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The author or concept searched is found in the following 159 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aesthetic Consciousness | Gadamer | I 91 Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer: What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on an achievement of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted in its original context of life, of all religious or profane function in which it stood and in which it had its meaning, it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". The abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness thus achieves a positive achievement for itself. It lets us see and is for itself what the pure work of art is. I call this, its achievement, the "aesthetic distinction". >Truth of Art/Gadamer, >Truth of Art/Schiller. This is intended to designate - in contrast to the distinction that a content-filled and certain taste exercises in selecting and rejecting - the abstraction that selects solely on the basis of aesthetic quality as such. It takes place in the self-consciousness of the "aesthetic experience". What the aesthetic experience is aimed at is to be the actual work - what it is not aimed at are the non-aesthetic moments inherent in it: purpose, function, meaning of content. These moments may be significant enough, as long as they integrate the work into its world and thus determine the whole range of meaning that it originally owns. But the artistic nature of the work must be distinguishable from all that. It virtually defines the aesthetic consciousness, that it carries out precisely this distinction of the aesthetically meant from all that is non-aesthetic. It abstracts from all conditions of access under which a work shows itself to us. Such a distinction is therefore itself a specifically aesthetic one. It distinguishes the aesthetic quality of a work from all content-related moments that determine our position in terms of content, morality or religion, and only means itself in its aesthetic existence. >Aesthetics, >Art, >Art works. The aesthetic consciousness therefore has the character of simultaneity, because it claims that everything that has artistic value is gathered in it. I 92 The "aesthetic distinction" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the standing theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic distinction", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his/her place in the world. I 105 Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer: [In the aesthetic experience] there is no progress and no final exhaustion of what is contained in a work of art. >Aesthetic Experience/Gadamer. The experience of art knows that about itself. Nevertheless, the aesthetic consciousness should not simply assume what it thinks of as its experience. For it perceives it, as we have seen, ultimately as the discontinuity of experience. But we have recognized this consequence as unacceptable. >Truth of Art/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetic Difference | Gadamer | I 90 Aesthetic Difference/Gadamer: [Gadamer speaks of aesthetic distinction, not of difference.] What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on an achievement of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted as its original context of life (all religious or profane functions in which it stood and in which it had its meaning), it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". The abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness achieves in this respect a positive achievement for itself. It lets us see and be for ourselves what the pure work of art is. I call this, its achievement, the "aesthetic difference". >Abstraction, >Distinctions, >Art, >Art works, >Aesthetics. I 95 In [the works of art], [the aesthetic difference] distinguishes the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic references in which it is placed, just as we can speak of someone behaving aesthetically outside the experience of art. The problem of aesthetics is thus restored to its full breadth and the transcendental question is restored, which had been abandoned by the standpoint of art and its separation of beautiful appearance and harsh reality. The aesthetic experience is indifferent to whether its object is real or not, whether the scene is the stage or life. I 92 The "aesthetic difference" which it operates as aesthetic consciousness also creates its own external existence. It proves its productivity by preparing its sites for simultaneity, the "universal library" in the field of literature, the museum, the theatre, the concert hall etc. I 93 Thus, through "aesthetic difference", the work loses its place and the world to which it belongs by becoming part of the aesthetic consciousness. This corresponds on the other hand to the fact that the artist also loses his or her place in the world. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Gadamer | I 90 Aesthetics/Gadamer: Aesthetic Consciousness: What we call a work of art and experience aesthetically is based (...) on a performance of abstraction. By disregarding everything in which a work is rooted in its original context of life, from all the religious or profane function in which it stood and in which it had its meaning, it becomes visible as the "pure work of art". The abstraction of the aesthetic consciousness thus achieves a positive achievement for itself. It lets us see and is for itself what the pure work of art is. I call this, its achievement, the "aesthetic distinction". >Truth of Art/Gadamer, >Truth of Art/Schiller, >Aesthetic Consciousness/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Aesthetics | Kant | Gadamer I 47 Aesthetics /"Urteilskraft"/Kant/Gadamer: What Kant for his part legitimized and wanted to legitimize through his critique of aesthetic judgement was the subjective generality of aesthetic taste, in which there is no longer any knowledge of the object, and in the field of the "fine arts" the superiority of genius over all rule aesthetics. Thus, Romantic hermeneutics and history find a point of reference for their self-understanding only in the concept of genius, which was brought to bear by the Kantian aesthetics. >Urteilskraft/ Kant. That was the other side of the Kantian effect. The transcendental justification of aesthetic judgement established the autonomy of the aesthetic consciousness, from which the historical consciousness should also derive its legitimation. The radical subjectivation that included Kant's re-foundation of aesthetics has thus truly made epoch. By discrediting any theoretical knowledge other than that of the natural sciences, it pushed the self-contemplation of the humanities into following the methodology of the natural sciences. At the same time, however, it facilitated this dependence by providing the "artistic moment", the "feeling" and the "attitude" as a subsidiary achievement. See >Method/Helmholtz, >Humanities/Gadamer. Truth/knowledge/episteme/art/Kant/GadamerVsKant: The transcendental function that Kant assigns to aesthetic judgement is capable of distinguishing it from conceptual knowledge. and in this respect to satisfy the definition of the phenomena of beauty and art. But is it possible to reserve the concept of truth for conceptual knowledge? Should one not also acknowledge that the work of art has truth? We shall see that an acknowledgement of this side of the matter puts not only the phenomenon of art but also that of history in a new light. >Truth of art/Gadamer. Gadamer I 48 Knowledge/Taste/Gadamer: one will be able to recognize that Kant's reasoning of aesthetics is based on the judgement of taste Gadamer I 49 does justice to both sides of the phenomenon, its empirical non-generality and its a priori claim to generality. But the price he pays for this justification of criticism in the field of taste is that he denies taste any meaning of knowledge. It is a subjective principle to which he reduces the public spirit. In it nothing is recognized of the objects that are judged beautiful, but it is only asserted that a priori a feeling of pleasure in the subject corresponds to them. Purposefulness/"Zweckmäßigkeit"/Kant: As is well known, this feeling is Kant was founded on expediency (...). This is the principle that Kant discovers in aesthetic judgment. It is here itself law. In this respect it is an a priori The effect of beauty, which is somewhere between a merely sensual-empirical agreement in matters of taste and a rationalistic generality of rules in the middle. The taste is "taste of reflection". Content/taste/Kant/Gadamer: (...) the culture of moral feeling [is] described as the way in which genuine taste can take a certain unchanging form(1). The content-related determination of taste thus falls outside the scope of its transcendental function. Kant is interested only in so far as there is a principle of aesthetic judgement of its own, and therefore pure taste judgement alone is important to him. >Beauty/Kant. 1.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, S. 264. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Altruism | Mayr | I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)(2): 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Art | Eco | I 48 Science/Art/Eco: in the open work of art you can see the resonance of some tendencies in modern science: the concept of the field comes from physics: it is a new understanding of the relationship between cause and effect: it has a more complex interaction of forces. There is a departure from a static and syllogistic view of order. It has an indefinite relation and is complementarity. I 55 Reception/Eco: the work of art offers the interpreter a work to be completed. I 105 Openness and disorder are relative terms. Something is more in order in comparison to a previous disorder. I 138 Definition openness of the first degree: integration and knowledge mechanisms are characteristic for every process of knowledge. I 139 Definition second-degree openness: second-degree openness corresponds to the grasping that constantly open process, it allows us to perceive new contours and new possibilities for a form. I 149 Openness: openness means that the recipient has freedom of choice. I 160 Art/Science/Eco: certain structures in art appear as epistemological metaphors, as structural decisions of a diffuse theoretical consciousness (not of a particular theory, but cultural belief). Art and science are mirroring certain achievements of modern scientific methodology in categories of uncertainty and statistical distribution. Bivalent logic, causality and the principle of the excluded middle are called into question. I 163 Art/Science/Cubism: art exhibits parallels to non-Euclidean geometry. There is a parallel between Hilbert's attempts to axiomatize geometry and neoplasticism and constructivism. I 165 Eco thesis: in a world where the discontinuity of phenomena has called into question the possibility of a unified and definitive view of the world, open art shows us a way of seeing and recognizing this world and of integrating our sensitivity. This discontinuity is not narrated but it is art. ((s)VsEco: Eco shows a strongly affirmative attitude: that it is about recognizing the world.) I 260 Alienation/Art/Eco: Epigones have become alienated from a habit that now fixes them without allowing them to move in an original and free way. >Artworks, >Alienation. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Autism | Happé | Slater I 154 Autism/Happé: In the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994)(1), (…) participants are asked to justify why a character might have chosen to say what he says in a complex mentalistic situation. For example, a soldier gets captured by enemy troops and upon being asked where the rest of his camp is hidden, he decides to reveal the exact location in the hope that the enemy will believe that he is lying and therefore send troops to the opposite location. Understanding this use of “double bluff” is a complex mindreading achievement that turns out to be especially challenging for individuals with autism, including for those individuals who do pass second-order theory of mind tests. >Autism/Baron-Cohen, >False Belief Task/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/ToM/psychological theories, >Theory of Mind/Dennett. 1. Happé, F. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters’ thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, 129—154. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Autonomy | Adorno | Grenz I 74 Autonomy/Adorno/Grenz: the concept of autonomy defines the subject as the individual, who defends itself helplessly against its heteronomy: the poorest and last straw, the false appearance, and all that emanates from it, is heteronomous. Only the individual's achievement makes it a subject. >Individual, >Subject/Adorno, >Appearance/Adorno, >Outside/Inside, >Outer World/Habermas. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Axioms | d’Abro | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 35 Axiomatics/d'Abro: This new science was developed mainly by the formalists Hilbert and Peano. >Formalism. 37 Hilbert/d'Abro: Examples of Hilbert's typical claims: 1. Two different points, A and B, always form a straight line. 2. Three different points, A, B, and C, which do not lie on a straight line, always form a plane. 3. Of three points lying on a straight line, there is one and only one between the other two. 4. If the segment AB is equal to the segments A'B 'and A''B'', then A'B' is equal to A''B''. The N.B. of Hilbert's postulates: points, lines, and planes are not the only quantities which satisfy these relations: with some imagination others can be found. E.g It originally refers to plane geometry and can be given a different meaning: circles as new lines, with angles as distances. All relations are fulfilled, so the new model and the old (Euclidean) model can be regarded as different models or so-called "concrete representations", both corresponding to the postulates. >Models. 38 It may seem absurd, but Hilbert warns against assigning a priori certain characteristics to the points and lines which he mentions in his postulates. We can replace the words point, straight, plane, in all postulates by letters a, b, c. If we then employ points, lines, and planes, we obtain the Euclidean geometry, if we employ others, whose relations, however, must be the same, we have a new model between point, lines and planes. They are isomorphic. >Isomorphism. For example, the new elements are expressed by a group of three of numbers and by algebraic terms which relate these numbers to one another. He had this idea when he chose cartesian coordinates instead of points, lines and planes. The fact that the new elements, here numerical, satisfied Hilbert's postulates, proves only that the simple geometrical ways of concluding and the Cartesian method are equivalent to analytical geometry. 39 This proves the logical equivalence of the geometric and arithmetic continuum. Long before Hilbert, mathematicians had realized that mathematics has to do with relationships, and not with content. With Hilbert's postulates, we can create the Euclidean geometry, even without knowing what is meant by point, line and plane. 49 The achievements of axiomatics: 1. They are of invaluable value, from the analytical as well as from the constructive point of view. 2. It has shown that mathematics is about relationships and not about content. 3. It has shown that logic itself cannot confirm the consistency. 4. It has also shown that we have to go beyond axiomatics and have to show their origin. >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Axiom systems. |
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| Bacon | Gadamer | I 354 Bacon, Francis/Gadamer: On the whole, one will have to follow the usual Bacon criticism and admit that Bacon's methodological proposals disappoint. >F. Bacon. They are all too vague and general, and have produced little when applied to I 355 natural science, as we can see today. >Method/Bacon, >Experiments/Bacon, >Interpretation/Bacon. Dialectics/GadamerVsBacon: It is true that this opponent of empty dialectical quibbles has himself remained deeply bound to the metaphysical tradition and its dialectical forms of argumentation, which he is fighting against. His goal of defeating nature by obeying it, the new attitude of attacking and conquering nature, all that has made him a champion of modern science, is only one programmatic side of his work, to which he has hardly contributed anything lasting. Prejudice/Bacon: His real achievement lies rather in the fact that he comprehensively examines the prejudices that occupy the human mind and lead it away from the true knowledge of things, thus achieving a methodical self-purification of the mind that is more a disciplina than a methodology, Bacon's famous doctrine of "prejudices" has the purpose of making a methodical use of reason possible in the first place(1). >Prejudices/Bacon. 1. F. Bacon, Nov. Org. 38ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Behavior | Mayr | I 319 Behavior/Genes/Mayr: genes also contribute to the behavior and personality of man. E.g. mathematical gifts, craftsmanship, musicality, clumsiness. >Genes, >Personality, >Personality traits. I 323 Natural selection: if it only rewards self-interest, how could ethics and, for example, altruism develop? >Selection. Huxley was right with his presumption that the self-interest of the individual somehow contradicted the benefit of society. Cf. >Altruism. I 324 Def altruism: (Trivers, 1985)(1): action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. Altruism/Comte: Care for the welfare of others. >A. Comte. Altruism/Mayr: is not limited to cases of danger or harm to the altruist. Three things need to be distinguished (already Darwin): Selection/Individual: An individual is the object of selection in three respects: as an individual, as a family member (reproducer), and as member of a social group. The human dilemmas are only to be understood with regard to this triad. I 325 Altruism/Overall Suitability: is found in many animals, especially with parental care and large families. Defense of the offspring by the mother. This behavior is favored by natural selection, since it improves the fitness of the common genotype of the altruist and its beneficiaries. Selection of relatives. Indirectly rather self-serving. Seemingly altruistic. >Altruism. Some authors believe that human ethics replaced altruism directed towards overall suitability. Mayr: I recognize many actions directed toward overall suitability in the behavior of humans: for example mother's love, moral attitude towards strangers. However, only a small part of today's ethics systems. Social animals: possess a remarkable ability to recognize their relatives. I 327 Reciprocal altruism: in solitary animals. Synergy of two non-related animals for mutual benefit. E.g. cleaner wrasse, alliance of two individuals fighting a third. For primates: a kind of consideration: if I help this individual, it will help me. Perhaps a root of human morality. Human/Mayr: all the great achievements of mankind were accomplished by less than one per cent of the total population. Without reward and recognition our society would soon break apart. I 328 Human: The entire history of the hominids is characterized by strong group-selection (already Darwin). I 329 Altruism/Behavior/Mayr: In contrast to individual selection, group selection can reward genuine altruism and other virtues. Ethical behavior is adaptive in humans. >Adaption. Sociality: not all collections of animals are social. E.g. schools of young fish and the huge herds of African ungulates are not. Real altruism: can be extended to non-relatives. For example, baboons. Some hominids must have discovered that larger groups have more chances. I 330 Norms: To be able to apply group norms, the brain had to develop the ability to think. >Norms, >Thinking. Ethics: two conditions for ethical behavior (Simpson, 1969)(2): 1) There are alternatives 2) The alternatives can be assessed 3) The person can decide freely This means that consequences are anticipated and responsibility is assumed. >Responsibility, >Prediction. Ethics/Cause: it is not possible to determine the cause and effect of ethics. >Ethics, >Morals. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. G. G. Simpson (1969). On the Uniqueness of Man: Biology and Man. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Behavioral Economics | Hirschman | Brocker I 526 Behavioural Economics/Hirschman: long before modern behavioural economics came onto the scene, Albert O. Hirschman formulated terms that can be used in discussions today. >Terminology/Hirschman: migration, conflict, loyalty. See also Conflicts/Hirschman. For example, emigration of consumers, party members, voters: loyalty delays emigration and makes return more difficult. (1) Example: from the difficult entry into an organization follows a tendency to self-deception about the true quality of the referred achievement. Homo oeconomicus/HirschmanVsTradition: this term dissolves under Hirschman's analyses. He is replaced by the actor whose behaviour is changeable. Brocker I 527 Panther: for a theory of rational action, this is hard to digest. 1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. Dt.: Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch. Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten, Tübingen 1974, S. 74-78. 2. Ibid. p. 79. Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHirschm I Albert O. Hirschman The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Brain/Brain State | Mayr | I 112 Brain/Mayr: the human brain acquired its still existing skills about 100,000 years ago. All the achievements we are looking back at today were made with a brain that was not developed for them by the selection! Three brain regions: 1) For reflexes ("closed programs"). 2) Information intake ("open programs"): languages, norms, behavior. What was once learned is difficult to forget; "simple coinage". 3) Regions are not yet defined; "memory", "storage". I 309 Brain/Evolution/Mayr: Australopithecus: 400-500 cm³ ((like a anthroid ape) Homo erectus 750-1250 significantly larger brains only in the last 150,000 years. Language/Animals/Mayr: There is no language among animals. Their communication systems consist in the exchange of signals. There are no syntax and grammar. >Animals, >Animal language, >Signals, >Signal language, >Grammar, >Syntax. I 310 Language/brain: could the absence of language be a reason why the Neandertals did not exploit their brain better? Language: evolved from about 300,000 - 200,000 years ago in small groups of hunters and collectors due to a selection advantage. Good location for brain enlargement. >Language, >Language evolution, >Thinking without language. I 311 Brain: a factor that led to a halt in brain development was perhaps the enlargement of the group. In larger groups, the reproductive superiority of a better-equipped leader is lower, while those with smaller brains enjoy better protection, longer life and greater reproductive success. Stagnation: social integration of people contributed enormously to the evolution of culture, but may have initiated a period of stagnation in the evolution of the genome. >Evolution. Mind: conceptual confusion: false limitation to the mental activities of humans. >Mind, >Thinking, >Humans, >Intentionality, >Action. Animal/Mind: it has been shown that there is no categorial difference between the mental activities of certain animals (elephants, dogs, whales, primates, parrots) and those of humans. >Animals, >Animal language. I 312 Consciousness/Animal: the same applies to the consciousness, a basic version of which is even to be found in invertebrates and possibly protozoa. >Consciousness. Mind/Mayr: there was simply no sudden emergence of the mind. >Emergence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Capitalism | Weber | Habermas IV 463 Capitalism/Weber/Habermas: in capitalist enterprises, the conspicuous achievement is not the institutionalization of wage labor, but the profit-oriented and rational accounting-based orderliness of economic decisions. Cf. >Labour, >K. Marx, >Marxism. "Spirit of capitalism"/Weber: the Spirit of capitalism is the mentality that characterizes the purpose-rational economic action of early capitalist entrepreneurs. >Purpose rationality, >Economics. WeberVsMarx: While Marx regards the mode of production as the phenomenon in need of explanation, and examines the accumulation of capital as the new mechanism of system integration, Weber learns the investigation into the reversal of the polarity of economy and state administration to purpose-rational orientations for action. This is about social integration. Habermas: Marx assumes problems of the system integration and Weber problems of social integration. Habermas IV 464 The learning capacities acquired by individuals or groups are incorporated into the interpretation system of society through exemplary learning processes. >Learning, >Society, >Progress, >Economic Systems. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Civilization | Schumpeter | Brocker I 254 Civilization/Schumpeter: Schumpeter ascribes all important achievements of progress in modern society to the capitalist process, starting with the rationalization of thinking and the emergence of modern sciences and arts, through the redirection of individual talents of the church and military to opportunities for advancement as economic entrepreneurs, to the institutional structures of the free constitutional state including its inward-oriented social legislation and its outward-oriented striving for peace. This context also includes two labels that Schumpeter only deals with later:"There is no more democratic institution than a market"(1). And further:"The capitalist process democratizes consumption"(2). 1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 1942. Dt.: Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen/Basel 2005 (zuerst: Bern 1946). S. 294 2. Ebenda S. 258, FN 3. Ingo Pies, „Joseph A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie (1942)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Commands | Gadamer | I 339 Command/Understanding/Gadamer: Understanding the command means applying it to the concrete situation it targets. Admittedly, a command is repeated to check that it has been correctly understood. But this does not change the fact that its true meaning is only determined by the concretion of its "analogous" execution. For this reason there is also an explicit refusal to obey, which is not simply disobedience, but is legitimized by the meaning of the command and its concretization, which is given to one. Disobedience: Someone who refuses to obey a command has understood it, and because he or she applies it to the concrete situation and knows what it would mean to obey it, he or she refuses. Obviously, understanding is measured by a measure that is not present in the wording of the command or in the real opinion of the one who commands, but only in the understanding of the situation and the responsibility of the one who obeys. >Obedience, >Sense. Understanding/Sense: It is a roguish motive to carry out commands in such a way that one follows their wording but not their meaning. There is therefore no doubt that the recipient of a command must perform a certain productive achievement of understanding the meaning. Cf. >Civil Disobedience, cf. >Exemplification/Goodman.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Communicative Action | Parsons | Habermas IV 384 Communicative action/Parsons/Habermas: The structures of linguistically generated inter-subjectivity, which underlie the common possession of a culture as well as the social validity of norms, must be reduced by Parsons to mechanisms such as exchange and organization, which ensure the cohesion of a system beyond the minds of the actors. An example of this reduction is the idea of intersystemic exchange relationships and the introduction of communication media that regulate this exchange. With these two means of construction, the system-theoretical art of reformulation penetrates the inner districts of the theory of communicative action. Parsons wants to trace the integration achievements of linguistic communication itself back to exchange mechanisms that undermine the structures of linguistic inter-subjectivity and thus finally pull in the distinction between social and subsystems. >Intersubjectivity, >Systems/Parsons, >Subsystems/Parsons. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Comparisons | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 265 Theory comparison/methodology/Lakatos/Feyerabend: "the relativity theory from 1919 is superior to the Newtonian celestial mechanics". For Lakatos, such valuations (which he calls "general scientific wisdom") form a useful basis for methodological discussions because they are recognized by the vast majority of scholars. "Although there are very few consensus on a general criterion for the scientific character of theories, there is widespread agreement on particular and fixable achievements." >Theory/Lakatos, >Comparability, >Criteria. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Competition | Hegel | Höffe I 329 Competition/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel adds three further topics to the debate, which is often conducted on the basis of social, legal or state theory: a) the human's confrontation with him- or herself, b) confrontation with nature and c) the concept of work belonging to the three dimensions. >Labour. In the fight against violent competition (...) he discovers (...) a far more fundamental task and ultimate achievement: "People do not initially become finished subjects, but must first acquire the necessary self-confidence in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and the - economic with nature.(1) >Self-Consciousness/Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Concepts | Gadamer | I 432 Conept/Gadamer: That the natural concept formation, which goes along with language does not always follow the order of essence, but very often carries out its word formation on the basis of accidentals and relations, is confirmed by every look into Platonic conceptual dihaireses or Aristotelian definitions. But the primacy of the logical order of essence, which is determined by the concepts of substance and accidental, makes the natural conceptualization of language appear only as an imperfection of our finite mind. Knowledge/Definition/Gadamer: Only because we know the accidentals alone, one is of the opinion that we follow them in the concept formation. Even if this is correct, however, a peculiar advantage follows from this imperfection - and Thomas Aquinas is right to have recognized this - namely the freedom to form infinite concepts and the progressive penetration of what is meant. >Knowledge. Thinking/Explaining: By thinking the process of thinking as the process of explication in the word, a logical achievement of language becomes visible, which cannot be fully understood from the perspective of the relationship of a material order as it would be before the eyes of an infinite mind. >Thinking, >Explanation. Categorization/Logic: The subordination of the natural formation of concepts by language to the essential structure of logic, which Aristotle and, following him, Thomas Aquinas taught, thus only has a relative truth. In the middle of the penetration of Christian theology by the Greek thought of logic rather something new arises: The center of language, in which the mediation of the incarnation event first brings itself to its full truth. >Incarnation/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. Christology becomes the forerunner of a new anthropology, which mediates the spirit of the human in his finiteness with divine infinity in a new way. Here what we have called the hermeneutical experience will find its real reason. >Hermeneutic consciousness/Gadamer. I 433 Thinking/Abstraction/Gadamer: the logical scheme of induction and abstraction [is] very misleading in that there is no explicit reflection in the linguistic consciousness on what is common between different things, and the use of words in their general meaning does not understand what is named and designated by them as a case subsumed under the general. The generality of the genre and the classificatory formation of concepts are quite far removed from the linguistic consciousness. >Categorization/Gadamer, >Induction, >Abstraction. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Constructivism | Wendt | Gaus I 297 Constructivism/international political theory/Wendt/Brown: During the course of the 1990s constructivism grew in importance, albeit aided perhaps by a certain lack of definition which enabled a great many varieties of nominally constructivist thought to flourish. The publication of Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics in 1999(1) - a text explicitly designed to play the same kind of role for constructivism as that played by Waltz's Theory of International Politics for neorealism - marked a kind of coming of age for the new approach (...). >K.N. Waltz. Wendt's achievement is to combine a high level of epistemological sophistication with insights drawn from older traditions of international thought, especially the work of the so-called 'English school' (Dunne, 1998)(2). He develops three different and competing accounts of 'anarchy'broadly, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian - and works through the different kinds of international system that could be expected to emerge under these different accounts (...). >Anarchism, >I. Kant, >Th. Hobbes, >J. Locke. Statism/VsWendt: Wendt's statism has been criticized, and he has been accused of attempting to construct a new orthodoxy by means of a Faustian bargain, producing a critique of conventional international thought that buys acceptance from the mainstream by toning down its criticism of the latter (Kratochwil, 2000)(3). Brown: This is harsh, although, as a recent forum on Wendt's work demonstrates, it is certainly the case that mainstream writers have been more favourably disposed to its positions than late modernists (Review of International Studies, 2000). In fact, these criticisms, even if accurate, miss the real point: the value of Wendt's work is precisely the promise it offers of bringing the concerns of international political theory and mainstream international relations theory back together, to the advantage of both discourses. 1. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Dunne, T. (1998) Inventing International Society. London: Macmillan. 3. Kratochwil, F. (2000) 'Constructing a new orthodoxy? Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics and the constructivist challenge'. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29: 73-101. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Correspondence Theory | James | Diaz-Bone I 88 PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> realization,> adjustment). --- Horwich I 22 Correspondence/accordance/pragmatism/James: only here does he begin to distinguish himself from "intellectualism": Accordance/James: accordance means first "to copy", but e.g. our word for clock is not a copy, but a symbol, which can replace a representation image very well. Symbol/James: for many things there are no "copies" at all, only symbols: e.g. "past", "force", "spontaneity", etc. Correspondence: can only mean proper guidance here. Namely, practically as well as intellectually. Horwich I 23 It leads to consistency, stability and fluid human communication. (1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Crises | Habermas | IV 434 Crises/Society/HabermasVsPasons/Habermas: Talcott Parsons Thesis: Social pathological phenomena are due to systemic imbalances. >Systems/T. Parsons, >Systems Theory. HabermasVsParsons: with this reduction, the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. Whether these imbalances assume a "critical dimension" can only be assessed by the systems analyst from an external perspective if, as with organisms, he/she can refer to clearly identifiable limits of superiority. A comparably clear-cut problem of death does not arise for social systems.(1) Crises/Habermas: only when relevant social groups experience structural changes that are systemically reduced as critical to their existence and feel their identity threatened, may the social scientist speak of crises.(2) Solution/Weber/Habermas: By understanding modernization as social rationalization, Weber establishes a connection with identity-vouching worldviews and with structures of the lifeworld that determine the conditions of consistency of social experiences. >Worldviews, >Modernization, >M. Weber. IV 565 Crises/Habermas: system imbalances only have an effect as crises if the achievements of economy and state remain manifestly below an established aspirational level and impair the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld by causing conflicts and reactions of resistance there. IV 566 Before such conflicts endanger core areas of social integration, they are moved to the periphery: before anomic states occur, phenomena of withdrawal of legitimacy or motivation occur. However, if we succeed in intercepting control crises, i.e. perceived disturbances of material reproduction through recourse to resources of the lifeworld, pathologies of the lifeworld will arise. This can be imagined as an overexploitation of the remaining resources: culture and personality are being attacked in favour of a crisis-managing stabilisation of society. Phenomena of alienation and uncertainty of collective identities arise. See Colonization of the Lifeworld (Terminology/Habermas) and Reification/Lukács. 1. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt, 1973 2. J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt 1973, S. 9ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Cultural Differences | Jensen | Slater I 122 Cultural differences/intelligence/skills/capacities/Jensen: Jensen (1969)(1) addressed issues related to SES (socioeconomic status) more generally as well as race. He evaluated the effectiveness of the intervention programs that had been implemented at that time ((s) e.g., the Head Start Program in the United States 1964(2)), accurately reporting the basic observation that those programs showed gains in IQ test scores in the short-run, sometimes substantially so, but the gains tended to fade and within a couple years generally had faded to nonsignificance. [Jensen] raised many fascinating questions about why this might be the case. He concluded that it was probably impractical to try to raise IQ scores; educators would have more success simply teaching basic skills rather than trying to encourage cognitive development. >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen, >Racism/Jensen. Slater I 123 Cultural differences/Jensen: Thesis: the differences arose because there were different genetic influences on associative learning abilities and the kinds of abilities tapped by IQ tests, which he termed „higher reasoning“. >Genetic variation/Jensen. Solution/Jensen: Given this, he suggested that education for the culturally disadvantaged should be tailored to what he claimed were their inherently more limited abilities. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 2. For the history of Head start see: https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ohs/about/history-of-head-start Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Customs/Morality | Ortega y Gasset | Brocker I 195 Customs/morality/Ortega y Gasset: public life has a spiritual, a moral, an economic, a religious, a political and a social dimension and concerns all collective customs (the so-called "usos", which are so fundamental to Ortega's concept of culture!) of social being. The "process of making masses" (See Mass/Ortega) brings about an astonishing increase in the quality of life, which has led to the fact that life options and possibilities for action, which in earlier times were reserved exclusively for a few people, are now open to many (if not all people). There is talk of a "general rise in the historical water level" (1) and a "rise in the entire historical level" (2), which is a "time of Brocker I 196 compensation" (3), through which the assets allegedly balance each other out. Brocker I 199 Mass Human/Ortega: "Morality is not a part of the mass human" (4). According to Ortega, both the anti-progressive, reactionary and the left-revolutionary mass human have no obligation whatsoever. He is not bound by rules of politeness or truthfulness. Respect, regard or even admiration for the excellent actions and achievements of certain people are completely foreign to him. >Society, >Community. 1. José Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelión de las Masas (con un prólogo para franceses, un epílogo para ingleses y un apéndice: Dinámica del tiempo), Madrid 1937 (zuerst 1929). Dt.: José Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen, Reinbek 1956, S. 17 2. Ibid. p. 19 3. Ibid. p. 18. 4. Ibid. p. 140 Thomas Gil, „Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen (1929)“ In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Decisions | Parsons | Habermas IV 333 Decisions/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons thesis: for any situation of action there are five problems which inevitably face each actor in the form of binary schematized general and abstract decision alternatives.(1) 1. Should the actor follow his/her interests directly or allow for normative considerations? 2. Should he/she immediately follow his/her emotions and desires or suppress impulses? 3. Should he/she analyse the situation in a detached way, or should he/she get involved as a participant? Habermas IV 334 4. Should he/she judge other actors according to their performance or contributions? 5. Should he/she consider concrete objects and actors in their complexity or limit himself/herself to analytically described circumstances? Parsons gains from this the following table: 1. The private vs. collective interest dilemma: self vs. collectivity orientation. 2. The gratification-discipline dilemma: affectivity vs. affective neutrality. 3. The dilemma of transcendence vs. immanence: universalism vs. particularism. 4. The choice between object modalities: performance vs. quality (achievement vs. diffuseness). 5. The definition of the scope of interest in the object: specitiy vs. diffuseness. HabermasVsParsons: he has not fulfilled the claim that this table constitutes a system. >Systems. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S. 76 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Deep Ecology | Pelluchon | Deep Ecology/Pelluchon: The pitfall of separating ecology and existence, as can be blamed on the environmental ethics that emerged in the 1970s (as in the deep ecology of the influential Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess) [is to be avoided]. Deep Ecology/Pelluchon: whose achievement consisted in decentering ethics by attributing to living beings a value beyond their usefulness. PelluchonVsNaess/PelluchonVsDeep Ecology: in its praise of natural wilderness, however, this ecological thinking of the 1970s tended to merely renew in other ways the dualism of man and nature that its opponents claimed. >Body/Pelluchon. Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020 |
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| Desire | Appraisal Theory | Corr I 62 Desires/appraisal theory/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)(1). These assumptions entail that the emotional reaction to a concrete event should be influenced by the degree to which superordinate desires are affected by this event, as well as the strength of these desires. >Motives, >Motivation. A number of tests of this assumption have been made. For example, Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001)(2) asked participants to recall the single most satisfying event experienced during the last month and to rate the extent to which this event satisfied each of ten candidate basic desires (e.g., the desire for competence, security, relatedness, popularity and personal autonomy). Other research has focused on an intermediate level of the motive hierarchy, where the top-level desires (e.g., the achievement motive) are concretized to more specific desires that represent what the person wants to attain in her current life situation (e.g., getting good grades; see Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998)(3). For example, Emmons (1986)(4) related these intermediate-level desires, called personal strivings, to emotions using an experiencing-sampling method… (for additional information, see Emmons 1996(5); Brunstein, Schultheiss and Maier 1999(6). Corr I 63 Beyond relating positive and negative emotions to desire fulfilment and desire frustration, respectively, appraisal theorists have linked particular emotions to particular kinds of desires (e.g., Lazarus 1991(7); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(8); Roseman 1979)(9). An important distinction in this context is that between wanting versus diswanting a state of affairs (Roseman 1979(9)), or between having an approach goal versus an avoidance goal. Several theorists (e.g., Gray 1994(10); see Carver 2006(11) for a review) proposed (a) that the pursuit of approach versus avoidance goals activates one of two different, basic motivational systems, a behavioural approach system (BAS) or a behavioural inhibition (BIS) system; and (b) that people differ in central parameters of these systems, specifically in the relative strength of their general approach and avoidance motivation. Carver (2004)(12) found that a measure of inter-individual differences in general approach motivation (BAS sensitivity) predicted the intensity of sadness and anger in response to frustration (the non-occurrence of an expected positive event). >Reinforcement sensivity, >Jeffrey A. Gray. 1. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam 2. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y. and Kasser, T. 2001. What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80: 325–39 3. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508 4. Emmons, R. A. 1986. Personal strivings: an approach to personality and subjective well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 1058–68 5. Emmons, R. A. 1996. Striving and feeling: personal goals and subjective well-being, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 313–37. New York: Guilford Press 6. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Maier, G. W. 1999. The pursuit of personal goals: a motivational approach to well-being and life adjustment, in J. Brandtstädter and R. M. Lerner (eds.), Action and self-development: theory and research through the life span, pp. 169–96. New York: Sage 7. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 8. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Gray, J. A. 1994. Three fundamental emotion systems, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 243–8. Oxford University Press 11. Carver, C. S. 2006. Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action, Motivation and Emotion 30: 105–10 12. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Dignity | Rawls | I 329 Dignity/human dignity/Rawls: if we wish this, we can say that all human beings have equal dignity, simply because we mean that they fulfil the conditions of a moral personality as they have by interpreting the initial situation of a society to be built. >Society/Rawls, Order/Rawls, Principles/Rawls). By being perceived as equal in this respect, they must be treated as the principles of justice require. But none of this implies that their achievements and activities are of equal excellence. >Perfectionism/Rawls. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Ecology | Pelluchon | Ecology/Pelluchon/PelluchonVsNaess: The pitfall of separating ecology and existence, as can be blamed on the environmental ethics that emerged in the 1970s (as in the deep ecology of the influential Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess) [is to be avoided]. Deep Ecology/Pelluchon: whose achievement consisted in decentering ethics by attributing to living beings a value beyond their utility. PelluchonVsNaess/PelluchonVsDeep Ecology: in its praise of the natural wilderness, however, this ecological thinking of the 1970s tended to only renew in other ways the dualism of man and nature that its opponents claimed. Physicality/Body/Pelluchon: Moreover, the holistic vision defended by the environmental ethics of the 1970s was too abstract: because it only addressed reason and not affects, it could not induce individuals to change their lifestyle. Nor did this thinking succeed in inspiring an ecological policy to put the economy at the service of living things and to reorganize production in such a way that it takes into account the limits of the planet and frees certain sectors, such as agriculture, livestock and care, from the economic dictates of maximum efficiency. >Body/Pelluchon, >Environmental Ethics/Pelluchon, >Ecology/Naess. Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020 |
