Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 69 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animals | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 161 Animal: Question: if we can ascribe thoughts to animals. Wittgenstein: "The dog is afraid, the Lord will beat him but he does not fear the Lord will beat him tomorrow." DummettVsWittgenstein: The theoretical apparatus is far more important here than Wittgenstein wants. >Future/Dummett, >Time/Dummett. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Artificial Consciousness | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 719 Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: why should one not "be able to say" that a machine has consciousness? >Consciousness, >cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial General Intelligence, >Human Level AI. That a chair "thinks" would simply be empty due to a lack of empirical criteria. >Criterion/Birnbacher. II 720 Concept/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Wittgenstein attributes the attribution criteria of a thing, to the concept of the thing, therefore he has an extended concept of the term. >Attribution. For example, the concept of pain is characterized not only by what pain in itself is, but also by its specific function in our lives. >Pain, >Language game, >Language community. Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: it follows that for Wittgenstein an artificial consciousness is logically impossible, since in our linguistic usage we only attribute it to humans. We would have no conditions according to which we would describe the behavior of machines as conscious. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 360) Truth/Assertiveness/Consciousness/Machine/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: The conditions of truth may be fulfilled, but the conditions of assertiveness may never be fulfilled. >Truth conditions, >Assertability conditions, >Assertability. I.e. even if it were true that the machine had consciousness, it would be conceptually impossible for us to claim it, because our concept of consciousness would not fit on it. Cf. >Machine Learning. The factually valid criteria are made for the factually applicable and not for any conceivable application situations. >Zombies, >Intentionality, >Thinking. II 722 Consciousness/Machine/Nomological Impossibility/Julian Huxley: in a BBC broadcast: "real" emotions and intentions are only possible in biotic matter. Also Paul Ziff, end of the 50s. II 724 Zombie/Robot/"Imitation Man"/Birnbacher: current discussion (early nineties): Phenomena of consciousness occur when a certain threshold of activation rate is exceeded. An "imitation man" might not feel anything, but he might think, mean, or expect something. (Intention). He could also think of himself, without actual self-consciousness. II 725 Consciousness/Man/Birnbacher: the nomological conditions for human consciousness are not only necessary, but also sufficient. I.e. they force consciousness in humans! >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Necessity. II 726 Criteria/Consciousness/Human/Wittgenstein: behaviour as a criterion for attributing consciousness. >Behavior. Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: behaviour cannot be a criterion for attributing consciousness to machines. Here neurophysiological criteria are important, which Wittgenstein attributes to the symptoms. >Symptoms. Consciousness/Behaviour/Animals/Rollin/BirnbacherVsWittgenstein: even in animals, behaviour is an unreliable criterion for consciousness! For example, cows eat immediately after an operation. Reason: their food is so low in nutrients that they would be weakened too much if they took long breaks. Longer periods of fasting are possible in humans. >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Speaking, >Robots. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Aspects | Searle | VI 169 Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true. Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make. There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect. VI 169/170 Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there. >Champagne example. The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions. For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer. For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect). Searle: this statement can also be true. II 75 Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.) Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus. If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect! II 76 ff Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Assertions | Dummett | II 124 Assertion/Dummett: By asserting something, the speaker excludes certain possibilities. II 125 But he does not rule out the possibility that the antecedent of the conditional is false. - Thus, its falsity does not make the assert. >Paradox of implication, >Conditional. III (e) 203 Meaning/assertion/Dummett: In general, no specific response is associated with an assertion - how the listener responds will depend on indefinitely many things - FregeVsWittgenstein: hence the meaning cannot be determined in the context of non-linguistic activities. Cf. >Use Theory. Tugendhat I 253 Meaning/assertion/game/Dummett/Tugendhat: (benefit) new: on the other hand it is said: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is right - Tugendhat: this requires the following: 1) that the circumstances for the accuracy of the use don’t matter 2) that the conditions on which the accuracy depends are such that their fulfillment is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions for its correctness (truth) are met - correctness is always implied (by the speaker). Listeners: separate the conditions and their presence. >Assertibility conditions. Tugendhat I 256f TugendhatVsDummett: 1) That does not state the truth conditions yet - possible solution: thruth conditions in turn by sentence - then a metalanguage is needed. >Metalanguage. TugendhatVsMeta language. Solution/Tugendhat: the explanation must lie in the usage rule of the first sentence. 2) Vs: Giving a guarantee in turn presumes the use of an assertive sentence (circular). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Atomic Sentences | Hacking | I 243 Atomic Sentence/Wittgenstein, early: e.g. the typewriter is on the table. This is not dependent on any representation. It is either true or false. >Truth values, >Atomism, >Picture theory, >Representation. HackingVsWittgenstein, early: simple atomic propositions are no representations at all. >Propositions. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Atomic Sentences | Popper | I 117 PopperVsWittgenstein/Tractatus: any "meaningful sentence" should be logically reducible to ’elementary propositions’. All meaningful sentences are "images of reality". His sense criterion thus coincides with the demarcation criterion of induction logic. This fails due to the problem of induction. The positivist radicalism destroyed metaphysics and natural science: the laws of nature are not logically reducible to elementary empirical propositions. >Protocol sentences, >Atomism, > Elementary Sentences, >Induction/Popper. After Wittgenstein’s criterion of meaning even the laws of nature are meaningless, i.e. not true (legitimate) sentences. This is not a distinction but an identification with metaphysics. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Beliefs | Wittgenstein | Stegmüller IV 499 Belief/Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Wittgenstein: the strength of belief is measured at the risks, which the believer is willing to take. MackieVsWittgenstein: 1. this is met not only by religious, but also by everyday beliefs - 2. the assumption, the meaning of the Last Judgement for the believer is a different than that one for the atheist boils down to Kierkegaard's problematic construction, that the interest of the questioner was part of his own question. >Religious belief. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Bivalence | Dummett | II 103 Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth. - And that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences. - It goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be. >Decidability. II 103f Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice. III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions. - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances...". >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means. Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. >Redundancy theory. III (b) 74 Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence. III (b) 76 Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value. Cf. >Multi valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Change | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 103 Change/object/substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the objects are retained. - That is the substance of the world. - Changes are changes from a possible world to another. ((s) This is not about physical motion). - ((s) WittgensteinVsLewis)/LewisVsWittgenstein) - the simple objects are non-temporal. - ((s) not its configurations) - ((s)> Wittgenstein per S4, not pro S5: see > S4/S5; > Systems), >Substance. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Colour | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 117 Color/Color Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: red cannot be defined. >Definitions. I 165 Color/Color Words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if colors were only represented by different names, that would be all the incompatibility - (no contradiction, no logical incompatibility) - on the other hand: if it is real functions that the points in the field of vision project on the color space (Wittgenstein pro), then there is real logical incompatibility .- "Red" and "green" as mere names are not contradictory - but they are when it comes to one single point - "(form of thought: Third) - (Hintikka: not explicit in Wittgenstein). >Contradictions, >Names. I 191/192 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The "colors" are not things that have certain properties so that you could easily look for colors or imagine colors that we do not know yet." I 323 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not want to let the differences between the individual experience of colors disappear. - On the contrary: public language must adapt to the nature of these experiences. I 324 It is not about "publicly used", but about "accessible for the public" - E.g. Robinson: must behave in a certain way for us to say that he plays a language game with himself. >Language Game. I 349 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is impossible to drive a wedge between physical and phenomenological color attribution... I 343 ...nor between pain and pain behavior. >Behavior. I 276ff Color/Color Words/Color Concepts/Color Theory/Experience/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at the end, we may delete the color experiences from our statements. I 377 The experiences, however, can be deleted just as little as pain - Color experience is, however, not about spontaneous expressions like sensations - WittgensteinVsPsychological Color Theories - VsEffect Theories of color - color tables are neither linguistically nor behavioristically bound. I 378 But our color words are not based on tables - (that would be like trying to put the rules above the language game)... I 379 ...nor on memories. I 380 Because of their privacy, our notions cannot be used in public language games. I 381 Solution: people simply follow certain language games - this is conceptual, not psychological - in the case of "red" we choose the image that comes to us while listening - (Philosophical Investigations/PI). I 383f Color/Color Words/Impression/Expression/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: We live in a world of impressions - (E.g. color impressions) - but we can only speak of them with reference to physical colors - Representation (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 280): if the painter gives a representation in addition to the image, by what right do we call both a representation? >Sensory impressions, >Representation. I 385 Although colors have a clearer structure than feelings, there is no essential difference between sensation concepts and color concepts. >Concepts. --- II 30 Colors/Color Words/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the fact that we can speak of greenish blue, but not of greenish red, is part of grammar - not psychology - Therefore, the entire color octahedron is not part of psychology. >Grammar. II 60 We need something additional to the color word "green". II 114 Color/Color Words/Grammar/Rule/Idea/Wittgenstein: it would be useless even to try to imagine red and green at the same time at the same place - on the other hand: useful: imagining to lift a man with one hand. II 118 MooreVsWittgenstein e.g. (see above) ...red and green... is a rule for "and". >Rules. II 212 Color/Notion/Wittgenstein: in color words it is essential that we envision a mental image - but this is not a mental act that animates a symbol. >Symbols. II 269 Color/General/Wittgenstein: the many instances of red have nothing in common - there is no thing that is common to all numbers. >Numbers. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Community | Blackburn | Esfeld I 119 Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn(1): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community. >Private language, >Rule following, >Language community, >Language use. KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Kripke's Wittgenstein. I 120 EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! >Dispositions. The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback. I 121 Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself? Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined. >Change, >Temporal identity, >Conceptual content. 1. S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301. |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Competence | Dummett | II 100 Abilities/superhuman/Dummett: our image of a super being that has direct insight into counterfactual things does not provide a picture of what these abilities actually consist of. >Superhuman. I 154/155 Meaning/competence/Dummett: meaning does not have to be explained by understanding! (Speakers have no explicit theory). - But also: DummettVsWittgenstein: control is more than a practical skill. III (b) 68 Speech/control/propositional knowledge/Dummett: there is usually little difference between knowledge of P and knowledge of the truth of the sentence. >Judgments. But propositional knowledge is not sufficient for language proficiency. - Propositiponal knowledge is not sufficient for word understanding. Knowledge of a single proposition is not sufficient for understanding of words. - ((s) The word must be able to appear in several contexts.) - ((s) Converse to substitution principle). III (c) 119 Translation theory/Dummett: does not explain the command of the native language. III (c) 117f Theory of meaning/Dummett: from a theory of truth (axioms like ""earth" denotates earth") - but meaning is more than knowledge of the axioms: Knowledge of the (corresponding) propositions. - From knowledge of the truth theory follows the ability of language as a whole, not sentence by sentence. -> Holism. Knowledge of the propositions is not available in lists. >Lists, >Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge. III (c) 133 Meaning Theory: Knowledge of reference is not sufficient for language proficiency. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Conventions | Bennett | I 155 Convention/Lewis: convention is more than mere behavior regularity - no agreement necessary - not even implied agreement. 170 Conventional meaning is more than the usual meaning, because it contains common knowledge about a regularity. >Regularity, >Intersubjectivity, >Community, >Language community, >Actions. I 167f Convention/Lewis: conventions are mutual knowledge. Cargile: this is useful only up to fourth reflection. David Lewis: only actions are coordinated. BennettVsLewis: do not imparting any action on a meaning I 189 Searle: there is no "conventional meaning"; instead: rules that apply for an expression. >Rules, >Language Rules, >Utterances, >Utterances/Searle, >Meaning/Searle. I 191 Convention/Meaning/Bennett: a speaker can only ever give an expression a conventional meaning if it already has a meaning. >Lemons example, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Wittgenstein: I cannot say "hot" while I mean "cold". >Meaning/intending, >Meaning/intending/Wittgenstein. SearleVsWittgenstein: the meaning exceeds the intention, it is sometimes also a matter of convention. Bennett: conventional meaning effective circumstance. >Circumstances. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Correctness | Millikan | I 308 Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction? >Learning, >Prediction, >Judgment, >Stimulus. Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same. Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above). >Sentence, >Negation, >Fact. Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity). >Contradiction. I 309 Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment. Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world. Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s) >inegalitarian theories/Nozick). There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast. E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence. Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time. >Objectivity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Correspondence Theory | Ayer | 1 291 VsCorrespondence Theory: privileging log sentences as basis sentences is a mistake, because it is falsely tacitly assumed that basis sentences stated facts. >Facts, >Statements, >Sentences. I 293 f AyerVsCorrespondence Theory/AyerVsWittgenstein: E.g. Map: assumption of structural similarity missed - otherwise, a map with the correct scale could be from a different country - E.g. a very similar photograph could be of someone else - there has to be a convention - physical correspondence only correct if it is chosen as method of representation - Convention decides what signs represent - fact about what is true. >Map example. I 295 Map/Ayer: may be considered as a kind of proposition - it expresses something by physically corresponding - truth by fulfilling this statement function - but not by the fact that we choose one or the other method to determine what the function is. I 296f AyerVsCorrespondence Theory: confuses the question of the conventionality of the symbol system with the question of the truth of what is symbolized. >cf. >Coherence theory. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Logic Texts | Read III 27 VsWittgenstein/Read: the correspondence theory is a realistic theory. The realism of the correspondence theory compels us to accept the law of bivalence. There may be statements about which we cannot in principle say whether they are true or false. (>The Present King of France is bald). Re III 40 VsCorrespondence Theory: The correspondence theory contains a metaphysics of facts and events correlated with statements. That is its fundamental misunderstanding. The truth scheme is neutral on this issue. >Correspondence theory. Re III 242 Correspondence theory: according to it, the truth predicate a substantive predicate which assigns a relational property to statements. True sentences then have a real property that distinguishes them from false statements. Correspondence Theory: Ontology contains facts - statements are made true by facts, not by things. >Fact, >Truth maker. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Correspondence Theory | Rescher | In: Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien Frankfurt/M 1996 I 344 Correspondence Theory/Rescher: can be 1) definitional 2) criterion-related. >Definitions, >Criteria. Verification: "confrontation with the facts" is useless: it is not possible with universal sentences, past, probability, modality, counterfactual conditional. >Universal sentences, >Past, >Probability, >Modality, >Counterfactual conditionals. RescherVsCorrespondence Theory: the question of the type of correspondence is completely unresolved. RescherVsWittgenstein - VsPicture-Theory: Language does not work like this. >Language, >Picture-Theory, >Language/Wittgenstein, >Facts/Wittgenstein. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Criteria | Chomsky | II 345 Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "inner workings of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the proper use of an expression. II 346 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: here it is not about a "real statement" e.g. if someone reads something, but about a legitimate claim - e.g. mirage: can provoke a legitimate (incorrect) assertion. >Assertions, >Assertibility conditions, >Justification. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Deceptions | Searle | I 57 Inverted spectra/Searle: people with inverted spectra show the same behavior. Therefore there cannot be simple causal relationships. >Inverted spectra. I 259 Perspective/deception/Searle: perspective is not mental content, there are no conclusions. Seeing is no mental content (perhaps it is a mental process). >Mental content. II 76 Rabbit-Duck-head/Wittgenstein: with the rabbit-duck-head there are different uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we do not only see objects but also aspects - we love people, but also aspects. >Rabbit-Duck-Head, >Apects. II 80 Deception: e.g. the moon on the horizon is bigger: this is part of the content. >Content. