Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
de dicto Lewis IV 144
Knowledge de dicto/Lewis: E.g. encyclopedia - aimed at the world and provides knowledge about the world, not on the reader (de se) E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds himself in the library - (> tour guide example, Lost wanderers) - provides localization in logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap - E.g. map: will only be useful when the red dot "you are here" is removed.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

I, Ego, Self Perry Frank I 398ff
Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference.
I 399f
I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. >I/Castaneda, >quasi-indicator.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986
---
I 402ff
I/Castaneda/Perry: not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "key index word" - Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". - Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. - False: Labelling: "the one who makes the mess" does not help, because no connection to me.
I 403
Belief/I/Perry: Solution: distinction belief-state/belief-object. - E.g. event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "still time". - Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 - state: "now" - specific labeling without an index is not enough.
I 414
I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I" - like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable. Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. - True/False: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. - There is nothing what all have in common. - Solution: lost wanderers in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Index Words Perry Frank I 22
PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. ---
Frank I 393f
Index words/Perry: without pointing component - demonstratives: with pointing component - meaning of index-words: their role - similar to the method for the determination of the object.
I 394f
Today/Meaning: constant, truth value with index word "today it's nice" is not constant, so the meaning is changing - if understanding is knowing the truth value. - Perry: role (determination process) changes, meaning constant - then the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. - What the speaker believes is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986
---
I 419
Index words/Perry: true-false exam does not help. - E.g. Two lost wanderers: that the Mt. Tallac is higher than Jack's Peak, is affirmed by all. - ((s) This presupposes that the two do not stand side by side in sight - Perry:. There is no mountain, everyone believes it is Mt. Tallac, no customer from which all believe that he has made the mess - no Professor, who does not feel guilty -. What people have in common here is not what they believe (E.g. wanderers). ---
I 394 ff
Sense/Perry: is oft of understood as a term - then question: is the meaning of index words to be equated with an individual-concept or a general term?
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Map Example Lewis IV 144
Knowledge de dicto/Map-Example/Lewis: e.g. encyclopedia - applies to the world and provides knowledge about the world, not about the reader (de se). - E.g. Lingens with memory loss found himself in a library and reads his own story. (-> E.g. Lost wanderers). - Knowledge de dicto provides localization in the logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap. - E.g. Map: will only be used if the red dot "you are here" is removed.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Map Example Peacocke I 76
Map / Peacocke: to use a map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. - ((s)> e.g. Two lost wanderers/J. Perry). ((s) e.g. GPS: intensional (tells you "who you are"). - Map: (extensional) will not help you.)

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Two Omniscient Gods Perry Frank I 404f
Lewis: Two omniscient Gods/Gods-Example/example of the Gods/wanderer-example: E.g. Perry: two lost wanderers need more than just the same travel guide to even detect differences with the situation and each other - they would call all the same sentences as true.
See also sugar trail at the grocery store (> supermarket-example) . (Frank I 402ff). > Two omniscient Gods.

See also >identification, >individuation, >propositions, >propositional knowledge, self-identification, >self-knowledge, >essential indexicals.


John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13
(1979), 3-21

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Wanderers (Expl) Perry, J. Fra I 421
Belief state / opinion state / 2 wanderers / Perry: there is no identity, not even an isomorphic correspondence, but only a systematic relation between the belief states in which you are, and what one believes, based on the way!

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994