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| Education | Wolfram | Brockman I 280 Education/computer age/Wolfram: What [would] the world would look like if most people could code. Clearly, many trivial things would change: Contracts would be written in code (…), Brockman I 281 simple things like that would change. But much more profound things would also change. Take high school education. The raw material for a typical high school student’s essay is something that’s already been written; students usually can’t generate new knowledge easily. But in the computational world, that will no longer be true. If the students know something about writing code, they’ll access all that digitized historical data and figure out something new. Then they’ll write an essay about something they’ve discovered. The achievement of knowledge-based programming is that it’s no longer sterile, because it’s got the knowledge of the world knitted into the language you’re using to write code. >Inventions/discoveries, >Creativity, >Knowledge, >Learning, >Programming, >Computers. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Education Policy | United States | Haslam I 217 Educational Policies/United States: In 1954, the landmark Brown v. Board of Education US Supreme Court case no longer allowed ‘separate but equal’ racial segregation in the schools. In the mid-1960s, the United States adopted sweeping civil rights legislation. In the aftermath, the decade of the 1970s was a period of experimentation with concrete policies to implement these principles. School busing, in which African American and White students were transported to predominantly White or African American schools respectively, was one way that public (state) schools were racially desegregated. Busing to achieve desegregation, though, was highly contested politically and often opposed by communities (…). these efforts were challenged in terms both of the seemingly more limited academic achievement of African American and White students in newly desegregated schools and the social friction that busing caused in these schools. It was in the context of this national controversy and unrest that Elliot Aronson and his students initiated their work on the jigsaw classroom. >Jigsaw method/Aronson; Cf. Aronson et al. (1978)(1). 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Emancipation | Huntington | Brocker I 839 Emancipation/Huntington: Thesis: the upswing of non-Western cultures in the 21st century is regarded as self-induced, i.e. not attributed to a Western "origin" within these cultural circles, although the use of "soft" power resources in the sense of Joseph Nye(1) contributed to Westernization. This phenomenon of "indigenization"(2) testifies to an emancipation: even if the prosperity of non-Western cultures has grown on the foundation of Western ideas, the new heyday is rather interpreted as the result of independent, cultural achievements. >Culture, >Cultural values, >Cultural tradition, >Society, cf. >Western rationalism. 1. Joseph Nye Nye, Joseph S., »The Changing Nature of World Power«, in: Political Science Quarterly 105/2, 1990, 177-192. 2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996. Dt.: Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, München/Wien 1998 (zuerst 1996).S. 136 Philipp Klüfers/Carlo Masala, „Samuel P. Huntington, Kampf der Kulturen“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHunt I Samuel P. Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order New York 1996 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Emissions Trading | Economic Theories | Mause I 440 Emissions Trading/Economic Theories: emissions trading took effect in 2005. Weidner and Mez 2008, p. 364.(1) As it is irrelevant to the impact on the climate where and how greenhouse gases are saved, emissions should be reduced where the costs of prevention across technologies, sectors and countries are minimal. In principle, market instruments such as CO2 taxes or emissions trading systems can contribute to an efficient achievement of climate policy objectives. Ströbele: "What was initially a national task, (...) has now become a club good for the entire EU with the introduction of the CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The CO2 price now reflected the scarcity of CO2 emission rights in all EU installations integrated into the system". (Ströbele et al. 2012, p. 349 f.)(2) >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Weidner, Helmut, und Lutz Mez. 2008. German climate change policy: A success story with some flaws. The Journal of Environment & Development 17( 4): 356– 378. 2. Ströbele, Wolfgang, Michael Heuterkes, und Wolfgang Pfaffenberger. 2012. Energiewirtschaft. Einführung in Theorie und Politik, 3. Aufl. München 2012 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Events | Gärdenfors | I 65 Event/Semantic Domain/Language Acquisition/Semantics/Gärdenfors: Thesis: I am modeling events with two vectors: a force vector, which typically represents an action, and a result vector that describes a change of a physical movement or an object. --- I 159 Events/Gärdenfors: there are principally three different approaches: (i) Metaphysical analyzes describing the ontology of events (ii) Cognitive models that represent how humans (or animals) represent events mentally. See Langacker (1987, sec. 3.3)(1), Givón (2001)(2), Croft & Wood (2000) (3), Langacker, (2008, chap. 3) (4); Croft, (2012a, sec. 1.4)(5). --- I 160 (iii) Linguistic studies describing the expressions with which events are constructed. E.g. [[ACT ‹Manner› ] CAUSE [BECOME (Y ‹BROKEN› ]]]. Vectors/event/Gärdenfors: with vectors we can represent changes of objects and distinguish events from their linguistic expressions: Definition State/Gärdenfors: is a set of points in a conceptual space. Definition Change/Gärdenfors: a change of a state is represented by a vector. Definition Path/Gärdenfors: is a continuous sequence of changes. (That is, there are no jumps). --- I 161 Vectors: not all belong to the acting ones: e.g. opposing forces. Acting/Agent: is not necessarily part of the event. Gärdenfors: this is about mental representation, not about a scientific representation of what is happening in an event, e.g. physically. --- I 162 Vectors: an event contains at least two vectors and one object. 1. Result vector: represents the change, 2. Force vector: causes the change. --- I 164 Event/intransitive/Gärdenfors: Problem: in intransitive constructions (e.g. "Susanna goes") the acting and the changed object (patiens) are identical. Then the conceptual space of the agent and of the object (patiens) coincide. --- I 165 Partial events/decomposition/parts/Gärdenfors: two ways can be selected when dividing into sub-events: 1. Events can be divided as simultaneously occurring or parallel partial events in the dimensions of the object space (patient space). 2. They can be represented successively by parts of paths. Agent/Patient/semantic roles/Gärdenfors: both can be represented as points in the category space. The domains of the space then define the properties of both. --- I 166 Patient/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: can be animated or inanimated, concrete or abstract. It has its own patient space with domains for properties. In contrast to the object categories, the properties usually contain the localization. Agent: has accordingly its agent space, which has at least one force domain. Dowty (1991): presents prototypical agents and prototypic patients. It is also about volitional involvement in an event.(6) --- I 171 Event/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: there are three approaches for dealing with events in linguistics: 1. Localist Approach: (Jackendoff, 1976, 1983, 1990)(7)(8)(9): Thesis: all verbs can be constructed as verbs of movement and localization. GärdenforsVsJackendoff: in his approach... --- I 172 ...force vectors cannot be represented appropriately. 2. Approach on aspects: (e.g. Vendler, 1957)(10): distinguishes between states, activities, achievements and accomplishments. See also Jackendoff, 1991, sec. 8.3; Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2005, p. 90). --- I 174 3. Causal Approach: e.g. Croft (2012a, 2012b)(13)(14) three-dimensional representation of causal and aspectual structures of events. Gärdenfors: that comes closest to my own approach. A geometric model is designed here. --- I 175 The vectors in such models are not in a vacuum, but are always in relation to a domain and its information, e.g. temperature. GärdenforsVsCroft: his approach does not support force vectors. 1. Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive grammar (Vol. 1). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2. Givón, T. (2001). Syntax (Vol. 1). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins. 3. Croft, W., & Wood, E. J. (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 51–78). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 4. Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford. 5. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Dowty, D. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67, 547–619. 7. Jackendoff, R. (1976). Toward an explanatory semantic representation. Linguistic Inquiry, 7, 89–150. 8. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 9. Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 10. Vendler, Z. (1957). Verbs and times. Philosophical Review, 56, 97 – 121. 11. Jackendoff, R. (1991). Parts and boundaries. Cognition, 41, 9–45. 12. Levin, B., & Rappaport Hovav, M. (2005). Argument realization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13. Croft, W. (2012a). Verbs: Aspect and argument structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14. Croft, W. (2012b). Dimensional models of event structure and verbal semantics. Theoretical Linguistics, 38, 195–203. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Experience | Gadamer | I 66 Experience/"Erlebnis"Gadamer: The investigation of the appearance of the word in German literature leads to the surprising result that it has first become commonplace in the 1970s of the 19th century. In the 18th century it is still completely missing, but even Schiller and Goethe do not know it. The earliest proof(1) seems to be a letter by Hegel(2). The word appears just as seldom in the fifties and sixties and only in the seventies [of the 19th century] it suddenly appears frequently(3). Its general introduction into common usage seems to be related to its use in biographical literature. Gadamer: to experience means first of all to be "still alive when something happens". From there, the word carries the tone of immediacy with which something real is grasped - in contrast to that of which one also beliefs to know, but for which the authentication by one's own experience is missing, whether it is taken over from others or comes from hearsay (...) Experience is always self-experience. Content: but at the same time the form "the experienced" is used in the sense that I 67 the lasting content of what is experienced is designated by it. Biography/Gadamer: It corresponds to this double direction of the meaning of "experience" that it is the biographical literature through which the word "experience" first becomes naturalized. The essence of biography, especially the biography of artists and poets in the 19th century, is to understand the work from life. Its achievement consists precisely in conveying the two directions of meaning that we differentiate, or in recognizing them as a productive connection. Something becomes an experience, provided that it has not only been experienced, but that its being experienced has had a special emphasis that gives it lasting meaning. >Subjectivity. I 69 Historical development of the terms "life"/"experience"/Gadamer: Schleiermacher's appeal to the living feeling against the cold rationalism of the Enlightenment, Schiller's call for aesthetic freedom against the mechanism of society, Hegel's opposition of life (later: of the spirit) - against these things stands the prelude to a protest against modern industrial society, which at the beginning of our century made the words experience and experiencing rise to watchwords of an almost religious sound. >F. Schleiermacher, >F. Schiller, >Enlightenment, >Rationalism, >Life/Hegel. The revolt of the youth movement against civic education and its way of life was under this sign. The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson also worked in this direction. >Life/Nietzsche, >H. Bergson. In addition an "intellectual movement" such as that around Stefan George and last but not least the seismographic fineness with which Georg Simmel's philosophising reacted to these processes testify the same. Thus the philosophy of life of our days ties in with its romantic predecessors. I 75 Art Experience/Gadamer: The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the very essence of experience. Just as the work of art as such is a world of its own, so the aesthetic experience as an experience is removed from all contexts of reality. It seems to be the very purpose of the work of art to become an aesthetic experience (...). I 76 In the experience of art, a wealth of meaning is present that does not belong to this particular content or object alone, but rather represents the meaning of life as a whole. I 352 Experience/Gadamer: All experience is (...) I 353 only valid as long as it is confirmed. In this respect, its dignity is based on its fundamental repeatability. This means, however, that experience, by its very nature, cancels out its history and thus erases it. This already applies to the experience of everyday life, and even more so to every scientific event of it. In this respect, it is not a coincidental one-sidedness of modern philosophy of science, but rather factually justified that the theory of experience is completely teleologically related to the acquisition of truth that is achieved in it. >Experience/Husserl. I 356 That experience is valid as long as it is not disproved by new experience (ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria) seems to characterize the general nature of experience, whether it is its scientific event in the modern sense or the experience of daily life as it has always been. Thus this characterization corresponds entirely to the analysis of the concept of induction given by Aristotle in the appendix to his second analytics.(4) >Induction/Aristotle. I 358 GadamerVsAristoteles: What Aristotle is interested in experience is merely its contribution to the formation of concepts. (>Experience/Aristotle). If experience is thus considered in terms of its result, then the Gadamer I 359 the actual process of experience is skipped. Gadamer: Because this process is a much more negative one. It cannot be described simply as the seamless formation of typical generalities. Rather, this formation happens by constantly refuting false generalizations through experience, by de-typing what is seen as typically.(5) Negative experience/Gadamer: (...) the actual experience is always a negative one. If we have an experience with an object, it means that we have not seen things properly up to now and now we know better how things are. The negativity of experience therefore has a peculiarly productive meaning. It is not simply a deception that is seen through and thus a correction, but a far-reaching knowledge that is acquired. Dialectical Experience/Gadamer: So it cannot be an arbitrarily picked up object on which one makes an experience, but it must be such that one gains a better knowledge not only about it, but about what one thought to know before, i.e. about something general. The negation by which it achieves this is a certain negation. We call this kind of negation dialectical. >Experience/Hegel. I 361 (...) the application that Hegel makes to history by seeing it conceived in the absolute self-consciousness of philosophy (>Experience/Hegel), [does not do justice to the hermeneutic consciousness (...)]. Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The essence of experience is thought here from the outset from that in which experience is transcended. Experience itself can never be science. It stands in an irrevocable contrast to knowledge and to that instruction that flows from theoretical or technical general knowledge. Openness: The truth of experience always contains the reference to new experience. Therefore, the one who is called experienced has not only become one through experience, but is also open to experience. But in this way the concept of experience, which is now at issue, contains a qualitatively new moment. It does not only mean experience in the sense of the instruction it gives about this or that. It means experience as a whole. I 363 The actual experience is the one in which the human becomes aware of his or her finiteness. This is where the ability to do and the self-confidence of his or her planning reason finds its limits. It turns out to be mere appearance that everything can be reversed, that always for everything is time and everything somehow returns. Rather, the person standing and acting in history constantly experiences that nothing returns. Recognition of what is does not mean here: recognition of what is once there, but insight into the limits within which the future is still open to expectation and planning - or, more fundamentally, that all expecting and planning finite beings is a finite and limited one. Actual experience is thus experience of one's own historicity. >Text/Gadamer, >I-You-Relation/Gadamer. I 372 (...) the negativity of experience [implies] logically the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. >Question/Gadamer. I 421 Experience/Gadamer: Experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. >Language and Thought/Gadamer. I 454 Experience/Discovery/Gadamer: The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to anything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world therefore does not mean that the world becomes the object of language. Rather, what is the object of cognition and statement is always already enclosed by the world horizon of language. The linguistic nature of human experience of the world as such does not mean the objectification of the world. 1. Cf. Konrad Cramer in J. Ritter's „Historischem Wörterbuch der Philosophie“ (Vol. 2, p. 702-711) 2. In the report of a journey Hegel writes "my whole experience" (Letters, ed. Hoffmeister, III 179). One has to keep in mind that this is a letter... 3. In Dilthey's Schleiermacher-Biography (1870), in Justi in the Winckelmann-Biography (1872), in Hermann Grimm's „Goethe“ (1877) and probably more often. 4. An. Post. B 19 (99ff.). 5. This is similarly described by Karl Popper's pair of concepts of trial and error - with the restriction that these concepts start all too much from the voluntary, all too little from the passionate side of human experiential life. GadamerVsPopper: That is justified as far as one has the "logic of research" in mind alone, but certainly not if one means the logic that is effective in the experiential life of humans. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Experiments | Aronson | Haslam I 220 Experiment/Aronson: In the jigsaw method scenario students are first divided into small (five- or six-student) groups that are diverse in terms of gender, ethnicity, race, and academic achievement. One student is selected as leader. The day’s lesson is then divided into five or six discrete segments (e.g., in learning about a famous person; segmenting the person’s life into early years, education, professional life). Each student is assigned a segment to learn and is given the opportunity to become knowledgeable about the segment by with students from other groups assigned the same segment of the lesson. Students then return to their own jigsaw group and present the segment to the others. >Jigsaw Method. At the end of the session, they are quizzed to ensure they have mastery of the material. (Aronson et al. 1978(1). >Jigsaw method/Aronson. Aronson: It is important to emphasize that the motivation of students is not necessarily altruistic; rather, it is primarily self-interest, which, in this case, happens also to produce outcomes that are beneficial to others. (Aronson and Bridgman, 2004(2): 427) For the single stages of the experiment to investigate the effects of the Jigsaw classroom in elementary school classrooms in Austin see Blaney et al. (1977)(3). They showed an increase in liking for the members of their group, both within and across racial and ethnic group lines, and they exhibited greater increases in self-esteem than students in a control condition who received ‘education as usual’ that involved traditional, competitive teaching methods. Lucker et al., (1977)(4) demonstrated changes in academic achievement in a unit on American history. Moreover, compared with students in traditional control classrooms, African American and Hispanic/Latino students in the jigsaw classroom performed significantly better on a standardized test, whereas White students performed equivalently well. >Learning, >Learning theories. 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Aronson, E. and Bridgeman, D. (2004) ‘Jigsaw groups and the desegregated classroom: In pursuit of common goals’, in E. Aronson (ed.), Readings about the Social Animal (9th edn). New York: Worth. pp. 423-34. 3. Blaney, N.T., Stephan, C., Rosenfield, D., Aronson, E. and Sikes, J. (1977) ‘Interdependence in the classroom: A field study’, Journal of Educational Psychology, 69: 139-46. 4. Lucker, G.W., Rosenfield, D., Sikes, J. and Aronson, E. (1977) ‘Performance in the interdependent classroom: A field study’, American Education Research Journal, 13: 115-23. John F. Dovidio, „Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Free Will | Augustine | Höffe I 101 Freedom of will/responsibility/Augustinus/Höffe: The] "theological-ethical Augustinism" severely limits human self-responsibility in moral terms. >Ideas/Augustine. Höffe I 102 For in contrast to the ancient, "pagan" Eudaimonism man owes his happiness or salvation in the end not to his own achievement but to a free gift of God, grace. AugustineVsPelagius: Augustine rejects both the view of the Irish theologian Pelagius (around 400 AD) that man can freely choose what is good thanks to an autonomous will, and AugustineVsManichaeism: the counter-assertion of the Manichaeans that man is completely unfree. Acrasia/weakness/freedom: According to Augustine, man is only free to want the good; but because of original sin, a kind of "innate weakness of will," he lacks the freedom to accomplish the good. Höffe I 102 In earlier works [Augustine] emphasizes a personal contribution, according to which, as Paul already emphasizes(1), one must freely agree to the grace of God in an act of faith. Later, he himself binds the decision to believe, the will to believe, to the grace of God. Höffe: In this view the last instance of human freedom, the freedom of will, is perhaps not abolished, but certainly minimized. >Recognition/Augustine. 1. Romans 3,28 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Functions | Parsons | Habermas IV 363 Functions/Society/Systems/Parsons/Habermas: Because each institution (business, state administration, law, church, family) belongs to all social subsystems (economy, law, preservation of cultural patterns) in different aspects, none is suitable as a defining characteristic for each of these subsystems. Functions/Parsons: he now defines them on a relatively abstract level as adaptation, goal achievement, integration and maintenance of structural patterns (see AGIL schema/Terminology). These are production services of the economy, organisational services of state administrations, integration services of law and the normalisation services of tradition. Habermas IV 364 Problem: Parsons must explain why these four functional aspects are necessary and sufficient for the analysis of action systems. Habermas IV 367 Since the scheme of the four basic functions in Parsons is no longer based on action theory and applies to living systems in general, the analytical components of the action themselves must now be seen as solutions to system problems. IV 370 VsParsons: the division and assignment of functions in his system theory is arbitrary. J. Alexander asks, for example, why integration problems cannot be solved just as well by universalistic as by particularistic action orientations or why problems of the preservation of cultural patterns should not be solved just as well by orientation on the achievements instead of on the intrinsic qualities of a counterpart. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Genetic Variation | Jensen | Slater I 121 Genetic Variation/intelligence/Jensen: Jensen (1969)(1): Jensen reported addressing the question [of racial test score differences] in discussions with geneticists. They were, he claimed, consistent in agreeing that races can be defined technically as populations having different distributions of gene frequencies, and that genetic differences among races are manifested in virtually all anatomical, physiological, and biochemical comparison, that had been made to date, which were then primarily of blood constituents. The geneticists Jensen spoke with also apparently agreed that any behavior that was measurable and heritable would show racial differences in the frequencies of the genes involved in the same ways as any other human characteristic. Slater I 122 They stressed that survival or adaptive advantage associated with the differences was not necessary. Jensen (1969) next accurately recounted the extent of the then-typical difference between African- and European-Americans on measures of intelligence and academic achievement at about one standard deviation, which meant that only 15% of the African-American population exceeded the average in the European-American population. He also reported that variance in intelligence test scores in the African-American population was about 60% of that in the European-American population, thus making the two distributions quite different in their defining parameters. He noted that, though the possibility that this difference in distribution was at least partly genetically determined had been strongly denounced, it had not been contradicted or discredited empirically. This meant, to him, that the evidence supporting the idea should be reviewed and its implications for education considered. >Heritability/Jensen, >Intelligence/Jensen. Johnson: The evidence [Jensen] presented stands to this day. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Genetic Variation | Social Psychology | Haslam I 245 Genetic Variation/racial gaps/Social psychology: One issue that stimulated a great deal of discussion in the 1990s was racial gaps in academic achievement and test scores that persisted despite legal and social efforts to dismantle institutionalized barriers to educational advancement (Kao and Thompson, 2003)(1). In popular media and academic circles, explanations ranged from stark differences in educational quality in what were (and still are) racially segregated schools (Kozol, 2012)(2) to controversial claims of inherent genetic differences in intelligence based on race (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994(3)). It was in the context of this broader national debate about the racial gap in performance that Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson introduced a ground-breaking set of studies that have become a modern classic in the field (Devine and Brodish, 2003(4); Fiske 2003(5)). >Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele. 1. Kao, G. and Thompson,J.S. (2003) ‘Racial and ethnic stratification in educational achievement and attainment’, Annual Review of Sociology, 29:417-42. 2. Kozol, J. (2012) Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools. New York: Broadway Books. 3. Herrnstein, R. and Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve. New York: Free Press. 4. Devine, P.G. and Brodish, A.B. (2003) 1Modern classics in social psychology’, Psychological Inquiry, 14:196—202. 5. Fiske, S.T. (2003) ‘The discomfort index: How to spot a really good idea whose time has come’, Psychological Inquiry, 14:203—8. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Genius | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 193 Genius/Understanding/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Procedures cause, provided that [a] production takes place mechanically according to laws and rules and not unconsciously ingeniously, the composition to be consciously reconstructed by the interpreter; but provided that it is an individual, in the true sense of the word, creative achievement of genius, there can be no such reconstructions according to rules. The genius itself is forming new patterns and rules. It creates new forms of language use, literary composition, etc. Schleiermacher takes this difference into account. On the side of hermeneutics, the ingenious production corresponds to the fact that it requires divination, immediate guessing, which ultimately presupposes a kind of congeniality. But if the boundaries between the artless and the artistic, the mechanical and the ingenious production are fluid, provided that individuality is always expressed and a moment of rule-free genius is always at work in it, as in children who grow into a language, it follows that the final reason for all understanding must always be a divinatory act of congeniality, the possibility of which is based on a prior connection of all individualities. >Individuals/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Good | Sandel | Brocker I 677 Good/The Good/Politics/State/Reason/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Sandel wants to put the achievements of modern democracy on a different basis than the purely formal one that Rawls drafts in his theory of justice. (1) Instead of a formal theory of rights, they should find their justification through an understanding of goodness rich in content. See Liberalism/Sandel, Rawls/Sandel, Contract Theory/Sandel, SandelVsRawls, Politics/Sandel. The space of the political would then be the space of lively debate about the good and not a space of a priori formulation of principles of justice. (2) 1 . Cf. John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971(dt. 1975) 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Grammar | Nietzsche | Ries II 35 Grammar/On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: pre-drawn relation of "accidental" predicate and "underlying" subject: fiction. This has made the rule of madness irrevocable. >Predication, >Sentence, >Fiction. Ries II 75 Grammar/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: Subject formation suggests real entities. Value judgements and statements of reality appear identical in their linguistic form. Terms are linked to attributes. Thus philosophy believes that it has made the real properties of things visible. --- Danto III 209 Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: something similar had set up thrasymachos in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, however Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. But pulsation cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can pulsate. >Justice/Thrasymachus, >Justice/Nietzsche. Danto III 210 Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not of nouns and adjectives. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Happiness | Augustine | Höffe I 102 Happiness/redemption/Augustinus/Höffe: The final salvation, the participation of human beings in extra- and supernatural happiness, depends on the unavailable and unpredictable grace of God. HöffeVsAugustine: On the other hand, the question arises whether an achievement of Christianity, the abolition of all ethnic limitation in favour of all people of good will, is not weakened here, because the ethnic limitation gives way to a selection of grace. >Recognition/Augustine. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Heritability | Jensen | Slater I 121 Heritability/Jensen: (Jensen 1969)(1) (1) Genetic and environmental influences should not be considered independent of each other as they may be correlated and/or interact; (2) heritability is a population statistic that does not apply to individuals; (3) heritability can vary substantially from one environment to another; (4) the level of heritability in one group does not mean that its level will be similar in other groups; (5) heritability in one group cannot be used to attribute mean differences between that group and another group to genetic differences between them; (6) there were (and still are) many reasons to believe that environmental differences between middle- and upper-class European-Americans and disadvantaged African-Americans were (and still are) large, (7) high heritability does not mean that a trait is immutable. >Racism/Jensen, >Genetic variation/Jensen. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Hermeneutics | Gadamer | I 169 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Hermeneutics should (...) be understood so comprehensively that it would include the whole sphere of art and its questions. Like any other text to be understood, any work of art must not only I 170 understand the literary. Thus the hermeneutic consciousness acquires a comprehensive breadth that even surpasses that of the aesthetic consciousness. Aesthetics must merge into hermeneutics. Cf. >Aesthetic Consciousness. The task today could be to escape the dominating influence of Dilthey's question and the prejudices of the "history of ideas" founded by him. >Hermeneutics/Dilthey. I 171 (...) art [is] never only past (...), but [it] knows how to overcome the distance between times through its own presence of meaning. In this respect, the example of art shows an excellent case of understanding on both sides. It is not merely an object of historical consciousness, but its understanding nevertheless already includes historical mediation. How then is the task of hermeneutics determined? >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Hegel. I 177 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The art doctrine of understanding and interpretation was developed in two ways, the theological and the philological, from an analogous drive: theological hermeneutics, as Dilthey showed(1), from the self-defense of the Reformation's understanding of the Bible against the attack of the Tridentine theologians and their appeal to the indispensability of tradition to rediscover philological hermeneutics as an instrument for the humanist claim to the I 178 classical literature. Biblical Hermeneutics: its precondition is the scriptural principle of the Reformation. >Interpretation/Luther. I 280 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The fundamental discrediting of all the prejudices that the experiential pathos of the new natural science connects with the Enlightenment becomes universal and radical in the historical Enlightenment. This is precisely the point at which the attempt at philosophical hermeneutics must be critically applied. The overcoming of all prejudices, this blanket demand of the Enlightenment, will prove itself to be a prejudice, the revision of which will first clear the way for an appropriate understanding of the finite nature that dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness. Cf. >Tradition/Romanticism. Does tradition really mean in the first place: to be subject to prejudice and to be limited in one's freedom? Is not rather all human existence, even the freest, limited and conditioned in manifold ways? If this is true, then the idea of an absolute reason is no possibility of historical humanity at all. Reason is for us only as real historical reason, i.e. par excellence: It is not master of itself, but always remains dependent on the circumstances in which I 281 it is active. This applies not only in the sense that Kant, under the influence of Hume's sceptical criticism, limited the claims of rationalism to the a priori moment in the knowledge of nature - it applies much more decisively to historical consciousness and the possibility of historical knowledge. Understanding/Gadamer: The human is alien to him- or herself and his or her historical fate in still quite a different way than nature is alien to him or her, which does not know about the human. For historical understanding see also: >The Classical/Gadamer. I 295 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Understanding itself is not so much to be thought of as an act of subjectivity, but rather as moving into a process of tradition (i.e. handing down) in which past and present are constantly mediated. This is what must be brought to bear in hermeneutic theory, which is far too much dominated by the idea of a procedure, a method. I 300 [A tension] plays between the foreignness and familiarity that tradition has for us, between the historically meant, distant representationalism and belonging to a tradition. In this in-between is the true place of hermeneutics. I 313 Application of the understood: The inner fusion of understanding and interpretation led (...) to the fact that the third moment in the hermeneutical problem, the application, was completely pushed out of the context of hermeneutics. For example, the edifying application of Sacred Scripture in Christian proclamation and preaching seemed quite different from the historical and theological understanding of it. Now our reflections have led us to the insight that in understanding there is always something like an application of the text to be understood to the present >situation of the interpreter. We are thus forced to take a step beyond romantic hermeneutics, as it were, by thinking not only of understanding and interpreting, but also of applying, as part of a unified process. >Legal Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Theological Hermeneutics/Gadamer. I 334 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Insofar as the actual object of historical understanding is not events but their "meaning", such understanding is obviously not correctly described when one speaks of an object that is in itself and the approach of the subject to it. In truth, historical understanding has always been based on the fact that the tradition that comes to us speaks into the present and must be understood in this mediation - even more: as this mediation must be understood. I 391 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Just as the translator, as interpreter, makes communication in conversation possible only by participating in the matter under discussion, so too, in relation to the text, the indispensable condition for the interpreter is that he or she participates in its meaning. It is therefore quite justified to speak of a hermeneutic conversation. But then it follows from this that the hermeneutic conversation, like the real conversation, must work out a common language, and that this working-out of a common language is just as little as in conversation the preparation of a tool for the purposes of understanding, but coincides with the accomplishment of understanding and understanding itself. Between the partners in this "conversation", as between two people, communication takes place that is more than mere adaptation. The text brings up a matter, but that it does so is ultimately the achievement of the interpreter. Both are involved. I 392 In this sense, understanding is certainly not a "historical understanding" that reconstructs the correspondence of the text. Rather, one means to understand the text itself. I 446 Hermeneutics/Humboldt/Gadamer: [Humboldt's] significance for the problem of hermeneutics lies (...) [in]: proving the language view as world view. >Language/Humboldt, >Culture/Humboldt. He recognized the living execution of speech, the linguistic energeia as the essence of language and thus broke the dogmatism of the grammarists. From the concept of force, which guides all his thinking about language, he has in particular also put into perspective the question of the origin of language, which was particularly burdened by theological considerations. Origin of language/Humboldt: [Humboldt] rightly emphasizes that language is human from its very beginning(2). I 479 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Universality of hermeneutics: (...) linguistically and thus understandably is the human world relationship par excellence and by its very basis. Hermeneutics is (...) in this respect a universal aspect of philosophy and not only the methodological basis of the so-called humanities. I 480 Art/history: (...) the concepts of "art" and "history" (...) are forms of understanding that are only just separated from the universal mode of being of hermeneutic being as forms of hermeneutic experience. 1. Dilthey, Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik, Ges. Schriften vol. V, 317 338. 2. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (first printed in 1836), § 9, p. 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| History | Augustine | Höffe I 109 History/Salvation History/Augustinus/Höffe: The idea of a unified history, first of all towards Christ and finally towards the Last Judgement, a world history as salvation history, has numerous roots. Their creative connection, an outstanding achievement of synthesis, now finds its first, long-lasting climax in Augustine. Old Testament roots: (...) the idea of a unified history of God acting on and with His chosen people. In addition, there is the tradition of the Apocalypse, begun in the Old Testament and continued in the New Testament, and the experience of the absence of the return of Christ. There are also New Platonic thoughts. Eras/world ages: Finally, the apostle Paul divides world history into three ages, the age before the law, the age under the law and finally the age under divine grace. Höffe I 110 Believers/unbelievers: According to the synthesis developed in the God state, the history is a veritable drama, driven by the tension between the worldly kingdom of the unbelievers and the divine kingdom of the believers. Fate: The history developing from this struggle is neither dominated by a fate (fatum) nor a (new)platonic world soul. Providence: Decisive are the providence of God and, within (narrow) limits, the free will of man(1), whose abuse admittedly leads to "a chain of misery and suffering"(2). >Progress/Augustine. Höffe I 117 Augustine's theory of history leads the influential historian and also politically active bishop Otto von Freising (1112-1158) to interpret world history as a struggle between the two kingdoms, the world and God's kingdom. Progress/Kant/Hegel: A formal core of Augustine's historical thinking, the teleological character, the idea of progress, which tends towards a positive goal, lives on in many places, however, partly as with Kant and Hegel as progress of law and freedom, partly as in an Enlightenment still practiced today as progress of science, medicine and technology. 1. Augustine, The State of God, De civitate dei V, 8 ff. 2. Ibid., XIII, 14 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Holiness | Habermas | IV 136 Holiness/Socialisation/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech the illocutionary elements are combined with the propositional and expressive elements in such a way that illocutionary forces are connected with all speech acts. This makes it clear to oneself what it means when the sacred institutions not only guide, preform and prejudice through processes of understanding, but also through the intersubjective recognition of the claims to validity raised by acts of speech. The acts of speech thus gain an independent illocutionary force independent of existing normative contexts. The authority of the holy behind the institutions no longer applies per se. Rather, it becomes dependent on the justification achievements of the religious world views. Cultural knowledge takes over functions of coordinating action by entering into the interpretation of the situation (...). >Communicative action, >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Validity claims, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Institutions. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Honesty | Psychological Theories | Slater I 168 Honesty/psychological theories: Psychologists have tended to focus on the role of such dilemmas in everyday life, often in relation to “white lie” or “politeness” contexts. In a typical white lie context, an individual is given an undesirable gift and is asked if he or she likes it (Cole, 1986(1); Saarni, 1984(2)). The recipient must decide whether to tell the truth and risk hurting the feelings of the gift-giver, or lie to make the gift-giver happy. Children’s reasoning about such conflicts speaks to philosophical debates about the acceptability of telling a lie when the motive is prosocial (see Bok, 1978)(3). >Honesty/Kohlberg, >Morality/Kohlberg, >Honesty/developmental psychology, >Honesty/cultural psychology. Slater I 169 [Some] research has addressed lying and truth telling with reference to situations in which a speaker calls positive attention to himself or herself. One focus of this work has been to examine whether children consider it acceptable to falsely deny responsibility for one’s prosocial acts. This topic has been of particular interest due to a strong cultural emphasis on modesty in East Asia (e.g., Bond & Hwang, 1986)(4). For example, children in China are encouraged to be “unsung heroes” and to avoid acknowledging their achievements and prosocial actions (Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997)(5). Evidence from research on the disclosure of one’s own prosocial acts supports the view that cultural influences play an important role in shaping the way children learn to assess the moral Slater I 170 implications of behavior. 1. Cole, P. M. (1986). Children’s spontaneous control of facial expression. Child Development, 57, 1309— 1321. 2. Saarni, C. (1984). An observational study of children’s attempts to monitor their expressive behavior. Child Development, 55, 1504—1513. 3. Bok, S. (1978). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. New York: Random House. 4. Bond, M. H., & Hwang, K. K. (1986). The social psychology of Chinese people. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The psychology of the Chinese people (pp. 213—266). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lee, K., Cameron, C. A., Xu, F., Fu, G., & Board, J. (1997). Chinese and Canadian children’s evaluations of lying and truth-telling. Child Development. 64,924—934. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Horizon | Husserl | Gadamer I 250 Horizon/Time Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: [With the term horizon] Husserl apparently tries to capture the transition of all the excluded intentionality of meaning into the supporting continuity of the whole. After all, a horizon is not a rigid boundary, but something that wanders along with it and invites further penetration. Thus the horizon intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the >stream of consciousness, corresponds to an equally comprehensive horizon intentionality on the objective side. For everything given as being is given worldly and thus carries the world horizon with it. >Way of Givenness. Self-Criticism/HusserlVsHusserl: In his "Retractations to Ideas I", Husserl emphasized in explicit self-criticism that at that time (1923) he had not yet sufficiently grasped the significance of the world phenomenon(1). The theory of transcendental reduction, which he had communicated in the ideas, thus had to become more and more complicated. The mere suspension of the validity of the objective sciences could no longer suffice, because even in the completion of the "epoch", the suspension of the being of scientific knowledge, the world remains valid as a given one. In this respect, the epistemological self-contemplation that asks for the a priori, the eidetic truths of the sciences, is not radical enough. HusserlVsNew Kantianism/DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: This is the point at which Husserl could know himself in a certain harmony with the intentions of Dilthey. In a similar way, Dilthey had fought the criticism of the New Kantians, in so far as the decline to the epistemological subject was not enough for him. >Subject/Dilthey. Dilthey: "There is no real blood running in the veins of the cognitive subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct"(2) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life" and, similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, already an indicator of the later widely accepted tendency, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. Husserl Ill, 390: "The great mistake of starting from the natural world (without characterizing it as a world)" (1922), and the more detailed self-critique Ill, 399 (1929). The concept of horizon (and horizon consciousness is, according to Husserliana VI, 267, also inspired by W. James' concept of "fringes". The impact that R. Avenarius (Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzig 1912) had on Husserl's critical turn against the "scientific world" was last pointed out by H. Lübbe in the "Festschrift für W. Szilasi" (Munich 1960) (cf. H. Lübbe, Positivismus und Phänomenologie (Mach und Husserl), FS W. Szilasi, pp. 161-184, esp. p. 171 f.). 2 Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, vol. 1. p. XVIII. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Human Nature | Conservatism | Gaus I 134 Human Nature/Conservatism/Kekes: [Pluralism] regards some political arrangements as necessary for good lives, but it allows for a generous plurality of possible political arrangements beyond the necessary minimum. The standard operates in the realm of moral necessity, and it leaves open what happens in the realm of moral possibility. The standard thus accommodates part of the universal values of absolutism and part of the context-dependent values of relativism. >Values/Relativism. Absolutism prevails in the realm of moral necessity; relativism in the realm of moral possibility. >Absolutism/Kekes. Human Nature: The source of this standard is human nature. (For a general account of the political significance of human nature for politics, see Berry, 1986(1). For the specific connection between human nature and conservatism, see Berry, 1983(2).) To understand human nature sufficiently for the purposes of this standard does not require plumbing the depths of the soul, unravelling the obscure springs of human motivation, or conducting scientific research. It does not call for any metaphysical commitment and it can be Gaus I 135 held without subscribing to the existence of a natural law. It is enoug tor it to concentrate on n people in a commonsensical way. It will then become obvious that good lives depend on the satis- faction of basic physiological, psychological, and social needs: for nutrition, shelter, and rest; for companionship, self-respect, and the hope for a good or better life; for the division of labour, justice, and predictability in human affairs; and so forth. Absolutism: Society: Absolutists go beyond the minimum and think that their universal and objective standard applies all the way up to the achievement of good lives. Relativism: Relativists deny that there is such a standard. Values/Relativism. Pluralism: In this respect, pluralists side with relativists and oppose absolutists. Pluralists think that beyond the minimum level there is a plurality of values, of ways of ranking them, and of good lives that embody these values and rankings. According to pluralists, then, the political arrangements of a society ought to protect the minimum requirements of good lives and ought to foster a plurality of good lives beyond the minimum. >Values/Pluralism, >Conserevatism/Kekes. 1. Berry, Christopher J. (1986) Human Nature. London: Macmillan. 2. Berry, Christopher J. (1983) 'Conservatism and human nature'. In Ian Forbes and Steve Smith, eds, Politics and Human Nature. London: Pinter. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Humans | Agamben | Brocker I 825 Human/Agamben: here the "homo sacer" (see also Life/Agamben, State/Agamben): in Roman archaic law, the holiness of a person does not promote his protection, but on the contrary authorizes his unpunished killing. Agamben contrasts this with the prohibition of sacrifice and thinks of it together: that is what makes homo sacer so specific. (1) This sheds light on "an original political structure located in a zone ahead of the distinction between the sacred and the profane, religious and political". (2) The figure of the "homo sacer" contradicts precisely the transgression from the profane into the sacred, insofar as exclusion from human jurisprudence does not open a transition into the divine sphere. The "homo sacer" becomes the original figure of life taken under sovereign spell, the sacred life is put into unity with the naked life, and its creation is "the original achievement of sovereignty". (3) See Sovereignty/Agamben. Holiness/Agamben: the contemporary talk of the "holiness of life" thus originally means the exact opposite, namely the complete subjugation of life to sovereign power as an exception. (4) >Terminology/Agamben, Life/Agamben, Biopolitics/Agamben. 1. Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 83. 2. Ibid. p. 84. 3. Ibid. p. 93 4. Ibid. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Humans | Aristotle | Gadamer I 317 Humans/Aristotle/Gadamer: Human morality is fundamentally different from nature in that it does not simply have abilities or powers at work in it, but that the human only becomes such a being through what he or she does and how he or she behaves, Gadamer I 318 i.e. but: being so, behaves in a certain way. In this sense, Aristotle contrasts "ethos" with "physis" as an area in which there is no irregularity, but which does not know the regularity of nature, but the changeability and limited regularity of human statutes and human modes of behaviour. >Ethics/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle, >Generality/Aristotle. Höffe I 65 Man/humans/Aristotle/Höffe: In addition to the (far better known) political anthropology [Aristotle] (...) in the introductory chapter of the animal lore sketches a political zoology. This places humans in a context with those "political animals" which, like the bee, the wasp, the ant and the crane, live together and thereby achieve a collective achievement. The main passage for Aristotle's political anthropology, the second chapter of Book I of Politics, does not take back this biological definition, but explains that man is to a greater extent a political being. While animals are essentially concerned with the simple life (zên), for humans the good and successful life Höffe I 66 (eu zên) also counts. Aristotle's political anthropology thus remains in political >Eudaimonism. 1. community: the individual is not enough for himself: see policy I 2(1) 2. logos: a "biological" particularity, the singular logos nature of man(2). 3. Aristotle qualifies the person living outside the polis as "greedy for war"; he is a "wild animal"; and armed armed armed injustice is the worst. AristotleVsHobbes/Höffe: Unlike Hobbes, Aristotle sees more than just a cure for the threat of war. He considers the friendship that creates harmony to be at least as important as law and justice. 1. Politika I 2, 1252a26–1253a7 2. I 2, 1253a7–18 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Identity | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 118 Identity/Developmental psychology/Upton: Aspects of identity: - Vocational identity: Career choice and aspirations; current or intended occupation - Intellectual identity: Academic aspirations and achievements - Political ideology: Political beliefs, values and ideals; may include membership of political groups -Spiritual/religious identity: Religious beliefs, attitudes to religion and spirituality; religious practices and behaviours; may relate to a specific moral and ethical code - Relationship identity: This may refer to intimate relationships and be defined by whether you are single, married, divorced etc; or to social relationships such as friend, colleague etc; or to family relationships — mother, daughter etc. - Sexual identity: Sexual orientation — heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual - Cultural identity: Where you were born and/or raised and how intensely you identify with the cultural heritage/practices linked to this part of the world; may also include language preference - Ethnic identity: The extent to which you feel a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group; the ethnic group tends to be one to which you can claim heritage and the beliefs of the group may influence your thinking, perceptions, feelings and behaviour - Physical identity: Body image and beliefs about your appearance - Personality: Characteristics that define patterns of behaviour, such as being shy, friendly, gregarious, anxious etc. Stages of development: According to Marcia (1993)(1), young adolescents are usually described by one of the first three statuses. 1) Identity diffusion refers to the individual who has not yet experienced a crisis or made any commitments. They are undecided about future roles and have not shown any interest in such matters. 2) Identity foreclosure describes individuals who have made a commitment to an identity without experiencing a crisis. They may, for example, have simply followed the ideologies and aspirations of their parents. 3) Identity moratorium is the term used to describe individuals experiencing an identity crisis and whose commitments have not yet been strongly defined. 4) Identity achievement is reached once individuals have undergone a crisis and made a commitment to their identity. According to Marcia (1993)(1), young adolescents are usually described by one of the first three statuses. However, there is increasing evidence that identity development is not solely a task of adolescence. Indeed, some aspects of identity are already well on the way to being established before adolescence. Gender, for example, is one aspect of identity that is a key aspect of development at an early age, but continues to be built on as more complex under standings of what it means to be male or female are negotiated. Likewise, some of the most important changes in identity occur after adolescence, taking place during early adulthood (Waterman, 1992)(2) >Social identity, >Socialization, >Identity/Henrich. 1. Marcia, JE (1993) The status of the statuses: research review, in Marcia, JE Waterman, AS Matteson, DR Archer, SL and Orlofsky, JL (eds) Identity: A handbook for psychosociogical research (pp 22-41). New York: Springer-Verlag. 2. Waterman, AS (1992) Identity as an aspect of optimal psychological functioning, in Adams, GR Gullotta, TP and Montemayor, R (eds) Adolescent ldentity Formation (50-72). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Identity | Marcia | Upton I 117 Identity/Marcia/Upton: The search for identity is supported by what Erikson calls a psychosocial moratorium. What he means is that adolescents are relatively free of responsibility, which enables them to have the space to try out (and discard) different identities. >Identity/Erikson. Marcia: Marcia (1987) suggested that this development is a staged process and he identified four different identity statuses. 1) Identity diffusion refers to the individual who has not yet experienced a crisis or made any commitments. They are undecided about future roles and have not shown any interest in such matters. 2) Identity foreclosure describes individuals who have made a commitment to an identity without experiencing a crisis. They may, for example, have simply followed the ideologies and aspirations of their parents. 3) Identity moratorium is the term used to describe individuals experiencing an identity crisis and whose commitments have not yet been strongly defined. 4) Identity achievement is reached once individuals have undergone a crisis and made a commitment to their identity. According to Marcia (1993)(1), young adolescents are usually described by one of the first three statuses. However, there is increasing evidence that identity development is not solely a task of adolescence. Indeed, some aspects of identity are already well on the way to being established before adolescence. Gender, for example, is one aspect of identity that is a key aspect of development at an early age, but continues to be built on as more complex under standings of what it means to be male or female are negotiated. Likewise, some of the most important changes in identity occur after adolescence, taking place during early adulthood (Waterman, 1992)(2). >Social identity, >Socialization, >Identity/Henrich. 1. Marcia, JE (1993) The status of the statuses: research review, in Marcia, JE Waterman, AS Matteson, DR Archer, SL and Orlofsky, JL (eds) Identity: A handbook for psychosociogical research (pp 22-41). New York: Springer-Verlag. 2. Waterman, AS (1992) Identity as an aspect of optimal psychological functioning, in Adams, GR Gullotta, TP and Montemayor, R (eds) Adolescent ldentity Formation (50-72). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Induction | Bacon | Gadamer I 354 Induction/Francis Bacon/Gadamer: It is the special achievement of Bacon (...) that he is not content with the immanent logical task of developing the theory of experience as the theory of a true induction, but that he has discussed the whole moral difficulty and anthropological questionability of such an experiential achievement. His method of induction seeks to rise above the random and accidental manner in which everyday experience is produced, and even more so above its dialectical use. In this context, he has, in a way heralding the new age of methodological research, upset the theory of induction, which is still represented in humanistic scholasticism, because of its enumeratio simplex. Induction: The concept of induction makes use of the fact that generalization is based on random observation and, as long as no counter-instance is encountered, claims validity. As is well known, Bacon contrasts anticipatio, this hasty generalization of daily experience, with interpretatio naturae, the knowledgeable interpretation of the true being of nature(1). Interpretation: Through methodically organized experiments, it should allow the gradual ascent to the true, durable generalities, the simple forms of nature. This true method is characterized by the fact that the mind is not left to itself there(2). He's not allowed to fly the way he wants. Rather, the requirement is to ascend gradatim (step by step) from the particular to the general in order to acquire an orderly experience and to avoid all haste(3). Experiment: The method that Bacon himself demands, is an experimental one(4). However, it should be borne in mind that the experiment in Bacon does not always mean the technical event of the natural scientist who artificially induces processes under isolating conditions and makes them measurable. Rather, experiment is also, and above all, the artistic guidance of our mind, which is prevented from allowing itself to be led by hasty generalisations, and who consciously varies the observations he makes on nature, consciously confronting the most remote, apparently most divergent cases, and thus gradually and continuously learns to arrive at the axioms by way of a process of exclusion(5). (See >Thought Experiments). GadamerVsBacon: >Francis Bacon/Gadamer. 1. F. Bacon, Nov. Org. I, 26ff. 2. A.a.O. 1, 20f; 104. 3. A.a.O. l, 19ff. 4. A. a. O. vgl. insbesondere die „distributio operis«. 5. A.a.O. 1,22, 08 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Industrial Production | Soviet Union | Acemoglu I 129 Industrial production/Policy of the Soviet Union/Acemoglu/Robinson: Innovations/motivation/incentives/production targets: (...) paying (...) bonuses created all sorts of disincentives to technological change. For one thing, innovation, which took resources away from current production, risked the output targets not being met and the bonuses not being paid. For another, output targets were usually based on previous production Acemoglu I 130 production levels. This created a huge incentive never to expand output, since this only meant having to produce more in the future, since future targets would be “ratcheted up.” Underachievement was always the best way to meet targets and get the bonus. Central planning: Problems: E.g., when the plan was formulated in tons of steel sheet, the sheet was made too heavy. When it was formulated in terms of area of steel sheet, the sheet was made too thin. Incentives/bonuses: Problems: (...) a “profit motive” was no more encouraging to innovation than one based on output targets. Prices. the system of prices used to calculate profits was almost completely unconnected to the value of new innovations or technology. Unlike in a market economy, prices in the Soviet Union were set by the government, and thus bore little relation to value. Innovations: To more specifically create incentives for innovation, the Soviet Union introduced explicit innovation bonuses in 1946. As early as 1918, the principle had been recognized that an innovator should receive monetary rewards for his innovation, but the rewards set were small and unrelated to the value of the new technology. This changed only in 1956, when it was stipulated that the bonus should be proportional to the productivity of the innovation. Acemoglu/Robinson: However, since productivity was calculated in terms of economic benefits measured using the existing system of prices, this was again not much of an incentive to innovate. Acemoglu I 131 Incentives: The fact that truly effective incentives could not be introduced in the centrally planned economy was not due to technical mistakes in the design of the bonus schemes. It was intrinsic to the whole method by which extractive growth had been achieved. (Extractive institutions: >Terminology Acemoglu.) Institutions: (...) when Mikhail Gorbachev started to move away from extractive economic institutions after 1987, the power of the Communist Party crumbled, and with it, the Soviet Union. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Information Processing | Ackerman | Corr I 170 Information Processing/psychological theories/Ackerman: Information-processing tasks are typically narrower in scope (…). Information-processing tasks usually involve participants comparing objects for similarities or differences, memorizing random digits, watching a computer display for specific signals over an extended period of time, and so on. Although information-processing tasks are not exactly good indicators for intellectual ability, they are typically associated with abilities to some degree, and some information-processing tasks are components of broader intellectual ability measures. >Abilities, >Intelligence, >Performance. The relationships between personality traits such as Impulsivity, Extraversion, Anxiety and nAch (need for achievement), and information-processing task performance also appear to be more complex. For example, Revelle and his colleagues (see e.g., Humphreys and Revelle 1984)(1) have shown that there are interactions between the kinds of information-processing tasks participants are asked to do, the time-of-day in which they are performing the task, and even the amount of caffeine the participants have before the task. The optimal level of arousal, according to Revelle and his colleagues, would be different for introverts and extraverts (see also the broader theory of Eysenck 1970)(2). Several studies have provided good support for these hypothesized relationships (see e.g., Revelle 1995(3) for a review). Problems: The difficulty in generalizing these findings from information-processing tasks to intellectual abilities is that many of the underlying effects are hypothesized to be curvilinear; for example, if introverts do better in the morning and extraverts do better in the afternoon, then assessments of abilities that are given at various times of the day might yield either positive, negative or zero correlations. >Generalization, >Method, >Experiments. It may be that the ultimate effects of these personality-ability linkages would be found not so much in personality trait-ability correlations, but rather with the interests and orientations of the individuals. There are, in fact, substantial correlations between some personality traits and vocational interest themes (such as Conscientiousness and conventional vocational interests; Extraversion and social and enterprising vocational interests, and Openness to Experience and artistic vocational interests; see Ackerman and Heggestad 1997)(4). >Personality traits. 1. Humphreys, M. S. and Revelle, W. 1984. Personality, motivation, and performance: a theory of the relationship between individual differences and information processing, Psychological Review 153–84 2. Eysenck, H. J. 1970. The structure of human personality, 3rd edn. London: Methuen 3. Revelle, W. 1995. Personality processes, Annual Review of Psychology 46: 295–328 4. Ackerman, P. L. and Heggestad, E. D. 1997. Intelligence, personality, and interests: evidence for overlapping traits, Psychological Bulletin 121: 219–45 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Intelligence | Developmental Psychology | Corr I 169 Intelligence/Developmental psychology/Ackerman: There have been a few studies that have followed the same individuals from birth to adult ages that have examined both personality traits and intellectual growth and change. These older studies (e.g., Bayley 1968(1); Haan 1963(2); Kagan, Sontag, Baker and Nelson 1958)(3) have all indicated that increases in relative standing on broad measures of intellectual ability during development are associated with positively-oriented personality traits, such as nAch (need for achievement), higher levels of coping, and lower levels of defence mechanisms. In contrast, individuals who show declines in relative intelligence levels tested to be more hostile, negativistic and have higher levels of traditionalism. >Brain development, >Cognitive development, >Learning, >Learning theory, >Personality traits, >Performance. 1. Bayley, N. 1968. Behavioural correlates of mental growth: birth to thirty-six years, American Psychologist 23: 1–17 2. Haan, N. 1963. Proposed model of ego functioning: coping and defense mechanisms in relation to IQ change, Psychological Monographs (No. 571) 3. Kagan, J., Sontag, L. W., Baker, C. T. and Nelson, V. L. 1958. Personality and IQ change, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 56: 261–6 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Intelligence | Gould | IV 251 Intelligence/Gould: intelligence tests were popular in the early 20th century and were carried out on recruits. IV 253 Singapore: in 1983 Singapore launched a campaign to encourage educated people to have more children, Prime Minister Le Kuan Yew feared a decline in intelligence among the population. GouldVs: fallacy: women with lower intelligence had on average more children. The reason was that less education also meant less sex education. Gould: but the sex education has nothing to do with intelligence. IV 255 Intelligence/twin research/Arthur Jensen, 1969: "Standard number": intelligence is said to be 80% hereditary. (1) IV 256 Cyril Burt, great old man of genetics, 1909: Cyril Burt's "study" (with 50 pairs of twins) is one of the most complete forgeries in the history of science. (2) Heredity/Gould: Lee Kuan Yew misinterpreted the following: wrong equation of "hereditary" with "fixed and inevitable". Definition Heredity/Gould: heredity measures how much variation in the appearance of a feature within a population can be held responsible for the genetic differences, e. g. eye colour, height, IQ. A kind of vision defect can be 100% hereditary, but can be completely compensated by glasses. Even if the IQ is 80% hereditary, it can still be improved through education. Cf. >Arthur Jensen. 1. Arthur R. Jensen: How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement? In: Harvard Educational Review. Bd. 39, Nr. 1, Winter 1969, S. 1–123. 2. Burbridge: Burt's twins: A question of numbers. In: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Volume 42, Nr. 4, S. 335–352, 2006. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Intelligence | Jensen | Slater I 118 Intelligence/psychology/Jensen: Jensen (1969)(1) presented evidence that racial and social class differences in intelligence test scores may have genetically determined origins, and proposed that African-American and children of lower socioeconomic status (SES) of all races might be better served by educational programs that recognize their presumed genetic limitations in learning capacity. VsJensen: The controversy was rooted less in the science surrounding what Jensen had to say than in the social implications of acting on Jensen’s proposal. Many thought this would create a permanent, ostensibly legitimized, underclass in which African-Americans would be disproportionately represented. Empirical data: a) African-American students averaged on the order of one standard deviation lower than European-American students on most measures of academic achievement and intelligence, (…) b) children from lower-social class families tended more generally to score similarly lower than children from middle- and upper-social class families. It was these same observations that had led to the development and funding of the Head Start Program in the United States in 1964, with first implementation as a summer kindergarten readiness program in 1965. Slater I 119 By 1969 the general optimism that had fueled the Head Start Program (…) had dissipated. The (…) program (…) was not meeting expectations. IQ/Jensen 1966(2): Can psychologists and educators raise the national IQ? (…) The genes and the prenatal environment control some 80 per cent of the variance in intelligence. This leaves about 20 per cent to the environment ... The degree of boost that can be effected in any person will, of course, depend on the extent to which his usual environment is less than optimal for the full development of his innate intellectual potential. (Jensen, 1966(2), p. 99). IQ/Jensen: (Jensen 1967)(3) “This widespread belief [in cultural disadvantage] gives rise to various plans for ... educational programs tailored to the apparent limitations of a large proportion of low socioeconomic status children. This is a harmful and unjust set of beliefs, if acted upon ... (1967(3) p. 5).” JensenVsJensen: (Jensen 1969)(1) two years later, Jensen recommended exactly that: educational programs tailored to the apparel limitations of minority and low SES (socioeconomic status) children. United States Commission on Civil Rights: (1967)(3) the US CCR report (…) at the time was heavily criticised, though its basic finding of few or no lasting gains in IQ scores has stood the test of time: Thesis: compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed (quoted in Jensen (1969(1) p. 1. Jensen (1969): the premise needs revisiting. Slater I 120 Solution/Jensen: (Jensen 1969)(1): society should use [the conclusion, that group or racial differences in levels of IQ are genetically determined] as the basis for designing educational programs that recognized presumably inherent and permanent racial and socioeconomic (SES) differences in capacity to benefit from education. >Intelligence tests/Jensen. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 2. Jensen, A. R. (1966). Verbal mediation and educational potential. Psychology in the Schools, 3, 99–109. 3. Jensen, A. R. (1967). The culturally disadvantaged: Psychological and educational aspects. Educational Research, 10, 4–20. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Intelligence | Molecular Genetics | Slater I 126 Intelligence/molecular genetics: Though there is still [2012] considerable debate about the magnitude of the heritability, the presence of substantial genetic influence is now well established, through the accumulation of evidence from many studies in many different samples (see Deary, Johnson, & Houlihan, 2009(1), for a recent review, and Neisser et al., 1996(2), for the consensus statement of an American Psychological Association Task Force). In contrast to the view prevailing at the time Jensen wrote (see Jensen 1969(2), >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen, >Intelligence tests/psychological theories), the existence of genetic influences on behavioural traits of all kinds is now generally accepted (Turkheimer, 2000)(3), which means that it would be considered exceptional if intelligence and achievement test scores were not genetically influenced. Slater I 127 Genome-wide association studies of cognitive ability test scores have yielded many alleles of extremely small effects that tend not to replicate from sample to sample and account at best for only tiny proportions of trait variance. At present we have not yet identified a single gene locus robustly associated with normal range cognitive ability test scores (Davis, Butcher, Docherty, Meaburn, & Curtis, 2010(4); Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010)(5). The general failure to identify clear associations between particular gene loci and highly heritable, well-measured common traits has been termed the “missing heritability problem” (Maher, 2008)(6). [There are] more complex genetic mechanisms (see Johnson, Penke, & Spinath, 2011(7), for more detailed information). 1. Deary, I. J., Johnson, W., & Houlihan, L. (2009). Genetic foundations of human intelligence. Human Genetics, 126, 613–624. 2. Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T. J., Boykin, A. W., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern, D. F., Loehlin, J. C., Perloff, R., Sternberg, R. J., & Urbina, S. (1996). Intelligence: Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51, 77–101. 3. Turkheimer, E. (2000). Three laws of behavior genetics and what they mean. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 160–164. 4. Davis, O. S., Butcher, L. M., Docherty, S. J., Meaburn, E. L., & Curtis, C. J. (2010). A three-stage genome-wide association study of general cognitive ability: Hunting the small effects. Behavior Genetics, 40, 759–767. 5. Deary, I. J., Penke, L., & Johnson, W. (2010). The neuroscience of human intelligence differences. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 201–211. 6. Maher, B. (2008). The case of the missing heritaiblity. Nature, 456, 18–21. 7. Johnson, W., Penke, L., & Spinath, F. M. (2011). Heritability in the era of molecular genetics. European Journal of Personality, 25, 254–266. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Intelligence | Psychological Theories | Corr I 163 Intelligence/psychological theories/Ackerman: Modern intellectual ability theories (see e.g., Carroll 1993(1)) represent intelligence in a hierarchical fashion, with a general intellectual ability (the most general construct) at the top of the hierarchy (Strata III), and somewhat narrower ability content as one moves down the hierarchy ((s) here from left to right). E.g. Crystalized intelligence - (e.g. verbal comprehension, lexical knowledge) Fluid intelligence - (e.g. sequential reasoning) Visual perception - (e.g. spatial relations) Learning and memory - (e.g. memory spun, associative memory) Speed - (e.g. perceptual speed, reaction speed) Auditory perception - (e.g. hearing and speech, music perception) (For the complete Table cf. (1)) For the relation between intelligence and personality traits see >Personality traits/Ackerman. Corr I 167 Def TIE/Ackerman: a measure of typical intellectual engagement: TIE is defined as the individual’s preference toward or away from intellectual activities.(Goff and Ackerman 1992)(2). The authors of the TIE hypothesized that scores on the measure would correlate mainly with measures of accumulated knowledge (an ability called ‘crystallized intelligence’) and less so with measures of fluid intellectual abilities (e.g., deductive reasoning and quantitative reasoning). Corr I 168 Overlap of intelligence with personality factors: The associations between personality trait measures that are narrower in scope than the broad five factors of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness typically show modest correlations with measures of intellectual abilities, whether at the general or specific level. Need for Achievement (nAch) probably shows the most robust positive correlations among this group of personality traits, with correlations in the range of r = .07 to .24. Traits like Alienation, Aggression, Harm-Avoidance and Traditionalism all show small negative correlations with intellectual ability measures, ranging from negligible magnitude to about r = −.15. >Personality traits/Ackerman. 1. Carroll, J. B. 1993. Human cognitive abilities: a survey of factor-analytic studies. New York: Cambridge University Press 2. Goff, M. and Ackerman, P. L. 1992. Personality-intelligence relations: assessing typical intellectual engagement, Journal of Educational Psychology 84: 537–52 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Slater I 127 Intelligence/psychological theories: Many who have recently addressed the subject have taken the same kind of debating perspective Jensen (1969(1) did, but from the opposite side. >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence test/Jensen, >Intelligence test/psychological theories. That is, they selectively present evidence just as indirect as Jensen’s but opposing his position, and prematurely conclude that he was wrong (see, e.g., Nisbett, 2009(2); Shenk, 2010(3)). Though the question of the source of the racial gap in test scores is certainly scientifically legitimate, it must be pursued responsibly from all perspectives (Hunt & Carlson, 2007)(4). Slater I 128 Jensen: Perhaps the greatest irony surrounding Jensen’s (1969)(1) article is that he was very creatively doing just that when he was sidetracked into arguing that socially dis-advantaged children were inherently less educable. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 2. Nisbett, R. E. (2009). Intelligence and how to get it: Why schools and cultures count. New York: Norton. 3. Shenk, D. (2010). The genius in all of us: Why everything you’ve been told about genetics, talent, and IQ is wrong. New York: Doubleday. 4. Hunt, E., & Carlson, J. (2007). Considerations relating to the study of group differences in intelligence. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 194–213. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Intelligence Tests | Jensen | Slater I 120 Intelligence tests/Jensen: In the mid-1960s, Jensen’s lab was conducting experiments with paired-associate and serial learning in children from various racial and SES backgrounds. In these tasks, participants are presented with randomly grouped stimuli, often words, and asked later to recall both the stimuli and the ways in which they were grouped. Jensen was comparing performance on these tasks in children with different IQs. Jensen was acutely aware that most intelligence tests include items intended to assess how much the individual had learned in the predominant cultural environment, thus potentially putting minority and low-SES (socioeconomic status) backgrounds at substantial disadvantage (Jensen, 1966(1), 1967(2), 1968a(3), 1969(4)). Solution/Jensen: basic, novel, laboratory learning tasks might be more direct and “culture-free” indexes of intelligence. Jensen and his staff noted that African-American, Mexican-American, and low-SES European-American children with low IQs in the 70–90 range tended to perform much better on these learning tasks than did middle- and upper-SES European-American children with similar IQs. In fact, the minority and low-IQ children performed very similarly on these tasks compared to middle- and upper-SES European-American children with normal and even above-normal IQs (Jensen, 1968b(5)). „Culture-free“ IQ test: Raven’s Progressive Matrices: Raven’s is a well-known nonverbal reasoning test that was then generally assumed, and still is by many, to be “culture-free” because of its nonverbal character and the absence of any performance reliance on knowledge of specific information. Problem: it was exactly this test that produced the greatest difference in correlations. Jensen: this suggested, that the source of the performance contrast was not cultural bias in the tests but some difference inherent between the children in the two kinds of groups. >Heritability/Jensen, >Intelligence/Jensen, >Racism/Jensen, >Science/Jensen, >Genetic variation/Jensen. Slater I 122 JohnsonVsJensen: Jensen did not present the evidence contradicting his case, nor did he present alternative interpretations of the evidence he presented. Slater I 128 Perhaps the greatest irony surrounding Jensen’s (1969)(1) article is that he was very creatively doing just that when he was sidetracked into arguing that socially dis-advantaged children were inherently less educable. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1966). Verbal mediation and educational potential. Psychology in the Schools, 3, 99–109. 2. Jensen, A. R. (1967). The culturally disadvantaged: Psychological and educational aspects. Educational Research, 10, 4–20. 3. Jensen, A. R. (1968a). Social class, race, and genetic – Implications for education. American Educational Research Journal, 5, 1–42. 4. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. 5. Jensen, A. R. (1968b). Patterns of mental ability and socioeconomic status. Proceedings of the National Academy of the United States of America, 60, 1330–1337. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Interpretation | Gadamer | I 196 Interpretation/Gadamer: Schleiermacher sees the act of understanding as the reconstructive execution of a production. Such an act has to make aware some things that can remain unconscious to the author. It is obviously the aesthetics of genius that Schleiermacher transfers to his general hermeneutics with this formula. The creative method of the genius artist is the model case on which the theory of unconscious production and the necessary consciousness in reproduction is based(1). It also follows - something that hermeneutics should never forget - that the artist who creates an artwork is not the appointed interpreter of it. As an interpreter, he or she has no fundamental authority over the merely receiving. He or she is, insofar as the person reflects, his or her own reader. The opinion he or she has as a reflective person is not decisive. The yardstick of interpretation is solely what the meaning of his creation is, what it "means"(2). >Meaning, >Interpretation, >Hermeneutics, >Understanding. Thus, the doctrine of ingenious production here accomplishes an important theoretical achievement, by making the difference between I 197 interpreter and creator. It legitimizes the equation of both, as long as it is not the reflective self-interpretation, but the unconscious opinion of the author that is to be understood. Schleiermacher does not want to say anything else with his paradoxical formula (it is necessary to understand a writer better than he or she has understood him- or herself). >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher, >Understanding/Schleiermacher. I 401 Interpretation/Gadamer: A correct interpretation "in itself" would be a thoughtless ideal that misjudged the nature of the tradition. Every interpretation must fit into the hermeneutical situation to which it belongs. Situational dependence in no way means that the claim to correctness, which every interpretation must make, dissolves into the subjective or occidental. For us, interpretation is not a pedagogical behaviour, but rather the consummation of understanding itself, which is not only completed for the others for whom one interprets something, but also for the interpreter him- or herself in the explicitness of linguistic interpretation. 1. H. Patsch has meanwhile clarified the early history of Romantic hermeneutics in more detail: Friedrich Schlegel's "Philosophie der Philologie" and Schleiermacher's early drafts on hermeneutics (Ztschr. f. Theologie und Kirche 1966, pp. 434-472). 2. The modern fashion of using the self-interpretation of a writer as a canon of interpretation is the consequence of a false psychologism. On the other hand, "theory", e.g. of music or poetics and oratory, can very well be a legitimate canon of interpretation. Cf. my recent work "Zwischen Phänomeektik - Versuch einer Selbstkritik" in Vol. 2 of the Ges. Werke, p. 3ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Jensen | Psychological Theories | Slater I 123 Jensen/intelligence/genetic variation/cultural differences/psychological theories: Jensen’s (1969)(1) article unleashed a storm of controversy. The article itself was published with commentary by nine well-known psychologists and geneticists. All rejected Jensen’s conclusion that the score differences could be considered genetically determined, generally pointing out the limitations in his arguments, alternative explanations for the facts he presented, and data he had overlooked. >Jensen, Arthur R, >Intelligence, >Intelligence tests. His critics were not able empirically to refute the case that Jensen had made, and often resorted to rather emotional attacks, particularly in the mainstream press. The response was so extreme and vitriolic that some felt that it ran contrary to the spirit of scientific debate and acted to restrict intellectual freedom of inquiry. Johnson: regardless of whether Jensen’s (1969)(1) article was the impetus, it is striking that, to this day, the American Psychological Association publishes a wide range of journals addressing many aspects of psychological function, including very specific aspects of cognition, but research involving general intelligence has no clear representation in any of these journals. >Cognition, >Cognitive psychology. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Jigsaw Method | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 221 Jigsaw method/psychological theories: in the years since Aronson’s experiments (>Jigsaw method/Aronson; Aronson et al. (1)) research on the jigsaw classroom has continued to yield positive results in terms of enhanced academic performance and esteem, particularly among students from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as improved intergroup relations within the classroom and the school (Johnson et al., 2000(2); Tomcho and Foels, 2012(3)). >E. Aronson, >Learning, >Learning theory, >Socialization, >Group behavior. It has been applied successfully to diverse topical Haslam I 222 areas such as English as a second language (ESL; Ghaith and El-Malak, 2004(4)) and physics classes (Hänze and Berger, 2007)(5), and positive results have been replicated internationally (Walker and Crogan, 1998)(6). Robert Cialdini initiated an influential set of studies on social influence that drew on observations of strategies used by individuals, such as salespeople, in applied settings, identified underlying psychological principles, and tested these ideas in field settings (Cialdini, 2009)(7). Also, basic research on attitudes and behaviour, such as the work of Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980)(8) theory of reasoned action (…), significantly guided the development of effective interventions to change sexual practices and promote medical adherence to help curb the emerging international AIDS epidemic (Albarracin et al., 2001)(9). Ingroup relations: research on this topic was also inspired by the jigsaw classroom research; see Paluck and Green (2009)(10). Haslam I 223 Publications: Indeed, the earliest publications publications on the jigsaw classroom – also known as cooperative learning – were published in education journals rather than social psychological journals. Limitations of the method:/VsAronson: Aronson’s work spawned a new generation of cooperative learning interventions that were constructed to be effective in a wider range of classroom situations, not just under the specific circumstances associated with recently desegregated schools. These newer cooperation-based interventions were more generally effective educationally. So it was that when David Johnson and colleagues (2000)(2) ranked eight commonly used cooperation-based teaching methods in terms of their effectiveness the jigsaw classroom was only ranked sixth in terms of impact on educational achievement. By the early 1990s, 79% of US elementary schools used cooperative learning methods (Puma et al., 1993)(11) attests to the influence of the jigsaw classroom on policy implementation. >Jigsaw method/Social psychology. 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Johnson, D., Johnson, R.T. and Stanne, M.B. (2000) ‘Cooperative learning methods: A meta-analysis’, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Johnson50/publication/220040324_Cooperative_learning_methods_A_meta-analysis/links/00b4952b39d258145c000000.pdf (04.05. 2019)). 3. Tomcho, T.J. and Foels, R. (2012) ‘Meta-analysis of group learning activities: Empirically-based teaching recommendations’, Teaching of Psychology, 39: 159–69. 4. Ghaith, G. and El-Malak, M.A. (2004) ‘Effect of Jigsaw II on literal and higher-order EFL reading comprehension’, Educational Research and Evaluation, 10: 105–55. 5. Hänze, M. and Berger, R. (2007) ‘Cooperative learning, motivational effects, and student characteristics: An experimental study comparing cooperative learning and direct instruction in 12th grade physics classes“, Learning and instruction, 17: 29-41. 6. Walker, I. and Crogan, M. (1998) ‘Academic performance, prejudice, and the jigsaw classroom: New pieces to the puzzle’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 8: 381–93. 7. Cialdini, R.B. (2009) Influence: Science and Practice (5th edn). New York: Pearson. 8. Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. (1980) Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior: Attitudes, Intentions, and Perceived Behavioral Control. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 9. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’. Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61. 10. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 11. Puma M.J., Jones C.C., Rock D. and Fernandez, R. (1993) ‘Prospects: The congressionally mandated study of educational growth and opportunity’, Interim Report. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Jigsaw Method | Social Psychology | Haslam I 223 Jigsaw method/Social Psychology: Within social psychology, the theoretical contribution of the jigsaw strategy (Aronson et al. 1978(1); >Jigsaw method/Aronson; >Jigsaw method/psychological theories) was limited because of difficulty in clarifying the underlying mechanisms that accounted for the effects obtained. Indeed, moving into the contemporary era, this focus on outcomes rather than process limited the kind of theory development that was becoming critically important for publication within social psychology. (…) the phrase ‘jigsaw classroom’ has not appeared in the title of an article published in a leading social psychology journal (…). Preliminary work: Contact hypothesis: Beginning with research in the 1930s but catalysed by Allport’s (1954)(2) classic book The Nature of Prejudice, the contact hypothesis had represented the state-of-the art intervention for improving intergroup relations (see Dovidio et al., 2003)(3). Aronson’s work drew heavily on Sherif et al.’s (1961)(4) concept of superordinate goals in the Robbers Cave study, helped to revitalize interest in the way intergroup contact can improve intergroup relations. And although it may seem that the jigsaw classroom was somewhat neglected by social psychologists, this is certainly not the case today. (Paluck and Green(2009)(5). Explanations: It was the development of two other contemporaneous frameworks – social cognition and social identity – that ultimately provided the essential insights into the underlying processes (e.g., after Fiske and Taylor, 1984(6); Tajfel and Turner, 1979(7)). Categorization/social cognition: intergroup biases are conceptualized as outcomes of normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and storing the overwhelming quantity and complexity of information that people encounter daily. One fundamental aspect of this process is the tendency to categorize individuals as members of social groups based on distinguishing characteristics, Haslam I 224 often socially constructed as essential qualities. >Categorization/Dovidio. Haslam I 225 Social identity theory: According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979(7); see also Abrams and Hogg, 2010)(8), the other important development around the time of Aronson and colleagues’ (1978)(1) original work on the jigsaw strategy, a person’s experience of identity varies along a continuum that ranges at one extreme from the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements, to another extreme in which the self is the embodiment of a social collective or group. Individual level: here, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. Group level: here, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own, and the group’s welfare is paramount. Intergroup relations: begin when people think about themselves as group members rather than solely as distinct individuals. (See Sherif (1961(4) and Tajfel and Turner (1979(7)). 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Allport, G.W. (1954) The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley. 3. Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L. and Kawakami, K. (2003) ‘The Contact Hypothesis: The past, present, and the future’, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 6: 5–21. 4. Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood, W.R. and Sherif, C.W. (1961) Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. 5. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67. 6. Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984) Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley. 7. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Labour Power | Marx | Habermas IV 493 Labour/labour power/Marx/Habermas: On the one hand, labour power is captured as an abstract achievement for a work process that is formally organised from the point of view of exploitation. As an action it belongs to the lifeworld of the producer, as a listing to the functional context of the capitalist enterprise and the economic system as a whole. Commodity/Marx/Offe: according to Marx, the labour power is not a commodity like any other: it is 'alive'. >Labor/Marx, >Commodity. 1) It does not arise for the purpose of saleability. 2) It is inseparable from its owner, 3) It can only be set in motion by its owner.(1) >Actions, >Subjects, >Markets. 1. C. Offe, Unregierbarkeit, in: J. Habermas. Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit, Frankfurt 1979, p. 315. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Language | Gadamer | I 383 Language/Gadamer: Gadamer Thesis: The fusion of horizons, which happens in understanding, is the actual achievement of language. >Horizon/Gadamer. I 388 Understanding: Understanding a language is not really understanding in itself and does not include a process of interpretation, but an execution of life. One understands a language by living in it - a sentence that, as is well known, applies not only to living languages but even to dead languages. I 408 Language as form: (...) it is undeniable (...) that linguistics and philosophy of language work under the premise that the form of language is their sole subject. But is the concept of form even relevant here? The language that is alive in speech, that encompasses understanding everything, I 409 also that of the interpreter of texts, is so much involved in the execution of thought or interpretation that we have too little in our hands if we want to disregard what languages pass on to us in terms of content and only think of language as form. The language unconsciousness has not ceased to be the actual mode of being of speaking. Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: It had no word for what we call language. I 421 Ideal Language/GadamerVsLeibniz: [With the rational construction] of an artificial language (...) one moves (...), it seems to me, in a direction that leads away from the essence of language. Linguisticality is so completely in line with the thinking of things that it is an abstraction to think the system of truths as a given system of possibilities of being, to which a sign could be assigned, which a subject reaching for these signs uses. The linguistic word is not a sign that one reaches for, but it is also not a sign that one makes or gives to another, not a being thing that one takes up and loads with the ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible. This is wrong on both sides. Meaning: Rather, the ideality of meaning lies in the word itself. It has always been meaning. But, on the other hand, this does not mean that the word precedes all experience of being and externally adds to an already made experience by making it subservient to itself. The experience is not at first wordless and is then made an object of reflection by naming it, for instance in the way of subsumption under the generality of the word. Rather, it belongs to experience itself that it seeks and finds the words that express it. I 449 Language/Gadamer: Language [has] its actual being only in conversation, that is, in the exercise of communication (...). This is not to be understood as if the purpose of language is indicated. >Communication/Gadamer. I 453 In linguistic events (...) not only the insistent finds its place, but also the change of things. (...) in language the world presents itself. The linguistic experience of the world is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of existence, because it comprises all being-for-itself I 454 in whatever relationships (relativities) it manifests itself in. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does therefore not mean that the world becomes the object of language. I 461 Language/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: "Centre of the language": (...) we are guided by the hermeneutical phenomenon. But its all-determining reason is the finiteness of our historical experience. In order to do justice to it, we took up the trace of language, in which the structure of being is not simply reproduced, but in whose paths the order and structure of our experience itself is first and forever changing. Language is the trace of finiteness, not because there is the diversity of human language construction, but because every language is constantly being formed and developed, the more it expresses its experience of the world. We have questioned important turning points in Western thought about language, and this questioning has taught us that, in a much more radical sense than Christian thought about what is finite, what happens in language corresponds to the finiteness of man. Cf. >Language/Christianity. It is the centre of language from which our entire experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds. >Experience/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Word/Gadamer. I 462 "Centre of language"/Gadamer: Each word makes the whole of the language it belongs to sound and the whole of the world view it is based on appear. Every word, therefore, as the event of its moment, also makes the unsaid, to which it refers to in responding and waving, be present. I 465 The important thing is that something happens here. Neither is the interpreter's consciousness mastering that what reaches it as the Word of Tradition, nor can what happens be adequately described as the progressive realization of what is, so that an infinite intellect would contain all that which could ever speak from the whole of Tradition. But the actual event is only made possible by this, namely that the word that has come to us as tradition and which we have to listen to, really strikes us as if it were addressing us and meant I 466 ourselves. Object/Gadamer: (...) on the part of the "object" this event means the coming into play, the playing out of the content of the tradition in its respective new possibilities of meaning and resonance, newly acquired by the other recipient. >Object/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Nietzsche | Ries II 35 Language/On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: Seduction by Language: makes the deception of intellectual judgement performance appear as a natural context. >Predication, >Sentence, >Fiction. Ries II 86 Language/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche:"coarse fetish being": produces reason prejudices: subject, causality and substance. --- Danto III 51 Language/thinking/order/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche draws his pessimistic conclusions from his epistemological analysis (like B. Russell later): according to them, our perceptions cannot be similar to their causes, so that the language we use (...) does not really describe the world. Order/Nietzsche/Danto: At this point Nietzsche assumes that there could be an order or structure in the world which we are not able to comprehend. Danto III 107 Language/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a philosophical mythology hidden in language, which breaks out every moment, however cautious one may be otherwise.(1) Danto III 209 Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak, but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. >Justice/Thrasymachus, >Justice/Nietzsche. Danto III 210 Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not nouns and adjectives. 1. F. Nietzsche: Der Wanderer und seine Schatten, KGW IV, 3. p. 215. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Learning | AI Research | Norvig I 693 Learning/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: Any component of an agent can be improved by learning from data. The improvements, and the techniques used to make them, depend on four major factors: - Which component is to be improved. Norvig I 694 - What prior knowledge the agent already has, - What representation is used for the data and the component. - What feedback is available to learn from. Components to be learned: 1. A direct mapping from conditions on the current state to actions. 2. A means to infer relevant properties of the world from the percept sequence. 3. Information about the way the world evolves and about the results of possible actions the agent can take. 4. Utility information indicating the desirability of world states. 5. Action-value information indicating the desirability of actions. 6. Goals that describe classes of states whose achievement maximizes the agent’s utility. >Representation/Norvig, >Knowledge/AI Research, >Supervised Learning/AI Research, >Environment/AI Research, > Artificial Neural Networks, >Learning Theory/Norvig. Norvig I 744 Support vector machines/SVM: The support vector machine or SVM framework is currently the most popular approach for “off-the-shelf” supervised learning: if you don’t have any specialized prior knowledge about a domain, then the SVM is an excellent method to try first. Properties of SVMs: 1. SVMs construct a maximum margin separator - a decision boundary with the largest possible distance to example points. This helps them generalize well. 2. SVMs create a linear separating hyperplane, but they have the ability to embed the data into a higher-dimensional space, using the so-called kernel trick. 3. SVMs are a nonparametric method - they retain training examples and potentially need to store them all. On the other hand, in practice they often end up retaining only a small fraction of the number of examples - sometimes as few as a small constant times the number of dimensions. >Artificial Neural Networks/Norvig. Norvig I 748 Ensemble Learning: The idea of ensemble learning methods is to select a collection, or ensemble, of hypotheses from the hypothesis space and combine their predictions. For example, during cross-validation we might generate twenty different decision trees, and have them vote on the best classification for a new example. The motivation for ensemble learning is simple. Consider an ensemble of K =5 hypotheses and suppose that we combine their predictions using simple majority voting. For the ensemble to misclassify a new example, at least three of the five hypotheses have to misclassify it. The hope is that this is much less likely than a misclassification by a single hypothesis. Independence of hypotheses: (… ) obviously the assumption of independence is unreasonable, because hypotheses are likely to be misled in the same way by any misleading aspects of the training data. But if the hypotheses are at least a little bit different, thereby reducing the correlation between their errors, then ensemble learning can be very useful. Hypotheses space: Another way to think about the ensemble idea is as a generic way of enlarging the hypothesis space. That is, think of the ensemble itself as a hypothesis and the new hypothesis Norvig I 749 space as the set of all possible ensembles constructible from hypotheses in the original space. If the original hypothesis space allows for a simple and efficient learning algorithm, then the ensemble method provides a way to learn a much more expressive class of hypotheses without incurring much additional computational or algorithmic complexity. Boosting: The most widely used ensemble method is called boosting. [It uses] the idea of a weighted training set. In such a training set, each example has an associated weight wj ≥ 0. The higher the weight of an example, the higher is the importance attached to it during the learning of a hypothesis. Boosting starts with wj =1 for all the examples (i.e., a normal training set). From this set, it generates the first hypothesis, h1. This hypothesis will classify some of the training examples correctly and some incorrectly. We would like the next hypothesis to do better on the misclassified examples, so we increase their weights while decreasing the weights of the correctly classified examples. From this new weighted training set, we generate hypothesis h2. The process continues in this way until we have generated K hypotheses, where K is an input to the boosting algorithm. The final ensemble hypothesis is a weighted-majority combination of all the K hypotheses, each weighted according to how well it performed on the training set. Norvig I 757 The performance of a learning algorithm is measured by the learning curve, which shows the prediction accuracy on the test set as a function of the training-set size. When there are multiple models to choose from, cross-validation can be used to select a model that will generalize well. Norvig I 847 Learning a model for an observable environment is a supervised learning problem, because the next percept gives the outcome state. >Reinforcement Learning/AI Research. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Legal Positivism | Dworkin | Brocker I 594 Legal Positivism/DworkinVsLegal Positivism/DworkinVsUtilitarianism/Dworkin:[Legal] positivists and utilitarians are united by their opposition to the idea of natural, morally predetermined rights for the state. Positivists reject them because they attribute all normative facts of the law to social facts such as legislation and judicial further training in law. Utilitarians deny them because their last criterion is the social (overall) benefit. Against both perspectives, Dworkin wants to defend a law-based theory to which his book title refers. Brocker I 596 Legal Positivism/DworkinVsPositivism/DworkinVsHart, L. H. A.: Dworkin rejects a system of rules like Hart's: see Rules/Hart, Law/Hart: instead, one must distinguish between law and principles. ((s) Thus Dworkin is influenced by Kant). Rules are either valid or not - however, principles can collide without at least one of them having to be invalid. Principles/Dworkin: have a certain weight and indicate in which direction arguments point. (1) Brocker I 599 DworkinVsPositivism: no description of law is possible that does not include judgmental judgements. For illustration, Dworkin introduces the character of the talented judge Hercules, who knows all the important institutional facts of law and its history, as well as all principles and goals. This allows him to make an accurate assessment of the law in an overall context. Justification/Dworkin: thesis: the justification of law in a matter of best available arguments is substantial in nature. Dworkin therefore sees no problem in the fact that his ideal judge is an isolated hero who apparently interprets the law monologically. VsDworkin: siehe Michelman 1986 (2), 76; Habermas 1994 (3). Jurisdiction/Dworkin: Responsible judges, according to Dworkin, do not succumb to the temptation to seek reasons and points of view outside the law just because so far no article of the constitution, no legal text and no explicit judgment provide authoritative information on a difficult case. Brocker I 600 Legal PositivismVsDworkin: a positivist could argue that Dworkin only wants the American legal system to appear in the most positive light possible, but his approach is unsuitable for giving general assessments of legal systems, such as today's Iranian legal system. Dworkin's approach is unsuitable because it already presupposes that a legal system must embody rational contents such as the idea of individual rights Brocker I 601 against the state. However, this is not a conceptual characteristic of law, but a fragile and in fact not generally recognised achievement of legal history. 1. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass. 1977 (erw. Ausgabe 1978). Dt.: Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen, Frankfurt/M. 1990, S. 58-64 2. Michelman, Frank I., »The Supreme Court 1985 Term – Foreword. Traces of Self-Government«, in: Harvard Law Review 100/1, 1986, 4-77. 3. Habermas, Jürgen, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt/M. 1994, S. 272-276. Bernd Ladwig, „Ronald Dworkin, Bürgerrechte ernstgenommen“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Dworkin I Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge, MA 1978 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Levinson | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 145 Levinson/adulthood/stages of development/Developmental psychology/Upton: Levinson (1986(1), 1996(2)) was correct in thinking that early adulthood is the time that we explore vocational possibilities. The evidence supports a process of making tentative commitments and revising them as necessary before establishing yourself in what you hope will be a suitable occupation (Super et al.. 1996)(3). Indeed, more than twice as many tentative and exploratory vocational decisions are seen at age 21 than at 36, and this is true for both men (Philips. 1982(4)) and women (Jenkins. 1989)(5). Careers tend to peak during the forties (Simonton. 1990)(6), when there is a tendency for adults to define themselves in terms of their work. However, factors such as personality and gender seem to mediate career success; conscientiousness, extraversion and emotional stability are all associated with job performance (Ozer and Benet-Martinez. 2006)(7) and, even at the start of the twenty-first century, many women still subordinate career goals to family ones (Kirchmeyer, 2006)(8). VsLevinson: There is much less evidence to support Levinson’s suggestion of a midlife crisis. >Midlife Crisis/Levinson, >Midlife Crisis/Psychological theories. Upton I 148 VsLevinson/Upton: While it is good that Levinson acknowledged this personal interest, [one] might wonder whether this influenced his interpretation of the findings. [One] might also argue that the biographical interview is not very objective and that Levinson’s sample is not very representative. (…) men who were interviewed for Levinson’s studies would have been born between 1924 and 1934. They were therefore raised in the 1930s and 1940s. Women and men who grew up during this time were gender-typed to a much greater extent than males and females are today. Other problems with the studies: Life experiences: Men who have grown up in the last few decades may well have had to deal with less stable families due to high divorce rates, as well as having to deal with a different kind of economy. Women: the upbringing, aims and expectations of women today are very different from those at the time of Levinson’s work. >Aging. 1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf. 2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf. 3. Super, D, Savickas, M, and Super, C (1996). The life-span, life-space approach to careers, in D. Brown, L Brooks, and Associates (Eds.), Career Choice and Development (3rd ed., 121-78). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 4. Philips, SD (1982) Career exploration in adulthood .Journal of Vocational Behaviour, 20: 129- 40. 5. Jenkins, SR (1989) Longitudinal prediction of women’s careers: psychological, behavioral, and social-structural influences .Journal of Vocational Behavior, 34: 204-35. 6. Simonton, DK (1990). Creativity in the later years: optimistic prospects for achievement. Gerontologist) 30, 626-3 1. 7. Ozer, DJ and Benet-Martinez, V (2006) Personality and the prediction of consequential outcome. Psychology, 57:402-21. 8. Kirchmeyer, C (2006) The difference effects of family on objective career success across gender: a test of alternative explanations. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 68: 323-46. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Life | Husserl | Gadamer I 253 Life/Husserl/Gadamer: "Life" [for Husserl] is not only the "just living there" of the natural attitude. "Life" is also and no less the transcendently reduced subjectivity, which is the source of all objectivations. The title thus refers to what Husserl emphasizes as his own achievement in his criticism of the objectivist naivety of all previous philosophy. In his eyes, it consists in revealing the illusory nature of the usual epistemological controversy between idealism and realism and instead addressing the inner relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.(1) This explains the turn of the "performing life". "The radical view of the world is a systematic and pure inner view of the self in the outward subjectivity(2). It is like in the unity of a living organism, which one can well observe and dissect from the outside, but can only understand if one goes back to its hidden roots...". Subject/Husserl: In this way, even the worldly behaviour of the subject has its comprehensibility not in the conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous ones of life. Gadamer I 254 Just as Dilthey (...) starts from the experience only in order to gain the concept of the psychological context, Husserl proves the unity of the stream of consciousness to be prior and essential to the detail of the experiences. (Cf. >Life/Dilthey). The thematic exploration of the life of consciousness must overcome the starting point of the individual experience, just as with Dilthey. GadamerVsHusserl: Husserl [wants to] derive the constitution of the historical world from the "life of consciousness". One asks oneself whether (...) the actual content of the concept of life is not (...) alienated by the epistemological scheme of such a derivation from last conditions of consciousness. Above all, the difficulties that the problem of intersubjectivity and the understanding of the foreign ego offer give rise to this question. >Intersubjectivity/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI, S34; S. 265f. 2. Husserliana VI, S. 116. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Master-Slave Dialectic | Hegel | Höffe I 329 Governance/Slavery/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: preliminary considerations: In competition with his peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel expands the often merely social, legal, or state theoretical debate on three further topics: a) the confrontation of humans with themselves, b) the confrontation with nature and c) the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. HegelVsHobbes: Hegel overcomes the reduction of the human driving forces to three conflict-causing passions and the resulting war of all against all. Th. Hobbes. Hegel neither denies the competition nor its possibly deadly violent character, nor does he deny that there are fortunately Höffe I 330 opposing forces, three passions of peace and the reason serving them. But in fighting off the violent competition (...) he discovers a far more fundamental task and ultimate achievement: people are not initially finished subjects, but must develop the necessary self-concsiousness in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and the - economic with nature. Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, leads to a "fight to the death". Struggle: Whoever now clings to survival within the framework of this struggle, and consequently shuns death, submits to the one who dares to live. He becomes a servant, the other a master. Reason/Master: Here, according to Hegel, the master represents the level of consciousness of the mind. Sensuality/Slave: the slave, because he considers physical survival to be the most important thing, the level of sensuality. Dialectic: But since the slave, forced by the master to work, in this very work, instead of directly enjoying nature, he is inhibited in his own lust. The master, on the other hand, who lets the other work, finds himself in the role of the merely enjoying, consuming individual. The slave, precisely because he must inhibit his desire, frees himself from the merely naturally existing. Thus the initial order of precedence is reversed: The servant proves himself superior to the master, whereby he rises to the actual master, while the previously superior, the master, stands there as a slave. Self-consciousness: The core of this struggle for recognition consists in a "self-knowledge in the other". a) personal: One recognizes oneself first and only in a second person. b) apersonal: Self-knowledge does not come about through social recognition alone. It also requires an examination of the pre- and extra-personal world through work, i.e. economic action.(1) >Dialectic/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >Progress/Hegel, >Self-Consciousness. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Mechanism Design | Economic Theories | Parisi I 490 Mecanism design/economic theories/Güth: (…) there is a long tradition of using auctions (see Milgrom, 1989)(1), partly very delicate applications like auctions to “trade” slaves. For the German-speaking areas, (…) Gandenberger (1961)(2) who documents an impressive constancy in relying on the lowest bid price procurement auction. Whether as procurement auctions by which a buyer wants to contract with one of the potential suppliers or as sales auctions where a seller wants to find a buyer, the literature now offers a lot of auction theory (Wilson, 1985)(3), auction experiments (e.g. Kagel, 2016)(4), and related field studies (Milgrom, 1989(1)). The voluntary supply of public projects, most typically in the form of pure public goods (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995) or common pool resources (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992)(5), also has a long tradition of applications. Rather than as a problem of mechanism design, it is usually studied by social dilemma games where community members nevertheless manage to cooperate to some extent, for example, due to repeated interaction, or some other aspects of their social life like monitoring and punishing (those who “free-ride”). Especially, the group in Bloomington has done an immense amount of field research and has also run experiments to study voluntary provision of public projects (see Ostrom, 2015)(6). Mechanism design, however, has a more recent, already very successful history (the Nobel laureates in 2007, L. Hurwicz, E. S. Mascin, and R. B. Myerson, were awarded for their achievements in the theory Parisi I 491 of mechanism design). Hurwicz (1960(7), 1973(8)) introduced the notion of incentive compatible mechanisms which in the form of dominance solvability were applied by Groves and Ledyard (1977)(9) to voluntary public good provision. The Revelation Principle had been propagated by Myerson (1979,(10) 1981(11), 1982(12)); Baron and Myerson (1982)(13); Maskin (1999)(14); Dasgupta, Hammond, and Mascin (1979)(15); Meyerson and Sattertwaithe (1983)(16); and Wilson (1985)(3), where we exclude the exercises for “large economies” (e.g. Bierbrauer and Hellwig, 2011)(17). The Revelation Principle is now a standard tool of mechanism design theory (see the more recent contributions like Bergemann and Morris, 2005(18) and Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001(19)). >Decision-making processes, >Auctions, >Cooperation. 1. Milgrom, P. (1989). “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3): 3–22. 2. Gandenberger, O. (1961). Die Ausschreibung. Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer. 3. Wilson, R. (1985). “Incentive efficiency of double auctions.” Econometrica 53(5): 1101–1115. 4. Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E. (2016). The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 5. Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner (1992). “Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible.” American Political Science Review 86(2): 404–417. 6. Ostrom, E. (2015). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Hurwicz, L. (1960). “Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes,” in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences, 27–46. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 8. Hurwicz, L. (1973). “The design of mechanisms for resource allocation.” American Economic Review 63(2): 1–30. 9. Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977). “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem.” Econometrica 45(4): 783–809. 10. Myerson, R. B. (1979). “Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.” Econometrica 47(1): 61–73. 11. Myerson, R. B. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1): 58–73. 12. Myerson, R. B. (1982). “Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1): 67–81. 13. Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson (1982). “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 4: 911–930. 14. Maskin, E. S. (1999). “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.” Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 23–38. 15. Dasgupta, P. S., P. J. Hammond, and E. S. Mascin (1979). “The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility.” Review of Economic Studies 46: 185–216. 16. Myerson, R. B. and M. A. Satterthwaite (1983). “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.” Journal of Economic Theory 29(2): 265–281. 17. Bierbrauer, F. and M. Hellwig (2011). Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2011/31. 18. Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005). “Robust mechanism design.” Econometrica 73(6): 1771–1813. 19. Jehiel, P. and B. Moldovanu (2001). “Efficient design with interdependent valuations.” Econometrica 69(5): 1237–1259. Werner Güth. “Mechanism design and the law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Method | Aronson | Haslam I 254 Method/stereotype threat/Aronson, Joshua/Steele: (…) research on stereotype threat, beginning with the original paper by Steele and Aronson (1995)(7), has not been without critique. One aspect of that critique relates to how the original research has been described in media outlets, textbooks, and by scientists directly. stereotype threat. In their studies, Steele and Aronson covaried out participants’ prior performance on high-stakes standardized tests as assessed with their self-reported SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) scores. This covariate analysis increases the power to detect the effect of a manipulation in the context of individual variation. However, critics have argued that this statistical caveat is too often lost in the retelling of the findings, leading people to report that the threat-free environment eliminates the racial gap in test performance (Sackett et al., 2004(1); Wicherts, 2005(2)). >Covariance, >Invariants. 1. VsAronson, Joshua/VsSteele: The problem with this conclusion is that by controlling for SAT, the authors have removed a portion of group performance differences and we simply do not know if stereotype threat or other factors led to this gap in the first place. A similar critique was lodged against Spencer et al.’s (1999)(3) research demonstrating stereotype threat impairments on highly identified women’s math performance (Stoet and Geary, 2012)(4). 2. VsAronson/VsSteele: Through the current lens of replicability, readers are increasingly skeptical of findings based on small sample sizes and effects that might seem to rely on the use of covariate analysis (Fraley and Vazire, 2014(5); Simonsohn et al., 2014(6)). 1. Sackett, P.R., Hardison, C.M. and Cullen, M.J. (2004) 10n interpreting stereotype threat as accounting for African American—White differences on cognitive tests’, American Psychologist, 59: 7—13. 2. Wicherts, J.M. (2005) 1Stereotype threat research and the assumptions underlying analysis of covariance, American Psychologist, 60 (3): 267—69. 3. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 4. Stoet, G. and Geary, D.C. (2012) ‘Can stereotype threat explain the gender gap in mathematics performance and achievement?’, Review of General Psychology, 16:93—102. 5. Fraley, R.C. and Vazire, S. (2014) The N-pact factor: Evaluating the quality of empirical journals with respect to sample size and statistical power’, PLoS ONE, 9: e109019. 6. Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L.D. and Simmons, J.P. (2014) 4p-Curve and effect size correcting for publication bias using only significant results’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9 (6): 666—8 1. 7. Steele, C.M. and Aronson, J. (1995) ‘Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African-Americans’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 797—811. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Method | Campbell | Corr I 15 Method/Psychology/Measurements/Campbell/Fiske: observation. Since constructs themselves are not directly observable, they must be translated into a form that can be observed, in order for empirical testing to be possible. >Conflicts, >Observation, >Unobservables, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Theories. Corr I 16 Strong evidence for a construct exists if these various measures of a particular trait correlate highly with one another. Lower correlations are expected with other traits, even if they are both measured in the same way (e.g., self-esteem and achievement motivation both measured by self-report should not be highly correlated). These considerations inspired advances in personality assessment by using what is called a ‘multi-trait, multi-method matrix’ (Campbell and Fiske 1959)(1) to demonstrate that abstract theoretical constructs, not measurement techniques, explain high correlations among observations. >Measurement, >Covariance, >Invariance, >Dimensional approach, >Personality, >Personality traits. 1. Campbell, D. and Fiske, D. 1959. Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix, Psychological Bulletin 56: 81–105 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Camp I D. T. Campbell Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research Boston 1966 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Method | Forbes | Haslam I 253 Method/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The contextualized frame that stereotype threat gives to performance gaps allows researchers to create ‘identity safe’ environments that avoid cuing stereotype threat. In the original laboratory studies, this was done by framing the task in a non-diagnostic way. Later studies created identity safety by directly communicating an expectation that groups would perform equally well (Good et aL, 2008(1); Spencer et al., 1999(2)) or by retraining implicit stereotypes (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(3)). Because these methods of creating identity-safe environments are not always practical to implement in field settings, researchers have sought to test other interventions to reduce naturalistic experiences of stereotype threat. >Stereotype threat, >Performance. Performance: (…)moving demographic questions to the end of an Advanced Placement exam boosted women’s performance on a calculus test, though the size and significance of these effects has been debated (i.e., the manipulation did not improve performance for minorities; Danaher and Crandall, 2008(4); Stricker and Ward, 2004(5)). Positive role models are also effective in both the lab and the field in combatting stereotype threat, changing implicit stereotypes, and increasing students’ self-efficacy (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004(6); Marx and Goff, 2005(6); McIntyre et al., 2003(7), 2005(8)). Coping strategies: in both the lab and the field, prompting students to affirm important values improves stigmatized students’ performance by mitigating stereotype threat (Martens et al., 2006)(9). In a remarkable field study at an elite university, minority students who completed brief self-affirmation exercises in their first semester in school showed improved grades up to two years later compared with those in a no-affirmation control condition (Cohen et al., 2006(10); Cohen et al., 2009(11); see also Miyake et al., 2010(12), and Sherman et aL, 2013(13), for similar studies with women in physics and middle-school students, respectively). >Problem solving, >Information processing. 1. Good, C., Aronson, J. and Harder, J.A. (2008) Problems in the pipeline: Stereotype threat and women’s achievement in high-level math courses’, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 29 (1): 17—28. 2. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 3. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 4. Danaher, K. and Crandall, C.S. (2008) ‘Stereotype threat in applied settings re-examined’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38: 1639—55. 5. Stricker, L.J. and Ward, W.C. (2004) ‘Stereotype threat, inquiring about test takers’ ethnicity and gender, and standardized test performance’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34:665—93. 6 .Marx, D.M. and Goff, P.A. (2005) Clearing the air: The effect of experimenter race on target’s test performance and subjective experience’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44(4): 645—57. 7. McIntyre, R.B., Paulson, R. and Lord, C. (2003) ‘Alleviating women’s mathematics stereo type threat through salience of group achievements’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 8 3—90. 8. McIntyre, R.B., Lord, C.G., Gresky, D.M., Ten Eyck, L.L., Frye, G.D.J. and Bond Jr., C.F. (2005) ‘A social impact trend in the effects of role models on alleviating women’s mathematics stereotype threat’, Current Research in Social Psychology, 10: 116—36. 9. Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J. and Schimel, J. (2006) ‘Combating stereotype threat: The effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 236—43. 10. Cohen, G .L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N. and Master, A. (2006) Reducing the racial achievement gap: A social-psychological intervention’, Science, 313: 1307—10. 11. Cohen, G.L., Garcia, J., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Apfel, N. and Brzustoski, P. (2009) ‘Recursive processes in self-affirmation: Intervening to close the minority achievement gap’, Science, 324:400—3. 12. Miyake,A., Kost-Smith, L.E., Finkeistein, N.D., Pollock, S.J., Cohen, G.L. and Ito, T.A. (2010) ‘Reducing the gender achievement gap in college science: A classroom study of values affirmation’, Science, 330: 1234—7. 13. Sherman, D.K., Hartson, K.A., Binning, K.R., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Garcia, J., Taborsky-Barba, S. ... and Cohen, G.L. (2013) ‘Deflecting the trajectory and changing the narrative: How self-affirmation affects academic performance and motivation under identity threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104: 591—618. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Method | Schmader | Haslam I 253 Method/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The contextualized frame that stereotype threat gives to performance gaps allows researchers to create ‘identity safe’ environments that avoid cuing stereotype threat. In the original laboratory studies, this was done by framing the task in a non-diagnostic way. >Stereotype Threat. Later studies created identity safety by directly communicating an expectation that groups would perform equally well (Good et aL, 2008(1); Spencer et al., 1999(2)) or by retraining implicit stereotypes (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(3)). Because these methods of creating identity-safe environments are not always practical to implement in field settings, researchers have sought to test other interventions to reduce naturalistic experiences of stereotype threat. Performance: (…)moving demographic questions to the end of an Advanced Placement exam boosted women’s performance on a calculus test, though the size and significance of these effects has been debated (i.e., the manipulation did not improve performance for minorities; Danaher and Crandall, 2008(4); Stricker and Ward, 2004(5)). Positive role models are also effective in both the lab and the field in combatting stereotype threat, changing implicit stereotypes, and increasing students’ self-efficacy (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004(6); Marx and Goff, 2005(6); McIntyre et al., 2003(7), 2005(8)). Coping strategies: in both the lab and the field, prompting students to affirm important values improves stigmatized students’ performance by mitigating stereotype threat (Martens et al., 2006)(9). In a remarkable field study at an elite university, minority students who completed brief self-affirmation exercises in their first semester in school showed improved grades up to two years later compared with those in a no-affirmation control condition (Cohen et al., 2006(10); Cohen et al., 2009(11); see also Miyake et al., 2010(12), and Sherman et aL, 2013(13), for similar studies with women in physics and middle-school students, respectively). >Performance. 1. Good, C., Aronson, J. and Harder, J.A. (2008) Problems in the pipeline: Stereotype threat and women’s achievement in high-level math courses’, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 29 (1): 17—28. 2. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 3. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 4. Danaher, K. and Crandall, C.S. (2008) ‘Stereotype threat in applied settings re-examined’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38: 1639—55. 5. Stricker, L.J. and Ward, W.C. (2004) ‘Stereotype threat, inquiring about test takers’ ethnicity and gender, and standardized test performance’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34:665—93. 6 .Marx, D.M. and Goff, P.A. (2005) Clearing the air: The effect of experimenter race on target’s test performance and subjective experience’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44(4): 645—57. 7. McIntyre, R.B., Paulson, R. and Lord, C. (2003) ‘Alleviating women’s mathematics stereo type threat through salience of group achievements’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 8 3—90. 8. McIntyre, R.B., Lord, C.G., Gresky, D.M., Ten Eyck, L.L., Frye, G.D.J. and Bond Jr., C.F. (2005) ‘A social impact trend in the effects of role models on alleviating women’s mathematics stereotype threat’, Current Research in Social Psychology, 10: 116—36. 9. Martens, A., Johns, M., Greenberg, J. and Schimel, J. (2006) ‘Combating stereotype threat: The effect of self-affirmation on women’s intellectual performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 236—43. 10. Cohen, G .L., Garcia, J., Apfel, N. and Master, A. (2006) Reducing the racial achievement gap: A social-psychological intervention’, Science, 313: 1307—10. 11. Cohen, G.L., Garcia, J., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Apfel, N. and Brzustoski, P. (2009) ‘Recursive processes in self-affirmation: Intervening to close the minority achievement gap’, Science, 324:400—3. 12. Miyake,A., Kost-Smith, L.E., Finkeistein, N.D., Pollock, S.J., Cohen, G.L. and Ito, T.A. (2010) ‘Reducing the gender achievement gap in college science: A classroom study of values affirmation’, Science, 330: 1234—7. 13. Sherman, D.K., Hartson, K.A., Binning, K.R., Purdie-Vaughns, V., Garcia, J., Taborsky-Barba, S. ... and Cohen, G.L. (2013) ‘Deflecting the trajectory and changing the narrative: How self-affirmation affects academic performance and motivation under identity threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104: 591—618. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Method | Steele | Haslam I 254 Method/stereotype threat/Aronson, Joshua/Steele: (…) research on stereotype threat, beginning with the original paper by Steele and Aronson (1995), has not been without critique. One aspect of that critique relates to how the original research has been described in media outlets, textbooks, and by scientists directly. In their studies, Steele and Aronson covaried out participants’ prior performance on high-stakes standardized tests as assessed with their self-reported SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) scores. This covariate analysis increases the power to detect the effect of a manipulation in the context of individual variation. However, critics have argued that this statistical caveat is too often lost in the retelling of the findings, leading people to report that the threat-free environment eliminates the racial gap in test performance (Sackett et al., 2004(1); Wicherts, 2005(2)). >Covariance, >Invariants. 