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Excluded Middle | Millikan | I 229 Law of the excluded middle/"not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: the sentence of the excluded middle does not apply to simple representative negative sentences. E.g. besides the possibility that a predicate and that its opposite is true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that is precisely the possibility that the sentence does not have a certain Fregean sense. >Fregean sense, >Negation, >Existence, >Nonexistence. "P or non-p": only makes sense if "p" makes sense. Negation: its function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to say that the sentence has no sense. Sense/Millikan: whether a sentence has meaning, cannot be known a priori. >Sense, >a priori/Millikan. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his error in the Tractatus, was to believe that when everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a sense, then the negative sentence is a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalistic belief that one might know the difference between sense and non-sense a priori. >Rationalism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Existence | Wittgenstein | Chisholm II 181 Existence/Wittgenstein/Simons: we cannot claim of an atom that it exists - Atomism/SimonsVsWittgenstein: linguistic analysis cannot show that there are atoms. >Atomism, >Atomic sentences, >Existence statements. --- Hintikka I 71 Name/existence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a name cannot occur in the connection "X exists" - if red did not exist, one could not speak of it - subject/existence/general: one cannot say "There are objects" like one can say "There are books "- unity: it is nonsense to talk of the "total number of objects". >Wholes. I 73 Existence/necessary/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since "possible existence" makes no sense, we need to regard every existing thing as necessary existent. - But this is only transcendental - of course the objects do not really exist necessarily - or the necessity is not expressible. - It follows that one must also interpret the possible facts constructed of the same objects. I 92f Existence/name/object/description/Russell/Hintikka: pointless: to say "this exists" - also with everything that is designated - against: useful for descriptions. Acquaintance: also provides the reference - so that even complex logical forms are objects of acquaintance - WittgensteinVsRussell: instead actual objects (and their connections). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Explanation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 29 Inexplicable/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are. I 190 Explanation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Metaphysics (> Metaphysics/Duhem). Large typescript: "Supposing my face image would be two equal red circles on a blue background: what's here available in a double number, and what just once? One could say we have a color here and two locations. But it was also said that red and circular were properties of two objects, which could be called spots and which are in a certain spatial relationship to each other. Sounds like an explanation of physics. I could also answer: two red lanterns, etc. But an explanation is not required here (trying to solve our dissatisfaction by an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics) (> Metaphysics/Duhem). What is worrying to us, is the ambiguity about the grammar of the sentence "I see two red circles on a blue background." I can also say: "I see the color red in two different locations" but then the grammar of the words "spot", "location" , "color" would need to align to the words of the first sentence. The confusion arises here in that we believe that we have to decide about the presence or absence of an object (spot). Like when you decide whether what I see (in a physical sense) is a red coat or a reflex. I 238 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond the symbolism ... thus we can do nothing further than to replace a symbolism with another." HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong because gestures of pointing can well lead us away from the field of purely linguistic. WittgensteinVsVs: denies that. He explains what we accomplish through ostensive explanation is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between the written or spoken language on the one hand and the sign language on the other hand. Ostensive explanation/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus. I 255 Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as "primordial phenomena". In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things. --- II 44 Indicative Definition: With this, however, nothing more is done than adding something to the symbolism. II 45 It will not lead us beyond this symbolism. We just replace a set of symbols by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols will in turn be indicated to the symbols. II 56 Explanation/Science/Wittgenstein: we explain an event in physics by describing another event - Analysis: finding out something new - not so in philosophy. II 60 Music/Language/Wittgenstein: #, b, resolution characters are signals in the strict sense. The language does not consist of signals. A signal must be explained, and the explanation must indicate something, whereby the signal is supplemented. We explain them in the same sense as colors. Besides the word "green" we need something else, additional. II 61 Explanation/Wittgenstein: the sentence with the explanation is not in this way different from the explanation itself. The explanation of a sentence is always something like a definition that replaces a symbol set by another. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Facts | Hempel | I 98 Facts/NeurathVsWittgenstein: the separation of statements and facts is the result of a doubling metaphysics. >Metaphysics, >Statements. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Facts | Quine | Rorty I 217 Fact/Quine/Rorty: "Dog" is the English word for "dog", and "Robinson believes in God": that is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "factual". Quine thus offers a distinction between truth by virtue of convergence and truth by virtue of correspondence instead of the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth. Davidson:... Quinesian resolution of the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact. Quine I 426f Facts/Quine: are not something mediating according to the image of our sentences (VsSellars, VsWittgenstein?) - better: are true sentences or true propositions - facts are not required, especially not in addition to propositions. >Propositions/Quine. II 37 Another term I want to save from the abyss of the transcendental is the term factual which proves to be relevant in the theory of radical translation. In this case, none of the facts decides which of the two manuals is right. And this term of the factual is neither transcendental nor epistemological to such an extent ((s) no fact can decide - requires facts that are just not fit to do so.) II 37 Actual: is the radical translation: no fact decides which of the manuals is right. Actual things are ontological, naturalistic but neither transcendental nor epistemological. They are physical conditions and not empirical skills. Reinterpretation is only done with others, not with ourselves. - Factuality as gravity is inherent in our nature. VI 113 Fact/Quine: we can erase that. "It is a fact" does not contribute anything. It is only seemingly founded in correspondence theory. A true sentence as a whole corresponds to a fact. "It is true that" is necessary for sentences that do not exist. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Facts | Searle | III 44ff Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition. Fact/Austin/Strawson: a fact is what is said, not something that is testified about. III 212 Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something. III 219 Strawson: facts are not complex things or groups of things. Fact and statement are not two independent entities and facts are not language independent. Facts are not what statements are "about". Frege: a fact is a true statement (StrawsonVs, AustinVs). Strawson: they are not identical, because they play different roles: facts are causal statements, not statements. III 214 Facts are "internal accusative" for true statements (spurious relation). III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact can only be formulated but not named. III 215 Searle: facts are not true statements. A fact has a causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. >Truth makers. III 219 Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition. III 219ff Fact/Strawson: a fact is that what is said, not something that is testified about. ((s) Like Brandom). >Fact/Brandom. SearleVsStrawson: a fact is not a true statement. A fact has causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. ((s) Like Austin). >Fact/Strawson, >Fact/Austin. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an object identified independently of facts! >Fact/Wittgenstein, >State of affairs/Wittgenstein. Otherwise one approached the traditional substance (VsWittgenstein, Tractatus). Quantification via objects is misleading. It is better to say: "there are examples". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Facts | Sellars | I 28 Def minimal fact/Sellars: facts about which can be reported reliably, because here errors are less likely. The fact that the tie seems to be on a certain occasion green. (SellarsVs). With seeing, one provides more than a description of the experience. One affirms a claim. >Evidence/Sellars. I 44 Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. >Experience. --- II 315/16 Subject: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of an utterance can be made). >Description levels, >Level/Order, >Metalanguage, >Name of a sentence. II 320 SellarsVsWittgenstein: we must avoid to join his equating of complex objects with facts. >Facts/Wittgenstein, >Complex/Wittgenstein. The claim that the complex object K, wold be the fact aRb is logical nonsense. Fact: you can say in two different ways something "about a fact": a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact expression, that means the name of a fact rather than a statement. II 323 Natural-linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: natural-language objects are seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). One can speak of them as "proper names". That coincides with Wittgenstein's view that elementary statements must be constructed as proper names occurring in a particular way. Cf. >Atomic sentences, >Atomism. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| God | Thomas Aquinas | Holz II 106 God/Thomas Aquinas: God is not the mirror of all things, but things are a mirror of God - but the recognition of a thing in the mirror is speculative recognition- Descartes: God cannot deceive because of his perfection. --- Geach I 318 Relationships/God/Human/World/Aquinas/Geach: human relations: are "real" (within the world). Divine relations to humans: are not "real". - E.g., 1. "God rules the world" 2. "The world is ruled by God" - both are logically equivalent. And both are true according to Thomas Aquinas, but only the second is a "real" relation according to him (because only secular things can enter into real relations) - this is Thomas Aquinas' "deep understanding that the way our mind works must not be the way, as things are". AquinasVsWittgenstein: that is, that our mind is not necessarily a "mirror of the world" (Tractatus). >Tractatus, >L. Wittgenstein, >World, >World/Thinking, >Reality, >Mirror/Rorty. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Language | Nagel | I 57 NagelVsprimacy of language: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytic philosophy. >Linguistic turn, >Analytic philosophy. Rejection of Frege. Thinking is often not linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. >Thinking without language. I 57 If language reveals principles of thought, this is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar follows a logic. >Logic, >Grammar, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 61 That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no concequences for the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. >Heterophenomenology. Nagel thesis: the sources of philosophy are preverbal, their problems are not dependent on culture. Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsWittgenstein: (according to Rorty): the limits of language are not the limits of thinking! "The content of some thoughts goes beyond any form that they may take in human consciousness." (Per distinction scheme/content). >Scheme/content. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language Games | Brandom | I 143 Sentence/Wittgenstein/Brandom: precedes, because it can only make one move in the game of language -> speech act. --- II 26 Language game/Wittgenstein/Brandom: The simple use of the word "plate" among workers is not a genuine language game. Vocal, but not verbal practice. II 27 BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification claims that language has a center - assertions are not just things you can do with language - they are rather that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Language Games | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 29 Language game/use/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are. I 247 Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only thing that distinguishes Wittgenstein's late period from the middle. - Solution to the problem: random acting in accordance with the rule to differentiate from real rule following. >Rules, >Rule following. I 250 Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Brown book: not fragments of language - but in itself closed system of understanding. - Simple primitive languages. - Solution to the problem of naming: role in our language. - There are so many relationships between names and object, as there are names and objects. >Names, >Words. I 273 Language/world/language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: StegmüllerVsWittgenstein: supposedly does not show how the language is directly linked to the reality. - Stegmüller: thesis: it would not be about the "vertical" connections, but only about the horizontal between steps in the language game. - Hintikka: quasi mere role without facts. - HintikkaVs: that would mean that not even descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. - justification solely by the role of words in our lives. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein emphasizes the vertical relationship on the contrary - whereby the logic before each match lies with facts - such as the method of measurement before measuring. - Measurement is very probably a comparison with facts. I 281 HintikkaVsStegmüller: otherwise speaking would be already the whole language game. I 282 Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: distinction between language games - a) that gives a word a meaning - b) the game in which we express the word. - E.g. we learn what a lie is, not like other words. I 329 Definition physiognomic language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. pain behavior: is conceptual - not bound to facts. >Pain, >Facts. I 331 Also involves the reaction of others. - This is a logical connection, which is constitutive for the language game. I 335 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. physiognomic language games. - Here doubts about the certainty are meaningless. - In primary language games epistemological concepts like knowledge/belief/truth/error and so on do not occur. I 348 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them cannot be corrected - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world. - In primary language games there are no criteria. - But they can provide as a whole criteria for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": in Wittgenstein "beginning of the language game". --- II 237 Explore/Law/Natural Law/Wittgenstein: Supposing someone has discovered the law of energy conversion - it could be a new math - he has developed a new game. - Not new mechanics. >Discoveries. II 283f In accordance/Wittgenstein: dependent on language games. - tertium comparationis. - An imagination in the context of truth does not relate to us. - Wrong: to think that things would be an extension of something else. - As if a sentence would be more true if it coincides with reality - that is not an extension. - ((s) > "Make true"/Wittgenstein, >More authors on Truthmakers). --- VI 138 Language game instead of calculus: - the rules are not strict - undefined terms - is not a theory of the language game - VsTheories: better: to search for a way. >Calculus. --- Metzinger II 721 Language Game/rules/Wittgenstein/Birnbacher: Problem: Stability/flexibility or changeability and historicality of the language game rules. Criteria can become symptoms and symptoms can become criteria. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 354). Wittgenstein himself tends to assume that criteria are undisputed that excldudes an appliance to exotic possibilities. (Residual Verificationism). Birnbacher: Pretty conservative fixation: not every new application is a shift in meaning. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Loewenheim | Hacking | I 176 Loewenheim/Hacking: it is a paradox: that statements about an area where they, for example, state the lack of clear assignability (e.g. subsets of natural numbers cannot be assigned unambiguously to the natural numbers), also apply to a countable area: then it would follow that the natural numbers cannot be unambiguously represented in the natural numbers (unintended model). Today that is no longer considered to be a paradox. >Unintended models. I 178 Loewenheim/HackingVsPutnam: Putnam's criticism only applies to the correspondence theory or the representation theory. >Correspondence theory. I 180 ff HackingVsLoewenheim/HackingVsPutnam: 1) Physics does not fit into 1st order logic. 2) Everyday language always has indicators. 3) VsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein does not prove that our use is essentially unreliable. 4) The Loewenheim proposition refers to numbers, not words. 5) I do not need a theory of reference to refer. 6) There are photographs in books about myons. 7) The Loewenheim proposition is not constructive! I.e. there is no method for producing an unintended model. 8) Affixes such as "sour" to cherry and "Persian" to cat do not work like the adjective "sweet." You do not pickle Vistula cats and do not eat heart cats as fresh fruit. Cf. >Loewenheim/Putnam. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Logical Constants | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 139 Logical Constants/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the structural elements, often referred to as logical constants, and which are the main tool for creating complex sentences from simple ones, are not necessarily needed. I 140 Logical Constants/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: were there is composition, there are argument and function, these are already all logical constants. >Compositionality. Tractatus: 5,441 "Here it becomes clear that "logical objects" and "logical constants" (in the sense of Russell and Frege) do not exist. For: "all results of truth operations with truth functions are identical, which are one and the same truth function of elementary propositions. II 79 Sheffer Stroke/notation/Wittgenstein: makes the internal relation visible. - WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing style does not make clear that p v q follows from p.q. >Sheffer stroke. VI 95/96 Logical Constants/Elementary Proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: new: priority of a sentence-system compared to single sentences - formerly VsLogical constants - (do not connect any objects, this is still true for Wittgenstein) - but wrong: that the rules have anything to do with the internal structure of sentences. New: they form part of a broader syntax. V 70 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "logical objects" or "logical constants" in Russell's sense do not exist. IV 71 Logical Constants/Tractatus: 5.441 this disappearance of the apparent logical constant also occurs when "~(Ex) . ~fx" says the same as "(x).fx" or "(Ex).fx.x =a" the same as "fa". IV 79 Logic/Symbol/Sign/Sentence/Tractatus: 5.515 Our symbols must show that what is indicated by "v" "u", etc. (logical constants) must be propositions. (Logical Form). >Propositions, >Symbols. IV 80 "p" and "q" requires even the "v","~" etc.! If the sign "p" in "p v q" does not represent a complex sign, then it cannot make sense on its own. But if "p v p" makes no sense, then "p v q" cannot make sense either. >Sense, >senseless. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Meaning | Dummett | I 18 Sense: according to Frege, the term has the meaning simply. The user need not always have the sense before his mind. In itself the meaning is objective. I 29 Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes use of the concept of truth superfluous > Meaning before Truth. I 45 f .... Husserl: a statement adopts the meaning with which it is met by an internal act . ((s)> Humpty- Dumpty Theory of Meaning). Def Meaning/Dummett: what one must know in order to understand the term (an expression). I 152 Def meaning: what makes a sentence true. I 154/55 Dummett : meaning must not be explained by understanding. ( Speakers have no explicit theory.) - but also: DummettVsWittgenstein: mastery over practical ability. I 188 Dummett/Frege: Knowledge of Meaning = knowledge of the truth conditions - WittgensteinVs A criterion of meaning has no basis when it is no theory of meaning as a proposition. II 109 Meaning/DummettVsDavidson: trivial axioms ( . " Snow..." / snow) does not even show understanding, but push the task of explaining the theory of meaning - it explains what it means to capture the corresponding proposition. II 133 Meaning/Dummett: remains an unsolved problem. I 29 Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth - Davidson truth before meaning (Defined truth conditions - later the theory) - Dummett both together. Use/truth /Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. > Meaning before Truth. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Necessity | Lewis | IV 37 Causally necessary/Lewis: is a sentence if it is true in all possible worlds in which the same laws of nature apply. --- Schwarz I 156 Necessary a posteriori: "Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because first of all you have to find out that the material that fills our streams and lakes is H2O.- necessary: in all possible worlds the substance that fills our streams is H2O - Discovery is contingent (chemical, not modal) - therefore, the H2O truths imply a priori the water truths. --- Rorty II 123 LewisVsWittgenstein: distinctions between essence and accidence or between necessity and contingency are an artificial product that changes with the description. --- Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessary/Schwarz: e.g. the sentence "Everything is the way it really is" necessarily implies all truths, but only for the actual world - >Quidditism, >Panpsychism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Negation | Millikan | I 221 Not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: Thesis: "not" is an operator who operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the sense of the entire sentence. >Operator. Negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences cannot have non-existent facts as the real value. Reason: Negative facts do not have causal forces that could play a role in a normal explanation. Negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. E.g. "not-p" is called "the fact that -p does not exist" In a similar way, Wittgenstein has understood it as well. >Fact. N.B.: we had said above, that existence sentences are not representations. Image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but understood sentences of the form "x does not exist" are understood in this way as to map a non-existent fact. Then the variable "x" in "x does not exist" does not go via names of single objects (objects, elementary objects) but via representations of possible states (possible facts). >Picture theory. Meaning/Non-existence/Negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning ((s)> Non-Existence/Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology it means that they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time, he could claim that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. N.B.: that made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: could we not maintain at least half of this equivalence? The from "not-p" to "that -p does not exist"? >Equivalence. MillikanVsWittgenstein: No, not even this we can do. If Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that -p does not exist," then that would mean for my position that negative sentences do not map world states and are not representations. Millikan: instead, they would represent linguistic facts, "not-p" would then be an icon, but it does not represent, whereby a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Protoreferent/Millikan. "p" would not be a representative of "not-p" but a protoreferent. Question: would "not-p" be an icon of which the "p is false" ((s) linguistically) explicitly represented? Vs: then "not" would be no operator anymore! Not/Negation/Operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: i.e. The mapping rule for "not-p" is a function of the mapping rule for "p". 1. If "not" is not an operator, it might happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p," but still the sense of "not-p" absurd. 2. If "not-p" says "that -p does not exist", "not-p" must also be true if some variant in "p" is not fully determined, i.e. has no adapted meaning. E.g. "Pegasus was not a winged horse" e.g. "The present king of France is not bald" would be true sentences! 3. Certainly, it is the case that "'p' is false" at least maps (icons) that "p" has no real value. Correspondingly, "x does not exist" maps then the fact that "x" does not have referents. N.B.: if "not-p" says "that -p does not exist" it still maps a negative fact. > Facts/Millikan. I 224 Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: Thesis: negative sentences, whose opposites are normal representative sentences, must themselves represent positive facts. >Prepresentation, >Sentence. I 224 Negation/stabilization function/not/representation/Millikan: what is the stabilization function of "not" in normal representing sentences? It is not needed to "erase" the rest of the sentence. "Erase": sometimes occurs, but then it is called "Sorry" or "I did not mean that". Negation/"not": its function is not to produce no believe. That would not be a function. Eigenfunction: of "not" is relational. That is, it is a (mathematical) function of the eigenfunction of the sentence without "not". Sentence: has the function of producing a belief. Likewise, a sentence with "not" has to produce something that has a potential benefit. Negative sentence: perhaps it should eliminate a false belief? But that would be similar to "does not exist" works. >Existence, >Nonexistence. I 224 Negative sentence/"not"/imperative/Millikan: an imperative like "bring no dirt into the house" has very well a positive function. E.g. if you do it anyway, it is not done with an excuse "I did not want it". For the command was not, to do it without purpose. Not sufficient: "I did not intend it". Correct: I intended not to do it. Not sufficient: "I did not know I did it" Correct: you have to know that you do not do it. Not/imperative: here the usage is not parallel to the function of "does not exist". I 257 Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence maps a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ontology | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 73 Ontology/Possible Worlds/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the objects remain the same - no matter how different a world is in relation to our actual world. ((s) See also the distinction S4/S5; see systems. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka; contains no functions as basic concepts. - Hintikka: because of Wittgenstein's interpretation of identity. See Identity/Wittgenstein, Functions/Wittgenstein, >Objects, >Identity, >Concepts, >Possible Worlds. I 30 Grammar/Hintikka: in a logically analyzed language, the grammar corresponds to ontology. >Grammar. I 73 et seqq. Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity. Necessity/Wittgenstein. I 123 Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein's basic ontology is the same as the one by Frege. As far as the connectives are concerned, there is complete agreement. That Wittgenstein invented the truth functions is often falsely claimed. I 124 Heijenoort/Hintikka: proves the truth functions of Frege as implicit. The sentence is the expression of his truth conditions. Because of his thesis of the inexpressibility of semantics, he does not establish a theory of truth functions. Ontology/Negation/Hintikka: ...this means that the negation is ultimately eliminated from the ontology and semantics of the Tractatus. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka: another objection is that Wittgenstein's Tractatus ontology contains no functions among the undefined elements (in contrast to properties and relationships). Hintikka: the reason is probably his interpretation of the identity in the Tractatus, which makes it difficult to identify functions in the usual way as relations whose last relation is clearly determined by the choice of the other values. III 142 Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: must consist of an absolute determination of what is conceivable and possible. VI 63 Tractatus/Schulte: no systematic representation of an ontology, or treatise on logical syntax. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Picture (Mapping) | Carnap | II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in that language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or folly be brought forth! > Picture theory. --- Millikan I 198 Picture/Identity/Reference/Millikan: no one who had gone through Carnap's school would assume that "A" refers to the word "A". Reference/Millikan: here we have to distinguish two types of reference. >Reference/Millikan. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Picture Theory | Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. --- Hintikka I 67 Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter... I 68 ...then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation. - ((s) The relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter. - This is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus. - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. I 127 Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. I 131 Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 132f ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics. - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. >Correspondence theory. I 134/35 Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. >Truth, >Truth conditions. I 135 Can be described as theory but not expressed. (structural equivalence, isomorphism). I 141 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. I 161 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). >Reflection, >Picture. I 183 Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection, VsWiderspiegelung. I 184 Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) > Phenomenology/Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. >Ordinary language. --- III 144 Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it. >World, >Reality, >Thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Positivism | Rorty | I 128ff Positivists/Rorty: Thesis: We should replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" with the term "language". - Then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke). >Qualities/Locke. But exactly this thesis was revived by Kripke's revolution against Wittgenstein. >Rule following/Kripke. KripkeVsLinguistic turn. >linguistic turn. II (f) 130f Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "Ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities are no longer in closer relation to reality than secondary qualities (VsLocke) - but exactly this thesis was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn). >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker | I 17 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of actually existing worlds there are better ways how the world might have been. I 14 Possible Worlds/Time/Stalnaker: there are many analogies between times and worlds. >Actualism. Actualism: actualism corresponds to presentism. Def presentism/(s): only the present exists and only the current point in time. Four-dimensionalism/Stalnaker: four-dimensionalism corresponds to modal realism. >Four-dimensionalism. Def modal realism/(s): modal realism means that other worlds exist literally. Representative: a representative is David Lewis. >Modal realism, >David K. Lewis. Stalnaker: very few are realists in terms of possible world and times, but most are realists in terms of space. >Realism, >Space, >Time. I 27 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of something like "I and my surroundings" we assume a way how the world is, that is a property or state. >States, cf. >Situations. Important argument: properties may exist uninstantiatedly. >Instantiation. I 38 Possible Worlds: a possible world is no thing of a certain kind, nor an individual. A possible world is that to which truth is relative or what people differentiate in their rational actions. >Possibility, >Actions. I 52 Possible world: r: it is pointless to ask whether possible worlds satisfy certain conditions, e.g. is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? This is pointless, the answer will always have the form of a necessary sentence: P-or-not-P. - But doubt about that will be a doubt about the content of the sentence and not doubt about a possible world. The same applies to the problem that you might not believe a necessary truth. Possible worlds/conditions: it is pointless to ask whether a possible world meets certain conditions. Possible world/necessary/Stalnaker: if it is true, e.g. that water is necessarily H2O or e.g. that there are unattainable cardinal numbers, then these assertions express exactly this proposition, and the sentences that express these propositions tell us nothing about the nature of possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Kripke. Stalnaker: therefore it is impossible to characterize the entire range of all the possibilities. For then we would know the way how the range of all possibilities is different from that how it could be -> Wittgenstein: you should remain silent about things that you cannot talk about (Tractatus). StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not help, because pointing also must have a content - therefore Ramsey says: "What you cannot say, you cannot whistle either". I 84/85 Possible worlds/Stalnaker: possible worlds are not just an exercise of our imagination, but part of our actions, e.g. scientific explanations. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Private Language | Dummett | I 127 Private Language/Dummett: It makes no sense to say that there is something about which we cannot talk. I 143 E.g. assuming there was a new language similar to Esperanto: "interlingua". Invented by a speaker for purely private use: it is not subject to Wittgenstein s verdict against a private language, because the privacy of this language is only a contingent feature. It is just de facto known to only one person. Wittgenstein s arguments are directed against the possibility of an essentially private language. Cf. >Rule Following. Dummett: But Interlingua would not be independent from other languages, it would not exist in a vacuum. I 143 Private Language: WittgensteinVs. - DummettVsWittgenstein: an artificial private language is possible and can be learned. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Private Language | Millikan | I 303 Perception langauge/perception/observation language/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one cannot develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. Cf. >Private language/Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Observation/Millikan, >Perception/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Proper Names | Searle | II 288 Names/Searle: names presuppose any other representation. They have no explicit intentional content.< >Intentional content. II 291 ff Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: Kripke exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. He overweights parasitic cases and presupposes an omniscient observer. Meteorology baptizes future events. >Causal theory of proper names. II 291 ff Names/Mill: names have no connotation, only denotation. Frege: the meaning of a name is detected by description. >Descriptions, >Connotation. II 292 Names/SearleVsKripke: a causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention. The causal chain is not pure, self-descriptive. Baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise a successful reference is explained by successful reference (circular). >Speaker intention. II 311 Names/meaning/reference/Searle: e.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is". We speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries. >Description/Kripke. E.g. swapped spots: identification: "the spot that causes the experience". Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." Wolf II 168 Names/Searle: the meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true. We cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle (Strawson ditto). >Bundle theory. Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name. Solution/Zink: localisation. >Zink. Searle V 145 Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Names/Mill. V 145 There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance. Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. V 245 Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description, we must unfortunately assume substances. From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties. Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning. - SearleVsWittgenstein. V 247 Names/Mill: names have no sense. FregeVsMill: e.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar. This is not more informative than Everest = Everest. FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects. Identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. V 256 Names/SearleVsFrege: names are not entirely clear, e.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description. SearleVsKripke: names are not rigid, otherwise they are like logical equivalents. Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function. >Predication, >Ostension. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Rabbit-Duck-Head | Searle | II 76 Rabbit-Duck Head: In the case of the Rabbit-Duck Head, we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presentational contents, but only one image. >Representation, >Internal representation. Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head shows different uses of the word "to see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. >Aspects/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Rule Following | Wittgenstein | Newen I 35 Rule-following/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: is a competence - without justification or consideration - rule: not fixed, but something that we feel bound to. - VsWittgenstein: Problem: uncertainty of usages. ((s) For the philosophical discussion of Wittgenstein's theory of rule following cf. >Kripke's Wittgenstein.) --- Stegmüller IV 120 Rule-following/Wittgenstein: assertibility conditions are impossible for private rule-following because community does not exist. --- Hintikka I 243 Rule/Philosophical Investigations/Wittgenstein: rule-following is nothing more than acting in accordance with a rule. This view is rejected by Wittgenstein initially: in the Blue Book, he rejects the view, the teaching of language is a mere drill. For the logically-thought out language use applies, "that the rule is included in the understanding, obeying, etc., if the symbol for the rule forms part of the calculation." Vs: Problem: so Wittgenstein is not satisfied in the long run, because it leads to regress .. How do we know that we follow the signs correctly? What does it mean to follow the sign expression of a rule? I 244 Later, Philosophical Investigations §§ 143 242: following a rule is analog to: following a command. One is trained to it and one responds to it in a certain way. Problem: what if one reacts differently to a command and drill? Who is right then? The common human behavior is the reference system (i.e., not behaviour, which would be common for all humanity, on the contrary, his writings contain many references that Wittgenstein is relativist in terms of language and culture.) With this last remark Wittgenstein gives a different answer than in the Blue Book or the Philosophical Remarks. Rule/rule-following/late/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: new: it is suspected that someone does not really follow the rule but only acts ((s) randomly) in accordance with it, Wittgenstein later does not want to raise the question whether the person concerned thinks of a certain sign formulation, or what role a specific codification of the rule plays. He wants to get to that with the late formulation: "God, if he had looked into our souls, he would have not been able to see of whom we were talking." I 245 Whether I act perhaps out of fear rather than in accordance with the rule (with the same result) I do not determine, in looking into my soul, but: by asking: "Has he ever been trained to perform commands? Ultimately, the answer can only come from the community framework of behaviors that are common to me and the other. Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein calls this broader horizon language game. Only in this context questions of the rule-following can be posed usefully. The task of the actually played language games cannot be satisfied by rules as far as their linguistic or symbolic expressions are concerned with these. I 257 The rule-following can only be understood in terms of language games. Certain psychological words express no conscious processes: for example, "understand" in the expression "to understand a rule." > Consciousness/Wittgenstein. I 267 The rule-following is not based on criteria. I 311 Rule-following/Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations § 202: "Following the rule" is a practice. And believing to follow the rule is not following the rule." --- II 111 Rule-following/Wittgenstein: "following rules" is an ambiguous term. 100 lines on the blackboard are equal to 101 lines in the visual space. II 121 Rule-following/rule/game/Wittgenstein: if one sets the rules for a game, then one does not really follow them during playing. Chess is not played with constant reference to the rules. But one cannot say, either one is merely a parrot or one looks up the rules. The matter is much more complicated. Why are primitive games without rules called games? II 265 Series/following/Wittgenstein: Knowing how the sequel is, is never only seeing a formula - one also needs the experience that he continues the series. --- VI 161 Rule-following/Wittgenstein/Schulte: is a practice, therefore you cannot follow a rule "privately". Otherwise "believing to follow the rule" would be the same. VI 194 Rule-following/private/Wittgenstein/Schulte: It does not make sense to say that a human has followed a rule once. It would have to be part of an institutionalized practice. But it is so, that some authors, such as Descartes have stood for a similar position (>Private language). (VI 193/94). