although (1) cannot be expressed in its notation. Ideas/Quine: "Ideas of ideas" we can drop them completely together with "ideology" (expressability). We are more interested in definability (in a theory). VII (g) 132 Definition definable/Quine: a general term t can be defined, in any part of the language that includes a sentence S such that S contains the variable "x" and is met by all and only the values of "x", of which t is true. - E.g. "whole" is not definable in theory T. XI 76 Analyticity/Synonymy/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: these terms can only be defined among themselves. We have nothing to break out of this circle with. XI 122 Diversity/Distinguishability/Definability/Mark WilsonVsQuine/VsDifferentiality/Lauener: LauenerVsWilson: Quine mistakenly assumes that two theories R and RT are different iff their union is logically incompatible. Wilson: this is unsatisfactory, because T and RT can be considered formalizations of the same theory, and yet they are not logically equivalent, because their languages are interpreted differently. Interdefinability/Theory/Wilson: two theories are interdefinable if each can be defined within the other, otherwise they are different. For example, one theory with mathematical vocabulary, the other with physical vocabulary. In addition, no superfluous properties may be introduced. Quine: ditto. In addition, the application of a theory should not be confused with the theory itself. >Theories. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Principle of Charity | Putnam | I (b) 56 Principle of Charity/N. L. Wilson: e.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles, according to Wilson, would then be the electrons! >Meaning change, >Theory change, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. I (b) 57 Principle of Charity/Wilson: e.g. someone who is erroneously using a name wrong, still refers to the one, he/she really meant. >Meaning/Intending), >Reference, >referential/attributive. PutnamVsWilson: the principle should only apply to real situations. Also beliefs should be distinguished by relevance. >Relevance. I (b) 58 Phenomena have priority during the reference, that means, if there were Bohr electrons in the other half of the universe, Bohr would nevertheless refer to our electrons. Contribution of the environment: it follows that XYZ (on twin earth) just looks like water, but it is not water. I (b) 58 Principle of Charity/PutnamVsWilson: the principle of charity is too numeric! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. You cannot count beliefs! Reference/possible world/Putnam: e.g. electron, Bohr: suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely assumed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons" but to our electrons. Reason: the primacy of phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and these are also our phenomena. Principle of trust advance/meaning/knowledge/imagination/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without even having a clear idea! The principle of trust forbids us to assume that baptizing must be experts. It also forbids accepting omniscience. >Omniscience, >PutnamVsWilson. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Selection | Dawkins | I 38 Selection/Dawkins: Thesis: Selection occurs at the lowest level. (Not species, not individual, but genes, unit of heredity). >Genes, >Genes/Dawkins. I 42 Selection/Dawkins: Earliest form of selection: simply a selection of more stable molecules and rejecting unstable ones. It would not make sense to shake the right number of atoms and the right amount of added energy to expect a human to come out. The age of the universe would not suffice for that. I 73 Order/ordering: The cards themselves survive the shuffling. Selection/Dawkins: If genes always mixed, selection would be absolutely impossible. I 158 Def Degree of relationship/Dawkins: generation span: steps on the family tree. To Uncle: 3 steps: the common ancestor is e.g. A's father and B's grandfather. Degree of Relationship: per generation span ½ multiplied by itself. For g steps (1/2) g. But that is only part of the degree of relationship. In case of several common relatives they must also be determined. I 158 Selection/relationship/altruism/Dawkins: Now we can correctly calculate the chances for the multiplication of genes for altruism: E.g., A gene for the suicidal rescue of five cousins would not become more numerous, but probably one for the suicidal rescue of five brothers or ten cousins. >Altruism. I 162 Family altruism/Dawkins: parental care is merely a special case of family altruism. The fact that siblings do not exchange genes is not relevant, because they have obtained identical copies of the same genes from the same parents. Family Selection/Kin Selection/DawkinsVsWilson, E.O.: transfers the concept of group selection to family. Now, however, the core of Hamilton's argument is that the separation between family and non-family is not clear, but a question of mathematical probability. Hamilton's thesis(1) does not imply that animals are selfless towards all family members and self-serving to all outsiders. I 164 