1. VsAronson, Joshua/VsSteele: The problem with this conclusion is that by controlling for SAT, the authors have removed a portion of group performance differences and we simply do not know if stereotype threat or other factors led to this gap in the first place. A similar critique was lodged against Spencer et al.’s (1999)(3) research demonstrating stereotype threat impairments on highly identified women’s math performance (Stoet and Geary, 2012)(4). 2. VsAronson/VsSteele: Through the current lens of replicability, readers are increasingly skeptical of findings based on small sample sizes and effects that might seem to rely on the use of covariate analysis (Fraley and Vazire, 2014(5); Simonsohn et al., 2014(6)). 1. Sackett, P.R., Hardison, C.M. and Cullen, M.J. (2004) 10n interpreting stereotype threat as accounting for African American—White differences on cognitive tests’, American Psychologist, 59: 7—13. 2. Wicherts, J.M. (2005) 1Stereotype threat research and the assumptions underlying analysis of covariance, American Psychologist, 60 (3): 267—69. 3. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 4. Stoet, G. and Geary, D.C. (2012) ‘Can stereotype threat explain the gender gap in mathematics performance and achievement?’, Review of General Psychology, 16:93—102. 5. Fraley, R.C. and Vazire, S. (2014) The N-pact factor: Evaluating the quality of empirical journals with respect to sample size and statistical power’, PLoS ONE, 9: e109019. 6. Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L.D. and Simmons, J.P. (2014) 4p-Curve and effect size correcting for publication bias using only significant results’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9 (6): 666—8 1. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Modernism | Touraine | Gaus I 271 Modernism/Touraine/West: Touraine, like Habermas, emphasizes the reflexive, self-critical potential of modernity. Although human beings have always made history, they have previously done so only unconsciously. This is because in premodern societies, society's 'self-production' was restricted and obscured by 'meta-social guarantees' - metaphysical and religious systems that represented certain values as absolute limits on social action and development. Society: Modernity has eroded these limits and so enhanced society's 'historicity', which refers to society's 'capacity to produce its own social and cultural field, its own historical environment' (Touraine, 1977(1): 16). For Touraine the ultimate bearer of this potential is social movements: 'Men make their own history: social life is produced by cultural achievement and social conflicts, and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements' (1981(2): l). Technology/Technocracy: But modernity's promise of autonomy and social creativity is, once again, threatened by the increasing pervasiveness of technical knowledge and bureaucratic structures of management within what Touraine calls 'postindustrial' or 'programmed' societies. >Postindustrial Society/Touraine. 1. Touraine, Alain (1977) The Self-Production of Society, trans. D. Coltman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Touraine, Alain (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Moral Philosophy | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 45 Moral Philosophy/Antique Philosophy/Gadamer: The emergence of the concept of taste in the 17th century (...) leads (...) into contexts of moral philosophy that go back to antiquity. It is this humanistic and thus ultimately Greek component that becomes effective within the moral philosophy determined by Christianity. Greek ethics - the ethics of measurements of the Pythagoreans and Plato, the ethics of the Mesotes created by Aristotle - is in a deep and comprehensive sense an ethics of good taste. Gadamer I 46 Such a thesis certainly sounds strange to our ears. Firstly, because the ideal normative element in the concept of taste is usually misunderstood and the relativistic-sceptical reasoning about the differences in taste is in our ears. Ethics/KantVs: Above all, however, we are determined by Kant's moral-philosophical achievement, which has purified ethics of all aesthetic and emotional moments. >Judgement/Kant. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Morals | Freud | Rorty V 62 Freud/Rorty: the greatest achievement of Freud is the pleasing character of the ironic, playful intellectual. --- V 65 Moral/Freud/Rorty: if we take Freud to heart, we need no longer to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of humanity, which is decisive in morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre. >Existentialism, >Human/Aristotle. --- V 66 We can find psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts. >Ethics, >Behavior. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nomos | Aristotle | Gadamer I 435 Nomos/Convention/Aristotle/Gadamer: The agreement on the linguistic use of sounds and signs is only one expression of that fundamental agreement on what is considered good and right. Cf. >Language and Thought/Aristotle. Now, it is true that the Greeks liked to understand what is considered good and right, that is, what they called the nomoi, as the statute and achievement of divine men. Gadamer I 436 But for Aristotle this origin of the Nomos also characterizes more its validity than its actual creation. This is not to say that Aristotle no longer recognizes the religious tradition, but rather that this, like any question of origin, is for him a way to recognize being and being valid. The agreement of which Aristotle speaks with regard to language thus characterizes the mode of being of language and says nothing about its origin. Concepts/Aristotle: This can also be proved by the memory of the epagoge analysis,(1) where Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. We can now see that he is thus taking into account the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. >Concepts/Aristotle. 1. An. Post. B 19. - - - Gaus I 313 Nomos/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle's analysis of nature leads to a complex treatment of the antithesis between physis and nomos. Nomos: Nomos (law) is 'a kind of order' in that it organizes human conduct through its commands and prohibitions (Pol. V 11.4.1326a29—30). The legal is a product of human reason (legislative science) and is thus opposed to the 'natural' in the sense of what has a natural efficient cause (see EN V .7.1134b18-1135a4). But Aristotle implies that law can (and should) be 'natural' in the sense of having a natural final cause, that is, of promoting natural human ends (see Pol. I.2.1253a29-39). It is only in the Rhetoric that Aristotle explicitly discusses natural law (I.10.1368b7-9, 13.1373b2-18, and 15.1375a25-b26). How this discussion relates to his discussion of natural justice in the Ethics and Politics is unclear, and this has generated controversy over whether Aristotle is 'the father of natural law' (for the controversy see: Shellens, 1959(1); Miller, 1991(2); Burns, 1998(3)). >Coercion/Aristotle; cf. >Persuasion/Aristotle, >Nature/Aristotle, >Natural laws/Aristotle, >Natural laws. Pol: Aristotle Politics EN: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. Shellens, M. Salomon (1959) 'Aristotle on natural law'. Natural Law Forum, 4: 72-100. 2. Miller, Fred D. (1991) 'Aristotle on natural law and justice'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Burns, Tony (1998) 'Aristotle and natural law'. History of Political Thought, 19: 142-66. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Order | Locke | Arndt II 198 Name/names/classes/order/Locke: subsumptions under names (general term) are only achievements of our minds - the mind is caused by the similarity to make abstract general ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Mind/Locke, >Similarity/Locke. Habermas IV 316 Order/Locke/LockeVsHobbes/Parsons/Habermas: Locke makes use of practical reason, which prohibits the rational pursuit of one's own interests obeying exclusively imperatives of purpose rationality. >Procedural rationality. Solution/Locke: even the natural state is conceived from the point of view of the intersubjective validity of a natural right to the purpose-rational representation of one's own interests. Rational action/Locke: the right to behave rationally in this sense is thus limited for everyone, since everyone else is entitled to it from the outset.(1) 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 96. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Perfectionism | Rawls | I 325 Perfectionism/Principle of Perfection/Rawls: two variants: a) the principle of a teleological theory that leads a society to build institutions and shape the duties and obligations of individuals in such a way that outstanding achievements in the arts, sciences and culture are achieved. >Teleology. b) (to be found in Aristotle and others) has more ambitious goals: here the principle of perfection is only one of several principles within an intuitionistic theory. >Intuitionism. The demands of perfection can even diminish for example, demands that are made on the maintenance of freedoms, e.g. when it is argued that slavery serves the goal of cultural refinement. On the other hand, it can only be a question of dividing social wealth into different areas, e. g. culture,... I 326 ... then egalitarian ideas become balanced. This less strict certainty allows for a variety of interpretations(1)(2)(3). Terminology/Rawls: we assume, Def Ideality-driven principles/ideal-regarding principles: are those that are not wish-driven(4). In other words, they are not only concerned with the distribution of a society's total wealth among needs that need to be satisfied. Then the principles of justice and perfection belong to the realm of idealistic principles. >Principles/Rawls. I 327 Contract doctrine/Rawls: holds onto an intermediate position between utilitarianism and perfectionism by not pretending to be a standard ideal of human excellence. >Utilitarianism. Perfectionism: if he wants to have a criterion of perfection, he must try to rank achievements and try to sum up their values. Problem/RawlsVsPerfectionism: in the initial situation of a society to be built, we assume that people initially have no mutual interest in each other; however, they know that they have certain moral and religious interests and also other cultural ideas that should not be put at risk. They can also have conflicting attitudes towards the aspirant. ((s) They just do not know what position they will take later in this society.) Problem: Assuming standards of perfection could lead to having to give up other freedoms, e. g. regarding religion. >Veil of ignorance, >Society/Rawls. I 328 The case here is completely different from the question of the principles according to which primary public goods (freedoms, infrastructure, etc.) are to be distributed! The latter are goods that everyone will strive for, regardless of their position. >Public Good/Rawls. In other words, striving for these goods makes no distinction between people. Criteria/perfection/Rawls: the criteria of excellence have not seen a rational basis from the point of view of daily life. On the other hand, within the arts and sciences there are standards for assessing achievements. Comparability: intrinsic values can obviously be compared. Value judgments have an important place in human life. They do not have to be vague. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Justice/value judgments/art/science/Rawls: the argument against perfectionism is rather that because of the different goals of the aspirations, the participants in the initial position of a society to be established have no reason to adopt the principle of perfection ((s) instead of the principles of justice). >Justice/Rawls. 1. See B. de Jouvenal, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge, 1951), S.53-56, 62-65. 2. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (London, 1907), vol. I, pp. 235-243. 3. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, ch. VI. 4. See Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London, 1965) pp. 39f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Personality | Resource Theory | Corr I 406 Personality/Resource theory/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Resource theory was applied to personality research initially to explain detrimental effects of trait anxiety. Early research (e.g., Spielberger 1966)(1) established that state anxiety disrupted information-processing on demanding tasks, but theory was vague about the nature of the interference. The greater sensitivity of performance to worry, rather than anxious emotion and autonomic arousal (Zeidner 1998)(2), encouraged a cognitive rather than an arousal theory perspective. Irwin Sarason’s (e.g., Sarason, Sarason and Pierce 1995)(3) influential theory of test anxiety suggested that the effects of worry are mediated by diversion of resources onto ‘off-task’ processing of personal concerns. >Attention, >Resources, >Performance. 1. Spielberger, C. D. 1966. The effects of anxiety on complex learning and academic achievement, in C. D. Spielberger (ed.), Anxiety and behaviour, pp. 3–20. London: Academic Press 2. Zeidner, M. 1998. Test anxiety: the state of the art. New York: Plenum 3. Sarason, I. G., Sarason, B. R. and Pierce, G. R. 1995. Cognitive interference: at the intelligence-personality crossroads, in D. H. Saklofske and M. Zeidner (eds.), International handbook of personality and intelligence, pp. 285–319. New York: Plenum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Personality Traits | Psychological Theories | Corr I 11 Personality traits/psychological theories: Gordon Allport (1937)(1) argued that traits are a central concept in personality, building on European research and theory (Matthews and Deary 1998)(2). Researchers have measured a variety of specific traits, such as field dependence, sensation-seeking and achievement motivation, predicting specific behaviours from domain-specific personality tests. The trait concept suffered a setback when Walter Mischel (1968)(3) pointed out that situations were more influential than traits in predicting behaviour. This situational challenge to the trait paradigm came with the rise of social psychology and decline of personality psychology, as sub-fields in psychology. >Situations/Mischel, >Situations/Murray, >Motivation, >Personality, >Temperament. Mischel himself later offered a conceptually more sophisticated, interactionist version of trait theory in which the effect of a person’s trait depends upon the situational context of behaviour (Mischel and Shoda 1995)(4). >W. Mischel. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt 2. Matthews, G. and Deary, I. J. 1998. Personality traits. Cambridge University Press 3. Mischel, W. 1968. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley 4. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Picture Theory | Materialism | Adorno XIII 214 Picture theory/materialism/Adorno: the picture theory (originating from >Epicurus) played its great role especially in the history of Marxist materialism. In dialectical materialism (called by Adorno DIAMAT), it is the thesis that the theory is to be an image of reality, quite unconcerned about the fact that the mental, the intentional, is concerned with facts, judges them, but is not similar to them and is not like them or like a picture. It is a great achievement of Husserl to have proved this. >Similarity, >Theories, >World/Thinking, >Reality, >World, >Marxism. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Play | Gadamer | I 107 Play/Aesthetics/Art/Gadamer: [for the context of aesthetics] it is important for us to detach this term from the subjective meaning it had with Kant and Schiller, which dominates the entire newer aesthetics and anthropology. When we speak of play in the context of the experience of art, play does not mean the relationship or even the state of mind of the creator or enjoyer and not at all the freedom of a subjectivity that is active in the game, but the mode of being of the work of art itself. Certainly the behaviour of the player can be distinguished from the game itself, which as such belongs together with other forms of behaviour of subjectivity. Thus, for example, it can be said that for the player the game is not serious and is played precisely for this reason. Seriousness/purpose/game: Playing has its own relation to seriousness. Not only that it has its "purpose" in it. Play/Aristoteles: It happens "for the sake of recreation" as Aristotle says(1). Gadamer: It is more important that playing itself has its own, yes, a sacred seriousness. And yet, in the behavior of play, all references to purpose, which determine the active and caring existence, have not simply disappeared, but come to hover in a peculiar way. The player knows for himself/herself that the game is only a game and stands in a world determined by the seriousness of its purposes. But he/she does not know this in such a way that as a player he/she still meant this reference to seriousness himself/herself. Only then does playing fulfil the purpose that it has, when the I 108 player finds himself/herself completely immersed in playing. Seriousness/purpose/game/Gadamer: Not the reference to seriousness in the game, but only the seriousness in the game lets the game be completely a game. Someone who does not take the game seriously is a spoilsport. The way of being of the game does not allow the player to behave towards the game as towards an object. The player knows what a game is and that what he/she is doing "is only a game", but he/she does not know what he/she "knows". Cf. >Play/Huizinga. Aesthetic Play/Art Experience/Gadamer: We had seen [in connection with the question about the >truth of art] that not the >aesthetic consciousness, but the >experience of art and thus the question about the way the work of art is to be the object of our reflection. But this was precisely the experience of art that we have to hold against the levelling of the aesthetic consciousness, that the work of art is not an object that is opposed to the subject being for itself. Rather, the work of art has its actual being in that it becomes the experience that transforms the experiencer. The "subject" of the experience of art, that which remains and persists, is not the subjectivity of the one who experiences it, but the work of art itself. This is the point where the way of being of the game becomes significant. For the game has a being of its own, independent of the consciousness of those who play. Play is also there, indeed actually there, where no being by itself of subjectivity limits the thematic horizon and where there are no subjects who behave in a playful manner. The subject of the game is not the players, but the game is merely represented by the players. Cf. Buytendijk(2). I 109 The mode of being of the game is (...) not of the kind that there has to be a subject who behaves in a playing manner so that the game is played. [Cf. "Play of Waves," etc.] Rather, the most original sense of games is the medial sense. I 111 Play/Nature/Art/Gadamer: Above all, it is only from this medial sense of play that the reference to the being of the work of art emerges. Nature, as long as it is a constantly renewing game without purpose and intention, without effort, can almost appear as a model of art. Friedrich Schlegel: "All sacred games of art are only distant imitations of the infinite games of the world, the eternally self-forming work of art.«(3) Subjectivity/Freedom/Game/Gadamer: the primacy of the game in front of the players who play it is now, where human subjectivity is involved and behaves playfully, is also experienced by the players themselves in a special way. [The player] is not yet committed to such opportunities as serious goals. He/She still has the freedom to choose one way or another. On the other hand, this freedom is not safe. Rather, the game itself is a risk for the player. You can only play with serious possibilities. I 112 All playing is being played. The attraction of the game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that the game becomes master of the player. I 113 Mission of the game/Purpose: Apparently the peculiar lightness and relief that stands for the playful behaviour is based on the special character of the task, which is due to the game task, and it arises from the success of its solution. One can say: the success of a task "represents it." The game is really limited to representing itself. Its mode of being is therefore self-representation. Sense of the game: Although the self-representation of human play is based, (...) on a behaviour bound to the apparent purposes of the game, its "sense" does not really consist in the achievement of these purposes. Rather, giving oneself over (German: "Sichausgeben") to the task of the game is in reality a playing oneself off I 114 in the play (German: "Sichausspielen"). The self-presentation of the game thus causes the player to achieve his or her own self-presentation, as it were, by playing something, i.e. representing it. Only because playing is always already a representation, the human game can find the task of the game in the representation itself. Cf. >Representation/Art/Gadamer. 1. Aristot. Pol. Vlll 3, 1337 b 39 u. ö. vgl. Eth. Nic. X 6, 1176 b 33. 2. F. J. J. Buytendijk, Wesen und Sinn des Spiels, 1933. 3. Friedrich Schlegel, Gespräch über die Poesie (Friedrich Schlegels Jugendschriften, hrsg. v. J. Minor, 1982, Il, S. 364). IVgl. auch die Neuausgabe von Hans Eichner in der kritischen Schlegel-Ausgabe von E. Behler 1. Abt., 2 Bd., S. 284—351, dort S. 324. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Politics | Schumpeter | Mause I 65 Politics/Schumpeter: Schumpeter's thesis is famous that the citizen "falls to a lower level of mental achievement as soon as he enters the political realm. He argues and analyses in a way that he would readily acknowledge as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He's becoming primitive again." (1) VsSchumpeter: Schumpeter still saw a lack of rationality in the ignorance of the citizens; later theorists have normatively revalued the same facts as rational ignorance. >Rationality, >Bounded rationality. 1. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York 1942. [dt. Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie. Tübingen/ Basel 2005, S. 416. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Power | Parsons | Habermas IV 400 Power/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: within Parsons system theory, power is understood as a communication medium (the other three communication media in Parsons are money, influence and value retention). >Money/Parsons, Communication Media/Parsons. As a control medium, power represents the symbolic embodiment of value without itself having an intrinsic value. Power consists neither in effective performance nor in the use of physical force. Like money, the power medium reflects the structure of claim and redemption. Habermas IV 401 Claims: the nominal claims for readiness to follow up on binding decisions defined by the code can be settled in real values and covered by special reserves. According to Parsons, the "utility value" of the realization of collective goals corresponds to the "exchange value" of power. The disposition via coercive means is used as cover. (1) Code: is structured similarly in the case of power as in the medium of money: rulers and subjects of power belong to the same collective. After all, power interests are defined by mobilising performance potential for the achievement of collectively desired goals. The generalized value here is efficiency (in money it is benefit). The power code schematizes possible expressions as consent to or rejection of imperatives. Habermas IV 402 Value: the amount of value corresponding to the claim to readiness to comply is not as manipulable as the exchange value in the case of money. This is because there is no sign system available in the power medium as in the case of the money medium. Symbols of power such as uniforms, emblems or official seals are not comparable to the system of prices from a syntactic point of view. This leads to the problem of measurability. Power can be sold, but is not circulable like money. However, power can only take the form of a medium because it is not attached to certain rulers or contexts. However, power binds itself more symbiotically to persons and institutions than money does. Habermas IV 403 Power must be demonstrated from time to time, as it is not covered like a deposit in a bank. Overall, power cannot be calculated as well as money. Power/Money/Luhmann: in terms of system characteristics, the two media money and power behave partly in the opposite direction: while financing money, e.g. granting credit, usually increases the inherent complexity of the economic system, the complexity of the system is reduced in the event of an increase in power.(2) Habermas IV 404 Unlike money, power not only needs cover (through coercive means) and legal standardization (in the form of incumbency), but it also needs legitimation. >Legitimation, >Legitimacy 1.T Parsons, Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process, in: T. Parsons, Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967, S. 264ff 2.N. Luhmann, Zur Theorie symbolische generalisierter Kommunikationsmedien, in. ZfS 1974, S 236ff. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Power | Przeworski | Gaus I 163 Power/democracy/Przeworski/Bohman: large advantages in the agency freedom of one group over all others may be due to the possession of vastly greater resources or other forms of social power, the achievement of their goals may not depend upon the consensual resolution of a conflict with groups with less social power. If Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988)(1) are right, for example, powerful economic groups have historically been able to attain their agency goals not by explicitly excluding topics from democratic discussion but rather by implied threats and other non-deliberative means (Bohman, 1996)(2). We can see the differences between such strategic forms of interaction to the extent that they reflect differences in bargaining power, regardless of the democratic means used to reach this equilibrium. Threats of declining investments block redistributive schemes, such as those that would burden well-off groups with higher tax rates; these credible threats circumvent the need to convince others of the reasons for such policies or to put some issue under democratic control. Bohman: Similar discursive effects occur when institutions operate with implicit discursive frames, as did the Nuclear Regulatory Agency when it considered the 1966 partial meltdown of the Detroit Edison reactor to be a mere 'engineering mishap' (Gamson, 1992)(3). The excessive agency freedom of some and the lack of social power of others means that some dissenting reasons will not become topics to be recognized or respected. However, it is possible to shift the frame. Discourse/democratic practice/Bohman: However, it is possible to shift the framework of justification (...) where the meanings of policies are changed and new agendas formed. In these cases, strategic actions by social movements are used to open up communication where it is blocked, to move discourse and deliberation beyond a bargaining equilibrium asymmetrical negotiating power. >Discourse, >Discourse theory. 1. Przeworski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein (1988) 'The structural dependence of the state on capital'. American Political Science Review, 82: 11-29. 2. Bohman, James (1996) Public Deliberation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Prejudice | Bacon | Gadamer I 355 Prejudices/Bacon/Gadamer: This is precisely where [Bacon] is interesting for us, because here, albeit critically and with the intention of exclusion, moments in the life of experience come up which are not teleologically related to the goal of science. For example, when Bacon, among the idola tribus, speaks of the tendency of the human mind to always remember only the positive and to forget the instantiae negativae. The belief in the oracle, for example, feeds on this human forgetfulness, which retains the true prophecies and ignores the untrue ones. Language/Bacon: Likewise, the relationship of the human mind to the conventions of language is in Bacon's eyes a form of disorientation of knowledge through empty conventional forms. It belongs under the Idola fori. GadamerVsBacon: (...) already these two examples can show that the teleological aspect, which dominates the question in Bacon, is not the only possible one. Whether the primacy of the positive in memory is valid in every consideration, whether life's tendency to forget the negative is to be treated critically in every consideration, is still to be asked. Hope/GadamerVsBacon: Since Aeschylus' Prometheus the essence of hope is such a clear distinction of human experience that, in view of its anthropological significance, the principle of letting the teleological standard of cognitive achievement apply alone must be regarded as one-sided. Language/GadamerVsBacon: Something similar will suggest itself to us in relation to the meaning of the language that guides all experience in advance. As certainly as verbalistic illusory problems can arise from the dominance of linguistic conventions, language is at the same time a positive condition and management of the experience itself. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Progress | Adorno | I Grenz 110 Progress/Time nucleus/Difference/History/Adorno/Grenz: the dynamics of progress in the techniques of reigning nature is preserved in every product of human labor. This is the concrete historical character of the self-realization of mankind: the time nucleus in the being. >History/Adorno, >Historiography, >Time. Through it, the category of possibility also gains its own. Its truth or its character as a criterion is their difference from itself: it as non-appearing. >Dialectic/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno, >Criteria. Grenz I 111 Nothing/Adorno/Grenz: But the certain nothing that it brings forth is not something. It is of a different quality than what it analyzes. >Nothingness. I Grenz 165 Progress/Adorno/Grenz: all the achievements of humans (...) are nothing in the sense of an emphatic concept of anthropogenesis, because, as Adorno argues, from the barbaric processes in the concentration camps, under the prerequisite of the theory of the retroactive force of history and knowledge - they have not appeared. I Grenz 77 Novelty/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno sees the new as a synthesis from the existing and its negativity. >Negation/Adorno. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Property | Rousseau | Höffe I 272 Property/Rousseau/Höffe: Instead of helping people to significant achievements, a “being-with-oneself”, the two interwoven basic evils of private property and the state create a threefold inequality among people and, as a result, a threefold alienation (aliénation)(1): If property - someone fences in a piece of land and declares it his own - surrounds itself with law and justice, it creates rich and poor, if an authority is added, additionally rulers and ruled, and in case of arbitrariness and tyranny, masters and slaves as well. >Civilization/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 État civil: With the conclusion of the social contract, people leave the state of nature and enter into the (civic) civil state (état civil). On the debit side [thereby] is the loss of natural freedom with Höffe I 276 its unlimited right to everything to which the request is directed. In return, for the loss of independence, everyone receives the freedom of a citizen with the ownership of all that one owns. According to the Partnership Contract(2), legitimate property begins historically and de facto with the possession of a piece of land, that is, with the erection of fences, as rejected by the Second Treatise(1). Conditions: Like Locke, Rousseau ties legitimate property to three conditions: 1) The corresponding area must not already be inhabited, which tacitly makes European colonialism appear illegitimate (RousseauVsColonialism); 2) One may not take possession of more than is necessary for subsistence, which is contrary to large scale properties (RousseauVsColonialism) 3) Where legal titles are lacking, "empty ceremony" is not enough, but "work and cultivation" is needed. >Property/Locke, >Colonialism. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique, 1762, I, 8. Mause I 47 Property/Rousseau: According to Rousseau, the extensive homogeneity of property relations belongs to the social functional conditions of a good, republican order. The guarantee of property, which is constitutive for the existence of a republican community, is in tension with its sovereign self-determination, since not only a policy aimed at equality of property, but taxes already levied by the state "directly attack property rights and thus the true basis of political society".(1) For taxes today see: >Tax avoidence, >Tax competition, >Tax compliance, >Tax evasion, >Tax havens, >Tax incidence, >Tax loopholes, >Tax system, >Taxation. 1. J.-J. Rousseau, Abhandlung über die Politische Ökonomie. In Politische Schriften, Hrsg. Ludwig Schmidts, Bd. 1, Paderborn 1977, S. 56. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Psychological Needs | Psychological Theories | Corr I 441 Psychological needs/psychological universals/psychological theories/Deci/Ryan: Psychologists have long agreed that human beings have basic physiological needs such as hunger, thirst and sex. These needs have played a role in general theories of behaviour (e.g., Hull 1943)(1) as well as in more specific theories related to behavioural domains more directly linked to the needs. There has been far less agreement, however, about whether people also have basic psychological needs – that is, needs of the psyche that are essential for psychological wellbeing and thriving. VsPsychological needs/VsPsychological Universals: Most motivational psychologists do not acknowledge psychological needs as a fundamental aspect of human motivation, instead arguing that the cognitive concept of goals is more useful in explaining motivated behavior. >Psychological Universals. VsUniversals: those who do use the concept of psychological needs have tended to treat them as individual differences in the degree to which people desire such things as achievement (e.g., McClellan 1985)(2) or cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982)(3). Pro psychological needs/pro psychological universals: White (1959)(4) argued for the concept of effectance as a basic need; De Charms (1968)(5) proposed that the experience of personal causation is a psychological need; Baumeister and Leary (1995)(6) suggested that belongingness is a need fundamental to all humans. Deci and Ryan (1985(7), 2000)(8): have postulated that human beings have three basic and universal psychological needs: the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. >Competence, >Autonomy, >Socialization. 1. Hull, C. L. 1943. Principles of behaviour: an Introduction to behaviour theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 2. McClelland, D. C. 1985. Human motivation. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman 3. Cacioppo, J. R. and Petty, R. E. 1982. The need for cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42: 116–31 Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. 4. White, R. W. 1959. Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence, Psychological Review 66: 297–333 5. De Charms, R. 1968. Personal causation: the internal affective determinants of behaviour. New York: Academic Press 6. Baumeister, R. and Leary, M. R. 1995. The Need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation, Psychological Bulletin 117: 497–529 7. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum 8. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychological Resilience | Developmental Psychology | Slater I 208 Resilience/causes/protection/risks/developmental psychology: the idea of progressive and spreading effects of problems, including negative chain reactions, has been quite influential (see Masten, Burt, & Coatsworth, 2006(1); Masten et al., 2005(2); Patterson, Reid & Dishion, 1992(3); Rutter, Kim-Cohen, & Maughan, 2006(4)). In 2010, two special issues of the journal Development and Psychopathology were published on the broad theme of developmental cascades, which encompasses both negative and positive chain reactions overtime, as well as the developmental impact of the many interactions across system levels that shape individual development (Masten & Cicchetti, 2010 a(5), 2010b(6)). >Resilience/psychological theories, >Resilience/Rutter. The long-term return on investments in early child development, for example through quality preschool experiences, can be viewed as initiating a positive cascade by promoting competence, which in turn begets future competence (Heckman, 2006)(7). Similarly, effects from interventions that grow over time or affect domains not originally targeted (see Patterson, Forgatch, & DeGarmo, 2010(8)) can be viewed as cascade effects. Slater I 209 The transition to adulthood, (…) has been viewed as a normative opportunity window when brain development and concomitant capacities for planning and self-redirection, motivation to move out into the world, and the opening of opportunities afforded by societies (e.g., military service, college, apprenticeships, or mentoring) converge in many contemporary societies (Masten, Obradovic, & Burt, 2006)(9). It is probably not a coincidence that longitudinal studies of resilience spanning this window have noted positive turning points when young people who got off-track in adolescence stage a recovery or move down a positive new track (Clausen, 1991(10); Elder, 1974/1999(11); Hauser, Allen, & Golden, 2006(12); Masten et al., 2004(13); Werner & Smith, 1992(14), 2001(15); Rutter & Quinton, 1984 (16)). 1. Masten, A. S., Burt, K. B., & Coatsworth, J. D. (2006). Competence and psychopathology in development. In D. Ciccheti & D. Cohen (Eds), Developmental psychopathology. Vol 3: Risk, disorder and psychopathology (2nd edn, 696—738). New York: Wiley. 2. Masten, A. S., Roisman, G. I., Long, J. D., Burt, K. B., Obradovic, J., Riley, J. R., Boelcke-Stennes, K., & Tellegen, A. (2005). Developmental cascades: Linking academic achievement, externalizing and internalizing symptoms over 20 years. Developmental Psychology, 41, 73 3—746. 3. Patterson, G. R, Reid, J. B., & Dishion, T. J. (1992). Antisocial boys. Eugene, OR: Castalla. 4. Rutter, M., Kim-Cohen, J., & Maughan, B. (2006). Continuities and discontinuities in psychopathology between childhood and adult life.Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47, 276—295. 5. Masten, A. S., & Cicchetti, D. (Eds) (201 Oa). Developmental cascades (special issue, part i), Development and Psychopathology, 22,491—715. 6. Masten, A. S., & Cicchetti, D. (Eds) (201 Ob). Developmental cascades (special issue, part 2), Development and Psychopathology, 22, 717—983. 7. Heckman, J. J. (2006). Skill formation and the economics of investing in disadvantaged children. Science, 312, 1900—1902. 8. Patterson, G. R., Forgatch, M. S., & DeGarmo, D. S. (2010). Cascading effects following intervention. Developmental Psychopathology, 22,941—970. 9. Masten, A. S., Obradovic, J., & Burt, K. (2006). Resilience in emerging adulthood: Developmental perspectives on continuity and transformation. In J. J. Arnett & J. L. Tanner (Ed.), Emerging adults in America: Coming of age in the 21St century (pp. 173—190). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press. 10. Clausen, J. S. (1991). Adolescent competence and the shaping of the life course. Amen can Journal of Sociology, 96, 805—842. 11. Elder, G. H.,Jr. (1974/1999). Children of the great depression: Social change in life experience. Boulder, CO: Westview Press (originally published in Chicago by the University of Chicago Press). 12. Hauser, S. T., Alien, J. P., & Golden, E. (2006). Out of the woods: Tales of resilient teens. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 13. Masten, A. S., Burt, K., Roisman, G. I., Obradovic, J., Long, J. D., & Tellegen, A. (2004). Resources and resilience in the transition to adulthood: Continuity and change. Development and Psychopathology, 16, 1071—1094. 14. Werner, E. E., & Smith, R. S. (1992). Overcoming the odds: High risk children from birth to adulthood. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 15. Werner, E. E., & Smith, R. S.(2001).Journeys from childhood to mid-life: Risk, resilience, and recovery. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 16. Rutter, M., & Quinton, D. (1984). Long-term follow-up of women institutionalized in childhood: Factors promoting good functioning in adult life. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2, 191—204. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Psychological Universals | Psychological Theories | Corr I 441 Psychological needs/psychological universals/psychological theories/Deci/Ryan: Psychologists have long agreed that human beings have basic physiological needs such as hunger, thirst and sex. These needs have played a role in general theories of behaviour (e.g., Hull 1943)(1) as well as in more specific theories related to behavioural domains more directly linked to the needs. There has been far less agreement, however, about whether people also have basic psychological needs – that is, needs of the psyche that are essential for psychological wellbeing and thriving. VsPsychological needs/VsPsychological Universals: Most motivational psychologists do not acknowledge psychological needs as a fundamental aspect of human motivation, instead arguing that the cognitive concept of goals is more useful in explaining motivated behavior. VsUniversals: those who do use the concept of psychological needs have tended to treat them as individual differences in the degree to which people desire such things as achievement (e.g., McClellan 1985)(2) or cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982)(3). Pro psychological needs/pro psychological universals: White (1959)(4) argued for the concept of effectance as a basic need; De Charms (1968)(5) proposed that the experience of personal causation is a psychological need; Baumeister and Leary (1995)(6) suggested that belongingness is a need fundamental to all humans. Deci and Ryan (1985(7), 2000)(8): have postulated that human beings have three basic and universal psychological needs: the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. >Competence, >Autonomy, >Socialization. 1. Hull, C. L. 1943. Principles of behaviour: an Introduction to behaviour theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 2. McClelland, D. C. 1985. Human motivation. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman 3. Cacioppo, J. R. and Petty, R. E. 1982. The need for cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42: 116–31 Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. 4. White, R. W. 1959. Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence, Psychological Review 66: 297–333 5. De Charms, R. 1968. Personal causation: the internal affective determinants of behaviour. New York: Academic Press 6. Baumeister, R. and Leary, M. R. 1995. The Need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation, Psychological Bulletin 117: 497–529 7. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behaviour. New York: Plenum 8. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychology | James | Diaz-Bone I 29 JamesVsPhysiological Psychology (Lotze). I 44 Psychology/James: "Provisional Knowledge". I 50f Psychology/James: James gains from the metaphysical re-interpretation of the (material) results of psychology findings on the constitution of the universe. Chalmers I 13 Psychology/William James/Wilhelm Wundt/Chalmers: Wilhelm Wundt and William James had in a Cartesian way developed psychological theories using introspection to explain behaviour, making phenomenology the arbiter of psychology. They thereby denied psychology as an autonomous domain. Corr I 8 Psychology/William James: Throughout the history of psychology, observers have noted a dichotomy between those who emphasize rigorous scientific methods, on the one hand, and those who are more open to subjective experience and a holistic study of the person: what William James (1902(1)) called the ‘tough-minded’ and the ‘tender-minded’. 1984). It reflects a broader intellectual rift between science and humanism, impacting both the content and methods of personality theory and research. As James indicated, the two poles arguably reflect the personalities of those on each side of the dichotomy (Conway 1992(2); Feist 2006)(3). Cloninger: A. The ‘tough-minded’ pole, well represented in experimental laboratories modelled after that of Wilhelm Wundt, found its influence in personality through behaviourism, with the work of John B. Watson and, later, B. F. Skinner. B. The other pole, the tender-minded or humanistic, persisted as well. For example, during the 1950s, Gardner Murphy took a more integrative stance, and a humanistic psychology movement grew, marking its entry by the establishment of the Association for Humanistic Psychology in 1962, with Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers and Rollo May among the founding members. 1. James, W. 1902. The varieties of religious experience; a study in human nature; being the Gifford lectures on natural religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902. New York: Modern Library 2. Conway, J. 1992. A world of differences among psychologists, Canadian Psychology 33: 1–24 3.Feist, G. J. 2006. How development and personality influence scientific thought, interest, and achievement, Review of General Psychology 10: 163–82 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychology | Nietzsche | Ries II 79 Psychology/Resentment/On the Genealogy of Morality/Nietzsche: Basic concept of the Psychology of Christianity. Explains how the hierarchy of power given by nature could turn into the rule of the powerless. 1. F. Nietzsche Genealogie der Moral, VI. 2. --- Danto III 130 Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche considered himself a born psychologist. DantoVsNietzsche: in his thinking was a whole lot of circular arguments. Our psychological theories are part of our perspective, but our perspective must be explained by psychic phenomena that are part of it. Our moral attitudes are jointly responsible for our (...) perspectives. Psychology, however, is invoked to explain why we take our moral perspectives, and especially why exactly them. >Perspective/Nietzsche, >Morality/Nietzsche. Danto III 132 Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: If there is nothing material, then there is nothing immaterial.(1) Danto: one could say that there is no substance that would be the task of psychology to explore. Moral/Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche fought on two fronts at the same time: On the one hand, he hoped to attack morality by exposing the psychology that was attached to it as illogical, on the other hand, he wanted to attack this psychology by attacking the morality assumed by it. Philosophy/Nietzsche: The attack on the soul or the self - in which he claimed to find the essence of modern philosophy - was at the same time an assassination attempt on the basic premise of Christian doctrine.