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Rules | Carnap | II 195 Rule/Carnap: an indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the term A, can be reformulated so that only B and C occur. Neutral towards realism/idealism. II 202 Rules/Carnap: a) form rules (syntax) b) transformation rules (logic) In principle no difference between them - hence syntax is expressible in the language. (VsWittgenstein). >Syntax, >Realism, >Idealism. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Rules | Evans | Wright I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: reflections on rule following are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (This is more quietistic than Wittgenstein himself). >Rule following, >Private language. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Sensations | Millikan | I 303 Senstation Language/Sensation/Private Language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one cannot develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. >Private language/Millikan, >Private language/Wittgenstein, cf. >Beetle example. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sensations | Wittgenstein | Rorty I 128 Wittgenstein: sensations would have some half of an existence between nothingness and something, they would "fell out" of the world like the beetle in the box. >Beetle example. Wittgenstein: sensation "not something, but also not nothing. The result was that a nothing would do the same services as the something about what cannot be stated." (Philosophical Investigations § 304.) RortyVsWittgenstein: confusion of the concept of incorrigibility with the notion of incommunicability. >Incorrigibility. --- Rorty VI 147 Sensation/Wittgenstein: Feeling alone (without language) is not enough. --- Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, for the subject itself unrecognizable. >Private Language, >Beetle example. --- Wittgenstein VI 118 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: a sentence about the sensations, because it completely remains at the level of linguistics, is outside the true/false dimension. VI 199f Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: has no object. >Object. VI 200 Expression: is not description (but more direct). >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Speech Act Theory | Austin | Husted III 240ff Speech Act Theory: expressive function. >Accuracy, >Adequacy. VsRedundancy Theory (p = "it is true that p"). >Redundancy theory. Speech Act/Austin: Def lokutionary act: enunciation - E.g. you give an example of the meaningful sentence "the bull is going". perlocutionary: effect by using the statement - E.g. warning with this sentence. >Perlocutionary acts. illocutionary: you frighten the listener. >Illocutionary acts. III 245 In addition: fulfilling conditions as a "plus" to the statement: the warranty given by the speaker -> Brandom, >Score keeping. II 247 Speech act theory -VsLogical Positivism: more than just the two functions a) description of reality, b) expression of emotions Speech acts belong to neither of these two categories. >Positivism. III 248 AustinVsWittgenstein: per continuous similarity - Speech act theory: shows its strength here. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Statements | Hare | II 133 Statements/tradition/Hare: Hare divides statements into empirical and analytical ones. In addition to that there seems to be nothing else. >Analyticity. Problem: one can easily assume on the basis of a confusion that the proposition, which states that the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytic. But it is at least not obviously true that e.g. the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not p' are analytically false" should be analytically true. Is it not a statement of how the words "and not" are used? And is it not analytically true that they are used in this way and not otherwise? Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytically, as well as empirically, as well as neither of both options. Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein calls the discussion "nonsensical." CarnapVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's behavior is contradictory: instead of being silent, he writes a whole book. II 134 HareVsCarnap: Carnap does not take Wittgenstein's doubts seriously enough. >Wittgenstein, >Carnap. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| States of Affairs | Quine | XII 96 Facts/States of Affairs/QuineVsWittgenstein: there is none, because many sentences are theoretical. Nevertheless pro verification theory of meaning: 1. for language learning 2. required for translation. >Language acquisition, >Translation, >Facts. Verification Theory/Quine: the Vienna Circle did not strongly enough advocate verification theory. Problem: many sentences are theoretical. Thus the concept of facts has no meaning! State of Affairs/QuineVsState of Affairs/QuineVsWittgenstein: the term has no meaning because most sentences are theoretical (except the pure observation sentences). But this is not a problem for the verification theory of meaning. >Verificationism. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Tautologies | Searle | V 190/91 Tautology: SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are not empty: e.g. "either he is fascist or he is not a fascist" is very different from "either he is a hairdresser or he is not a hairdresser". V 161 Universals/Searle: theoretically, a universal can be derived from any tautology: "bald or not bald". Vs: if one wanted to infer the existence of redness from the tautology "everything is either red or not red", this would only be a misunderstanding. With tautologies, no extra-linguistic facts are assumed. >Universals. V 176 Existence/language/universalia/SearleVsTradition: but the assertion that any non-linguistic entities exist can never be a tautology. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Terminology | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. I 91 VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". I 162f Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". I 217 Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. I 337 Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. I 338 Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. I 246 Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. I 266 Definition expulsion game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro). >use/Tugendhat, > truth conditions/Tugendhat, >Meaning/Tugendhat. I 276 The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Thing in itself | Rorty | IV 115 Thing in itself/RortyVsKant/Rorty: he needs the noumenal (thing in itself) only to introduce appearance. No appearance without appearing. >Appearance, >Things in themselves/Kant, >Experience/Kant. Like Aristotle requires a form of the formless - and e.g. Spinoza the distinct idea of indistinct. >Recognition/Spinoza, >Substance/Spinoza. Similar: Wittgenstein's silence in the face of thediscrimination sensible/senseless. >Metaphysics, >Senseless. RortyVsWittgenstein: one has to know a lot before one can conclude that the metaphysician says something meaningless. VI 129 Is/be/illusion/appearance/Rorty: false distinction between things - "in itself" and "for us" - RortyVsKant. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Thinking | Black | II 94 Thinking/Black: not to be covered with "various linguistic clothes". - If a thought is supposed to be "too profound for words", we have to ignore it - VsClothing Model: would lead to regarding all speaking as the encoding process and hearing as decoding. II 97 Wrong: "Think before you speak" - Vs Cl.I.Lewis: meaning very well comes into existence through communication (otherwise we ge a "Clothing Model"). >Communication. However Black Thesis: thinking without language is possible - E.g. imagining chess positions. Cf. >Psychological theories on language and thought, >Chess. II 98 The speech current does not need to be accompanied by a parallel stream of mental events - the spoken language needs no mental correlate to be meaningful. >Speaking/Ricoeur. II 100 It is hardly possible to distinguish between thoughts and linguistic representation. II 119 But: Language/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 4.002: Language disguises the thought - in a way that one cannot infer the shape of the clad thought from the outer shape of the dress. (BlackVsWittgenstein). |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Thinking | Nagel | I 63 Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper. I 65 Therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event. - It cannot be considered separately from its contents. - Thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle). >Intentionality/Searle, >Intentionality, >Naturalism. Nagel: The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event. I 93 ff Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking. >Description/Nagel. I 101 Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant. >I, Ego, Self. One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point. Rorty VI 147 Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought. >Thinking without language. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth Conditions | Dummett | II 72 Truth Conditions/Dummett: Truth conditions are assumed to be given. - But only for each type of speech act. - A theory of >force must then distinguish between question, command, etc. Being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct). II 95 Truth Conditions/Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger. - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (the truth conditions for the attribution of skills are needed). II 100 Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know them if you cannot tell when they are satisfied. --- III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: An explanation of sense has to be given by truth conditions. - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: Under which circumstances is a sentence true... >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that "P is true" means. Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained. >Meaning. VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. III (c) 122 Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! Problem: the truth conditions are not always recognizable, even if met. Solution: to think that something is true requires only knowledge of the truth conditions, not knowing whether they are fulfilled. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Truthconditional Semantics | Strawson | Graeser I 123 Truthconditional Semantics/StrawsonVsWittgenstein/StrawsonVsDavidson/StrawsonVsFrege: Problem: the language include phrases or expressions that have no truth conditions. >Truth-conditional semantics. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Understanding | Dennett | II 30 uNDERSTANDING7DennettVsWittgenstein: if a lion could speak, we would understand him quite well - with the usual trouble that requires a decent translation between different languages. But in conversations with him we would learn next to nothing about the spirit of normal lions because its spirit that is equipped with speech would be completely different. Dennet per Wittgenstein. in any case we should not assume that the spirit of language incompetent animals be such as ours. >Animals/Dennett, >Animal Language/Dennett, >Language/Dennett. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Use Theory | Grice | Welker I 137 ff WelkerVsUse Theory of meaning: since sentences hardly come up twice in our lives in the same form, we should question why the use determines the meaning (VsWittgenstein). >Sentences, >Language behavior. If we give the mastering of a language as an answer, we need to refer back to time-independent meaning. >Competence, >Timelessness. Languages exist, genetically speaking, before all users of language. >Language. To explain words using other words leads to similar indefinite infinities, as the explanation of numbers in their relation to other numbers. >Words. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Welker I David D. Welker Linguistic Nominalism, Mind, 1970, pp. 569-580 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Use Theory | Rorty | I 139 Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use. >Language use, >Community, >Convention. II (c) 70 Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (VsMeaning change). >Meaning change. III 36 RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >Vocabulary. III 101 Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!. III 102 Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools. III 194 SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate. >Language game, >Heidegger, >Wittgenstein, >Sellars. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Use Theory | Searle | V 221 SearleVsUse theory of meaning: there is no distinction between word and sentence (SearleVsWittgenstein). >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning. V 231f SearleVsUse theory: "use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth conditions for proposition and those of the illocutionary force. >Truth condition, >Illocutionary act. E.g. Obscenities: the use of obscenities differs substantially from that of the corresponding polite synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is as derogatory as "He is a nigger." >SearleVsUse theory. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Use Theory | Welker | Meg I 145 Use theory/WelkerVsWittgenstein: since the sentences in our lives hardly occur twice in the same form, it is questionable whether the use determines the meaning. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Meaning theory, >Meaning, >Language use. To explain words with other words leads into infinities as well as explaining numbers with relations to other numbers. >Regress, >Explanations, >Circularity, >Relations. |
Welker I David D. Welker Linguistic Nominalism, Mind, 1970, pp. 569-580 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Verificationism | Quine | VII (b) 37 Verification Theory of Meaning/Peirce/Quine: the method of empirically determining the confirmation or refutation of a statement is its meaning. Then an analytical statement is the boundary case that is confirmed no matter what the case is. Synonymy exists when the method of empirical confirmation or refutation is the same. This is then about cognitive synonymy of statements, not generally about linguistic forms. ((s) Terms below the sentence level). Meaning/Term/Cl.Lewis/Quine: Meaning of an expression: "a criterion in mind" mental criterion (criterion in mind) in relation to which one is able to accept or reject the expression in the face of a fact. (Cl. I. Lewis 1948,p.133). VII (b) 38 Verification Theory/Verificationism/Quine: but what are the methods or the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences that should contribute to confirmation or refutation? 1. Most naïve view: radical reduction: direct report. This precedes the actual verification theory for a long time. (Locke and Hume, Tooke). Tooke: a term should be the name of a sense date or a part of it, or an abbreviation for it. Quine: that is ambivalent between: Sense Data/Quine: can be understood as a) event b) quality. This remains vague as far as the contribution to the whole statement is concerned. Verification Theory/Quine: we better take whole statements as units of meaning, VII (b) 39 to translate them into sense data language, not expression for expression. VII (b) 40 Reductionism/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2. More refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensory impressions, so that each occurrence either increases the probability (likelihood) of the truth of the utterance VII (b) 41 or narrows it. This, of course, is contained in the verification theory. Quine thesis: (comes from Carnap's "construction"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem-Thesis). Two Dogmas/Quine: the verification theory thus shows us the intimate connection of the two dogmas of empiricism: 1. Analytic/Synthetic and 2. Reductionism. X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a proposition would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning. QuineVsPeirce: that also equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic order: is here the totality of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some knowledge theorists would catalogue these alternatives by introspecting the sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve irritation (at the nerve ends). Problem: one cannot clearly assign the sensory evidence to individual sentences ((s) formulations). (Indeterminacy of empiricism). XI 76 Def Synonymy/Verification Theory/Meaning/Lauener: according to verification theory, two statements are synonymous if the method of their empirical verification is the same. Def Analyticity: is then the borderline case where there is no need for a method of confirmation. XII 11 Verificationism/Quine: what is its status? Ultimately, the theory of meaning must also be empirical. Because analyticity is not tenable, the verification theory of meaning is not tenable either. XII 96 Verification Theory/Quine: the Viennese Circle did not advocate verification theory strongly enough. Problem: many sentences are theoretical. Thus the concept of facts has no meaning! Subject Matter/QuineVsSubject Matter/QuineVsWittgenstein: the term has no meaning, because most propositions are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But this is not a problem for the verification theory of meaning. Verification theory of Meaning/Quine: pro: the kind of meaning necessary for language learning and translation is the empirical meaning and nothing more. XII 105 Epistemology/Quine: thus becomes semantics. But it still revolves around observation (because of the verification theory of meaning). If we go beyond the observation sentences, epistemology merges with psychology and linguistics. >Verification, >Confirmation. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| World | Meixner | I 125 World/VsWittgenstein/Meixner: the world is in itself a large individual (sum of individuals, not facts). >World/Wittgenstein, >Facts/Wittgenstein, >States of affairs/Wittgenstein, >L. Wittgenstein, >World, >Totality, >Wholes, >Reality, >Individuals, >Mereological sum. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| World | Strawson | Danto I 259 World/Strawson/Danto: two main components: people and things. (particular). >Person/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson, >Terminology/Strawson. To this, M-predicates correspond: E.g. "weighs 100 kg". P-predicates: "thinks of fame". Nothing is describable with P-predicates alone. - That would be different if there were really disembodied ghosts. - People are described by both predicate types. --- Strawson I 263 Behaviorism: attempts to blur the distinction between P- and M-predicates. >Predicates/Strawson. Strawson I 35 World/Strawson: seems to be constructed of particulars and events. - Are also other images possible? - When someone mentions something outside of space and time, we believe that it does not exist. --- Strawson II 256 World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: Thesis: Only things and events are part of the world. StrawsonVsAustin: otherwise there is a temptation to talk about situation as about things. >Situations. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| World/Thinking | Wittgenstein | III 144 Language/reality - thought/world: the actual relationship between language (thought) and reality cannot be part of reality itself. Reason: an image A must have the same shape as the state of affairs S that is now a picture B, which should reflect the relationship between A and S as a picture ratio, so it would also have to have this form. But then it would either only be identical with A, or it would be the image of another state of affairs of the same shape. E.g. a painter can paint a different painter, who paints a tree. But how could you picture the mere fact that the painter paints the tree? The picture shows a painter, who paints a tree. But which hyphens in the painting form this situation? >Picture (image), >Picture (mapping), >Picture theory. Therefore it is said in the Tractatus: a sentence shows its meaning. (>Pointing/telling/sense/seeing: Ostension/Wittgenstein, Picture theory/Wittgenstein). It is not possible for an imaging elementary proposition to map the sense of the elementary proposition. This is not to be confused with our possibility to express what is stated by a sentence. --- Rorty IV 41 Language/world/Wittgenstein/Rorty: according to Wittgenstein any idea that we can get from an independent reality has to remain within the limits of our way of life - NagelVsWittgenstein: (with Kripke): Wittgenstein cannot be reconciled with realism - ((s) but Nagel as Wittgenstein: we cannot enter the world of the bat. Cf. >Bat example. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, E. | Wittgenstein Vs Anscombe, E. | Hintikka I 163 ff Hintikka: The problem of color incompatibility is solvable. Color/color terms/color terms/logic/AnscombeVsWittgenstein: argues what is not accepted by WittgensteinVsAnscombe that, provided red and green are objects, we know which is their logical type. --- I 164 Color words/color terms/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: incompatible does not mean contradictory: (red/green). E.g. "This patch is red" and "This patch is green" are incompatible, but this incompatibility is not logical, in the sense that it is indicated by the notation (but: see below: 4). Also it does not reduce to a truth-functional contradiction. (Contradiction is for Wittgenstein a precisely defined term in the theory of truth functions (4:46)). "It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colors at the same time, is a contradiction. Hintikka: but here it is not about the status of colors, but about the status of the color attribution. There is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein has ever believed color attributions such as "This is red" would have subject predicate form. Wittgenstein: from the use of these forms (meant here are grammatical sentences) we cannot draw, at most vague, conclusions. --- I 165 Sentence/form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. "This lecture is boring", "The weather is nice" are only seemingly sentences of the same form. They have nothing to do with each other. HintikkaVsAnscombe: their argument loses its strength with that: this is about someone who makes very different conditions. Hintikka: if you make other conditions, the situation is obviously quite different: Example: Assume that the general concept of color in the language not to be reproduced by a class of color predicates but by a function c which maps points of the visual space in a color space. The logical incompatibility would then be mirrored by the fact that the colors red and green are represented by different names. Then, the two sentences are logically incompatible! Due to their logical form a function cannot take two different values for the same argument. Wittgenstein claims even emphatically that attributions of different qualities of perception are essentially clear, that is, can be represented by real functions. --- I 165/166 Color/color words/neccessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colors incompatibility means a breach against Wittgenstein's notion that purely logical necessities are the only necessities, is now moved into a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of color terms. (Or the correct notation). Is a) every single color represented by a predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical type. b) points in a color space: then the incompatibility of various colors cause no illogical necessities. (Wittgenstein is this alternative (but certainly strange to Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of the color space. However, this concept fails to satisfy if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates --- I 341 ff Pain/private experiences/Cartesianism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most surprising thesis of this chapter is probably the thesis of Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, so the assertion that there are really private internal event-like experiences like pain and other such sensations according to Wittgenstein. It is undisputed that the language must be based on a public language game, one is divided what must follow for the private feelings. Implies the neccessity of a public framework that these experiences themselves are now objects, events, or anything not private? That this follows, is represented by many philosophers. e.g. --- Hintikka I 342 Anscombe: "If a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition." Since private ostensive definitions are impossible there can probably be no personal item acording to this view. HintikkaVsAnscombe: but this implication does not apply. Of course we cannot say that sensations and the like are private in our language according to Wittgenstein. But that is not what this is about, this is just one of the consequences of inexpressibility of semantics. Actual question: are the philosophers right who claim that there are no private events according to Wittgenstein? No. PU § 272 provides a counter-example: "The essence of the private experience is actually not that each has its own example, but that no one knows whether the other also has this or something else. So it would be possible, although not verifiable, that one part of humanity has a sensation of red and the other a different one." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Austin, John L. | Schiffer Vs Austin, John L. | I 266 Austin: the expression : "the meaning of a word" is almost always a dangerous nonsense. (1961, 24, also Wittgenstein 1953 Ryle 1957) so all VsFrege. DavidsonVsSchiffer/DavidsonVsAustin/DavidsonVsWittgenstein : speaks of an entity that is designated by the "that" as in for example "that snow is white". (Davidson 1968). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Carnap, R. | Hare Vs Carnap, R. | Hare II 133 Statements/Tradition/Hare: splits statements into empirical and analytical ones. There seems to be nothing beyond that. Problem: Because of confusion, you can easily come to the assumption that the proposition that states this and the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytical. But it is at least not obviously true that. E.g. The statement: "propositions of the form ’p and not p’ are analytically false" should be analytically true. Because is it not a statement about how the words "and not" are used? And is it not analytically true that they are used like this and not otherwise? Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytical as well as empirical as well as none of both. Wittgenstein: considers the debate "absurd". >Silence. CarnapVsWittgenstein: his behavior is contradictory: instead of remaining silent, he wrote a whole book. Hare II 134 HareVsCarnap: does not take Wittgenstein’s doubts seriously enough. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Davidson Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 651 Self-attribution/External attribution/Wittgenstein: External attribution: based on behavioral criteria, self-attribution: without the benefit of such assistance. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: this is not satisfactory in response to skepticism: 1) it is a strange idea that the absence of clues should be better! Fra I 652 2) one would normally say that what is considered a clue will help to define the appropriate concept. Now, if the criteria are different, the concepts must also be different! Externally mental/External attribution/Self-attribution/Language/Error/Deception/Davidson: We should allow that the necessarily public and interpersonal character of language guarantees that we often apply mental predicates correctly to others, and therefore in fact often know what others think. Then the question is, what are the reasons you have for knowing yourself what you think. DavidsonVsWittgenstein: his answer may solve the externally mental, but creates the problem of the self-mental. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Rescher Vs Correspondence Theory | I 344 Correspondence Theory/Rescher: can be 1. definition-like 2. criterion-related Verification: "confrontation with the facts" useless: not in all propositions, past, probability, modality, counterfactual conditional RescherVsCorrespondence Theory: kind of correspondence completely unsolved RescherVsWittgenstein VsPicture Theory: language does not work like this. I 345 RescherVsCorrespondence Theory: what kind of "correspondence" is at stake is not even nearly satisfactorily solved. I 382 RescherVsWittgenstein: this theory assumes a reflection or representation theory. Language does not really work that way. I 345 The correspondence theory does not solve the problem of the criterion. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Davidson, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson/Aristotle: practical syllogism causes are reasons - WittgensteinVs: Causes not empirical but recognizable through language skills. --- Davidson II 84 All such arguments assume that between reason and act exists such a tight logical-conceptual relation that reasons and actions cannot be understood as two distinct events. Only as numerically different, they could stand in a cause-effect relationship. This would, however, be prevented by the deductive relation. --- II 85 DavidsonVsWittgenstein ("Actions, Reason and Causes") This is false solution: Essential for the relationship is that the agent performs the action because he had reasons. One can also have a reason and not act according to that reason. What interests us is the reason for which the agent did x, not any arbitrary reason. As long as this "because" is not explained, the actual explanation performance of explanations of reasons is not exhausted. This deficit is only avoidable if we assume that "rationalization is a species of causal explanation". --- Dummett I 111 Turning to the language: Wittgenstein's Tractatus principle of analytic philosophy: the only way to the analysis of thought leads via the analysis of language. Davidson always presupposes a theory of meaning, WittgensteinVsDavidson: avoids in his later writings, the formation of a general theory of meaning, because he thinks that any attempt at a systematic explanation of language cannot help but to squeeze various phenomena in a single form of description: distortion. But also Wittgenstein believes that the goal of philosophy is to get us in a working order by overview of the functioning of language and thus on the structure of our thoughts to correctly recognize the world. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Dummett, M. | Putnam Vs Dummett, M. | VI 394 Understanding/truth conditions/WB/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. PutnamVsWittgenstein, DummettVsWittgenstein. Cf. >Understanding/Wittgenstein. Problem: then it gets incomprehensible when reversed, what this knowledge should be. Meaning/Meaning Theory/PutnamVsDummett: I do not think that a theory of understanding could be the entire meaning theory. VI 395 VsMetaphysical realism: thus, we can refute it with Dummett. (Through a theory of reference, not meaning theory). --- III 48/49 Proto-thoughts/PutnamVsDummett: terms for animals: dogs have just as little a preconception of meat, like gazelles have a preconception of running fast. ---- I (d) 124 Realism/anti-realism/PutnamVsDummett: Problem: We argue that the understanding of sentences would be knowing the truth conditions. But how can we say at all what this knowledge is? Putnam: We have seen that "mentalese" does not help. I (e) 151 Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to Dummett, but: truth is not identified according to him with justification, but with an idealization of justification. Putnam: Truth should be a property of statements that cannot get lost contrarily to the justification. Justification is also gradual as opposed to the truth. The "ideal justification" corresponds to the "frictionless surfaces" of physics. It has "pure value". Internal realism/PutnamVsDummett: related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification, Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (e) 152 Truth is independent of justification here and now, but not of any justification. (> Assertibility). Like Quine: the conditions of justification change with the development of our corpus of knowledge. ---- I (f) 161 Truth/justification/PutnamVsDummett: to reject the divine point of view, does not mean to identify truth with rational acceptability as Dummett says that we should do it. Truth: cannot get lost. Justification: can very well do this. E.g. "The earth is a disk." E.g. also that it is a ball, is not a "gradual truth" but it is gradually justified. Truth/Putnam: an idealization of rational acceptability. (Under epistemically ideal conditions). I (f) 162 Truth/Putnam: 1. independent of the justification here and now, but not independent of any justification. 2. supposed to be stable and convergent. --- I (h) 214 Truth/Dummett: (1976, 1991) is justification. PutnamVsDummett: 1. this is misleading in many ways, it is likely that one cannot specify the conditions of the justification for the sentences of a natural language. (But Dummett believes that). 2. Dummett believes in a final verification, I only in an idealized one (based on the current evidence, so context-sensitive). Assertibility conditions/PutnamVsDummett: are not manageable for an arbitrary sentence. How do we learn them? By appropriating a practice. But this is not an algorithm (how reductionist philosophers believe). I (h) 215 The assertibility conditions cannot be formalized and therefore not the human rationality. ((s) They may well be independent of situations, but not of our entire practice.) |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Frege, G. | Millikan Vs Frege, G. | I 102 Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world. Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond? Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying. wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies". Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world. I 103 Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks. Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.). ((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.) I 190 real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...". focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted. intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset. embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence. Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined. Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references. Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning. Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified. I 191 Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having". I 274 Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time. polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance. But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual. Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property. I 275 Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said: Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else. Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category. Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th. Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined. Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc. I 308 Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Holism | Dummett Vs Holism | Fodor/Lepore IV 8 Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. Fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interpersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing. Fodor/Lepore IV 9 And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction. Horwich I 459 Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about"). DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German." T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again. Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers". Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto). DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible. RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty I 289 Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Stalnaker Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stalnaker I 125 VsContingent Identity/Stalnaker: if it is possible that one thing would be two things, then there is an a that this thing in the possible world (poss.w.) is w1 and b and c in w2. Then the cross world identities b = a and a = c should both be true but the innerworldly identity b = c is wrong! (In w2). That precisely violates the transitivity of identity. Solution/Stalnaker: we have to ask in which poss.w. this statement is made. In w1 b = c is also true that means it is true in w1 that the individual that is b in w2 is identical to the one that is c in w2. That is no violation of the transitivity. Versus: From the perspective of w2: here b = c is wrong (see above). What about b = a and c = a? Those identify two individuals that are identical in w1 with an individual from w1. Problem: from the perspective of w2 the description "the individual that is identical to a in w1" is an unsuitable description. Hence: w2: from the perspective of w2 identity statements are either false, without truth value or ambiguous. Analogous to E.g. Russell is the author of Principia Mathematica – the author of PM is Whitehead - so Russell is Whitehead. (see above the counterpart relation has to be flexible, it may not require transitivity). I 184 Metaphysics/Kripke/Stalnaker: not all his metaphysical assertions are equally convincing. On the one hand a) is hard to deny that we can accept potentialities and opportunities for certain individuals reasonably, regardless of the manner in which the individual is specified on the other hand: b) is less convincing that Kripke denies some possibilities that individuals could have. StalnakerVsKripke: it is not convincing that Kripke does not allow on the one hand, that Shakespeare could have had other parents, on the other hand could have lived in another century. How should that be possible? KripkeVsVs/Stalnaker: would say that we are if we accept such things at all, we are confused. This counterfactual possibilities are not coherent. Possible worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: are not made to clarify metaphysical questions. Metaphysics/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke's metaphysical theses do not require his theories on reference and intentionality. Is it reversed that his causal theory requires his metaphysical image? Stalnaker: the metaphysical thesis about the identification of individuals on poss.w. is easy to separate from the theory that names are rigid designators whose reference can be found on causal interaction. I 181 Object/properties/thing/object/SearleVsWittgenstein/SearleVsTractatus/Stalnaker: (Searle was not directed at the time against Kripke, whose book was published later). Kripke/Stalnaker: but he also makes the metaphysical distinction between object and properties what Searle rejects. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Horwich Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stegmüller IV 154 Meaning/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/HorwichVsWittgenstein/HorwichVsKripke: the list (see above) has to be completed: d) Meaning addition with "plus" does not exclude that mistakes are made. That must not be violated by any concept of meaning. e) The meaning of "plus" is an intrinsic property! This stands in contradiction to d), though! Horwich: brain research could produce matches, by the way. Kripke and Wittgenstein have indeed shown that there must not necessarily be facts of meaning, but that there could be! IV 154/155 Stegmüller: Wittgenstein as well would certainly welcome a return to empiricism, but a theory could probably determine the match as a fact (like the theory of Chomsky), but still only in the context of assertability conditions (justification conditions), not in the sense of a truth-functional semantics. Turing Machine/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Stegmüller/Chomsky: e.g. (Kripke) a machine fallen from the sky can be analyzed with respect to all relevant things (program and memory). a) Stegmüller: Chomsky thus accepts a view that contains a linear solution of the paradox. Due to differences in the program, we recognize, whether "plus" or "quus" is represented. Because we have a theory that tells us something about differences. IV 156 b) Linear solution: linguistic competence: we distinguish well-formed and not well-formed vocalizations. IV 157 "Switch Model"/Internalized Language: in the structural original state there may be many switches that are set to "zero", waiting to be turned into active positions. Language is nothing more than a present stable switch setting (internalized language). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Objectivity | Chisholm Vs Objectivity | II 105f Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. II 107 "Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality. II 120 Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense. II 120/121 Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute. II 123 Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game. II 124 Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference. II 125 VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy". II 126 Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X. II 128 BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Prior I 39 Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. I 40 The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.) Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx". But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ". Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur. E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander." logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__". ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies). Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property" logical form: "For a φ, φ __" "Σφφ". (Σ: there is a) Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order. Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's". Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols. That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems. E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..." "If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact. Symbolically: 1. CΠφNφxNψx. I 41 "If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong) 3. CΠφNφx. The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory. Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions). Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented: E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong. logical form: 1. CΠpNpNq by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?) 