Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accidents | Hobbes | Adorno XIII 245 Accidents/accidental property/Hobbes/Adorno: The accidental is not real in Hobbes, but it is the way in which the bodies are perceived by us. Through this moment, the materialism of Hobbes, like most modern materialist philosophies, plays into positivism or empiricism. >Positivism, >Empiricism, >Materialism. This concept of accidents is already very similar to a concept which Locke, the immediate successor and radical critic of Hobbes, has characterized: the concept of secondary qualities. >Secondary qualities, >Qualities. N.B.: the relation of essence and appearance is reversed in opposition to the Platonic tradition: what is appearance there, becomes essence, namely, the body-world. On the other hand, this becomes the appearance, which is essence there, namely, the way of mental conception, or even mental activity. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Definitions | Kripke | III 342 Definition/Kripke: a definition is a "great fundamental principle". Definitions must be formulated in a language already understood - then there is little room for alternative interpretations of a metalanguage (even if the syntactic and semantic structure can be interpreted differently). >Loewenheim, >Meta language, >Object language. III 390 Implicit Definition/Kripke: an implicit definition is given by rule - otherwise no generalizations in finite systems can be derived from (infinite) instances. III 392 Definition/Kripke: no inductive definition is possible if it does not start with a general characterization of the atomic (basic) case. III 393 Direct definition: a direct definition is not recursive. Recursive definition: is indirect. In Tarski the definition of truth is given via a recursive definition of fulfillment. Question: could he also have defined truth directly? If so, would fulfillment be definable in terms of truth? >Satisfaction, >Satifiability. III 399 Implicit Definition: depends on axioms. These imply (for example) truth implicit in the sense that truth is the only interpretation of the predicate T(x) which makes all the axioms true. Explicit definition: does not depend on axioms, but on expressive power of the language (not theory). Sat1(x,y) is explicitly definable in terms of T(x) - it is an explicit definition by introducing a new variable (II 402). --- Kripke I 66ff Definition/reference/standard meter/Kripke: Kripke does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. There is a certain length which he would like to denote. He denotes it through an accidental property. Someone else may refer to the same reference by another accidental property. He can still definitely say: if heat had been in the game, the length would have changed. Rigid: the meter is rigid. Not rigid: the length of S at time t is not rigid. >Standard meter, >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke. I 136f The "definition" does not say that the two terms are synonymous, but that we have determined the reference of the term "one meter" by establishing that it should be a rigid designation expression that actually has the length S. So not a necessary truth! We must distinguish between definitions that specify a reference, and definitions that specify a synonym. >Synonymy/Kripke. Definition: is not necessary: e.g. tiger: large, carnivorous, four legged cat, etc. Suppose someone says: "This is the meaning of tiger in German". ZiffVs: this is wrong. E.g. a tiger with three legs is not a contradiction in itself. I 153 In the case of proper names the reference can be defined in various ways. Determination of reference: is a priori (contingent) and not synonymous. Meaning: is analytical (required). Definition: specifies reference and expresses a priori truth. >Meaning/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Identity Theory | Kripke | Frank I 32 Identity Theory/mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the identity theory teaches the diversity of the logical subjects of the physical and the psychic. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalistic one (semantic structures). >Physical/psychic, >Naturalism, >Mentalism. Frank I 32 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: the identity theory will not go further than that an identity between syntactic and semantic structures would, if at all, be based on the fact that the semantic is not without the syntactic, but this does not sufficiently determine it through the syntactic - which is a variant of the supervenience thesis. >Supervenience. Frank I 114 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: it is conceivable that a psychic event (e.g. pain) occurs without a physical event - hence the two are not identical. It is not an essential property of the sensation of pain to be a psychic event - it is rather only an accidental property. >Pain/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke. Frank I 123 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: identity theory asserts a contingent identity - however, as it is necessary, we cannot speak of a deception if we try to imagine that the identity statement is false! It could have turned out that pain is not C fiber stimulation: this is no analogy to heat/molecular motion. We pick out heat because of its contingent property that it feels a certain way. We pick out pain by the necessary property to feel like pain. KripkeVsLewis: the causal role suggests the misconception that the cause of pain is contingent. >Contingency/Kripke, >Causal role. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Pain | Kripke | I 167 A certain sensation (pain) could not have existed without being a sensation. >Pain/Kripke. Pain: it is a mistake to think that a pain S and a brain condition B could exist independently. >Identity theory/Kripke. --- Rorty I 93 Kripke/Rorty: same epistemic situation: even in the absence of heat you can be in the same epistemic situation that you can feel the heat sensation. Pain: in the case of pain and other mental phenomena this is not possible. Being in the same epidemic situation that would exist if there was a pain means to be in pain. I 174 Heat: although "heat" is a rigid designator, the reference is determined with respect to an accidental property. >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke. Pain: pain is a rigid designator whose reference is determined by an essential property of the reference (LewisVs). >Essence/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Pain | Rorty | I 83f Pain/Descartes: pain are particulars RortyVs). Their being is constituted in a single property: painfulness. --- I 93f Pain/Kripke/Rorty: difference: a) heat: Even in the absence of heat you can feel heat - (same epistemic situation) b) Not so in the case of pain. Difference: a) reference in heat is determined by an accidental property - b) in pain: by an essential property. >Pain/Kripke, cf. >Necessity a posteriori. I 127 f E.g. The not yet speaking child knows in the same way that it is in pain, as the plant knows the direction of the sun and the amoeba the temperature of the water. Knowledge: this way of knowledge, however, is unrelated to what a user of language knows, if he knows what pain is. Wittgenstein: it is a mistake to think that we learn what pain is in this second sense in putting our knowledge, of what pain in the first sense is, in a linguistic construct. >Linguistic disguise. I 128 Wittgensteinians: make a fuss about the facts about behavior and environment. RortyVs: these are irrelevant to the nature of pain. Because the nature of pain is simply determined by what is named. --- VI 172 Rorty: Pain, people and beliefs (I'm not so sure with hairstyles) are not entities, about which one can learn to talk by obtaining succinct definitions. >Definition. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Particulars | Stalnaker | I 72 Bare particular/anti-essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible worlds in which it does not. >Bare particulars, >Possible Worlds, >Essentialism. Exception: self-identity. Problem: we need special semantics for that. I 72/73 Essential properties/bare individual things/theoretical terms/particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare particulars there are undeniable essential properties. 1) Something that is necessarily an essential property of everything, e.g. the ability to be self-identical, e.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, e.g. to be colored when red. 2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967)(1) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: e.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, e.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, e.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, e.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. This also applies in possible worlds where Babe Ruth is a tricycle. 3) Possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970)(2) possible worlds-indexed properties are undeniable essential properties, e.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something/someone has in any possible world iff. this person/thing has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world). Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had. >Properties, >Necessity, >Necessity de re, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essential property, >Essentialism. 1. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967): Essentialism in modal logic, Nous 1, (1):91-96. 2. Alvin Plantinga (1970): "World and Essence", Philosophical Review 79, pp. 461-92. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kripke, S. A. | Dummett Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 361 Rigid Designators/DummettVsKripke: (Frege): in modal contexts: Descriptions: to be construed as precluding the modal operator (MO), proper names: include MO E.g. Kripke: St. Anne did not have to be mother of Mary but still St. Anne, DummettVsKripke: "St. Anne" is not a predicate, not a candidate for being an accidental property of someone BurckhardtVsDummett: false justification: "St.Anne" simply as a rigid designator - by Dummett: in essential properties it is different. Stalnaker I 173 DummettVsKripke: (M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London 1973, 232) there can be no proper name, whose whole purpose is to have an object as a reference, without sense that defines the object somehow. Stalnaker: what kind of argument could indicate that we are not only speaking no such language, but that we are not even able to do it? |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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