(2) Danto III 134 I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the "I" as being, in the "I" as substance and projects the belief in the ego-substance on all things - it only creates the term 'thing' through this ... Being is thought into everything as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'...(3) >Subject/Nietzsche, >Person/Nietzsche, >I/Nietzsche. Danto III 200 Psychology/Nietzsche/Danto: two terms play a prominent role in Nietzsche's psychology: resentment and bad conscience. Resentment/slave morality: the slave fears not only the malice of the master and plays it up: he resents (resentment) the strength of the master as well as his own relative powerlessness. Danto III 201 He cannot act out his hostility on the paths open to the aristocrats. Slave's strategy: to get the master to accept the slave's list of values and to judge himself from the slave's perspective. Finally, the master will be evil in his own eyes. >revaluation of all values, >Master/Slave. Danto III 208 Gentlemen/Slaves/Nietzsche: it would be a mistake to ask the beast to suppress its animal instincts. Similarly, people have no choice but to be different from what they are. Nietzsche: Demanding from strength that it does not express itself as strength (...) is just as absurd as demanding from weakness that it expresses itself as strength.(4) Strengths/Nietzsche: the strong are simply actions of strength, not individuals who act in a strong way at their discretion. Just as lightning is not an entity that does something, but the light itself. The strong being is not free to show his strength or not to show it.(5) >Individual/Nietzsche, >Superhuman/Nietzsche. Danto III 209 Humility: is not an achievement of the weak but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in politics: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake. >Justice/Thrasymchus. DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both have stumbled upon the grammar: they have elevated a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality. NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 537. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 p. 33. 3. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 p. 71. 4. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 293. 5. Ibid. p. 294. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Public Opinion | Luhmann | Habermas IV 508 Public opinion/Luhmann/Habermas: The two simultaneously existing imperatives of trust of private investors and the trust of the masses in the political system clash above all in the political public sphere. Luhmann: The "public opinion" that is articulated in the political public sphere means something different from the perspective of the lifeworld than from the system perspective of the state apparatus.(1) Habermas IV 509 Habermas: On the one hand, the demoscopically recorded public opinion or the will of voters, parties and associations is regarded as a pluralistic expression of a general interest, whereby the social consensus is regarded as the first link in the chain of political will formation and as the basis of legitimation. On the other hand, the same consensus is seen as the result of legitimation procurement - it is seen as the last link in the chain of production of mass loyalty with which the political system equips itself to make itself independent of lifeworld restrictions. These two lines of interpretation are wrongly compared as normative and empirical approaches; in fact, however, both views cover only one aspect of mass democracy. The decision-making process created through party competition is the result of both: the pressure of communicative value and norm-building processes on the one hand, and the push of organisational achievements of the political system on the other. 1.N.Luhmann, Öffentliche Meinung, in: ders. Politische Planung, Opladen 1971, S. 9ff. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Public Sphere | Ortega y Gasset | Brocker I 195 Public Sphere/Ortega y Gasset: respective dimensions of public life concern all collective customs (the so-called "usos", which are so fundamental for Ortega's concept of culture!) of social being. The process of "Making Mass" (See Mass/Ortega) brings about an astonishing increase in the quality of life, which has led to the fact that life options and possibilities for action, which in earlier times were reserved exclusively for a few people, are now open to many (if not all people). There is talk of a "general rise in the historical water level" (1) and a "rise in the entire historical level" (2), which is a "time of Brocker I 196 compensation" (3), through which the assets allegedly balance each other out. Brocker I 199 Mass Human/Ortega: the mass human knows no connection to rules of politeness or truthfulness. Respect, regard or even admiration for the excellent actions and achievements of certain people are completely foreign to him. According to Ortega, the actions of the modern state promote Brocker I 200 such a standard-free mass behaviour. The security machinery of the state abolishes all spontaneity and creativity in social action. It bureaucratizes all social spheres and reservations. A society that had created the state as a tool to live better must see how the state takes itself above it and it must begin to live for the state. (4) >Norms, >State, >Society. 1. José Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelión de las Masas (con un prólogo para franceses, un epílogo para ingleses y un apéndice: Dinámica del tiempo), Madrid 1937 (zuerst 1929). Dt.: José Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen, Reinbek 1956, p. 17 2. Ibid. p 19 3. Ibid. p. 18. 4. Cf. Ibid. p. 140 Thomas Gil, „Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen (1929)“ In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Racism | Jensen | Slater I 121 Racism/Intelligence/IQ tests/Jensen: (Jensen 1969)(1) Jensen wrote about the evils and injustices of racial prejudice, and stated very clearly that, “No one questions the role of environmental factors, including differences from past history, in determining at least some of the variance between racial groups in standard measures of intelligence, school performance, and occupational status” (Jensen, 1969, p. 83). >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Intelligence/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen, >Science/Jensen. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Rational Choice | Forbes | Gaus I 61 Rational choice theory/Forbes: The rapid development of rational choice theory and research has been the most dramatic change in professional political science since the 1950s. Its root problems - the fairness of games of chance, the unpredictability of strategic interaction, the merits of different voting rules, the peculiarity of spatial competition - have more or less lengthy histories. Around 1960 the techniques that mathematicians and economists had developed to deal with these problems crystallized as a distinctive outlook and set of principles. The principles can be summarized in three words - individualism, rationalism, and formalism. Rational choice theorists seek to explain collective outcomes by individual choices, which are generally assumed to derive from fixed preferences that are basically self-regarding. Individual actors are assumed to be rational in the limited sense, roughly, of having clear goals (being able to rank the possible outcomes of their choices coherently) and being willing and able to do whatever is necessary (within given constraints) to satisfy them. (...)it is assumed, any satisfactory explanation of what happens in these confusing situations must have the form of a mathematical model that reveals the implications of instrumental rationality. Gaus I 62 VsRational choice theory: Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, after reviewing rational choice studies of American politics up to the early 1990s, concluded that their achievements were ‘few, far between, and considerably more modest than the combination of mystique and methodological fanfare surrounding the rational choice movement would lead one to expect’ (1994(1): 179). WaltVsRational choice theory: Stephen Walt (1999) offers a similarly harsh assessment of the contributions of game-theoretic models in international relations. Geraldo MunckVsRational choice theory: the ‘value added’ by formalization may be ‘relatively minor’ (2001(3): 191). Rational choce theoryVsVs: One reaction to these and other criticisms has been to retreat from the demanding assumptions about instrumental rationality used in building simple models and to adopt instead more realistic assumptions as a basis for building ‘second generation models of empirically grounded, boundedly rational, and moral decision-making’ (Ostrom, 1998(4): 15). Gaus I 63 Solutions: (...) Kenneth Shepsle (1995)(5) endorses the combination of ‘hard theory and soft assessment’ represented by rational choice theory, in contrast to the ‘soft (or no) theory with hard assessment’ favoured by its critics. The ‘hard theory’ offers real insight, he maintains, while ‘statistical political philosophy’ offers only unintelligible correlations. Similarly, Peter Ordeshook (1993(6); 1995(6a)) and Emerson Niou and Ordeshook (1999)(7) make a distinction between science and engineering that amounts to saying that abstract models need not fit any easily observable regularities in order to be illuminating. Institutions: Institutions can be understood as ways of constraining individual maximizing behaviour, to reduce this potential instability (Miller, 1997(8): 1193–8; Weingast, 1996(9)). But how could such constraining institutions develop on the basis of individual self-interest? The recent and much discussed volume on Analytic Narratives (Bates et al., 1998(10)) is essentially an offshoot of this ‘new institutionalism’. Individuals: (...) are assumed to be free and reasonable, at least potentially, and not just the victims of blind causation. Nomothetic/idiographic: Seen from this angle, rational choice theory represents a return to an ‘ideographic’ mode of inquiry from the currently dominant ‘nomothetic’ conception of science (Bates et al., 1998(10): 10). >Nomothetic/idiographic/Windelband. 1. Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro (1994) Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2. Walt, Stephen M. (1999) ‘Rigor or rigor mortis? Rational choice and security studies’. International Security, 23 (4): 5–48. 3. Munck, Geraldo L. (2001) ‘Game theory and comparative politics: new perspectives and old concerns’. World Politics, 53: 173–204. 4. Ostrom, Elinor (1998) ‘A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action’. American Political Science Review, 92: 1–22. 5. Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1995) ‘Statistical political philosophy and positive political theory’. Critical Review, 9 (1–2): 213–22. 6. Ordeshook, Peter C. (1993) ‘The development of contemporary political theory’. In William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinch and Normal J. Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation, Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 6.a. Ordeshook, Peter C. (1995) ‘Engineering or science: what is the study of politics?’ Critical Review, 9 (1–2): 175–88. 7. Niou, Emerson M. S. and Peter C. Ordeshook (1999) ‘Return of the Luddites’. International Security, 24 (2): 84–96. 8. Miller, Gary J. (1997) ‘The impact of economics on contemporary political science’. Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 1173–1204. 9. Weingast, Barry R. (1996) ‘Political institutions: rational choice perspectives’. In Robert E. Goodin and v Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds, A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167–90. 10. Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, JeanLaurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast (1998) Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rationality | Weber | Habermas III 239 Rationality/Weber/Habermas: the term can have several meanings: a) increasing theoretical mastery of reality through increasingly precise abstract terms b) methodological achievement of objectives through more precise calculation of means.(1) III 240 Practical rationality/Weber/Habermas: a) Weber starts from a broad concept of technology that exists for every action, e.g. prayer techniques... III 241 b) This broad meaning limits Weber by specifying means that are part of the objective world. III 242 c) Not only means, also purposes can be more or less rational. (2) III 243 In this context, a distinction is made between formal (more technical) and material (more ethical) rationality. d) According to formal rationality, the actor must be aware of his preferences. Weber is, however, sceptical about normative issues. >Purpose rationality, >Purposes, >Preferences, >Goals, cf. >Technology. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 265f. 2. Ibid. p. 265 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Reaction Range | Jensen | Slater I 124 Reaction range/genetic theories/psychology/Jensen: the genetic concept of “reaction range,” [indicates] the observation that the same genotype can give rise to rather different observable traits in different environments. Jensen (1969(1) discussed this problem on pages 63-64. Another problem is, that different genotypes may show different reaction ranges: some may be more buffered than others from environmental circumstances. [Jensen] noted that this implies that heritability estimates may vary for subgroups within population groups, specifically pointing out that no estimates of the heritability of intelligence were available to African-American groups, and that samples that included European-Americans of the same lower SES (socioeconomic status) level as many African-Americans were not sufficiently relevant, as the SES measure might not reflect racial differences in the environmental conditions that actually impact development of intelligence and/or academic performance. >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Reason | Dilthey | Gadamer I 223 Reason/Dilthey/Gadamer: [Dilthey intended] to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. This task alone shows the turning away from speculative idealism. It establishes an analogy that is to be understood quite literally. Dilthey wants to say: historical reason needs justification just as much as pure reason. The epoch-making result of the Critique of Pure Reason was not only that metaphysics as a pure science of reason was destroyed by the world, soul and God, but that at the same time a field was established within which the use of a priori concepts is justified and makes knowledge possible. Gadamer: This critique of Pure Reason not only destroyed the dreams of a spirit-reader, it also answered the question of how pure natural science is possible. In the meantime, speculative idealism had taken the world of history into the self-explication of reason, and moreover, especially through Hegel, had achieved ingenious achievements in the historical field. With this, the claim of the pure science of reason has been in principle extended to the Gadamer I 224 historical knowledge. It was part of the Encyclopedia of the Spirit. But in the eyes of the historical school, the speculative philosophy of history was as blatant dogmatism as rational metaphysics had been. Cf. >Kant/Gadamer, >Epistemology/Gadamer. Gadamer I 225 Hegel: By teaching reason in everything, even in history, Hegel had been the last and most universal representative of the ancient Logos philosophy. Problem: Now, in view of the criticism of a priori philosophy of history, one saw oneself once again caught in the spell of Kantian criticism, whose problem now also arose for the historical world, after the claim of a pure construction of reason of world history was rejected and historical knowledge was also limited to experience. If history, as little as nature, is thought of as a manifestation of the spirit, then it is just as much a problem in what way the human spirit should recognize history as the knowledge of nature had become a problem for it through the constructions of the mathematical method. Dilthey: So Dilthey had to look for an answer to the question of how pure natural science is possible, as well as Kant's answer to the question of how historical experience can become science. In a clear analogy to Kant's question, he therefore asked about the categories of the historical world that the humanities are capable of carrying. He does not forget, that experience here is something fundamentally different than in the field of knowledge of nature. Neo-Kantianism: The categorical analysis [of the] "object of knowledge" was in the eyes of of Neo-Kantianism the positive achievement of transcendental philosophy(1). DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: [Dilthey] felt that New Kantian criticism itself was dogmatic, and he was just as right as when he called English empiricism dogmatic. For what supports the construction of the historical world are not facts taken from experience, which then come under a value reference; rather, their basis is the inner historicity that is suitable for experience itself. It is a life-historical process and has its model case not in the determination of facts, but Gadamer I 226 in that peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into a whole which we call experience and which one acquires by having experiences. Thus it is in particular the suffering and the teaching which, through the painful experience of reality, is given to the person who matures through insight, which preformed the way of recognition for the historical sciences. They only think further, what is already thought in life experience. 1. Cf. H. Rickerts gleichnamiges Buch: Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Freiburg 1892. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reciprocity | Rawls | I 103 Reciprocity/Rawls: For example, two representative people in a society, A is less, B is more favoured. A can accept the benefits that come with B if this improves its own expectations. If B weren't in position, A would be even worse off. This presupposes a scheme of social cooperation without which no one would have a satisfactory life. Differential principle/Rawls: ensures that everyone agrees to this cooperation. >Difference Principle/Rawls. I 291 Reciprocity/Saving/generational justice/Rawls: generations should ask themselves how much they are willing to save when all others do the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. I 288 Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but nobody knows in the initial situation of a society to be established which generation they belong to. I 290 Reciprocity/Rawls: The principle of reciprocity is usually used when it comes to compensating for advantages. But you cannot give anything back to the previous generation. This is the special case for reciprocity in saving. I 291 Alexander Herzen and also Kant complained about the injustice that the later ones would benefit from the achievements of the former ones without giving anything back. RawlsVsKant/RawlsVsHerzen: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself. I 292 Solution/Rawls: To accept individuals as part of a family line that continues. The rest is governed by the two principles of justice. I 293 No disadvantaged person of any generation can then complain that others are not doing their part. People of different generations share duties and obligations as well as contemporaries. The present generation cannot do what it likes, but must behave in the manner prescribed by the principles that would be chosen in the initial situation where no one knows what role they themselves play. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Recognition | Droysen | Gadamer I 219 Recognition/Droysen/Gadamer: Against historical apriorism, [Droysen] agrees with Ranke that we cannot see the goal, only the direction of the movement. The purpose of the purposes to which the restless work of historical humanity is related cannot be determined by historical knowledge (§§ 80-86)(1). It is only the object of our foreboding and belief. The position of historical knowledge now corresponds to this image of history. DroysenVsRanke: Even [historical cognition] cannot be understood as Ranke understood [it]: as an aesthetic self-forgetfulness and self-extinction in the manner of the great epic poetry. Ranke: The pantheistic move in Ranke allowed here the claim of a universal and at the same time direct participation, a complicity of the universe. Droysen: Droysen, on the other hand, thinks of the mediations in which understanding moves. The moral powers are not only the actual reality of history, to which the individual elevates him- or herself in action. At the same time, they are what makes the one who questions and researches historically rise above his or her own particularity. The historian is determined and limited by his or her belonging to certain moral spheres, his or her homeland, his or her political and religious convictions. But it is precisely on this irrevocable one-sidedness that his or her participation is based. Under the concrete conditions of one's own historical existence - and not hovering over things - the task is justice. "His or her justice is that he or she seeks to understand" (§ 91)(1). Droysen's formula for historical recognition is therefore "to understand by research" (§ 8). Therein lies both an infinite mediation and an understanding" (§ 8). Therein lies also an infinite mediation and a final immediacy. The concept of research, which Droysen connects here in such a significant understanding should mark the infinity of the task by which the historian is as fundamentally separated from the achievements of artistic creation as he or she is from the perfect harmony that sympathy and love between you and I bring about. >Science/Droysen. 1. J.G. Droysen, Grundriß der Historik, 1868 |
Droys I J. G. Droysen Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reification | Lukács | Habermas III 474 Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Lukács thesis: "in the structure of the relationship of goods (can) the archetype of all forms of representationalism and all corresponding forms of subjectivity be found in bourgeois society". (1) Habermas: Lukács uses the new Kantian expression "representational form" in a sense shaped by Dilthey as a historically created "form of existence or thought" that distinguishes the "totality of the stage of development of society as a whole". >Neo-Kantianism, >W. Dilthey, >About Dilthey. He understands the development of society as "the history of the uninterrupted transformation of the representational forms that shape people's existence". LukácsVsHistorism/Habermas: Lukács does not, however, share the historicist view that the particularity of each unique culture is expressed in a representational form. The forms of representationalism convey "the confrontation of the human Habermas III 475 with his/her environment, which determines the representationalism of his/her inner and outer life".(2) >Historism. Def Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Reification is the peculiar assimilation of social relationships and experiences to things, i.e. to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds (subjective, objective and social ((s) shared) world) are so miscoordinated in the social a priori of the living world that category errors are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we understand them in the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although in reality they are components of our common social world or of our own subjective world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Life world. Habermas: because understanding and comprehending are constitutive for the communicative handling itself, such a systematic misunderstanding affects the practice, not only the way of thinking but also the "way of being" of the subjects. It is the lifeworld itself that is "reified". Habermas: Lukács sees the cause of this deformation in a Habermas III 476 method of production that is based on wage labour and requires "becoming goods of a function of humans"(3). Habermas III 489 AdornoVsLukács/HorkheimerVsLukács/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno shift the beginnings of reification in the dialectic of the Enlightenment back behind the capitalist beginning of modernity to the beginnings of the incarnation. >Dialectic of Enlightenment, >M. Horkheimer, >Th.W. Adorno. The reason for this is that Lukác's theory of the unforeseen integration achievements of advanced capitalist societies has been denied. >Society, >Capitalism. 1. G. Lukács, „Die Verdinglichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats“ in: G. Lukács, Werke, Bd. 2. Neuwied 1968, S. 257-397. 2.G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke, Bd. 2, 1968, S. 336 3. Ebenda S. 267. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Republicanism | Rousseau | Mause I 45 Republicanism/Rousseau: Modern republicanism, which, from a modified connection to the old European republicanism of the Greek polis and the Roman res publica, proceeds from a primacy of the state or politics over society, is founded in opposition to liberalism and criticizes its glorification of bourgeois society. He takes up the theoretical achievements of the liberal tradition and gives them a critical turn: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) establishes the primacy of politics in a contractualist way in the form of the volonté générale in "The Social Contract" (Du contrat social, 1762).(1) >Social Contract, >Republic, >Republicanism. 1. J.-J. Rousseau, Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag oder Prinzipien des Staatsrechts. In Politische Schriften, Hrsg. Ludwig Schmidts, Bd. 1, Paderborn 1977, S. 72-93. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Resource Theory | Cognitive Psychology | Corr I 406 Resource theory/cognitive psychology/personality/Matthews: Resource theory was applied to personality research initially to explain detrimental effects of trait anxiety. Early research (e.g., Spielberger 1966)(1) established that state anxiety disrupted information-processing on demanding tasks, but theory was vague about the nature of the interference. The greater sensitivity of performance to worry, rather than anxious emotion and autonomic arousal (Zeidner 1998)(2), encouraged a cognitive rather than an arousal theory perspective. Irwin Sarason’s (e.g., Sarason, Sarason and Pierce 1995)(3) influential theory of test anxiety suggested that the effects of worry are mediated by diversion of resources onto ‘off-task’ processing of personal concerns. >Attention, >Resources, >Performance. Corr I 407 VsResource Theory/VsRevelle/VsHumphreys: The Humphreys and Revelle (1984)(4) theory successfully predicts the trend towards Extraversion enhancing short-term memory but impairing attention (subject to arousal and time of day factors). The theory also states that the key mediating factors are resource availability and arousal, but substantiating these mediating mechanisms has proved more difficult. 1) One problem is that arousal is likely multidimensional, with different arousal dimensions impacting performance in different ways. Although Extraversion may correlate negatively with some psychophysiological indices of arousal (De Pascalis 2004)(5), the trait also tends to correlate positively with subjective energetic arousal. 2) a)The Humphreys and Revelle (1984)(4) theory is compatible with the superior performance of introverts on vigilance tasks (Koelega 1992)(6), but two difficulties should be pointed out. First, we would expect introvert superiority to be especially marked on the most demanding vigilance tasks that, presumably, require the maximal allocation of resources (cf., Warm, Matthews and Finomore 2008)(7). b) Tests for mediation have failed to confirm that Extraversion differences are a consequence of variation in arousal, whether measured subjectively (Matthews, Davies and Lees 1990)(8) or using the EEG (Matthews and Amelang 1993)(9). Extraversion and arousal often appear to have separable effects in these studies. >VsRevelle. Corr I 408 3) Another challenge to resource theory comes from studies of dual-task performance. Assuming that dual-task interference reflects an insufficiency of attentional resources, extraverts should be more vulnerable to interference (subject to the usual caveats concerning time of day and arousal). In fact, broadly, extraverts tend to out-perform introverts in dual-task performance studies (Matthews, Deary and Whiteman 2003)(10), but studies also show that finding the effect is dependent on careful control of task stimuli (e.g, Szymura and Necka 1998)(11). 1. Spielberger, C. D. 1966. The effects of anxiety on complex learning and academic achievement, in C. D. Spielberger (ed.), Anxiety and behaviour, pp. 3–20. London: Academic Press 2. Zeidner, M. 1998. Test anxiety: the state of the art. New York: Plenum 3. Sarason, I. G., Sarason, B. R. and Pierce, G. R. 1995. Cognitive interference: at the intelligence-personality crossroads, in D. H. Saklofske and M. Zeidner (eds.), International handbook of personality and intelligence, pp. 285–319. New York: Plenum 4. Humphreys, M. S. and Revelle, W. 1984. Personality, motivation and performance: a theory of the relationship between individual differences and information processing, Psychological Review 91: 153–84 5. De Pascalis, V. 2004. On the psychophysiology of Extraversion, in R. Stelmack (ed.), On the psychobiology of personality: essays in honor of Marvin Zuckerman, pp. 295–327. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 6. Koelega, H. S. 1992. Extraversion and vigilance performance: 30 years of inconsistencies, Psychological Bulletin 112: 239–58 7. Warm, J. S., Matthews, G. and Finomore, V. S. 2008. Workload and stress in sustained attention, in P. A. Hancock and J. L. Szalma (eds.), Performance under stress, pp. 115–41. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 8. Matthews, G., Davies, D. R. and Lees, J. L. 1990. Arousal, Extraversion, and individual differences in resource availability, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 150–68 9. Matthews, G. and Amelang, M. 1993. Extraversion, arousal theory and performance: a study of individual differences in the EEG, Personality and Individual Differences 14: 347–64 10. Matthews, G., Deary, I. J. and Whiteman, M. C. 2003. Personality traits, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press 11. Szymura, B. and Necka, E. 1998. Visual selective attention and personality: an experimental verification of three models of Extraversion, Personality and Individual Differences 24: 713–29 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Resource Theory | Matthews | Corr I 406 Resource theory/personality/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Resource theory was applied to personality research initially to explain detrimental effects of trait anxiety. Early research (e.g., Spielberger 1966)(1) established that state anxiety disrupted information-processing on demanding tasks, but theory was vague about the nature of the interference. The greater sensitivity of performance to worry, rather than anxious emotion and autonomic arousal (Zeidner 1998)(2), encouraged a cognitive rather than an arousal theory perspective. Irwin Sarason’s (e.g., Sarason, Sarason and Pierce 1995)(3) influential theory of test anxiety suggested that the effects of worry are mediated by diversion of resources onto ‘off-task’ processing of personal concerns. >Attention, >Resources, >Performance. 1. Spielberger, C. D. 1966. The effects of anxiety on complex learning and academic achievement, in C. D. Spielberger (ed.), Anxiety and behaviour, pp. 3–20. London: Academic Press 2. Zeidner, M. 1998. Test anxiety: the state of the art. New York: Plenum 3. Sarason, I. G., Sarason, B. R. and Pierce, G. R. 1995. Cognitive interference: at the intelligence-personality crossroads, in D. H. Saklofske and M. Zeidner (eds.), International handbook of personality and intelligence, pp. 285–319. New York: Plenum Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Rights | Consequentialism | Gaus I 107 Rights/Consequentialism/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism. VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view. 1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules. 2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). Drawing inspiration from Sidgwick, Robert E. Goodin (1995(3): ch. 4) has recently defended ‘government house’ utilitarianism, which casts utilitarianism as a ‘public philosophy’ to be employed by policy-makers, rather than a guide to individual conduct. 1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Goodin, Robert E. (1995) Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rights | Sumner | Gaus I 107 Rights/Consequentialism/Sumner/Gaus: L. W. Sumner (1987)(1) presents an especially influential consequentialist case for rights. Sumner recognizes the paradoxical air of a thoroughly consequentialist argument for rights: in so far as the consequentialist seeks to maximize achievement of a certain goal, and rights are a constraint on the ways goals are achieved, it looks as if the consequentialist must argue that the best way to achieve the goal is to constrain our efforts to achieve it. The key to resolving this paradox, says Sumner, is to distinguish consequentialism as a theory of moral justification from the preferred theory of moral decision-making (1987(1): 179) or, we might say, consequentialism as a theory of evaluation from a theory of deliberation. This argument for rights consequentialism (or, more generally, rule consequentialism) argues that there is no easy transition from the claim that the right action is that which maximizes good consequences to the claim that the best decision procedure is to perform that action which one thinks has the best consequences. Sidgwick: This type of argument was advanced by Sidgwick (1962(2): 489), who accepted that utilitarianism may be self-effacing, in the sense that it could instruct us not to encourage its use as a theory for making decisions. It may be better, he argued, if many people are guided by common sense morality. >Rights/Utilitarianism. VsSidgwick/VsSumner: Two problems confront such a view. 1) First, it is often not realized that rule utilitarianism puts more, not less, computational burdens on those devising the system of rules. 2) Second, by divorcing utilitarianism as a standard of evaluation from its role as a standard of deliberation, we invite the sort of moral elitism that attracted Sidgwick: perhaps hoi polloi should be restricted to non-utilitarian reasoning, but the class of excellent calculators may be able to better promote utility by employing utilitarianism as a method of deliberation (1962(2): 489ff). >Utilitarian Liberalism/Goodin. 1. Sumner, L. W. (1987) The Moral Foundations of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1962) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Saving | Rawls | I 291 Savings/generational justice/reciprocity/Rawls: the generations should ask themselves how much they are prepared to save when all others do the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all. --- I 288 Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but nobody knows in the initial situation of a society to be established which generation they belong to. --- I 289 However, the principle of fair saving does not force us to continue saving forever. Details have to be clarified at a later date. Each generation has its own appropriate goals. Generations are no more subject to each other than individuals are subject to each other. No generation has special demands. --- I 290 Savings/Saving Rate/Wealth/Rawls: the last stage of a society does not have to be one of abundance. The principle of justice does not require previous generations to save money so that later generations will have more. Rather, saving is about enabling a fair society and equal freedoms. If more is saved, it is for other purposes. It would be a misunderstanding to think that the realisation of a good and fair society must wait until a high standard of living has been achieved. Reciprocity/Rawls: The principle of reciprocity is usually used when it comes to compensating for advantages. But you cannot give anything back to the previous generation. This is the special case for reciprocity in saving. --- I 291 Alexander Herzen and also Kant complained about the injustice that the later ones would benefit from the achievements of the former ones without giving anything back(1)(2). RawlsVsKant/RawlsVsHearts: these feelings are out of place: the relation is asymmetric, but this has to be corrected. First of all, the question of justice does not arise because of the extension of time in only one direction. What can be fair or unfair is the way in which institutions deal with this situation and with historical possibilities. If all generations, with the exception of the first, now benefit and everyone inherits from their ancestors, all they have to do is choose a fair saving principle that ensures that future generations will also benefit from their services. The only reciprocity between generations is virtual. However, each generation can regulate the details for itself. --- I 292 Fairness of savings/fair saving/Rawls: we accept the fictitious initial situation of a society to be established as present and ourselves as participants. This situation involves members of all possible generations. No one knows what generation he belongs to. So there is no reason for anyone to save money - either previous generations have saved or not. You cannot change that now. Solution/Rawls: to accept individuals as part of a family line that continues. The rest is governed by the two principles of justice. (See Principles/Rawls.) Just as the first principle of justice and the principle of equal opportunity limits the application of the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) within a generation, the principle of fair saving limits its application between generations. --- I 293 No disadvantaged person of any generation can then complain that others are not doing their part. (1) Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44. (2) Quote A. Herzen from Isaiah Berlin's Einführung zu Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, New York, 1960 p. xx. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Science | Droysen | Gadamer I 219 Science/Droysen/Gadamer: Droysen's formula for historical recognition is therefore "to understand by research" (§ 8)(1). Therein lies both an infinite mediation and an understanding" (§ 8). Therein lies also an infinite mediation and a final immediacy. The concept of research, which Droysen here so meaningfully links with that of understanding, is intended to mark the infinity of the task by which the historian is fundamentally separated from the achievements of artistic creation as well as from the perfect harmony which sympathy and love between I and you bring about. Only in "restlessly" researching the tradition, in the opening up of ever new sources and in ever new interpretations of the same, does research gradually approach the "idea". That sounds like a reference to the procedure of the natural sciences and like an anticipation of the Neo-Kantian interpretation of the thing in itself (as the "infinite task"). But on closer inspection it becomes clear that there is something else in it. Because Droysen's formula not only demarcates the historian's action against the consummate ideality of art and against the intimate communion of souls, but it also seems to be against the procedure of the natural sciences. >Research/Droysen. 1. J.G. Droysen, Grundriß der Historik, 1868 |
Droys I J. G. Droysen Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Science | Heidegger | Gadamer I 263 Science/Objectivity/Heidegger/Gadamer: Dilthey's endeavour to make the humanities understandable from life and to take life experience as a starting point had (...) never reached a real balance with the Cartesian concept of science to which he adhered. >W. Dilthey. Heidegger, on the other hand, was able to begin quite differently, when (...) Husserl had already made the decline to life a virtually universal working topic and thus left behind the restriction to the question of the methods of the humanities. His analysis of the world of life and the anonymous endowment of meaning that forms the basis of all experience gave the question of objectivity in the humanities a completely new background. >E. Husserl. Objectivity/Husserl: [Husserl's analysis] made the concept of objectivity in science appear as a special case. >Objectivism/Husserl. Science is anything but a fact to be assumed. The constitution of the scientific world is rather a task in its own right, the task of enlightening the idealization of science. But this task is not the first. In the retreat to the "performing life" (>Life/Husserl) the opposition of nature and spirit proves to be not ultimately valid. Both the humanities and the natural sciences can be derived from the achievements of the intentionality of universal life, that is, from an absolute historicity. This is the understanding in which the self-contemplation of philosophy alone is sufficient. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Life/Heidegger. Temporality of Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the mode of knowledge of the natural sciences [becomes] visible as a variation of understanding, "which got lost in the legitimate task of grasping the existing in its intrinsic Gadamer I 264 incomprehensibility."(1) Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Gadamer I 459 Science/Heidegger/Gadamer: It seems to me that Heidegger (...) in "Being and Time" has gained the point of view from which both the difference and the connecting element between Greek and modern science can be thought. When he presented the concept of "Vorhandenheit" (engl. presence-at-hand) as a deficient mode of being and recognized it as the background of classical metaphysics and its continued effect in the concept of subjectivity of modern times, he had followed an ontologically correct connection between the Greek Theoria and modern science. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity. In the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics as a whole is an ontology of the existing, and modern science, without suspecting it, is its heir. In the Greek Theoria itself, however, there was certainly something else. Theoria grasps not so much what exists as the thing itself, which still has the dignity of the "thing". That the experience of the thing has as little to do with the mere ascertainability of the pure existence as with the experience of the so-called I 460 experiential science, was precisely emphasized by the later Heidegger himself(2). Gadamer: So, like the dignity of the thing, we will also have to keep the objectivity of language free from the prejudice against the ontology of the existing and in one with it from the concept of objectivity. >Language, >Language/Heidegger. 1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit p. 153. 2. Cf. on "das Ding" lectures and essays, pp. 164f. Here the summary of the "Theoria" with the "Science of the Existing" which "Being and Time" had undertaken, is dissolved under the question of the later Heidegger (see also ibid. p. 51 f.). (Cf. also my afterword to M. Heidegger's Kunstwerk-Aufsatz, Stuttgart 1960 (Reclam), pp. 102-125,now in "Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk", Tübingen 1983, p. 81-92; Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke). Rorty II 65 Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality. Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. --- Figal I 107f Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Science | Jensen | Slater I 121 Science/intelligence tests/Jensen: (Jensen 1969)(1) stated that he strongly disagreed with those who believe that science should be used to search for truth only in certain circumstances, implying that this was the reason for the dearth of discussion of the possibility of genetic determination of these racial test score differences. >Intelligence tests/Jensen. Apparently, the idea that discussion of this possibility had been suppressed because it was somehow socially inappropriate was to him a rationale that made it essential to develop and present the evidenciary basis for the possibility. >Intelligence/Jensen, >Racism/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen. 1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123. Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Science | Kuhn | I 25 Definition Normal Science/Kuhn: Research that is firmly based on one or more scientific achievements of the past. I 47 Science/Kuhn: problems: Three classes of problems: - 1st determining important facts - 2nd mutual adjustment of facts and theory - 3rd articulation of theory. >Theories/Kuhn. I 182 Target/Science/Kuhn: Science does not move towards a "goal". - There must be no such destination at least. I 193 Community/Science/Kuhn: Typical for group formation: shared use of symbols - e.g. mathematical formulas. >Paradigms/Kuhn. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 |
| Science | Merton | Surowiecki I 224 Science/Surowiecki: the reward for scientists consists in attracting attention from colleagues. Science/Merton: In science, private property is founded on giving away one's substance."(1) Surowiecki I 226 Merton: Thesis: There is no such thing as a scientific truth in which only one person believes and which is questioned by the rest of the scientific community. A thought only becomes truth when it is accepted by a large majority of scientists. (...) This is meant by the term "contribution to science": it is always provisional (...).(2) >Majority, >Minority, Cf. >Truth. Surowiecki I 228 Matthew-Effect/Terminology/Merton/Surowiecki: (in allusion to the verses of the Gospel of Matthew, "Who has, is given to him"): most scientific treatises find hardly any readers, while a small part of them delight many readers. Famous scientists are quoted considerably more often. When a famous scientist collaborates with others, he is attributed a greater share of the result. When two teams or two scientists make a discovery at the same time, the more famous of them are credited with their achievements. >Fame, >Glory. Surowiecki: the Matthew-Effect can be understood as a heuristic process: it serves as a sieve to channel the immense flow of information. >Information. 1. Robert K. Merton, »The Matthew Effect«, Science 159/1968), S. 56-63. 2. Robert K. Merton, »The Matthew Effect (II) – Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property«, Property«, Isis 79/1988, S. 606-623. |