3. NΠpNp, Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself. And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2. RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order". VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom. By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again. Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification. Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements). E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form) Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences. Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves. E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc. RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between "p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters. Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Wittgenstein Vs Searle, J.R. | Esfeld I 76 Use theory/Esfeld: does not imply that beliefs to statements can be reduced in a public speech or can be replaced by statements. Otherwise one would have to develop a theory of meaningful statements that is not referring to believe states of people. SearleVsWittgenstein: Thesis: believe states have priority of linguistic expressions. WittgensteinVsSearle: instead: thesis: to have beliefs and to master a public language is equally original. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Tractatus | Wittgenstein Vs Tractatus | Tugendhat I 163 Tractatus/Tugendhat: naive object-theoretical position. Wittgenstein: "what the case, the fact is, is the existence of atomic facts", "the fact is a combination of objects". "In the facts objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain". (2.03). (Later discarded by Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein/late/self-criticism/VsTractatus: Philosophical remarks: "complex is not the same as fact I say of a complex, it is moving from one place to another, but not from a fact." "To say that a red circle consists of redness and circularity, or a complex of these constituents, is an abuse of such words and misleading." --- I 235 ff WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/WittgensteinVsTractatus/Hintikka. WWK, 209 f. "unclear to me in the Tractatus was the logical analysis and ostensive definition" ... "thought at this time that it is a connection between language and reality"... --- I 236 Sign/Meaning/Definition/showing/Waismann ("theses"): "We can give meaning to characters in two ways:. 1. by designation 2. by definition". --- I 237 Hintikka: deeper reasons: in the Tractatus the thesis of inexpressibility of semantics does not stop Wittgenstein from highlighting the role of the ostensive definition under the guise of showing. Through his move from phenomenology to the physical language it is impossible for him to indicatively define all his not further-back-tracable objects. One and the same gesture may be in the game when one indicatively defines a person's name, a color word, a substance name (mass terminus) a numeral, the name of a compass direction. The differences apparantly do not seem to belong to the area of the phenomenological, but to the ontology of everyday objects. Philosophical Investigations, PI § 28 For these reasons, Wittgenstein rejects for some time the idea that the ostensive explaining could establish a connection between language and reality. --- I 297 ff Image/agreement/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: is the vividness an agreement? --- I 298 Image/sentence/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/self-criticism: in the Tractatus I said something like: it was an agreement of the form, however, this is a mistake. Hintikka: this could give the wrong impression, that Wittgenstein abandoned the image thoughts. But that is a mistake. Image/Wittgenstein: the image can represent a possible state of affairs. It does not need to be an image of a de facto state in the world. A command is usually an image of the action that should be performed, but not necessarily an image of the actual completed act. (Also work drawing). What is the method of projection? --- I 299 "So I imagine the difference between sentence and reality is offset by the projection beams belonging to the image, the idea and which leave no more room for a method of application. There is only agreement and disagreement." "Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality in grammar can be found in the language." --- II 138 Atomism/VsAtomism/self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake, that there were elementary propositions, into which all sentences can be dismantled. This error has two roots: 1. that one conceives of infinity as a number, and assumes that there is an infinite number of sentences. 2. statements that express degrees of qualities. ((s) they must not exclude any other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent). --- III 151 Tractatus/later self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein: he was dealing with two weak points: 1. that the descriptive language is so openly regarded as a model of the actual language. There are many unrecognized forms of speech. It may be questioned whether the meaning of an utterance can be understood regardless of the context. In addition, doubt, as to whether any meaningful sentence has one and only one logical form. 2. Problem of intersubjectivity disregarded. --- III 214 WittgensteinVsTractatus (self-criticism): discussions with Ramsey and the Italian economy scientist Piero Sraffa. SraffaVsTractatus: VsImage theory: Vs, that a meaningful sentence must be a projection of a state of affairs. Also denied that any meaningful sentence could be resolved into elementary propositions. From this critique emerged in 1929 30 Philosophical remarks (PB) 1932 34 Philosophical Grammar (PG) 1933 34 The Blue Book + The Brown Book Main work of the "Second Period": Philosophical Investigations (Philosophical Investigations). --- III 217 WittgensteinVsTractatus/Wittgenstein/late/Flor: that can be useful and clear in a specific situation, to give a vague question or a vague description or a vague instruction. --- VI 95/96 Logical constants/elementary proposition/WittgensteinVsTractatus/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Schulte: self-criticism: does now no longer assume that one would be able later to specify elementary propositions. In truth, we already have everything, namely at present. New: Priority of sentence system over the individual sentence. Previously: I believed that we have to do without the logical constants, because "and", "or", "not" do not connect the objects. (I abide by this). But I falsely believed that the elementary propositions would be independent from each other because I falsely believed the linking rules of logical constants could have something to do with the internal structure of sentences. In reality, the logical constants form rather just a part of a comprehensive syntax of which I did not know anything then." --- VII 148 Language/Tractatus/Tetens: language only serves one purpose here: to map facts. WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/VsTractatus/later Wittgenstein/Tetens: instead there is a variety of language games. To speak sensibly, we must take part in a complicated social life form with its diverse language games. --- VII 149 The philosopher must describe how we use the expressions in everyday language. --- VII 150 "... a picture holds us captive. And we could not get out because it was in our language, and it seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." (Philosophical Investigations, PI 82) Descriptive/normative/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein's ignores in the Tractatus the distinction between descriptive and normative sentences. He later calls this the "one-sided diet" ((s) only descriptive sentences). (Philosophical Investigations, PI p. 251, § 593) --- VII 152 Skepticism/philosophy/Wittgenstein/late: also the philosophers learned the words "error", "doubt", etc., from the everyday language, they have not been invented for the purpose of philosophizing. --- VII 153 Deception/Wittgenstein/late: when the philosopher asks if one could not be mistaken about everything, then he uses the words in a way that he would never use them in everyday life. --- VII 154 Wittgenstein: E.g. one cannot say that one his mistaken about something in his joy. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Tractatus | Verschiedene Vs Tractatus | I 106 Object/VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus/Hintikka: many philosophers claim that Wittgenstein never became clear about the metaphysical status of simple objects. Hintikka: as the object of experience they have semantic status, not yet metaphysical status. Russell/Moore/Hintikka: for them, the objects of acquaintance are defined as objects of direct experience. So-called > Illusion argument: with its help the two succeed in drawing the conclusion, which in their opinion is sufficiently justified, that the objects of direct experience (acquaintance) cannot be equated with physical objects. I 172 Ontology/Tractatus/VsWittgenstein/Hintikka: another objection states that Wittgenstein's Tractatus ontology among the undefined elements contains no functions (as opposed to properties and relationships). Hintikka: the reason is probably his interpretation of the identity in the tractatus which makes it difficult to identify functions in the usual way as relations whose last relation is clearly determined by the choice of the other values. |
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| Use Theory | Rorty Vs Use Theory | III 36 Use Theory/RortyVsUse Theory/RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >Vocabulary. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Use Theory | Verschiedene Vs Use Theory | Metz II 328 HolensteinVsuse theory: must be supplemented by world knowledge. Rules alone are not enough. Grice I 145 Use theory of meaning / WelkerVsWittgenstein: because the phrases uttered in our lives hardly appear twice in the same form, it is the question why the use determines the meaning. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Various Authors | Quine Vs Various Authors | II 111ff QuineVsSemantic Theory: there is a lack of a general definition of meaning QuineVsUse Theory of Meaning: definition of meaning through use too vague! (Demarcation of what is detectable under the "circumstances") (QuineVsWittgenstein). III 272 Singular Term/QuineVsSingular Terms: the whole category of singular terms is logically superfluous and should be abolished! ((s) Instead: variable). V 58 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. the child learns that "red" is applied to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, etc. The idea associated with that may be whatever it likes! Language bypasses the idea and focuses on the object. ((s) reference/(s): goes to the object, not an idea, which is in this case unnecessary.) Stimulus/Quine: has nothing mysterious in language learning. V 60 Problem: in progressive learning sentences are formed which have less to do with stimuli. E.g. about past and future. Quine: philosophers have great difficulty to specify accurately and in detail which connections it is about. QuineVsSupranaturalism. V 61 We only need orientation by external circumstances. Internal mechanisms are only insofar positive as we can hope that they will be clarified by neurophysiology. IX 199 Individuals/QuineVsFraenkel: we cannot follow him to simply waive individuals, because under TT this would exclude infinite classes and also the classical number theory. (Chapter 39). Solution: (from Chapter 4): the identification of individuals with their One classes. IX 199/200 But then we would have to make an exception in the interpretation: if x is an individual, then "x ε x" should count as true. (Above, "x ε y" became false if neither were objects of sequential type). Now (1) and (2) reduce to: (4) Ey∀x(x ε y (Tnx u Fx)), (5) (∀w(w ε x w ε y) u x ε z) > y ε z. Moreover, the definition of "Tnx" needs to be revised to make it match the new idea of the individual: " x VT y" by way of merging we can define (6) "T0x" stands for "∀y (y ε x y = x)" ((S) "all parts of individuals are identical with this one".) "T n + 1 x" stands for "∀y(y ε x > Tny)" ((s) "The set x is always one type higher than its elements y".) IX 237 Set Theory/QuineVsAckermann: (like ML and NB) but unlike ZF: does not fully guarantee the existence of finite classes. Additional concept "M". II 129 QuineVsZettsky: Zettsky: properties are identical if the classes to which they belong are the identical... but when are such classes identical? II 130 We cannot rely on the identity of the elements here (as with physical objects), as we simply have no antecedent principle of individuation for the properties (as elements of classes) here. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Vendler, Z. | Rorty Vs Vendler, Z. | I 276 Idea/Mentalese/Zeno Vendler (provocative VendlerVsWittgenstein): how to move from the language of thought to a rationalist epistemology: I 277 "Such a system of innate "ideas" makes for a frame. They are "a priori", "self-contained" by development.: no experience will be able to change their content. No experience is relevant to my idea of what it means to say something or demand, to believe or to decide, or what persons, objects, processes, states, changes, purposes, causation, time, expansion and numbers are." >Mentalese, >Vocabulary/Rorty. RortyVsVendler: this inference from a built-in vocabulary on a system of opinions that can only be "clarified" and not modified, adds to Quine's criticism of the distinction between the empirical and the conceptual, science and philosophy, meaning explanation and change of mind! |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Vollmer, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Vollmer, G. | Evolutionary Epistemology/WittgensteinVsVollmer: we cannot say, our knowledge of the evolution is a result of evolution. --- II 103 (DennettVsWittgenstein: knowledge has grown gradually.) |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Anscombe Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 95 AnscombeVsWittgenstein: the bishop may confuse the lady’s knee with his own, but will he confuse the lady with himself? - Bishop Butler: "Every thing is what it is and not another thing." - Anscombe: why equalize everything? |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Wittgenstein | Ayer Vs Wittgenstein | I 294 Correspondence Theory: Problem: similarity relationship. Model: photograph or map. VsWittgenstein: not only are sentences not images, but also in the case of photographs or maps the assumption of of structural equivalence is misguided: the true scale does not make a map an accurate map, just as the greatest similarity of any photograph does not make it a true photograph. Were it so, a map with the correct scale could be a map of a different country and the photograph of someone quite different, although it looks very similar! There must be a convention. Similarity: physical correspondence is only correct if it is selected as the method of representation! |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Wittgenstein | Black Vs Wittgenstein | Simons I 320 Atomism/BlackVsTractatus/BlackVsWittgenstein: "metaphysical prejudice": the thesis that not every existence is conditional. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Brandom Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 92 Wittgenstein: the fact that there is a conception of a rule is not the interpretation, it manifests itself from time to time what we call "following the rules" and what we call "acting against it". That means there must be something like practice-implicit standards. I 94 BrandomVsWittgenstein: worrying that the normative attribution here requires a range of regularities of behavior and dispositions. Moreover, that the existence of these regularities is not part of what is asserted by such attributions. An analogy to length measurement assumes the rigidity of the world. But we learn practically immediately to apply new concepts. I 820 BrandomVsWittgenstein: W. had insisted that explicit standards are intelligible only before a background of practice-implicit standards. (see above regress - prevention). II 26/27 Brandom: He was wrong to say that this principle is incompatible with understanding the discursive practice in a way that it involves interpretation at every level (in his sense), including the most basic one. Double score keeping: an assertion is seen in the face of further determinations assigned by the score keeper as well as the stipulations entered into by himself. BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification asserts that the language has a center. Assertions are not just things that can be done with language. Rather, they are that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Carnap Vs Wittgenstein | II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory). Hempel I 99/100 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora). CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose. CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences. Carnap II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora) |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Wittgenstein | Chomsky Vs Wittgenstein | II 344 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: he speaks of "the different processes, to expect someone to tea". Chomsky: there is no point in talking about "processes of expectation". II 345 Criteria/mental states/Wittgenstein: mental states or the "internal functions of the mind" do not provide a criterion for the correct use of an expression. II 346 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: but this is not about a "correct claim". E.g. whether someone is reading, but about a legitimate claim. II 349 ChomskyVsWittgenstein: this often leads to the brink of the deepest and most interesting problems, in order then to stand still and to assert that the philosopher cannot go further here. II 350 We need more than mere description (descriptive linguistics or philosophy): otherwise the important question is forgotten, for which the data is actually data. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Wittgenstein | Davidson Vs Wittgenstein | I (a) 6ff Many philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein: recognition of the mind of another person: difference in the way we recognize our own mind and how we recognize the one of another person. In the first case there is no evidence needed, in the second case: the behavior must be observed. (not own behaviour) Davidson: As regards the use of these concepts of the mental, I agree with this distinction. But: DavidsonVsWittgenstein: The description of our practice does not constitute a solution to our original problem. Our practice has never been in doubt. Two questions: 1) Why should evidence-based knowledge not have greater certainty? 2) boils down to: we have no reason to believe that we are dealing only with a single concept. Why should one believe the other one has the exact same mental states as he himself? Rorty I 230 Truth Function/ Wafu / extension / intension / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are characterized not in a particular way of reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality", do not in the intensional vocabularies this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional / intensional is not more interesting than between nations and people. She’s just apt to evoke emotions reductionist. Rorty I 230 Truth function/tr.-fnc./Extension/Intension/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies do not stand out by reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality" in a particular way in which intensional vocabularies do not do this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional/intensional is not more interesting than that between nations and people. It is only apt to evoke reductionist emotions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Dennett Vs Wittgenstein | II 103 WittgensteinVsVollmer: you cannot say that my knowledge of the evolution is a result of evolution II 30 (DennettVsWittgenstein: gradually emerged (> robots, molecules). DennettVsWittgenstein: if a lion could talk, we would understand it quite well - with the usual trouble that a decent translation between different languages requires. But in conversations with it we would learn virtually nothing about the mind of normal lions, because its mind equipped language would be completely different. Pro Wittgenstein: in any case, we should not assume that the mind of the speechless animals is like ours. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Dummett Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 490 Wittgenstein (according to Dummett): There is no single means of derivation of all other properties from one. (Use only) DummettVsWittgenstein: If there is no key concept anymore, then we do not know what the meaning of a word is as opposed to the meaning of a sentence. Dummett I 31 DummettVsUse Theory: The downside is that this is essentially unsystematic. According to Wittgenstein, however, this is an advantage, because he emphasizes the variety of speech acts. Dummett: orderliness is not everything, though, the use theory is likely to assume that a significant portion of language is already understood. Only a systematic theory might explain in how far linguistic meaning can be explained without a previously given stock of semantic concepts. Ideally, no semantic concepts are needed in advance. From the elusiveness of truth (Frege) does not follow the inexplicability. Dummett I 83 Understanding/Wittgenstein:> understanding is not a mental process, but an ability (dispositional).LL. FregeVs: the grasping of a thought is an act of consciousness. And one that is directed towards something outside of the consciousness: (episodic). DummettVsWittgenstein: hard to see why no episodic sense of understanding should be possible if E.g. you can be stunned at first hearing of a sentence!. I 145 Private Language: WittgensteinVs - Dummett artificial private language possible and learnable. I 156 DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsUse Theory: Failure to assume a complete representation of language understanding is given as soon as its statements that express themselves in the use are described. For this reduces command of a language to having a practical ability. I 161 Animal: question: whether we can attribute thoughts to animals. Wittgenstein: "The dog is afraid that the master will strike it, but it is not afraid that the master will strike it tomorrow". DummettVsWittgenstein: this depends to a much lower degree than Wittgenstein would like on memories, but rather on a theoretical apparatus. