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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuants | Meixner | I 49 Def Continuant/Contuants/Meixner: continuants are singular individuals with a time duration that have at most spatial parts - no temporal parts! Therefore no accidents. >Accidens, >Individuals, >Objects. ((s) then no change is possible). Identity in time is given anyway, no question about it is possible. - Then a continuant is no individual which has these temporal parts, the accidents. Cf. >Temporal identity, >Change, >Motion, >Person. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Counterparts | Stalnaker | I 72 Counterpart/Lewis: the things in the actual world have counterparts in other worlds. Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual has accidental properties, properties that it does not have in other worlds. >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Bare particulars, >Possible worlds, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essentialism, >Possible worlds/Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Particulars | Stalnaker | I 72 Bare particular/anti-essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible worlds in which it does not. >Bare particulars, >Possible Worlds, >Essentialism. Exception: self-identity. Problem: we need special semantics for that. I 72/73 Essential properties/bare individual things/theoretical terms/particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare particulars there are undeniable essential properties. 1) Something that is necessarily an essential property of everything, e.g. the ability to be self-identical, e.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, e.g. to be colored when red. 2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967)(1) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: e.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, e.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, e.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, e.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. This also applies in possible worlds where Babe Ruth is a tricycle. 3) Possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970)(2) possible worlds-indexed properties are undeniable essential properties, e.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something/someone has in any possible world iff. this person/thing has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world). Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had. >Properties, >Necessity, >Necessity de re, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essential property, >Essentialism. 1. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967): Essentialism in modal logic, Nous 1, (1):91-96. 2. Alvin Plantinga (1970): "World and Essence", Philosophical Review 79, pp. 461-92. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Terminology | Meixner | I, 43f Tropics: individual properties as basic building blocks of reality - then no accidentals but substances. >Accidens, >Substance. Vs: linguistic determinations surpassed, "revisionary" ontology: must depict language as irrelevant. >Ontology. I 45 Group individual: e.g. "the first three chancellors" - constituents: all possible combinations - but: Adenauer's head part of Adenauer, but not a (constitutive) part of the group. >Constitution, >Mereology, cf. >Sets, >Set Theory, >Comprehension. I 56f Def INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: individual-like objects: Example "the round square", but also e.g., Sherlock Holmes, fictitious persons and their parts of the body, of which it cannot be said whether they have certain properties or not - "the man who knew that he knew nothing": not Socrates, but INDIVIDUAL (overdetermined: knowledge/ignorance). >Fiction, >Knowledge, >Predication, >Attribution, >Individuals/Meixner. I 56 Def (initial property-wise) complete: e.g. numbers: we cannot say that they smile or do not smile. >Numbers, >Nonsensical. I 57 Def initial property-wise maximally consistent/Meixner: entities that are ee ee complete and not ee overdetermined - Def maximally consistent/Wessel: (external): a set of formulas that are consistent and no further consistent formulas exist. That is, that any addition of another formula makes the set inconsistent. >Overdetermination, >Consistency, >Properties/Meixner. Def maximally consistent/Meixner: of every individual property, the INDIVIDUAL contains either that one itself or its negation. >Continuous determination/Kant. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
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