DawkinsVsWilson: He does not consider offspring as relatives! (I 461: Wilson has now withdrawn that). Def Group selection/Dawkins: different survival rate in groups of individuals. I 164 Kin selection/Dawkins: Of course animals cannot be expected to count how many relatives they are saving! I 462 Kin selection/Dawkins: It is a frequent mistake for students to assume that animals must count how many relatives they are saving. I 165 Kin selection/Dawkins: To determine the degree of relationship actuarial weightings can be used as a basis. How much of my wealth would I invest in the life of another individual. I 166 An animal can behave as if it had done this calculation. E.g. just as a human catches a ball as if he had solved a series of differential equations. I 372 Gene/selection/Dawkins: Under reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes. The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like GouldVsDawkins.) The selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same just like all tapes look the same. Genes show in their effects. ((s) effect creates identity.) 1. Hamilton, W.D. 1964. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. In: Journal of Theoretical Biology 7. pp- 1-16; 17-52. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Abstraction | Prior Vs Abstraction | I 132 Thinking/Grammar/Prior: Othello thinks of Desdemona that she ...becomes ...thinks that... Difference: whether the gap for the verb is filled, but not that for the name. Nominalization: ("old game"): instead of "Desdemona is faithful": "It is true of Desdemona that she is faithful." (Introduction of "that"). That-Sentences: pronouns are almost always through abstracta (quasi-names). (>Cook Wilson): Subject/Predicate/Wilson: E.g. "Jones's musical": here it is not predicated "is musical", or "that he is musical," but "musicality". I 133 PriorVsWilson: but the difference is not very large. Moreover, the true relation is that between "Jones" and "he". Better. Attribution of musicality. The introduction of abstractions such as "ness", etc. is always a trick. Verb/Prior: is like a sentence: its job is to make names of sentences. A verb is a sentence with one or more gaps. Verbs can be composed in the same way as sentences. Every composition of a sentence is ipso facto a composition of the verbs it contains. I 134 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the formal presentation of ordinary language sentences requires abstraction. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Charity Principle | Putnam Vs Charity Principle | I (b) 56 Charity Principle/N. L. Wilson: E.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles would then be the electrons according to Wilson. I (b) 57 E.g. historians made a terrible mistake and not Caesar (who was actually a fictional character), but Pompey founded the Roman Empire and did all the other heroic deeds that were previously attributed to Caesar. According to Wilson, Smith then always refers to Pompey when he says "Caesar"! PutnamVsWilson: according to a "historical" conception of names this is wrong, of course. He does not refer to a real person when he says "Caesar" (because he is now a fictional character). We have a false causal chain. PutnamVsWilson: descriptively, his theory is wrong: E.g. Someone has heard about another Quine and falsely believes that he is the logician Quine. We would then not say he refered to the right one, because that would be the most charitable! Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: affects only real situations! Applying it to counterfactual situations would mean not to grasp the distinction between what we mean by our expressions (even if we speak about counterfactual situations!) and what we would mean if that were the real situation! It would miss what Kripke calls rigidity. Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: Second deficiency: too egalitarian: what makes my beliefs about elm trees true is unimportant for determining the denotation of "elm". Even for the denotation in my idiolect. I (b) 58 Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: too numerical! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. Convictions cannot be counted! Reference/Possible World/Putnam: E.g. electron Bohr. Suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely imputed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons", but toour electrons. Reason: the primacy of the phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and they are also our phenomena. I (b) 58/59 Contribution of the Environment/Reference/Twin Earth/Putnam: from the fact that a liquid would be associated with the same stereotype and the same criteria on different planets would not follow that XYZ is water. It would only follow that it looks like water, tastes, etc. The reference depends on the true condition of the paradigms (?), not on our minds. Principle of Credit of Trust/Meaning/Knowledge/Idea/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without ever having a clear notion of it! The principle of credit of trust forbids us to assume that baptists must be experts! It also prohibits assuming omniscience. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Various Authors | Pinker Vs Various Authors | I 26 Robots Basic Laws/Asimov: 1) A robot may never hurt a human being, 2) it must obey the orders of humans, unless the orders conflict with the first law 3) It must protect its own existence, unless this conflicted with the 1st or 2nd law. I 27 PinkerVsAsimov: he was not able to position himself outside his own thought processes. The ability of humans to do evil is not considered, and their support is not excluded by the laws. I 458 Brain/Emotion/Tradition: "Triune brain": Unity of the cerebrum as evolutionary palimpsest of three layers: 1) Bottom: base ganglia (reptiles), seat of the primitive and selfish emotions 2) Limbic system: softer, more social emotions (parent feelings etc.) 3) The two are surrounded by the modern mammalian brain, the neocortex, which grew rapidly during evolution and is home to the intelligence. PinkerVsTrinity Theory (with Paul MacLean): the evolutionary forces do not simply accumulate layers. Although our bodies are witnesses of the past, they only possess few parts that have not been modified. Even the appendix is now conceded a function in connection with the immune system. Not even the circuits for emotions remain unaffected. (i.e. also: VsDennett?). I 459 Emotions are easy to reprogram! E.g. after less than 1,000 years of breeding dogs include Pitt Bulls and Saint Bernards. Furthermore, the cortex is not riding piggyback on the prehistoric limbic system. The systems work hand in hand. The amygdala dyes our experiences with feelings. It liaises with virtually every other part of the brain. I 62 Def SSM/"Sociological Standard Model": separation between culture and biology. Thesis: biological evolution was replaced by cultural evolution. (E.O.Wilson, later became victim of angry protests). LewontinVsWilson. I 63 Incorrect quotes of the opponents: E.g. Dawkins: "Genes created us, body and mind." (correct). VsDawkins: wrong quote: "genes control us, body and mind." - - I 324 Seeing/PinkerVsGombrich, Ernst H.: contrary to popular belief, we do not see what we expect to see. I 342 Seeing/Marr: completely ignores the backs, and even the surfaces. He analyzed the form of animals as if they had been made of pipe cleaners. Seeing/BiedermanVsMarr: assigns to every e.g. animal multiple geone combinations for different views. PinkerVsBiederman/PinkerVsGeones: it is precisely this concession that opens the possibility that forms are recognized in a completely different way. Why should we not think the idea through and assign many memory elements to every form, one for each position? Such memories do not need an exotic object-centered frame of reference, but can use the coordinates of the two-and-a-half dimensional sketch as long as there are so many memories that all perspectives are covered. Pinker: that was dismissed for many years from the outset. It took perhaps 40,000 aspects for each subject (memory elements). But this does not cover the positions outside the center of the field of vision yet! In recent times, it was considered, however, that for each object at most 40 aspects are sufficient when interpolating between views. I 343 Direction/Up/Down/Seeing/Pinker: People adjust themselves to the top down direction: if Africa lies on its side, it is not recognized, a square is not a diamond. This brings a further dilution of the geone theory: relations such as "over" or "above" must come from the retina, and not from the object. This limitation is likely to be indispensable, because often there is no way to define the "up" in an object before you recognized it! We can also turn objects in our mind (VsGeones). This makes a frame of reference of geones oriented to the object even less necessary. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Wilson, E.O. | Dawkins Vs Wilson, E.O. | I 164 Family Selection/Kin Selection/DawkinsVsWilson, E.O.: transfers the concept of group selection to family. Now, however, the core of Hamilton's argument is that the separation between family and non-family is not clear, but a question of mathematical probability. Hamilton's thesis does not imply that animals are selfless towards all family members and self-serving to all outsiders. DawkinsVsWilson: he does not consider offspring as relatives! (I 461: Wilson has now withdrawn that). |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Sozio-Evolut. | Wilson, E.O. | Pinker I 62 Def SSM. "Sozialwissenschaftliches Standardmodell": Trennung zwischen Kultur und Biologie. These: die biologische Evolution sei von der kulturellen Evolution abgelöst worden. (E.O.Wilson, wurde später Opfer wütender Proteste). LewontinVsWilson. I 63 Falsche Zitate der Gegner: Bsp Dawkins: Gene schufen uns, Körper und Geist." (Richtig). VsDawkins: falsches Zitat: "Gene kontrollieren uns, Körper und Geist". I 72 E.O.Wilson: These: Männer neigen stärker zur Polygamie. Steven RoseVsWilson . Buch: "Die Gene sind es nicht": Wilson wolle sagen: Mädels, werft euren Partnern nichts vor... |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
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