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wittgenstein | Frege Vs Wittgenstein | Dummett I 83 Understanding/Wittgenstein: Understanding no mental process, but ability (dispositional). - FregeVs: grasping a thought is an act of consciousness. And one that is directed towards something outside of the consciousness: (episodic). DummettVsWittgenstein: hard to see why absolutely no episodic sense of understanding should be possible, if E.g. you can be flabbergasted at the first hearing of a sentence. Wittgenstein VI 66 Tractatus/FregeVsWittgenstein/Schulte: Frege has, as Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, not understood a word of the Tractatus. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Goodman Vs Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein I 295 Image/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: second meaning of image: "not similar, but that it is an image of something consists in the intention". (Lecture 26). I 296 Large typescript: here, the comparison with genre paintings is used to understand the nature of sentences to which the verification concept cannot be applied: (E.g. novels). Such sentences correspond to historic paintings or portraits: isomorphic structure like the possible fact that would make it true. (GoodmanVsWittgenstein, E.g. Constable) ((s)> Cresswell). I 297 The image conception does not only apply after the reference objects are allocated, but also regardless of the manner in which the objects are determined for a sentence, even if these simple components do not stand for specific entities. Early: the relationships between name and object do not require any action on the side of the speakers and can therefore be understood once and for all without further ado. late: this Wittgenstein overthrows this early conception once he introduces language games. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Habermas Vs Wittgenstein | I 233 HabermasVsWittgenstein: against Derrida, I would not like to cite Wittgenstein’s language game positivism: not the common linguistic practice in each case decides which meaning a text or an expression has in a particular moment. More likely, language games only work, because they presuppose cross-language game idealizations which - as a necessary condition of possible communication - give rise to the prospect of an agreement that is criticizable against validity claims. (Endurance test). Using this colloquial probation constraint, Austin and Searle allow to distinguish the "ordinary" from the "parasitic" language use. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Wittgenstein | Hacking Vs Wittgenstein | I 243 Atomic sentence/Wittgenstein, early: according to Hacking. E.g. typewriter is on the table, which is not dependent on any representation. It is either true or false. HackingVsWittgenstein, early: Simple atomic sentences are no representation at all!. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Wittgenstein | Kripke Vs Wittgenstein | I 43 E.g.: Wittgenstein: "Moses does not exist" means that "no human being has done this and that".(KripkeVs). Kripke: This is about the difference between reference and meaning: The theory in question is regarded as a theory of the meaning of the name "Moses" and not simply as a theory of his reference. KripkeVsWittgenstein: In any case I think it is wrong that "Moses exists" actually holds this meaning (that he has done something). I 70 KripkeVsWittgenstein: However, if the description has the function to rigidly define a reference, it is clear that this is "not" what the sentence "Moses did not exist" means; because in the counterfactual case, for example that no one led the Israelites out of Egypt, we can then ask: Does it ensue that Moses did not exist in such a situation? It seems that it does not ensue. For surely Moses would have been able to spend days more pleasantly. NS I 39 Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Problem of Infinity: How can a finite number of examples define an infinite number of new cases? Wrong solution: through meaning Wrong solution: through disposition NS I 40 Another pupil obviously has a different disposition, i.e. individual dispositions are not enough. Wittgenstein’s solution: collective dispositions. KripkeVsWittgenstein: there are no facts (>Problem of Normativity). 2. Problem of Normativity: which facts lay down which is the correct answer? Kripke: We can establish a new praxis at all times. New Literature/Newen/Schrenk: Pragmatic solution: Def Persuasion/New Authors/Newen/Schrenk: To have convictions with a defined meaning you need to take part in social practices and to mutually ascribe convictions with specific meanings. (Solution for Kripke’s Wittgenstein). (Literature. 2-24). Putnam III 219 Belief/Elisabeth Anscombe: Did once ask Wittgenstein what he would do if one of his friends was believing in faith healing. Would he try to dissuade him? Wittgenstein said yes, not knowing why however. KripkeVsWittgenstein: Classifies it as a distinct proof for Wittgenstein’s relativism. PutnamVs: Wittgenstein only finds it useless. Stegmüller IV 35ff Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: The crucial dispositions have been acquired in the past, the difference was already present in the past. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are actually irrelevant a) When I have a hypothesis regarding my disposition, I still do not know whether it is the right one - IV 37 b) If we wanted to "let the past rest" and were only asking what we consider to be right at this moment, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: Important argument: I have always had the same dispositions! – Disposition/VsKripke: a) it could be an idealization of my praxis KripkeVs: fantastic new assumptions will be necessary VsKripke: b) Idealization "if I had the possibility..." KripkeVs: It requires a function/fact or a table that is independent from the disposition. IV 39f KripkeVsWittgenstein: No table it is infinite, it is impossible to have checked everything. To mean, to conceive: no happenings in the consciousness but dispositions, dispositions are not happenings as well. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Moore Vs Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein II 118 Color/Color Words/Rule/Moore/MooreVsWittgenstein: the rule in relation to red and green is a rule for the use of the word "and". |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Positivism Vs Wittgenstein | Danto2 I 315 Logical Positivism: after Wittgenstein’s death in 1951, the logical positivists tried to put the natural and social sciences analog. (VsWittgenstein). |
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| Wittgenstein | Putnam Vs Wittgenstein | V 154 Wittgenstein/Quine (old): they have constructed thoeries that levae no room for a rational activity of philosophy. For this reason these conceptions are self-contradictory. (PutnamVsQuine, PutnamVsWittgenstein). Putnam: move: argumentative debate about the nature of rationality is an activity that requires a concept of rational justifications. This goes beyond institutionalized criterial rationality! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Quine Vs Wittgenstein | I 209 Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but yet different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3, 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes. (QuineVs/FregeVs) I 210 Identity/QuineVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's mistake is easier to recognize: Wittgenstein: "To say of two things that they are identical is nonsense and saying of one thing that it is identical with itself says nothing." Quine: Indeed identity statements that are true and not idle consist of unequal singular terms that refer to the same thing, of course. XII 96 Facts/QuineVsState of Affairs/QuineVsWittgenstein: the concept has no meaning, because most sentences are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences). But that is no problem for the verification theory of meaning. XII 44 Representation Theory/Language/QuineVsWittgenstein: traditional, close to the myth of the museum. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Wittgenstein | Read Vs Wittgenstein | Read III 27 Wittgenstein: has a much more substantial view of what a statement is. Facts are facts that refer to objects. So what is characteristic of reality is what kind of facts there are. Objects must be common to all possibilities. Signs: are arbitrary and conventional. ReadVsWittgenstein: 1. The correspondence theory is a realistic theory. The realism of correspondence theory forces us to accept the law of bivalence. There may be statements about which we cannot in principle say whether they are true or false. (Example: The present King of France is bald). |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Wittgenstein | Rorty Vs Wittgenstein | II 176 Wittgenstein/Late/Rorty: helped analytic philosophy to realize that many of Locke's and Kant's problems need not be taken seriously. But Hegel and Nietzsche had long ago understood this. RortyVsWittgenstein: Neglecting Hegel and Nietzsche among the English helped Wittgenstein's success here. And he appeared more original than he was. Ryle/Rorty: has actually solved all the problems of Wittgenstein. II 177 RortyVsWittgenstein: Gadamer never needed a therapy by Wittgenstein. He never sat in a flytrap. There is nothing that Wittgenstein could teach him. He was never held hostage by the images that held the early Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is not the titanic figure many considered him to be. He effectively did something that Dewey, the early Heidegger and many others have also done: freeing us of Descartes, Locke and Kant. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Wittgenstein | Sellars Vs Wittgenstein | II 318 Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand. II 319 Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves. Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy). Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways: a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement. K depicts y. Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of: that p depicts y: II 321 Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards. Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to. Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model fact depicts fact. There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions. Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention. II 322 Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations. E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York. Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed. Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects? II 323 Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). II 324 One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Wittgenstein | Strawson Vs Wittgenstein | Horwich I 195 Fact/situation/VsStrawson: it could be argued that they (because they are connected to that-sentences) are used as placeholders for yet to be specified expressions. Just as E.g. "thing" for nouns E.g. "event " for certain verbs, etc. StrawsonVsVs: the answer is twofold: World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. All the charm of these expressions like "situation", "state" (state of affairs), "fact", etc. is that we look at them as things or quantities of things. (StrawsonVs). StrawsonVsAustin: this urge is overwhelming. Austin does not resist it. He needs for concealment "feature" (feature) as a substitute for "fact". Definition feature/feature/Strawson: E.g. nose can be a feature of a face. E.g. a mountain feature a landscape.(1) 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson II 265 StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. --- Wittgenstein VI 172 StrawsonVsWittgenstein/Schulte: actually one should only talk in very specific cases of the meaning of names: E.g. "Peter" (Pierre) means "stone". Schulte: that is quite foreign to Wittgenstein. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Tarski Vs Wittgenstein | Berka I 410 Analytical/Tarski: the division of terms into logical and extra-logical ones also plays an important role in the specification of this term. I 411 Tautology/Tarski: however, some authors see analytical statements as an exact formal correlate of the concept of tautology (i.e. a statement that says nothing about reality). TarskiVsWittgenstein/VsWiener Schule: that seems vague to me. I 412 Foot note Tautology/Wittgenstein/Berka: that T says nothing about reality, stems from Wittgenstein's conception of formal truth: according to this, the expression (p > q) > ((q > r) > p > r)) true by its form alone. (1) Tautology/material/formal/G. Klaus: the difference between formal and material truths does not lie in the fact that one of the two (the material one) requires a reference to reality, and the other does not, but only in the way in which the truth is founded. What representatives of the theory of formal truth call material W is what can be confirmed by practice and experiment. The formal, on the other hand, are merely derived from arithmetic operations. G. KlausVs: but this does not prove the truth, but only leads it back to the truth of other statements, which in turn still require justification. (G. Klaus, (1966), S 117).(2) 1. A.Tarski, „Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. VII, ASI 394, Paris 1936, pp 1-11 2. G. Klaus, Moderne Logik, Berlin 1966 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Wittgenstein | Tugendhat Vs Wittgenstein | Pauen I 254 I/TugendhatVsHeidelberger School/Pauen: (1979): has created its own problems with false basic assumptions. Instead: semantic approach: use of the expression "I" in everyday language. What do we mean by the self-attribution of mental states? Tugendhat: "The ego" is a false substantiation of a personal pronoun. An art expression. Tugendhat like Wittgenstein: in reality they are expressive sentences. Wittgenstein: "I feel pain" only replaces "Ouch"! I 255 TugendhatVsWittgenstein: difference between the two: the former expresses knowledge. It can also be denied. The sentence cannot be mistakenly misused. In the case of self-attribution, the possibility of false knowledge is omitted. ((s) Cf. >privileged access, >incorrigibility). I 256 Tugendhat: "Epistemic asymmetry" between self and external attributions. Self-attributions are true exactly when they are also attributed to others. But not vice versa. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Turing Vs Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein VI 122/123 Contradiction/TuringVsWittgenstein/Schulte: a practical calculation with a "hidden contradiction" can have fatal consequences, therefore the fear of it is not unfounded. Wittgenstein/Schulte: makes concessions. However, he maintains that one should not think that one should never rely on one's bills as long as the objection is not excluded by evidence. False idea of an "absolute certainty" of mathematics. A good angel will always be necessary so that we are on the right path. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Williams, M. Vs Wittgenstein | Brendel I 260 Knowledge/Seclusion/M .WilliamsVsWittgenstein/Brendel: M. Williams pro seclusion of the knowledge term. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Wittgenstein | Williams, B. Vs Wittgenstein | McDowell I 187 LearVsWittgenstein: "stunted transcendental idealism". A fully formed one would be the argument that we cannot be fundamentally deceived about the world, since we have constituted it ourselves. With the "stunted" the "we" disappears. McDowell: That is correct, but we never needed reinsurance through the "we". Bernard WilliamsVsWittgenstein: variety of transcendental idealism. The world and the fact that we have mind are transcendental for each other. McDowell: but none of that is found in Wittgenstein. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Wittgenstein | Wright Vs Wittgenstein | McDowell I 205 Crispin WrightVsWittgenstein: he is bound to a particular conception of meaning, but his quietism prevents him from fulfilling this obligation. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Wittgenstein | Verschiedene Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 97 NeurathVsTractatus: (Carnap was the first to discover the implications of Neurath's ideas.) Neurath: Science is a system of statements consisting of statements of only one kind. Each statement can be combined or compared with any other. But statements are never compared with a "reality", with "facts". I 98 A separation of statements and facts is the result of a doubling metaphysics. Neurath VsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still eliminated: it is easily imaginable that the protocol of a certain observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one drops one of the two sentences. I 100 Protocol sentences can therefore no longer be regarded as an unchangeable basis. I 101 Neurath: we are not against a judge, but the judge is deductible. Stegmüller IV 76 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke: some defend Wittgenstein against Kripke: Kripke did not represent conceptual nihilism or meaning nihilism. IV 77 Stegmüller: But that is not what it is about: it is about the possibility of capturing meanings. But the concept of "meaning" becomes meaningless if people do not have the opportunity to grasp it! Not the grasping of objects is the problem, but the grasping of the intensional structures, the intention, the Fregesian sense, which precede the denotates. Stegmüller IV 152 GoldfarbVsKripke: the relation token/type is a special case of the "continuation of a series" and the "rule sequence". Goldfarb: this is not correct: 1. In order to determine whether two tokens belong to the same type, one simply has to be able to detect the perceptible similarity. 2. "Type" is not a sequence to be generated according to a rule, but an unordered set! Also not for the Platonist. GoldfarbVsKripke: the conditions of justification (conditions of assertiveness) do not replace the conditions of truth at all, but are only a trivial reformulation. Wittgenstein VI 167 Original Meter/Sense/Wittgenstein/Schulte: also here misunderstanding: one has said: VI 167/168 VsWittgenstein: even if the sentence "The original meter is not 1m long" is always wrong, it still makes sense! Schulte: but this does not agree with Wittgenstein's conception of "sense". ((s) To have meaning means to be able to be negated.). Schulte: the train must have a joke in the language game! Example: "The original meter is not 1m long" is not a valid move and it is also not a joke. VI 175 VsWittgenstein/Schulte: it confuses the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. Never taken seriously by Wittgenstein. Wants to overcome borders anyway, although such theories do not belong to his philosophy at all. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Place Vs Wittgenstein | Arm II 55 PlaceVsWittgenstein/PlaceVsArmstrong: the world should not be regarded as a "world of facts" (Tractatus). Situations/Armstrong: are localized in space and time. Spacetime itself is a "big situation". (II 33/34) Conceptualism/PlaceVsArmstrong: thus understood space and time would be abstractions. But these are only linguistic fictions. Ontology/Place: everything that exists are certain spatial relations between particulars. Also relations within particulars. And between situations. Space/Time/Place: are only abbreviations for spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal relations. Spatial Relations/Place: exist between particulars. Temporal Relations/Place: not between particulars, but between situations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Wittgenstein | Mackie Vs Wittgenstein | Stegmüller IV 499 Religion/faith/Wittgenstein: (Faith: ambiguous term.) IV 500 As Kierkegaard: the believer does not even want a proof. IV 500/501 There is a specific religious parlance. The strength of faith is measurable by the risks, which the believer is willing to take. Or, by the extent to which the belief determines his decisions of action and the overall interpretation of his life. MackieVsWittgenstein: : all that is also met by everyday convictions, not only religious beliefs! MackieVsWittgenstein: the supposition, the significance of the Last Judgement were any different for an believer than for an atheist comes down to Kierkegaard's problematic construction that the interest of the querist were part of the question itself. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Hintikka Vs Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein I 32 Calculus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: but Wittgenstein’s calculus is not an intra-linguistic act. Understanding a sign is a step of calculus, (quasi to a calculation). "What a sentence is, is in a sense determined by the rules of sentence structure, in another sense through the use of the sign in the language game." PU § 136. HintikkaVsWittgenstein: Problem: that we actually need to do something in the application of the calculus. This approach has failed, and therefore Wittgenstein almost entirely dispensed with the calculus analogy in the PU. But it is not true that he no longer considers the entire theory valid, he has only come to realize that the concept of calculus cannot fulfill both purposes at the same time. Wittgenstein I 238 Showing/Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s, the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond symbolism... we cannot do anything more than to replace one symbolism it with another." HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong, because pointing gestures can easily lead us out of the realm of the merely linguistic. WittgensteinVsVs: denies this. He explains that what we achieve with an ostensive definition is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between written and spoken language on the one hand and sign language on the other hand. Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus. Wittgenstein I 242 Rule/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: for the first time, the rule is introduced as a mediator. But that does not remove the questions: What is the conceptual status of such a rule? How does it fulfill its mediation mission? Here is the seed to later philosophy: main question: the issue of the rule obedience. HintikkaVsWittgenstein: of course it bothers Wittgenstein to postulate mysterious "mediator beings". But in the middle phase the rules threaten to become such beings. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Cresswell Vs Wittgenstein | I 55 CresswellVsLogical atomism/CresswellVsAtomism/CresswellVsWittgenstein/CresswellVsTractatus: the error of the logical atomists was to think that if only they found the correct total physical theory and brought it into a 1st-stage language, that then every speech about the world (in everyday language) would be translatable into the language of this theory. ((s) i.e. the contrary of what Cresswell does here). Cresswell: I want to show both here: how we can keep our everyday language without giving up any claims with respect to the adequacy of a 1st order physical theory. --- Hintikka I 133 ... The process of the logical semanticist (Carnap, Tarski) violates the above-mentioned principle of the categorical analogy. ((s) that R corresponds to a relationship in the world). This difference is important for Wittgenstein (not for Frege): because the objects are elements of possible facts and circumstances. This is a big difference to Frege. Therefore, it is not enough to simply indicate an "R", and thus a value course, but you have to specify what the relation is in all the different possible worlds. (VsTarski) CresswellVsWittgenstein/FregeVsWittgenstein/Hintikka: could now argue that the indication of all these value courses was identical with the specification of the relation (the so-called possible worlds semantics is based on that). --- I 134 But precisely there, the difference between the image theory of the Tractatus (the modal logic extended) and the logical semantics prove to be (largely) an illusion. Tractatus/Hintikka: Thesis: in the Tractatus you are dealing with a variety of possible facts, so it is actually a modal logic. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Stalnaker Vs Wittgenstein | I 52 Content/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Stalnaker: actually the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus had this notion of content and he simultaneously recognized the problem. ((s) content as a domain of all possibilities that can, however, not be distinguished from a domain - how the possibilities could have been different). Problem: the content of necessary truths and the characterization of the space of possibilities. Solution/Wittgenstein: "About what you cannot speak, you should remain silent". I 53 StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not really help, then: Showing/content/Stalnaker: showing also has a content or has to have a content. Just like saying. Showing/content/Ramsey: "What we cannot say, we also cannot whistle". (Ramsey 1929/1990:146). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Wittgenstein | Neurath Vs Wittgenstein | Hempel I 100 NeurathVsWittgenstein: third phase of turning away from the Tractatus: even this principle is still under elimination: it is easily conceivable that the protocol of a particular observer contains two statements that contradict each other. Then, in practice, one of the two sets is dropped. Log sentences can thus no longer be regarded as immutable basis. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Wittgenstein | Birnbacher Vs Wittgenstein | Metz II 726 Criteria/Consciousness/Human/Wittgenstein: behaviour as a criterion for attributing consciousness. Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: behaviour cannot be a criterion for attributing consciousness to machines. Here neurophysiological criteria are important, which Wittgenstein attributes to the "symptoms". Consciousness/behaviour/animals/Rollin/BirnbacherVsWittgenstein: even in animals, behaviour is an unreliable criterion for consciousness. E.g. cows eat immediately after surgery. Reason: their food is so low in nutrients that they would be weakened too much if they took long breaks. Longer periods of fasting are possible in humans. II 726 Consciousness/Machine/Birnbacher: that a machine formulates I-sentences is not a criterion for consciousness at all. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 |
| Wittgenstein | Horwich Vs Wittgenstein | Stegmüller IV 154 Meaning/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/HorwichVsWittgenstein/HorwichVsKripke: the list (see above) has to be completed: d) Meaning addition with "plus" does not exclude that mistakes are made. That must not be violated by any concept of meaning. e) The meaning of "plus" is an intrinsic property! This stands in contradiction to d), though! Horwich: brain research could produce matches, by the way. Kripke and Wittgenstein have indeed shown that there must not necessarily be facts of meaning, but that there could be! IV 154/155 Stegmüller: Wittgenstein as well would certainly welcome a return to empiricism, but a theory could probably determine the match as a fact (like the theory of Chomsky), but still only in the context of assertability conditions (justification conditions), not in the sense of a truth-functional semantics. Turing Machine/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Stegmüller/Chomsky: e.g. (Kripke) a machine fallen from the sky can be analyzed with respect to all relevant things (program and memory). a) Stegmüller: Chomsky thus accepts a view that contains a linear solution of the paradox. Due to differences in the program, we recognize, whether "plus" or "quus" is represented. Because we have a theory that tells us something about differences. IV 156 b) Linear solution: linguistic competence: we distinguish well-formed and not well-formed vocalizations. IV 157 "Switch Model"/Internalized Language: in the structural original state there may be many switches that are set to "zero", waiting to be turned into active positions. Language is nothing more than a present stable switch setting (internalized language). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Wittgenstein | Meixner Vs Wittgenstein | I 31 Names/Ontology/Meixner: Example "that Regensburg is situated at the Danube" is a name for a factual entity. Example "to be square": Name, but not for an individual or a factual entity, but a name for a property. (Property name). I 32 The names tell us which entities the ontology calculates with. But they are only certain indicators for entities. We do not know if they refer successfully. (> Reference). However, if names were mistrusted in principle, language would lose a large part of its ontological relevance. I 33 Meixner: "ontological basic trust": where there is a name, there is also the corresponding entity". Therefore we can assume that the names tell us something about ontology on the whole. MeixnerVsWittgenstein: had no deeper justification for his skeptical intention of fundamental linguistic criticism. I 125 World/real world/actual world/sum/subject/state of affairs/Meixner: for "the sum of all existing state of affairs par excellence" one can also say: "the real (actual) world", or briefly "the world". (>Wittgenstein: speaks of facts, not of things that form the world). MeixnerVsWittgenstein: but one can also call the world a single large actual individual (namely the sum of all actual individuals). Vs: but the world as state of affairs has the advantage that non-actual, thus possible worlds (poss.w.) must also be state of affairs, and thus belong to the same category. Because it is not possible, since they belong to different ontological categories. Possible Worlds/poss.w./Meixner: what kind of state of affairs do they form? The paradigmatic possible worlds and the non-actual possible worlds must have something designating in common. I 126 Actual World/Real World: maximum consistency state of affairs. And also the possible world. That is what they have in common. ((s) They cannot be contradictory in themselves. That is why we need separate possible worlds.) Maximal Consistent/Meixner: incomparably richer in content than just consistent state of affairs. Possible Worlds: are so rich in content that they are temporally determined and for each state of affairs x, which is temporally determined or time-differentiated, have either this itself or its negation as partial-state of affairs. Part: the partial relationship between state of affairs is the specification of the relational transcendental "part of" for state of affairs. For example that Fritz is taller than Anna is part-state-of-affairs of the state of affairs that Anna is shorter than Fritz. General: If sentence B follows logically from sentence A, then the state of affairs is that B is part of the state of affairs that A. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Wittgenstein | Millikan Vs Wittgenstein | I 221 not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: thesis: "not" is an operator which operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the meaning of the entire sentence. (s)VsWittgenstein/(s)VsMIllikan: Problem: a) "no" does not belong to the sentence, then it can be applied on the whole sentence "The sun is shining". Wittgenstein: "no" changes the meaning of the sentence, to which it belongs. b) it is part of the sentence, then it would have to be applied twice, the second time on itself. It only changes the meaning, if it is not part of the sentence. Projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: then the sentence stands for something that does not exist. Problem/Millikan: this leads to a reification of possibilities. negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences can not have non-existent facts as real value. Justification: negative facts have no causal powers that could play a role in a normal explanation. negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. Ex "not-p" is to say "the fact that p does not exist". Wittgenstein has understood it roughly in that way. Pointe: above we said that existence theorems are not representations. projection theory/image theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but he does not think that sentences of the form "x does not exist" represent a non-existent fact. Then the variable "X" in "x does not exist" is not about names of individual things (objects, elementary objects) but about representations of possible states (possible facts). Sense/non-existence/negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning. ((s) > Meinong). Millikan: in our terminology that is, they are representations (MillikanVs). I 222 And at the same time he could argue that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. Pointe: this made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p". Millikan: couldn't we keep up at least one half of this equivalence? From "non-p" to "that p does not exist"? MillikanVsWittgenstein: no, not even that we can. When Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that p does not exist", then that would mean for my position that negative sentences dont project world states and aren't representations. Millikan: instead they would project linguistic facts, "not-p" would be an icon, but it does not represent, even though a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant. Proto reference/Millikan. "P" would not be an underrepresented reference of "not-p" but a proto reference .Question: would "not-p" be an icon of "p is false"? Vs: then "not" would no longer be an operator! Not/negation/operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: that is, the projection rule for "not-p" is a function of the projection rule for "p". 1. If "no" would not be an operator, it could happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p", but still the meaning of "not-p". Absurd. 2. if "not-p" says "that p does not exist", "not-p" would also have to be true if any version of "p" is not completely determined, has no custom meaning. Ex "Pegasus was not a winged horse" Ex "The present king of France is not bald" were true statements! 3. sure, ""p" is wrong" at least reflects (icons) that "p" has no real value. Accordingly: "x does not exist" then reflects the fact that "x" has no reference. Pointe: if "not-p" says "that p" does not exist, it still projects a negative fact. negative fact/Millikan: we should be able to show that a negative fact is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. But we can not. We have just moved in circles. non-existent fact/Millikan: can not be a matter of an icon and not the object of a representation. negative fact/Millikan: would have to be something other than a non-existent fact. Pointe: but if we can show that, we don't need to assume any longer that "not-p" says "that p does not exist". negative sentence/projection/fact/negation/Millikan: what I have to claim is that negative sentences depict real or existing world states (facts). It is well known how such a thing is done: Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is applied only to the logical predicate of the sentence ((S) internal negation). Here, the meaning of the predicate is changed so that the predicate applies to the opposite (depicts) as of what it normally does. I 223 This can then be extended to more complex sentences with external negation: Ex "No A is " becomes "Every A is non-". MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well known: 1. Problem: how can the function of "not" be interpreted in very simple sentences of the form "X is not" Ex "Pegasus is not (pause)". Here, "not" can be interpreted as operating through predicates! Sentences of the form "X is not" are of course equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist." Problem: we have said that "existing" is no representation. So "not" can not be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence. Ex "Cicero is not Brutus" can not operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, because simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" must have still other functions. Problem: how do these different functions relate to each other? Because we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts. meaningless/meaningless sentences/negation/projection/Millikan: here there is the same problem: Ex "Gold is not square". The sentence does not become true just because gold would have another form than to be a square. Problem: the corresponding affirmative sentences have no sense! Yet Ex "Gold is not square" seems to say something real. Problem: in turn: if "not" has a different function here than in representing sentences, we still need to explain this function. 2. Problem: (Important): the projective rules between simple sentences of the form "X is not " and its real value. real value/negation/Millikan: is the real value of a negative sentence the world state? Ex The fact of John's not-being-tall? Or a precise fact as Johns being-exactly-180cm? I 224 Millikan: the latter is correct. Representation/negation/Millikan: thesis: negative representations have an undefined sense. ((S) But Millikan admits that negations are representations, unlike identity sentences and existence sentences). Millikan: as in vague denotations, real values are determined if they occur in true sentences, but they must not be identified by the hearer to meet their intrinsic function. Opposite/negative sentence/representation/Millikan: thesis: negative sentences whose opposites are normal representative sentences must project positive facts themselves. I 229 "not"/negation/negative sentence/representation/SaD/Millikan: thesis: the law of the excluded third is inapplicable for simple representative negative sentences. Ex additionsally to the possibility that a predicate and its opposite are true, there is the possibility that the subject of the sentence does not exist. And that's just the way that the sentence has no particular Fregean sense. "P or not-p": only makes sense if "p" has a sense. Negation: their function is never (in the context of representative sentences) to show that the sentence would not make sense. sense/Millikan: one can not know a priori if a sentence makes sense. Negation/representation/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein: his mistake (in the Tractatus) was to believe that if everyone sees that "x" in "x does not exist" has a meaning that the negative sentence is then a negative representation. Rationalism/Millikan: the rationalist belief that one could know a priori the difference between sense and non-sense. I 303 Sensation Language/sensation/private language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one can not develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Newen Vs Wittgenstein | New I 94 Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles 2) Hintikka: points in the visual field 3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties 4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects. Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned I 95 to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed. (ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors. (iii) elementary propositions are logically independent. Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time. Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent. Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form. I 98 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties). I 99 Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red." Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names. Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised. 100 Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here. NS I 35 Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them. This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign. ((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.) NS I 36 VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change. NS I 37 Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293). Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community. One person alone cannot give meaning expressions. NS I 38 Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow. VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Positivism | Pro | Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?) HabermasVsWittgenstein: Wttg. positivist. WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty. WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy) |
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| Positivism | Versus | Bezzel Wittgenstein : HabermasVsWittgenstein: W. Positivist. WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Spiel des Zweifels setzt schon Gewißheit voraus. WittgensteinVs: Behaviorismus, Metaphysik, hinweisende Erklärung, "Sprache zweiter Ordnung", Fortschrittsdenken der Naturwissenschaft,(westlich) |
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| Language essent. Comm. | Versus | Rorty VI 147 Language / thinking / Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein / Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Atomism, Logical | Versus | Simons I 320 Atomism: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Leibniz monads - VsAtomismus: Aristotle: prima materia (continualism) BlackVsWittgenstein / BlackVsAtomism: - "metaphysical prejudice": the thesis that not every existence depends on something - SimonsVsatomism. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Positivism | Rorty, R. | II 130f Positivists / Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the term "language" - then primary qualities become more closely related to reality than secondary (VsLocke) - but that this theory was resurrected by KripkeVsWittgenstein - (KripkeVslinguistic turn). |
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| Belief, Priority | Searle, J.R. | Esfeld I 76 SearleVsWittgenstein: Thesis: belief states have priority over linguistic expressions. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Wahrheitsfunktion | Sellars, W. | II 314 Tractatus/SellarsVsWittgenstein: nicht alle Aussagen können Wahrheitsfunktionen sein. - Denn das lässt sich nicht mit der These vereinbaren, dass elementare Aussagen "logische Bilder" von Tatsachen sind. Problem: nicht alle außersprachlichen Sachverhalte lassen sich durch eine Aussage ausdrücken. - Daher kann es keine Abbildungsbeziehung sein. Paradox/Sellars: dass wir eine Abbildung erkennen können, aber weder aussagen noch denken Bsp (1) "S (in l) bildet aRb ab". a) die Aussage "aRb" kommt darin gar nicht vor b) sie kommt vor, aber (1) ist gar keine Aussage. (...+...) I 316 Problem: Tatsache/Gegenstand - Lösung/Sellars: Tatsache = Quasi-Gegenstand: sprachlich (nicht in der Welt). - Problem: Wahrheit - dann müsste auch die Welt zur Sprache gehören - absurd. |
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