SocMerton I Robert K. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure New York 1968 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Science | Romanticism | Gadamer I 279 Science/Romanticism/Gadamer: [The] revaluations of romanticism are the source of the attitude of historical science in the 19th century. It no longer measures the past by the standards of the present as if by an absolute; it ascribes its own value to past times and can even acknowledge their superiority in one respect or another. The great achievements of Romanticism, the awakening of the dawn of time, the hearing of the voice of the peoples in songs, the collection of fairy tales and legends, the cultivation of ancient customs, the discovery of languages as Gadamer I 280 world views, the study of the "religion and wisdom of the Indians" - they all triggered historical research, which slowly, step by step, transformed the foreboding reawakening into distant historical recognition. >Worldviews, >Religion. Historism: The connection of the historical school to Romanticism thus confirms that the Romantic repetition of the original itself is on the ground of the Enlightenment. The historical science of the nineteenth century is its proudest fruit and sees itself almost as the completion of the Enlightenment, as the final step in the liberation of the mind from dogmatic bias, the step towards the objective knowledge of the historical world, which is equal to the knowledge of nature through modern science. >Historism/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Self | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 82 Self/Developmental psychology/Upton: A. Empirical Self: The first step on the road to self-understanding is the recognition that ‘I’ exist as an individual, and have agency (the power to act) and distinct and unique experiences. This awareness is thought to begin to develop in infancy, when babies begin to show understanding that they have agency; that is, they can cause things to happen and have the ability to control objects (Cooley, 1902)(1).In this way a sense of agency emerges at around four months of age and is gradually consolidated. A two-year-old child is more assertive, demanding and picky than a four-month-old baby. Indeed, the tantrums so often associated with the ‘terrible twos’ are suggested to reflect the frustration felt by toddlers when attempts to control the world around them fail. Empirical investigations of the existential self in infants and toddlers are limited and studies tend to be speculative (Damon and Hart, 1988)(2). >Stages of development. B. Categorical self: Empirical support for the emergence of the categorical self in late infancy/early childhood is provided by an investigation carried out by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979)(3). Rouge test: In this test, an experimenter surreptitiously places a dot of rouge on the nose of the child, who is then Upton I 83 placed in front of a mirror and whose reactions are then monitored. Self-recognition is shown when the child touches their nose or attempts to wipe away the rouge. Lewis and Brooks-Gunn found that self-recognition emerges at around 18–24 months; at 18 months, 50 per cent of the group recognised the reflection in the mirror as their own, and by 20–24 months this increased to 65 per cent. However, it is important to remember that this is only behavioural evidence for awareness; it does not tell us anything about the subjective experience associated with this consciousness. Children’s understanding of themselves as active agents (…) can be seen in their attempts to cooperate with others in play. They use their knowledge of their own power to act on their world, when they offer to share a toy or join in pretend play with a friend. It is in these routine relationships and interactions that the child’s understanding of him or herself continues to emerge Dunn (1988)(4). Once children have gained a certain level of awareness of the existential self, they begin to form increasing awareness of their categorical self as they begin to place themselves – and to be placed by others – in different categories (e.g. gender, nationality). >Symbolic interactionism/Mead, >Self-consciousness. 1. Cooley, C.H. (1902) Human Nature and the Social Order, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 2. Damon, W. and Hart, D. (1988) Self-understanding in Childhood and Adolescence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 3. Lewis, K and Brooks-Gunn, J (1979) Social Cognition and the Acquisition of the Self. New York: Plenum. 4. Dunn, J (1988) The Beginnings of Social Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell. Upton I 121 Self/Developmental psychology/Upton: Sense of self is (…) thought to be influenced by adolescent involvement in cliques and crowds. According to Erikson (1950)(1), community membership is central to the achievement of identity as it requires solidarity with a group’s ideals. Identification with cliques and crowds is argued to help adolescents defend themselves against the loss of identity that may be provoked by the identity crisis. Thus, adolescents deal with the difficulties they experience in committing to adult identities (the identity crisis) by making exaggerated commitments to certain style groups and by separating themselves from other style groups. >Youth culture/Developmental psychology. 1. Erikson. EH (1950) Childhood and Society, New York: WW Norton. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Self | Erikson | Upton I 121 Self/Erikson/Upton: Sense of self is (…) thought to be influenced by adolescent involvement in cliques and crowds. According to Erikson (1950)(1), community membership is central to the achievement of identity as it requires solidarity with a group’s ideals. Identification with cliques and crowds is argued to help adolescents defend themselves against the loss of identity that may be provoked by the identity crisis. >Self/Developmental psychology, >Youth culture/Developmental psychology. 1. Erikson. EH (1950) Childhood and Society, New York: WW Norton. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Self | Rosenberg | Upton I 114 Self/Method/Rosenberg/Upton: Arguably one of the most important studies of the development of sense of self was carried out by Rosenberg (1979)(1). He conducted open-ended interviews with individual children to find out about their self-perceptions. He interviewed a sample of 8—18 year olds about various aspects of their sense of self. Upton I 115 1. find a way of sorting the children’s replies into meaningful categories 2. search for patterns in the kinds of replies that were given by particular age groups. Categories: A. Physical: - objective facts — e.g. ‘1 am eight years old’; overt achievements — e.g. ‘I can swim 25 metres’; -manifested preferences — e.g. ‘I like milk’; - possessions — e.g. ‘I’ve got a blue bike’; - physical attributes — e.g. ‘I’ve got brown hair and blue eyes’; - membership categories — e.g. ‘I am a girl’. B. Character: - qualities of character — e.g. ‘I am a brave person and I think that I am honest; - emotional characteristics — e.g. ‘I am generally happy and cheerful’; - emotional control— e.g. I don’t get into fights’, I lose my temper easily’. C. Relationships: - interpersonal traits — e.g. i am friendly and sociable’, i am shy and retiring’; - relationship to others — e.g. ‘I am well liked by other children’, 4Other people find me difficult to get on with’. D. Inner: Inner: descriptions of self that refer to an individual’s more private inner world of emotions, attitudes, wishes, beliefs and secrets, such as self-knowledge. Results: Rosenberg (1979)(1) found that the majority of the descriptions given by younger children were about physical activity and physical characteristics. The older children were more likely to use character traits to define the self. Rosenberg also found increasing reference to relationships. Upton I 116 The oldest children (those aged around 18 years of age) made far more use of inner qualities, knowledge of which was only available to the individual. These descriptions were concerned with their emotions, attitudes, motivations, wishes and secrets. Rosenberg also found that older children are much more likely to refer to self-control when describing themselves, for example ‘I don’t show my feelings’. >Self-description, >Self-knowledge, >Self-awareness. Upton I 117 VsRosenberg/Problems/Upton: 1) This was a cross-sectional study, so while differences may well have been observed in terms of the self-descriptions given by children at different ages, it is difficult to be absolutely certain that these differences reflect developmental change — only a longitudinal study could really confirm this interpretation. 2) Even if these changing descriptions do reflect a developmental change, how can we be sure that the developmental change is actually about understanding of self? 1. Rosenberg, M (1979) Conceiving the Self. New York: Basic Books. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Self- Consciousness | Block | II 547 Self-Consciousness/Animal/Block: possession of the concept of self. Some animals recognize themselves in the mirror. E.g. Animal experiment: Chimpanzees are anesthetized and then paint is applied in spots on the nose and ears. 7- to 15-year-old chimpanzees, after looking in the mirror, try to wipe off the spots. Explanation/Block: E.g. there is an explanation of this animal experiment, which consists in denying the self-consciousness to the chimpanzees. Instead, they should recognize a fellow in the mirror and conclude that they themselves might have similar spots. Block: This is not a refutation of the actual explanation, but unintentionally presumes a much stronger consciousness in the chimpanzees as well as the ability to conclude! Also self-consciousness: to think about whether I have a spot on my forehead, I need to be able think about myself. II 557 Animal experiment: e.g. on a screen, a chimpanzee controls the movements of his arm in a hole he can not see into. (Is considered as "cultural achievement" by some.) BlockVsDnett: self-consciousness yes, but why cultural? E.g. That I need a "director's self-consciousness" to see me as a director is simply trivial and does not really require any culture. Otherwise I'd need a separate self-consciousness for me as someone who has the keys in his pocket. Ad infinitum. Infinitely many characterizations do not require their own special self-consciousness. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Sensory Impressions | McDowell | I 14 Sensory impressions do not belong in the area of the reasons. Sensory impressions/Empiricism: not in the same space as knowledge. Sensory impressions are not in such a space in which the one is justified by the other. (Otherwise the naturalistic fallacy threatens). >Justification/McDowell, >Space of reasons, >Naturalistic fallacy. I 33 Sensory impressions/McDowell: Thesis: from the outset there is no distance between the conceptual content and the effects of reality on the sensuality. The sensory impressions already have the most basic conceptual content. >Experience/McDowell, >Concept/McDowell, >Spontaneity. I 173f Definition sensory impression/McDowell: The impact of the world on our senses. (s) So the world's achievement, not the subject's achievement. Not the impression we have, but the impression made by the world. According to Sellars/Davidson: non-conceptual. A sensory impression: the belief that an object has certain properties is due to the fact that the corresponding fact itself exerts an impression on the subject. This is the same as the impression which the object exerts. Sensory impressions/DavidsonVsMcDowell: 1. There are no facts at all. 2. Causality: only conclusions from knowledge about causal connections - causality itself does not reveal the world. >Causality, >Fact. Sensory Impressions/McDowell: are transparent according to me, Sellars and Davidson do not see it like this. Sensory Impressions/McDowell: Thesis: a harmless concept of this could be: we can assume that spontaneity is rationally controlled by the receptivity without the receptivity blocking our access. For this we must reject only the dualism of reason and nature. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Situations | Psychological Theories | Corr I 32 Situations/Psychological Theories/Funder: A. Lexical approach. One of the earliest examples of the lexical approach to the study of situations was a study by Van Heck (1984), in which he combed the dictionary for words that could be used to fill in the blank, ‘being confronted with a . . . situation’. See Edwards and Templeton (2005)(1); by Yang, Read and Miller (2006)(2) applied the lexical approach to both Chinese idioms and their English translations. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies >Everyday language, >Cultural differences, >Cultural psychology. B. Empirical approach: For example, Endler, Hunt and Rosenstein (1962)(3) used ‘stimulus-response’ questionnaires to ask participants, ‘how anxious would you be if . . .?’. Using this method, they discovered what they felt were three kinds of situations that caused anxiety: interpersonal situations, situations of inanimate danger (e.g., hurtling car, earthquake), and ambiguous situations. >Anxiety, >Fear. Similarly, Fredericksen, Jensen and Beaton (1972)(4) analysed executives’ responses to a weekend in-basket exercise, resulting in a taxonomy of executive business situations with categories including evaluation of procedures, routine problems, interorganizational problems, personnel problems, policy issues and time conflicts. Along similar lines, Magnusson (1971)(5) asked students to list all the situations they had encountered during academic study, and then had all possible pairs rated for similarity. Corr I 33 By visiting psychiatric wards, student residences and classrooms, Moos (1973)(6) was able to develop scales to measure what he called ‘perceived climate’ based upon psychosocial features. He found three broad dimensions he labelled ‘relationships’ (e.g., social support), ‘personal development’ (e.g., academic achievement) and ‘system maintenance/change’ (e.g., order and organization). Price and Bouffard (1974)(7) used student diaries but focused on physical location by categorizing situations based upon what they called ‘constraint’ – the number and kinds of behaviours that were considered appropriate within them. Researchers have sometimes asked participants to describe their hypothetical feelings or behaviours in response to hypothetical situations: Forgas and Van Heck (1992)(8) used questionnaires to measure behavioural reactions in a series of situations (e.g., ‘you are going to meet a new date’) and were then able to allocate the variance in responses to persons, situations and interactions. Vansteelandt and Van Mechelen (1998)(9) asked people about their reactions (mostly hostile) to situations classified as ‘high frustrating’, ‘moderately frustrating’ and ‘low frustrating’. Ten Berge and De Raad (2001)(10) posit that situations are only useful in that they render the understanding of traits less ambiguous, and thus asked students to write sentences explicating how traits might be expressed in certain situations. Rather than asking participants to rate hypothetical situations, some investigators have asked them instead to generate their own; such as Forgas (1976)(11), who asked housewives and students to provide two descriptions each for every interaction they had experienced in the previous twenty-four hours. He found a two-dimensional episode structure for housewives (intimacy/involvement and self-confidence) and a three-dimensional structure for students (involvement, pleasantness and knowing how to behave). Pervin (1976)(12) used the free-response descriptions of his participants of situations they had experienced over the past year to create a taxonomy of daily situations. Corr I 34 C. Theoretical approach. Krause (1970)(13) drew on sociological theory in an attempt to categorize situations on theoretical grounds. Based upon the way in which he posited that cultures assimilate novel situations into traditional, generic situations, Krause suggested seven classes, including joint working, fighting and playing, among others (a classification that guided the recovery of similar factors in the study by Van Heck (1984) cited above.) >Situations/Asendorpf. 1. Edwards, J. A. and Templeton, A. 2005. The structure of perceived qualities of situations. European Journal of Social Psychology 35: 705–23 2. Yang, Y., Read, S. J. and Miller, L. C. 2006. A taxonomy of situations from Chinese idioms, Journal of Research in Personality 40: 750–78 3. Endler, N. S., Hunt, J. McV. and Rosenstein, A. J. 1962: An S-R inventory of anxiousness, Psychological Monographs 76: 1–33 (17, Whole No. 536) 4. Frederiksen N., Jensen O. and Beaton A. 1972. Prediction of organizational behaviour. New York: Pergammon 5. Magnusson, D. 1971. An analysis of situational dimensions, Perceptual and Motor Skills 32: 851–67 6. Moos, R. H. 1973. Conceptualizations of human environments, American Psychologist 28: 652–65 7. Price, R. H. and Bouffard, D. L. 1974. Behavioural appropriateness and situational constraint as dimensions of social behaviour, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30: 579–86 8. Forgas, J. P. and Van Heck, G. L. 1992. The psychology of situations, in G. V. Caprara and G. L. Van Heck (eds.), Modern personality psychology: critical reviews and new directions, pp. 418–55. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 9. Vansteelandt, K. and Van Mechelen, I. 1998. Individual differences in situation-behaviour profiles: a triple typology model, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 751–65 10. Ten Berge, M. A. and De Raad, B. 2001. Construction of a joint taxonomy of traits and situations, European Journal of Personality 15: 253–76 11. Forgas, J. P. 1976. The perception of social episodes: categorical and dimensional representations in two different social milieus, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34: 199–209 12. Pervin, L. A. 1976. A free-response approach to the analysis of person-situation interaction, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34: 465–74 13. Krause, M. S. 1970. Use of social situations for research purposes, American Psychologist 25: 748–53 Seth A Wagerman & David C. Funder, “Personality psychology of situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Social Identity | Aronson | Haslam I 225 Social identity/Aronson: A key premise of social identity theory, which is particularly relevant to Aronson and colleagues’ (1978)(1) classic jigsaw classroom research, is that social identities are malleable. People tend to activate social identities that are most important in a given context. By shifting the relevant social identity from one based on race and ethnicity to one tied to learning in the classroom, Aronson and colleagues’ intervention reduced racial and ethnic tension that interfered with students’ opportunities to learn, and created a sense of social belonging within the classroom that is particularly critical to the educational achievement of members of traditionally marginalized groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities (Walton and Cohen, 2011)(2). >Social behaviour, >Socialization, >Social identity theory, >Jigsaw method. 1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 2. Walton, G.M. and Cohen, G.L. (2011) ‘A brief social-belonging intervention improves academic and health outcomes of minority students’, Science, 331: 1447–51. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Social Movements | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 268 Social Movements/Politial Philosophy/West: (...) the (...) neutral term 'social movement' , which now spans the disciplines of sociology and political science, reflects the ideological impact of the civil rights, anti-war and student activism of the 1960s (Brand, Büsser and Rucht, 1986(1): 35—7; Gamson, 1975(2); Oberschall, 1973(3); Piven and Cloward, 1977(4)). Pakulski: Social movements, according to Pakulski's useful definition, are 'recurrent patterns of collective activities which are partially institutionalized, value oriented and anti-systemic in their form and symbolism' (1991(5): xiv). Social movements can be recognized as significant achievements on the part of previously isolated and powerless social groups. In other words, social movements solve the 'problem of collective action'; for a particular constituency they achieve the collective good of political action (Taylor, 1987)(6). Institutions: (...) the concept of social movement extends the scope of political studies by recognizing political actions beyond the sphere of institutionalized politics. Since social movement activity significantly influences and may serve to transform institutionalized political forms, it must be acknowledged as a proper element of the political field. Cf. >Institutions. Eisenstein: New social movements directly attack intrinsically political features of civil society, such as patriarchy, homophobia and racism (Eisenstein, 1984)(7). They seek changes independently of, as well as through, state action. Social movements are, in sum, both important determinant of institutionalized politics and a crucial constituent of the relatively autonomous politics of civil society. Gaus I 269 Empirical material for the studies of new social movements: (Kriesi et al., 1995(8); Rucht, 1991(9)). 1. Brand, K.-W., D. Büsser and D. Rucht (1986) Aufbruch in eine andeæ Gesellschaft: Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik, 3rd rev. edn. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. 2. Gamson, William A. (1975) The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, IL: Dorsey. 3. Oberschall, Anthony (1973) Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 4. Piven, F. F. and R. A. Cloward (1992) 'Normalizing collective protest'. In A. Morris and C. M. Mueller, eds, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 5. Pakulski, Jan (1991) Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire. 6. Taylor, Michael (1987) The Possibility of Co-operation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Eisenstein, Hester (1984) Contemporary Feminist Thought. London: Allen and Unwin. 8. Kriesi, H. , R. Koopmans, J. W. Dyvendak and M. G. Giugni (1995) New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 9. Rucht, Dieter, ed. (1991) Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA. Boulder, CO: Westview. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Socialization | Habermas | Habermas IV 65 Socialization/Subjectivity/Mead/Habermas: Mead explains the formation of identity from the process of socialization of the growing child in such a way that it learns to follow norms of action and to assume ever more roles. The adolescent can only refer to something in the social world with a communicative act when... Habermas V 66 ...he/she knows how to adopt a norm-compliant attitude and how to orient actions towards normative claims of validity. >G.H. Mead, >Adolescence/Mead, >Developmental Stages/Psychology. IV 136 Socialization/Language/Habermas: in the grammatical speech, the illocutionary elements are combined with the propositional and expressive elements in such a way that illocutionary forces are connected with all acts of speech. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act This makes it clear what it means when the sacred institutions not only guide, preform and prejudge through processes of understanding, but also through the intersubjective recognition of the claims to validity raised by acts of speech. The acts of speech thus gain an independent illocutionary force independent of existing normative contexts. The authority of the holy behind the institutions no longer applies per se. Rather, it becomes dependent on the justification achievements of the religious world views. Cultural knowledge takes over functions of coordinating action by entering into the interpretation of the situation (...). >Worldviews, >Religion/Habermas. IV 143 As language establishes itself as a principle of socialization, the conditions of sociality converge with conditions of communicatively established intersubjectivity. Since the authority of the holy is transformed into the binding power of normative claims to validity, which can only be discursively redeemed, the notion of the validity that has to be achieved is purified from empirical admixtures. In the end, the validity of a norm only means that it could be accepted by all those concerned for good reasons. >Norms, >Validity claims. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Socrates | Nietzsche | Danto III 77 Socrates/NietzscheVsSocrates/Nietzsche/Danto: Not only has Socrates caused the decline of the Greek tragedy for Nietzsche, it also marks a turning point in the history of humanity. Both are inseparable. The tragic art of Attica was a reaction to the pessimistic conception of nature, which the Greeks originally represented and by means of which they were able to transform their fears, ie. could live at all. Curiously enough, Socrates pursued the same goal or at least contributed to its achievement. The view goes back to him that the universe is completely understandable.(1) >Tragedy/Ancient Philosophy. Rationality/Nietzsche: Nietzsche does not speak out against rationality at any point. Danto III 78 It is only directed against Socrates' limited understanding of reason (or science and logic): against the view it would show the only way to achieve human performance. Danto III 85 Art/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche later, however, represents the mistrust towards the artist, which Nietzsche had criticized in Socrates, himself.(2) >Art/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III, S. 95. 2. F. Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, KGW IV, 2 S. 144. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Software | Wolfram | Brockman I 278 Software/Wolfram: Today’s programming will be obsolete in a not very longtime. For example, people no longer learn assembly language, because computers are better at writing assembly language than humans are, and only a small set of people need to know the details of how language gets compiled into assembly language. A lot of what’s being done by armies of programmers today is similarly mundane. There’s no good reason for humans to be writing Java code or JavaScript code. We want to automate the programming process so that what’s important goes from what the human wants done to getting the machine, as automatically as possible, to do it. This will increase that equalization, which is something I’m interested in. A one-line piece of code already does something interesting and useful. It allows a vast range of people make computers do things for them. Brockman I 279 What will the world look like when most people can write code? One feature of code is that it’s immediately executable; it’s not like writing. When you write something, somebody has to read it, and the brain that’s reading it has to absorb the thoughts that came from the person who did the writing. Brockman I 280 What [would] the world would look like if most people could code. Clearly, many trivial things would change: Contracts would be written in code (…), Brockman I 281 simple things like that would change. But much more profound things would also change. Take high school education. The raw material for a typical high school student’s essay is something that’s already been written; students usually can’t generate new knowledge easily. But in the computational world, that will no longer be true. If the students know something about writing code, they’ll access all that digitized historical data and figure out something new. Then they’ll write an essay about something they’ve discovered. The achievement of knowledge-based programming is that it’s no longer sterile, because it’s got the knowledge of the world knitted into the language you’re using to write code. >Inventions/discoveries, >Creativity, >Knowledge, >Learning, >Programming, >Computers. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Soviet Union | Acemoglu | Acemoglu I 126 Soviet Union/Acemoglu/Robinson: Neither the newly created industry nor the collectivized farms were economically efficient in the sense that they made the best use of what resources the Soviet Union possessed. But the Soviet Union grew rapidly.asf Allowing people to make their own decisions via markets is the best way for a society to efficiently use its resources. When the state or a narrow elite controls all these resources instead, neither the right incentives will be created nor will there be an efficient allocation of the skills and talents of people. But in some instances the productivity of labor and capital may be so much higher in one sector or activity, such as heavy industry in the Soviet Union, that even a top-down process under extractive institutions (>Terminology/Acemoglu) that allocates resources toward that sector can generate growth. Acemoglu I 127 There was (...) huge unrealized economic potential from reallocating (...) labor from agriculture to industry. Stalinist industrialization was one brutal way of unlocking this potential. By fiat, Stalin moved these very poorly used resources into industry, where they could be employed more productively, even if industry itself was very inefficiently organized relative to what could have been achieved. >Soviet Union/Samuelson. Problems: Though the policies of Stalin and subsequent Soviet leaders could produce rapid economic growth, they could not do so in a sustained way. By the 1970s, economic growth had all but stopped. The most important lesson is that extractive institutions cannot generate sustained technological change for two reasons: the lack of economic incentives and resistance by the elites. In addition, once all the very inefficiently used resources had been reallocated to industry, there were Acemoglu I 128 few economic gains to be had by fiat. >">Institutions/Acemoglu, >Terminology/Acemoglu, >Economic growth/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 129 Innovations/motivation/incentives/production targets: (...) paying (...) bonuses created all sorts of disincentives to technological change. For one thing, innovation, which took resources away from current production, risked the output targets not being met and the bonuses not being paid. For another, output targets were usually based on previous production Acemoglu I 130 production levels. This created a huge incentive never to expand output, since this only meant having to produce more in the future, since future targets would be “ratcheted up.” Underachievement was always the best way to meet targets and get the bonus. |
Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| Soviet Union | Robinson | Acemoglu I 126 Soviet Union/Acemoglu/Robinson: Neither the newly created industry nor the collectivized farms were economically efficient in the sense that they made the best use of what resources the Soviet Union possessed. But the Soviet Union grew rapidly. Allowing people to make their own decisions via markets is the best way for a society to efficiently use its resources. When the state or a narrow elite controls all these resources instead, neither the right incentives will be created nor will there be an efficient allocation of the skills and talents of people. But in some instances the productivity of labor and capital may be so much higher in one sector or activity, such as heavy industry in the Soviet Union, that even a top-down process under extractive institutions (>Terminology/Acemoglu) that allocates resources toward that sector can generate growth. Acemoglu I 127 There was (...) huge unrealized economic potential from reallocating (...) labor from agriculture to industry. Stalinist industrialization was one brutal way of unlocking this potential. By fiat, Stalin moved these very poorly used resources into industry, where they could be employed more productively, even if industry itself was very inefficiently organized relative to what could have been achieved. >Soviet Union/Samuelson. Problems: Though the policies of Stalin and subsequent Soviet leaders could produce rapid economic growth, they could not do so in a sustained way. By the 1970s, economic growth had all but stopped. The most important lesson is that extractive institutions cannot generate sustained technological change for two reasons: the lack of economic incentives and resistance by the elites. In addition, once all the very inefficiently used resources had been reallocated to industry, there were Acemoglu I 128 few economic gains to be had by fiat. >">Institutions/Acemoglu, >Terminology/Acemoglu, >Economic growth/Acemoglu. Acemoglu I 129 Innovations/motivation/incentives/production targets: (...) paying (...) bonuses created all sorts of disincentives to technological change. For one thing, innovation, which took resources away from current production, risked the output targets not being met and the bonuses not being paid. For another, output targets were usually based on previous production Acemoglu I 130 production levels. This created a huge incentive never to expand output, since this only meant having to produce more in the future, since future targets would be “ratcheted up.” Underachievement was always the best way to meet targets and get the bonus. |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 |
| State (Polity) | Rousseau | Höffe I 270 State/Rousseau/Höffe: (...) although himself a vagabond loner, [Rousseau] defends society in its forcibly reinforced form, as a state order. Höffe I 272 The natural state qua primordial state does not recognise privileges that some people enjoy to the detriment of others; there are neither privileges nor discrimination. The two basic evils that destroy this ideal state are private property and the state (which protects it), "civil society". In French it says "société civile", not "société bourgoise". Rousseau's bourgeois society here, as with other authors of modern times, is not an economic bourgeois society as opposed to a civic society, but the community with the power of coercion, the state, itself. Property: Instead of helping people to achieve the decisive achievement of being with themselves, the two interwoven basic evils, private property and the state, create a threefold inequality among people and, as a result, a threefold alienation: If property - someone fences in a piece of land and declares it his own - surrounds itself with law and justice, it creates rich and poor, if an authority is added, additionally rulers and ruled, and in case of arbitrariness and tyranny, masters and slaves as well. >Civilization/Rousseau. Höffe I 273 In the text [of the second treatise(1)] (...) the establishment of a state appears as a primal sin, with which Rousseau rejects Aristotle's political anthropology (the "inherently political" nature of man) even more sharply than Hobbes. Here the state is not only considered artificial, as it was for Hobbes, but even unnatural. Paradoxically, however, in the end it proves to be necessary. Höffe I 275 Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by the means of a free consent, i.e. the >Social Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement that is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully. >Justification. État civil: With the conclusion of the social contract, people leave the state of nature and enter into the (civic) civil state (état civil). In this transition they undergo a change which, because of its radical nature, can be described as a revolution, admittedly a non-violent one. From now on their behaviour is no longer determined by a physical instinct, but by a "voice of duty"(2) or justice, where the right takes the place of the request. Höffe I 278 Separation of powers: Rousseau rejects the idea of separation of powers just as radically as the idea of representation. However, he wisely considers the democracy he propagates to be an ideal that can never be achieved. >Parliamentarism/Rousseau: RousseauVsPolitical Representation. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique, 1762, I, 8. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Stereotype Threat | Forbes | Haslam I 250 Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The original studies suggested that stereotype threat can be cued for Black college students by how a task is described or whether one’s group identity is made salient. >Experiment/Aronson/Steele; >Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele. Triggers: Along with our colleague Michael Johns, we proposed that stereotype threat is triggered when a situation simultaneously primes three incongruent cognitions: a) I am a member of Group X, b) Group X is thought to do poorly in this domain, c) I care about doing well in this domain (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Cues to subtle sexism, a cartoon demeaning women’s math performance on a lab wall, can for example impair women’s math performance (Adams et al., 2006(2); Oswald and Harvey, 2000(3)). But simply being outnumbered by men in a math or science context can also trigger a concern among women that they might not belong or perform well in the setting (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev, 2000(4); Murphy, Steele and Gross, 2007)(5). Importantly, individuals often need to feel person ally invested in doing well, as individual anonymity often reduces effects (Jamieson and Harkins, 2010(6); Wout et al., 2008(7); Zhang et al., 2013(8)). Haslam I 251 Moderators: A key assumption of the theory is that to experience stereotype threat, one must have knowledge of a negative stereotype about one’s group in relevant domains (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(9); Keifer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007(10); McKown and Weinstein, 2003(11)). Although believing the stereotype is true is not necessary to experience effects, suspicions that the stereotype might be accurate can magnify performance impairments (Schmader et al., 2004)(12). Likewise, individuals are more susceptible to stereotype threat effects when they are more stigma conscious, or attuned to these negative stereotypes (Brown and Lee, 2005(13); Brown and Pinel, 2003(14)). (…) gender gaps in performance are non-existent in countries where there is no evidence of a strong math = male association or where there is greater evidence of gender equality in the culture as a whole (Else-Quest et al., 2010(15); Nosek et al., 2009(16)). Although correlational, this variability might suggest that women in these more gender egalitarian cultures experience less stereotype threat. Even in cultures where stereotypes are prevalent, not all members of a stigmatized group will be vulnerable to effects. As Steele’s (1997) vanguard hypothesis posits, individuals who are most invested in performing well might ironically show the largest performance impairments because the stereotypes themselves pose a greater threat to their identity (Lawrence et al., 2010(17); Nguyen and Ryan, 2008(18)). Such effects could help explain why among one sample of students, racial minorities who initially placed a high value on academic pursuits were later the most likely to drop out of high school (Osborne and Walker, 2006)(19). Just as identification with the domain raises the stakes for one’s performance, so too does the identification with the stigmatized groups to which one belongs (Davis et al., 2006(20); Ployhart et aL, 2003(21); Schmader, 2002(22). Those who are highly group identified perform poorly when scores will be used to compare groups, even if their personal performance is anonymous (Wout et al., 2008(7)). Explanation of the stereotype threat >Explanation/Forbes/Schmader. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Adams, G., Garcia, D.M., Purdie-Vaughns, V. and Steele, C.M. (2006) ‘The detrimental effects of a suggestion of sexism in an instruction situation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 602—15. 3. Oswald, D.L. and Harvey, R.D. (2000) ‘Hostile environments, stereotype threat, and math performance among undergraduate women’, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 19: 3 38—56. 4.. Inzlicht, M. and Ben-Zeev, T. (2000) ‘A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males’, Psychological Science, 1 1: 365—71. 5. Murphy, M.C., Steele, C.M. and Gross, J.J. (2007) ‘Signaling threat: How situational cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings’, Psychological Science, 18: 879—85. 6. Jamieson, J.P. and Harkins, S.G. (2010) ‘Evaluation is necessary to produce stereotype threat performance effects’, Social Influence, 5: 75—86. 7. Wout, D., Danso, H., Jackson, J. and Spencer, S. (2008) ‘The many faces of stereotype threat: Group- and se1f-threat, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44:792—99. 8. Zhang, S., Schmader, T. and Hall, W.M. (2013) L’eggo my ego: Reducing the gender gap in math by unlinking the self from performance’, Self and Identity, 12: 400—12. 9. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 10 .Keifer, A.K. and Sekaquaptewa, D. (2007) ‘Implicit stereotypes and women’s math performance: How implicit gender—math stereotypes influence women’s susceptibility to stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43: 825—32. 11. McKown, C. and Weinstein, R.S. (2003) ‘The development and consequences of stereotype consciousness in middle childhood’, Child Development, 74:498—515. 12. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Barquissau, M. (2004) The costs of accepting gender differences: The role of stereotype endorsement in women’s experience in the math domain’, Sex Roles, 50: 83 5—50. 13. Brown, R.P. and Lee, M.N. (2005) ‘Stigma consciousness and the race gap in college academic achievement’, Self and Identity, 4: 149—5 7. 14. Brown, R.P. and Pinel, E.C. (2003) ‘Stigma on my mind: Individual differences in the experience of stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 626—33. 15. Else-Quest, N.M., Hyde,J.S. and Linn, M.C. (2010) ‘Cross-national patterns of gender differences in mathematics: a meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 136(1): 103—2 7. 16. Nosek, B.A., Smyth, F.L., Sriram, N., Lindner, N.M., Devos, T., Ayala, A. ... and Kesebir, S. (2009) Nationa1 differences in gender—science stereotypes predict national sex differ- 17. Lawrence, J.S., Marks, B.T. and Jackson, J.S. (2010) ‘Domain identification predicts black Students’ underperformance on moderately-difficult tests’, Motivation and Emotion, 34(2): 105—9. 18. Nguyen, H.-H.D. and Ryan, A.M. (2008) ‘Does stereotype threat affect test performance of minorities and women? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 93: 1314—34. 19. Osborne, J.W. and Walker, C. (2006) ‘Stereotype threat, identification with academics, and withdrawal from school: Why the most successful students of colour might be the most likely to withdraw’, Educational Psychology, 26: 563—77. 20. Davis, C.I., Aronson, J. and Salinas, M. (2006) of threat: Racial identity as a moderator of stereotype threat’, Journal of Black Psychology, 32: 399—417. 21. Ployhart, R.E., Ziegert, J.C. and McFarland, L.A. (2003) iJnderstanding racial differences on cognitive ability tests in selection contexts: An integration of stereotype threat and applicant reactions research, Human Performance, 16: 231—59. 22. Schmader, T. (2002) ‘Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38: 194—201. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Stereotype Threat | Schmader | Haslam I 250 Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The original studies suggested that stereotype threat can be cued for Black college students by how a task is described or whether one’s group identity is made salient. (>Experiment/Aronson/Steele; >Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele). Triggers: Along with our colleague Michael Johns, we proposed that stereotype threat is triggered when a situation simultaneously primes three incongruent cognitions: a) I am a member of Group X, b) Group X is thought to do poorly in this domain, c) I care about doing well in this domain (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Cues to subtle sexism, a cartoon demeaning women’s math performance on a lab wall, can for example impair women’s math performance (Adams et al., 2006(2); Oswald and Harvey, 2000(3)). But simply being outnumbered by men in a math or science context can also trigger a concern among women that they might not belong or perform well in the setting (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev, 2000(4); Murphy, Steele and Gross, 2007)(5). Importantly, individuals often need to feel person ally invested in doing well, as individual anonymity often reduces effects (Jamieson and Harkins, 2010(6); Wout et al., 2008(7); Zhang et al., 2013(8)). Haslam I 251 Moderators: A key assumption of the theory is that to experience stereotype threat, one must have knowledge of a negative stereotype about one’s group in relevant domains (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(9); Keifer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007(10); McKown and Weinstein, 2003(11)). Although believing the stereotype is true is not necessary to experience effects, suspicions that the stereotype might be accurate can magnify performance impairments (Schmader et al., 2004)(12). Likewise, individuals are more susceptible to stereotype threat effects when they are more stigma conscious, or attuned to these negative stereotypes (Brown and Lee, 2005(13); Brown and Pinel, 2003(14)). (…) gender gaps in performance are non-existent in countries where there is no evidence of a strong math = male association or where there is greater evidence of gender equality in the culture as a whole (Else-Quest et al., 2010(15); Nosek et al., 2009(16)). Although correlational, this variability might suggest that women in these more gender egalitarian cultures experience less stereotype threat. Even in cultures where stereotypes are prevalent, not all members of a stigmatized group will be vulnerable to effects. As Steele’s (1997) vanguard hypothesis posits, individuals who are most invested in performing well might ironically show the largest performance impairments because the stereotypes themselves pose a greater threat to their identity (Lawrence et al., 2010(17); Nguyen and Ryan, 2008(18)). Such effects could help explain why among one sample of students, racial minorities who initially placed a high value on academic pursuits were later the most likely to drop out of high school (Osborne and Walker, 2006)(19). Just as identification with the domain raises the stakes for one’s performance, so too does the identification with the stigmatized groups to which one belongs (Davis et al., 2006(20); Ployhart et aL, 2003(21); Schmader, 2002(22). Those who are highly group identified perform poorly when scores will be used to compare groups, even if their personal performance is anonymous (Wout et al., 2008(7)). Explanation of the stereotype threat: >Explanation/Forbes/Schmader. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Adams, G., Garcia, D.M., Purdie-Vaughns, V. and Steele, C.M. (2006) ‘The detrimental effects of a suggestion of sexism in an instruction situation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 602—15. 3. Oswald, D.L. and Harvey, R.D. (2000) ‘Hostile environments, stereotype threat, and math performance among undergraduate women’, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 19: 3 38—56. 4.. Inzlicht, M. and Ben-Zeev, T. (2000) ‘A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males’, Psychological Science, 1 1: 365—71. 5. Murphy, M.C., Steele, C.M. and Gross, J.J. (2007) ‘Signaling threat: How situational cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings’, Psychological Science, 18: 879—85. 6. Jamieson, J.P. and Harkins, S.G. (2010) ‘Evaluation is necessary to produce stereotype threat performance effects’, Social Influence, 5: 75—86. 7. Wout, D., Danso, H., Jackson, J. and Spencer, S. (2008) ‘The many faces of stereotype threat: Group- and se1f-threat, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44:792—99. 8. Zhang, S., Schmader, T. and Hall, W.M. (2013) L’eggo my ego: Reducing the gender gap in math by unlinking the self from performance’, Self and Identity, 12: 400—12. 9. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 10 .Keifer, A.K. and Sekaquaptewa, D. (2007) ‘Implicit stereotypes and women’s math performance: How implicit gender—math stereotypes influence women’s susceptibility to stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43: 825—32. 11. McKown, C. and Weinstein, R.S. (2003) ‘The development and consequences of stereotype consciousness in middle childhood’, Child Development, 74:498—515. 12. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Barquissau, M. (2004) The costs of accepting gender differences: The role of stereotype endorsement in women’s experience in the math domain’, Sex Roles, 50: 83 5—50. 13. Brown, R.P. and Lee, M.N. (2005) ‘Stigma consciousness and the race gap in college academic achievement’, Self and Identity, 4: 149—5 7. 14. Brown, R.P. and Pinel, E.C. (2003) ‘Stigma on my mind: Individual differences in the experience of stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 626—33. 15. Else-Quest, N.M., Hyde,J.S. and Linn, M.C. (2010) ‘Cross-national patterns of gender differences in mathematics: a meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 136(1): 103—2 7. 16. Nosek, B.A., Smyth, F.L., Sriram, N., Lindner, N.M., Devos, T., Ayala, A. ... and Kesebir, S. (2009) Nationa1 differences in gender—science stereotypes predict national sex differ- 17. Lawrence, J.S., Marks, B.T. and Jackson, J.S. (2010) ‘Domain identification predicts black Students’ underperformance on moderately-difficult tests’, Motivation and Emotion, 34(2): 105—9. 18. Nguyen, H.-H.D. and Ryan, A.M. (2008) ‘Does stereotype threat affect test performance of minorities and women? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 93: 1314—34. 19. Osborne, J.W. and Walker, C. (2006) ‘Stereotype threat, identification with academics, and withdrawal from school: Why the most successful students of colour might be the most likely to withdraw’, Educational Psychology, 26: 563—77. 20. Davis, C.I., Aronson, J. and Salinas, M. (2006) of threat: Racial identity as a moderator of stereotype threat’, Journal of Black Psychology, 32: 399—417. 21. Ployhart, R.E., Ziegert, J.C. and McFarland, L.A. (2003) iJnderstanding racial differences on cognitive ability tests in selection contexts: An integration of stereotype threat and applicant reactions research, Human Performance, 16: 231—59. 22. Schmader, T. (2002) ‘Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38: 194—201. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Subjects | Dilthey | Gadamer I 227 Subject/Dilthey/Gadamer: (...) [Dilthey] agreed (...) with the historical school: there is not a general subject, but only historical individuals. The ideality of meaning is not to be assigned to a transcendental subject, but arises from the historical reality of life. It is life itself that unfolds and forms itself into understandable units, and it is the single individual who understands these units as such. This is the self-evident starting point for Dilthey's analysis. The interrelation of life, as it is revealed to the individual (and in the biographical recognition it is experienced and understood by others), is created by the significance of certain experiences. From them, as from an organizing centre, the unity of a life course is formed, just as the meaning of a melody is formed - not from the mere one after the other of the tones, but from the musical motifs that determine their design unity. >Interrelation/Dilthey. Gadamer I 250 Subject/DiltheyVsLocke/DiltheylVsHume/DiltheyVsKant/Gadamer: "In the veins of the recognizing subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct, real blood does not run".(1) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life", and very similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, and which was already an indicator of the tendency that later became widely accepted, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. W. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, Bd. 1. S. XVIII. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Teleology | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 462 Teleology/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: What is, is true in its essence, that is: present in the presence of an infinite spirit, and only because of this is it possible for finite-human thinking to recognize being. Here, then, one does not think from the concept of a subject that would be for itself and that made everything else an object. On the contrary, in Plato, the being of the "soul" is determined by the fact that it participates in the true being, that is, that it belongs to the same sphere of being as the idea(1), and Aristotle says of the soul that it is, in a certain sense, all that exists(2). In this thinking, there is no talk of a worldless Gadamer I 463 spirit that is certain of itself and that would have to seek the path to worldly existence, but both originally belong together. The relationship is the primary one. Teleology: The older thinking took this into account by the universal ontological function that it gave to the idea of teleology. In the relationship of purpose it is so that the mediations by which something is achieved do not by chance prove to be suitable for the achievement of the purpose, but they are chosen and taken from the outset as appropriate means. The allocation of the means to the end is therefore a priori. We call it expediency, and it is well known that not only reasonable human action is expedient in this way, but also where there is no talk of setting ends and choosing means, as in all living conditions, it is true that they can only be thought of under the idea of expediency, as the mutual interaction of all parts with each other(3). Here too the relationship of the whole is more original than the parts. >Purpose/Aristotle. 1. Plato, Phaid. 72; 2. Arist. De anima III 8, 431 b 21. 3. As is well known, Kant's criticism of teleological judgement also leaves this subjective necessity quite intact. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Terminology | Dawkins | I 27 Def Altruistic/Dawkins: An organism behaves altruistically when it increases the welfare of another at its expense. I 28 Def Well-Being/Dawkins: Well-being is defined as survival chances even if the effect on the actual outlook is so small that it can seem negligible. Egoism/Altruism/Dawkins: oriented on actual behavior, not on intentions. No psychology of motives! I 32 Altruism/Dawkins: Altruism is often falsely attributed: when living creatures actually behave in a way that benefits the "well-being of the species" or "well-being of the group". I 126 Def ESS/Dawkins: an evolutionarilly stable strategy is one that - if the majority of a population adopts it - cannot be overruled by any alternative strategy. ((S) Not defined.) I 447 Narrower Def ESS: a strategy that performs well against copies of itself. It will often encounter copies of itself, since a successful strategy is predominant in a population. I 227 Fitness/Dawkins: The expression should not be used, because it falsely emanates from the individual! Instead, the selfish gene is the only entity that matters! Genes in children are selected because of their ability to override parents, genes in the parents' body vice versa. I 377 Def Extended phenotype/Dawkins: phenotypic effects of a gene are all the effects of a gene on the body in which it sits. But it also affects "the world"! E.g. beavers' dams, birds' nests, shell of the quiver flies (movable cement houses). In difference to the eye as a "miracle of nature", we do not have to attribute these achievements to processes that occur within the mothers' interior. They are achievements of the creating individual. (Usually called "instinct"). I 386 Def haplodiploid: unfertilized eggs develop into males. I.e., e.g., male bark beetles have no father (as is the case with bees and ants). But in the case of the bark beetles something must penetrate the eggs. This task is performed by bacteria. (Parasites). |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Terminology | Monod | I 30 Teleonomy/Monod: teleonomy is ambiguous as it includes the idea of a "project". All achievements that contribute to the success are called teleonomic. I 31 Definition teleonomic information (set)/Monod: all structures and services correspond to a certain amount of information which must be transferred in order for these structures to be realized. >Order/Monod, >Selection/Monod, >Structures/Monod. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
| Terminology | Parsons | Habermas IV 333 Pattern variables/Terminology/Parsons: since Parsons neglects the mechanism of communication in building his theory of action, he must, under different premises, try to find an equivalent to the lifeworld with the three components culture, society and personality. >Life world, >Culture, >Society, >Personality He introduces the "pattern variables of value orientation"(1): Cultural values serve as a pattern for a choice between alternative courses of action: they determine the orientations of an actor by defining preferences without affecting the contingency of the decision. Habermas IV 334/335 The pattern variables lie on the dimensions in which older sociology had described the transition from traditional to modern societies, i.e. the processes of social rationalization. Habermas VI 336 Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. It should be possible to test how any cultural values structure the decision-making scope of actors through one of the a priori possible combinations of basic decisions. Habermas IV 341 Def Allocation/Parsons: covers adaptation and target achievement functions, procurement, mobilisation, distribution and the effective use of scarce resources. Def social integration/Parsons: extends to functions of preservation and integration of cultural values incorporated into the system of action. It is not measured by functional imperatives, but by consistency requirements. Habermas IV 361 AGIL Schema/Parsons/Terminology/Habermas: (Since 1953): Adaptation (behavioral system) Goal attainment (personality) Latency (Cultural System) Integration (Social System). HabermasVsParsons: in doing so, he disguised the interface that had been created by the merging of the two paradigms "action" and "system". Habermas IV 366 Problem: Parsons has to analyze the coping with the problems simultaneously in the dimensions space and time. A system must secure its existence in relation to the environment and to itself (internal/external) as well as in relation to the start/end state. >Space, >Time, >Systems, >Inside/Outside. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System NY 1951, S. 78ff |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Thinking | James | Diaz-Bone I 32 Mental activities/James: mental activities cannot be recognized independently of their relationship to the physical environment. Reality and knowledge, environment and knowledge are not separate achievements. Action is adaptation. >World, >World/Thinking, >Environment/Gadamer, >Lifeworld. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Understanding | Dilthey | Gadamer I 235 Understanding/Finiteness/Infinfinity/History/Dilthey/Gadamer: Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness be an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge? Gadamer I 236 The foundation of history in a psychology of understanding, as Dilthey envisioned it, places the historian in precisely that idealistic simultaneity with his or her object that we call aesthetic and admire in Ranke. Of course, the decisive question remains, how the finite human nature should be able to achieve such infinite understanding. Can this really have been Dilthey's opinion? DiltheyVsHegel: Didn't Dilthey insist towards Hegel that one has to hold on to the consciousness of one's own finiteness? Here alone one has to look more closely. His criticism of Hegel's rational idealism meant only the apriorism of his concept speculation - the inner infinity of the spirit had no fundamental gravity for him but was positively fulfilled in the ideal of a historically enlightened reason, which would have matured into the genius of "understanding everything" (German: "Allesverstehen"). Infinity/Dilthey: For Dilthey, the consciousness of finiteness did not mean an infinity of consciousness and no limitation. Rather, it testifies to life's ability to rise above all barriers in energy and activity. In this respect, the potential infinity of the spirit is represented in him. Certainly not speculation, but historical reason is the way in which this infinity is actualized. Historical understanding spreads out over all historical circumstances and is truly universal because it has its firm ground in the totality and infinity of the spirit. For this, Dilthey follows the old teaching, which derives the possibility of understanding from the sameness of human nature. The limits set to the universality of understanding by the historical finiteness of our being are thus only of a subjective nature to him. Certainly, he can nevertheless recognize something positive in them that will be fruitful for knowledge; thus he assures that only sympathy makes real understanding possible.(1) >Sympathy/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 277 Wright I 153 Understanding/Dilthey/Wright, G. H.: Dilthey's Concept of Understanding (W. Dilthey: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883; W. Dilthey: Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie, 1894) was originally strongly "psychologistic" and "subjectivistic". Later he emphasized - obviously under Hegel's influence - the "objective character of the achievements of the method of understanding. (especially W. Dilthey: Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik , 1900, Appendix S. 332-338.) |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Understanding | Ranke | Gadamer I 215 Understanding/Ranke/Historism/Gadamer: Ranke, Thesis: The last result of historical science is "compassion, complicity of the universe"(1). Rankes' famous twist to erase himself is based on this pantheistic background. DiltheyVsRanke: Of course, such self-extinction is in truth, as Dilthey(2) has objected, the expansion of the self into an inner universe. RankeVsDilthey: For Ranke, self-extinction is still a form of real participation. One must not understand the concept of participation in psychological-subjective terms, but must think of it from the standpoint of the concept of life that underlies it. Because all historical phenomena are manifestations of All-Life (German: "All-Leben"), participation in them is participation in life. Gadamer: From there the expression of understanding gains its almost religious sound. Understanding is direct participation in life, without the mental mediation through the concept. It is precisely this point that the historian is concerned not to relate reality to concepts, but to reach the point where "life thinks and thought lives". The phenomena of historical life are grasped in understanding as the manifestations of All-Life, the divinity. Such an understanding penetration of the same means in fact more than a human cognitive achievement of an inner universe, as Dilthey reformulated the historian's ideal against Ranke. It is a metaphysical statement that puts Ranke in the greatest proximity to Fichte and Hegel when he says: "The clear, full, lived insight, that is the marrow of being (German: "Seyns") has become transparent and sees through itself"(3). In such a phrase it is quite noticeable how close Ranke remains to German idealism. The full self-transparency of being, which Hegel thought of in the absolute knowledge of philosophy, legitimizes even Ranke's self-confidence as a historian, no matter how much he rejects the claim of speculative philosophy. Gadamer I 216 Gadamer: The pure devotion to the vision of things, the epic attitude of one who seeks the fairy tale of world history(4) may indeed be called poetic, provided that for the historian God is present in everything not in the form of the concept but in the form of the "external imagination". Indeed, one cannot better describe Ranke's self-image than by these terms of Hegel. The historian, as Ranke understands him, belongs to the figure of the absolute mind, which Hegel described as that of the >Kunstreligion. DroysenVsRanke/Gadamer: For a sharper-thinking historian, the problem of such a self-conception had to become visible. The philosophical significance of Droysen's historiography lies precisely in the fact that he seeks to detach the concept of understanding from the indeterminacy of aesthetic-pantheistic communion that he has with Ranke and formulates his conceptual premises. The first of these preconditions is the concept of expression(5). Understanding is understanding of expression. >History, >History/Ranke, >Historiography, >World History, >Universal history. 1. Ranke (ed. Rothacker). S. 52. 2. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 281. 3. Lutherfragment 13. 4. Ebenda S. 1 5. Vgl. auch unten S. 341 f. , 471 f. und Bd. 2 der Ges. Werke, Exkurs VI, S. 384ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Understanding | Schütz | Habermas III 176 Understanding/Sociology/Schütz/Habermas: Schütz thesis: we make at least three preliminary methodological decisions by choosing basic concepts of action theory: 1. We describe social reality in such a way that it is conceived as a construction of the everyday world that emerges from the interpretative achievements of the participants.(1) Habermas III 177 2. The scientist has to ask which model of an individual being can be constructed and which typical contents are to be assigned to it.(2) 3. The theoretical concepts must follow the pre-theoretical concepts in which the members interpret their situation.(3) >Action theory, >Theories, >Theory language, >Observation language, >Method, >Models. 1. A. Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, Wien 1932, S. 6. 2. Ibid. p. 49f. 3. Ibid. p. 50. |
Schütz I Alfred Schütz Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt Wien 1932 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Universal History | Weber | Habermas III 225 Universal History/Weber/Habermas: For Weber, the main question is: why outside Europe, "neither scientific nor artistic nor national nor economic development should be directed in the direction of rationalization that is characteristic by the Occident".(1) >Rationalization, >Art, >Culture, >Economy, >Science. Western Culture/Weber/Habermas: Weber counts among the achievements of Western rationalism: the modern natural science, the systematic specialized company of the university organized sciences, the printed products produced for the market, the art business, the harmonious music with the work forms of sonata, symphony, opera and orchestra instruments, the use of the linear and air perspective in painting, scientifically systematized jurisprudence, the institutions of formal law and jurisprudence by legally trained civil servants, modern state administration on the basis of a fixed law, predictable private law transactions and the profit-oriented working capitalist enterprise, which requires the separation of budget and business, i.e. requires the legal separation of personal and company assets.(2) >Western rationalism, >Rationality, >Purpose rationality, >Modernity, >Modernization, >Society, >Culture, >Cultural transmission. 1. Zur Bibliografie: C. Seyfarth, G. Schmidt, Max Weber Bibliografie, Stuttgart 1977; G. Roth, Max Weber, A Bibliographical Essay, in: ZfS, 1977, p. 91ff; D. Käsler (Hg.) Klassiker des Soziologischen Denkens, Bd II, München 1978, p. 424ff. 2. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, Vol. I, Hamburg 1973, p. 20 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Validity Claims | Habermas | III 65 Definition validity claim/Habermas: a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of a statement are fulfilled. While yes/no opinions on claims to power are arbitrary, statements on claims of validity are characterised by the fact that the listener agrees or disagrees with a criticisable statement for reasons. They are an expression of insight. HabermasVsTugendhat: this neglects this distinction in E. Tugendhat 1976(1). III 66 Examples of claims of validity are those of truth, correctness, appropriateness or comprehensibility (or well-formedness). These claims of validity are usually implicitly raised. >Truth, >Correctness, >Appropriateness, >Understandability, >Well-formedness. IV 107 Validity Claim/Speech Act/Habermas: a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his/her offer independently of the normative context. >Motivation. This is not the achievement of an effect with the listener, but a rationally motivated communication with the listener, which comes about on the basis of a criticisable validity claim. This is about a speaker's demand that the listener should accept a sentence as true or as truthful. >Agreement. IV 111 Norm validity/truth/Durkheim/Habermas: the idea of truth can only borrow from the concept of norm validity the determination of the impersonality deprived of time (2) of an idealized agreement, an inter-subjectivity related to an ideal communication community. >Norms, >Ideal speech community. The authority behind knowledge does not (...) coincide with the moral authority behind norms. Rather, the concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with the claim to intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, the idea of correspondence of sentences and facts with the concept of an idealized consensus. >Consensus, >Intersubjectivity, >Correspondence, >Facts, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Experience. Validity Claim/Habermas: only from this connection does the term of a criticizable validity claim emerge. 1. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1976, p. 76f, 219ff 2. Vgl. 1.E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, S. 584. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Welfare Economics | Neoclassical Economics | 269ffWelfare Economics/Neoclassics: Welfare Economics is an essential part of the neoclassical paradigm. It makes use of methodological individualism and pursues an approach of marginal utility. It is orientated utilitarian, i.e. that the respective benefit estimation of the individuals is taken into account. (Bentham's welfare function (1)). W = W(y1, y2, ..., yn) Methodical Problem: the individual benefit estimates are in turn aggregated to a social welfare value. This cannot be founded on an individualistic basis. Mause I 270 Problem: this form of redistribution can lead to injustice if the individual pecuniary situation of individuals is not taken into account. Solution: one has to go back one step and use the general functional form of a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function. (2)(3) Welfare maximum: one condition for its achievement is Pareto efficiency. Def Pareto efficiency: exists when no member of society can be better off without putting another member worse. If this condition is not met, efficiency reserves must still be used. Another condition for an optimal fiscal policy: there must be no unused potential for exchange profits, i.e. that the individual goods are allocated to the consumers. Problem: there are theoretically infinitely many allocations that are Pareto efficient, but only one maximizes social welfare. Def First theorem of welfare economics: any market equilibrium produces Pareto efficiency during full competition and absence of external effects. Def Second theorem of welfare economics: each of these market equilibria can be achieved through an appropriate distribution of resources in the initial situation without loss of efficiency. (4) 1. Jean Hindriks & Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate public economics, Cambridge, MA, 2013. 2. Bergson, Abram. 1938. A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 52 (7), 1938, S. 314– 344. 3. Paul A. Samuelson, The foundations of economic analysis. Cambridge, MA 1947. 4. Nicola Acocella, The foundations of economic policy: Values and techniques. Cambridge 1998 S. 72-77. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Western Rationalism | Mbembe | Brocker I 915 Western rationalism/Mbembe/Herb: "It has never been easy to talk sensibly about sub-Saharan Africa" (Mbembe 2016(1), 39). Mbembe blames the dogmatic image of the West for this, in which Africa appears primarily as a sign of lack, absence and non-existence, as a place of cannibalism, pandemics and plague, in short as the absolutely different of the West. Brocker I 916 In this respect, it is precisely this that gives the West access to its own unconscious and justifies the shape of its own subjectivity. Many are involved in the creation of this image. In the wake of the great thinkers of modernity from >Hegel to Weber, namely all those who celebrate subjectivity, individuality and rationality as exclusive achievements of the West. (>Subjectivity/Mbembe). In contrast, all other cultures appear traditional, primitive and underdeveloped, unable to follow the rules of the universal grammar of the West. Mbembe names the unholy alliance of modernity, rationality and occidentality in the Eurocentric self-image and wants to overcome it. He calls for a fundamental philosophical critique of Western epistemes. Thus he sees the violence of Western discourse still at work in the social sciences and humanities today. Economic and political sciences, for example, however meagre their Africa expertise may be, continued in their own way the practices of colonial subjugation with their demands for good governance, free market and neoliberal world order. In such criticism, Mbembe maintains an equal distance to Marxist theories of dependence and to discourses of Foucault, neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist façon. >Subjectivity/Mbembe. 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| World | Postmodernism | Gaus I 48 World/historiography/Postmodernism/Bennett: A metanarrative is an overarching theory about the way the world operates, a story about the fundamental character of the natural-social universe. As such, it functions as a frame of reference for judging other theories of more limited scope and aspiration. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. It may be experienced as a religious truth or as a metaphysical imaginary with a contingent heuristic value, or as occupying one of many positions between these two poles. Metanarratives are used within political theory to help legitimate a theory’s claims about authority, the state, citizenship, freedom, rights, etc. For example, Hobbes uses a metanarrative of a world of natural bodies in perpetual motion and a distant, Jobian God to ground his notions of sovereignty, contract, political speech, and civil peace. [Some postmodern theorists] affirm[] the psychological utility and ethical power of an ontological imaginary. >Th. Hobbes, >Freedom, >Rights, >State, >Citizenship. These theorists, like Hobbes, link their political claims to speculative claims about nature, matter, or being. But their metaphysical views are presented as an onto-story whose persuasiveness is always at issue and ‘can never be fully disentangled from an interpretation of present historical circumstances’ (White, 2000(1): 10–11). Nietzsche is often the inspiration behind the onto-stories affirmed within postmodern theory, in terms of both content and style. He offers a vision of the way the world is. But he also insists that, like all metaphysical orientations, it is a ‘conjecture’ he is not able to prove (...)(2). >F. Nietzsche. Deleuze: The Deleuzean story of a world of protean forces shares Nietzsche’s emphasis on open-ended dynamism and flow, as does Lyotard’s ‘A postmodern fable’, a sci-fitale of humans preparing to escape the earth as the sun is about to burn out. >G. Deleuze. Lyotard: Also like Nietzsche, Lyotard describes a world without the promise of a final or eschatological achievement. If to be modern, says Lyotard, is to long to re-establish a ‘full and whole relation with the law of the Other … as this … was in the beginning’, then to be postmodern is to try to cure thought and action of this eschatological desiring (1997(3): 96–7). Gaus I 49 Humans: Postmodern theorizing repositions the human in relation to the non-human entities and forces with which it shares the world. Its metaphysics of immanence displaces humans from the centre of the universe. We are viewed instead as a particularly complex and reflexive formation, differing from other forms in significant degree but not in kind. >J.-F. Lyotard, >Immanence. 1. White, Stephen K. (2000) Affirmation in Political Theory: The Strengths of Weak Ontology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1987) The Will to Power. New York: Random House. 3. Lyotard, Jean-François (1997) Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges van den Abbeele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Youth Culture | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 121 Youth culture/self/Developmental psychology/Upton: Sense of self is (…) thought to be influenced by adolescent involvement in cliques and crowds. According to Erikson (1950)(1), community membership is central to the achievement of identity as it requires solidarity with a group’s ideals. Thus, adolescents deal with the difficulties they experience in committing to adult identities (the identity crisis) by making exaggerated commitments to certain style groups and by separating themselves from other style groups. They may use particular kinds of clothes and music to indicate their unique style and how it differentiates them from other groups. These cliques and crowds, clearly identified by their own set of style, values and norms, are what we often now refer to as ‘youth culture’. According to Miles et al. (1998)(2), identifying with youth culture gives adolescents some power over their identity in a rapidly changing world. Paradoxically, by playing the conformity game, adolescents become more able to feel unique and different. Recently, studies of youth culture have suggested that (…) consumption is central to the construction of adolescent identities (Phoenix. 2005)(3). Many such studies have focused on the links between consumption, style and identity, and have concluded that style provides an essential way of defining and sustaining group boundaries (Croghan et al.. 2006)(4). Milner (2004)(5) proposes that adolescents use their consumer power to gain a sense of acceptance and belonging with their peer group. However, the flip side of this is that failing to maintain such an identity can lead to problems such teasing, social exclusion and loss of status (Blatchford, 1998(6); Croghan et al., 2006)(4). Given that such consumption is often linked to particular brands, an important issue to consider here is how economic disadvantage might make a difference to adolescent popularity. Some evidence suggests that not having enough money to afford the ‘right’ brands can lead to social exclusion, as brand items serve as markers of group inclusion that have to be genuine and could not be faked (Croghan et al. 2006)(4). Other studies (e.g. Milner. 2004)(5) suggest that, rather than engaging in conflicts around style, young people may express solidarity with these cliques by modelling themselves on the popular groups, but resisting the consumption of brand-name goods, Upton I 122 thereby establishing a new, less high-status group. >Social behavior, >Socialization, >Social identity, >Group behavior, >Group cohesion, >Social psychology. 1. Erikson. EH (1950) Childhood and Society, New York: WW Norton. 2. Miles, S, Cliff, D and Burr, V (1998) ‘Fitting in and sticking out’: consumption, consumer meanings and the construction of young people’s identities, Journal of Youth Studies, 1:81-91. 3. Phoenix. A (2005) Young people and consumption: communalities and differences in the construction of identities, in Tufte, B, Rasmussen, J and Christensen LB (eds) Frontrunners or Copycats? Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. 4. Croghan, R. Griffin, C, Hunter J and Phoenix, A (2006) Style failure: consumption, identity and social exclusion. Journal of Youth Studies, 9(4): 46 3-78. 5. Milner, M (2004) Freaks, Geeks, and Cool Kids: American teenagers, schools, and the culture of consumption. New York: Routledge. 6. Blatchford, P (1998) Social Life in School. London: Palmer. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Correspondence Theory | James Vs Correspondence Theory | Diaz-Bone I 88 Pragmatism Vs correspondence theory: a match for James softens the dichotomy true/false. (> achievement, adjustment). Truth/James: analogy to money: Credit: belief can turn out to be wrong. I 89 Wrong: something that turns out to be false after an investigation - has it always been wrong? James: Assumptions can have been real (some sort of "true"). They had a truth value that was a guide for action. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Dodwell, P.C. | Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C. | I 258 Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model. I 259 VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware. The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine. I 259 Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value. I 260 The idea of a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them. DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements! Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom). Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual. Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs). I 261 Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway) Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside. Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology: As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character. I 262 No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea: I 263 if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement: Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain. The latter is doubtful. RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself. Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs. Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle. I 263/264 It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?"). I 265 Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid. I 266 For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills: RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations. At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs). Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature. Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes. Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Epiphenomenalism | McGinn Vs Epiphenomenalism | I 216 McGinnVsEpiphenomenalism: we should preceive the theory of the by-product as much more surprising than we do and as more enigmatic. It's really amazing, only quite unforeseeable that the reason proves to be capable of the achievements that it it is actually capable of. ((S) Reason makes our lives so complicated) ... it is a mystery why the genes have not installed a limitation. By-product/Epiphenomenon/McGinn: to take the relevant theory seriously we ought to see a conceptual or theoretical continuity between understanding problems affecting the lives of flying or floating creatures or beings in underground passages and the problems of our philosophy. I 217 McGinnVsEpiphenomenalism: bare fiddling around. as long as it is not shown why it should be such that human reason might extend in this direction. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Freud, S. | Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. | Derrida I 101 Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud). Derrida I 101 ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers. Lacan I 41 LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying. I 122 LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind"). Rorty V 42 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". (Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.) V 62 Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual. V 63 MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view. Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings. V 64 "Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires. V 65 RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre. V 66 We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts. V 67 Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre. V 67/68 Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view". V 69 Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism. V 70 What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Goodman, N. | Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. | Introduction Putnam II IV Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language. Sainsbury V 129 Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 358 Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher. ((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.) I 359 Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger: 1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction 2. provisional nature 3. without claim to factuality 4. expediency. RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed. I 360 Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95). Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 406ff Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery. It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production. 407 Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura. (Bolz pro Aura). Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility. Putnam I 256 Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Hume, D. | Quine Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 115 Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume). Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure. I 178 The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. Quine V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. V 88 Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as V 89 e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times. QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist. But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images: a) Fantasies b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory. Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit" b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete. Quine VII (d) 65 Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it. Quine XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved? |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Luhmann, N. | Habermas Vs Luhmann, N. | I 426 Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies. I 430 HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment. I 431 Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life. Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true). I 434 HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself. I 435 Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that! I 437 HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution. I 438 HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events. I 441 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension. Luhmann II 136 Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness." II 141 HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice. II 165 System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action. AU Cass.12 HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Realism | Millikan Vs Realism | I 245 Classical Realism/thinking/Millikan: for classical realism thinking about a thing was to bring this thing or its nature before the conscious mind. Plato/Aristotle/Husserl: the nature of the thing alone occurs in the mind. formerly Russell/Moore/phenomenalism: the thing alone comes before the mind, (without "nature"). Locke/Hume: Thesis: instead of the thing we are dealing with a representation that embodies its nature by copying it. Descartes/Whitehead: a way or an aspect of the thing embodies its nature. Knowledge/thinking/realism/Millikan: So we know ipso facto what we think. The following four things are not distinguished by classical realism: 1. that it seems that one thinks something of something 2. really thinking 3. that it seems that one knows what one is thinking 4. really knowing what one thinks. Identification/classical realism/Millikan: to identify the real value of one'S thoughts is then not the identification with something, or recognition, because one only has a single encounter with the thing. Clear and precise/Realism: if a thought is clear, it is necessarily real and known about the nature of this thing, real or possible. I 246 Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object happens in the moment and never has a reference to past or future acts of consciousness. Problem: how then a thing should be identified as the same as earlier. Classical realism makes a mystery of that. Item/object/thing/classical realism: an object may then have no permanent existence. Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: nothing can be identified by perception alone, recognition: is an act of pure thought in the re-encounter in the volatile flux of things that are given to the senses. Sense/Platon/Descartes/Locke: to somehow direct the mind on eternal objects. thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: Then one could only ever have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects. Solution: taking properties and kinds as the eternal objects one could think of directly. I 247 Problem: how should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could being involved in the world be essential to them? Then it had to be assumed that there are features and kinds that are not exemplified. Thing/nature/essence/classical realism/Millikan: because durable items could not appear before the (only momentarily conscious) mind, the thing and its nature had to be separated. (Nature is eternal and necessary, the thing transitory and accidental). nature/classical realism was sometimes simplistically interpreted as a set of properties. Problem: how can the nature of a transitory thing, its very own identity, be a set eternal characteristics? Identity/MillikanVsRealism: how can the identity of a thing be something other than this thing again? But this has not troubled philosophers at that time. Empiricism/EmpirismVsRealism/Hume/Millikan: revolutionary with Hume was that nothing should be in the mind which had not previously been in the senses. This means that the previous distinction between perception and thought coincided. Problem: now is no longer how to construct the temporal from the eternal, I 248 but how we should construct permanent objects from current objects. ((S) Hume/(S): Thesis: an object only exists in one moment and later again).This led to forms of nominalism and phenomenalism. Realism/thinking/judgment/nature/thing/existence/Millikan: a solution: if there is rather the nature than the object that comes before the mind, then the accidental object is not necessary for nature, it does not necessarily have to exist. Then the realization that there is really the object corresponds to a judgment rather than contemplation about its nature. Existence: that the thing existed became something additional that was added. Ontology/Millikan: Problem: that something should exist "in addition to its previously existing nature". Thinking/Classic Realism/Millikan: applying a term was then equated to judging that a thing exists. So thinking-of = Identifying. I 249 Identification/realism/Millikan: takes place only in a moment and involves only a single encounter with the object. Then this is a kind of aesthetic experience in which consciousness bathes in a becoming aware of the thing. What good would that do? Identification/Millikan: which purpose does it serve normally? Thesis: a) it supposed to help apply prior knowledge to a current case. b) it should match up experiences that were mediated by a medium with experiences from another medium Ex seeing and language. Identity/Relation/Millikan: then identification needs to be described as essentially relational! But classical realism is not able to. Identification/classical realism/Millikan: assumes that the identification of the object is involved in thoinking of it. And since thinking of an object is a momentary act that has nothing to do with other acts, it is impossible to match the capturing of one aspect of an object and capturing a different aspect of that object! Ex knowing that Kant lived in Konigsberg has nothing to do with knowing that he was a philosopher. I 250 Recognition/classical realism/Millikan: recognizing the object as the same is another achievement, it has nothing to do with the repeated thinking of the object. Intentionality/MillikanVsRealism/Millikan: Solution: there may be simple thoughts of complex objects. Also, my theory allows that one knows what one thinks while discovering the complexity of one's thoughts. Intension/Millikan: my theory does not confuse intentionality with having differing intensions. That is, a term can transform with time, without losing track of the thing at issue. (Conceptual change, >meaning change). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Subjectivism | Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism | Stegmüller IV 177 VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words. IV 178 VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness. IV 216 Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation. Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable. VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones: 1. Hierarchy of objective norms 2. The impossible changeability of human nature. IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all! 1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? IV 304 VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls). IV 305 VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists. Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands. IV 306 Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time. IV 307 Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations, from the outside they are causes. Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Various Authors | Dennett Vs Various Authors | I 87 DennettVsDavies, Paul: ("God’s plan"): the human mind cannot be an unimportant byproduct. Dennett: why should it be unimportant or trivial merely because it is a byproduct? Fallacy, error. Why can the most important thing of all not be something that has emerged from something unimportant?. I 192 DennettVsSnow: was wrong when he compared scientific discoveries with Shakespeare: Shakespeare belongs only to himself, scientific achievement belongs to all. E.g. Why is there no copyright on the successful multiplication of two numbers?. I 244 DennettVsSmolin/Parallel Universes: Problem: there are too few limitations on what should be described as obvious variations and why. I 333 GhiselinVsPangloss Principle: is bad because it asks the wrong question: the question of what is good. Instead, we should ask "What happened?". I 692 DennettVsGhiselin: he deceived himself: there is never a clear answer to this question that does not greatly depends on what we like!. General/Particular/AI/Dennett: Donald Symons: there is no "general problem solver", because there are no general problems, only particular problems. DennettVsSymons: What was that? Neither is there a general wound, but only particular wounds. Nevertheless, there is a general healing process. II 23/24 Consciousness/Language/Dennett: There is a view that certain beings could possess a consciousness, but due to their lack of language they cannot inform us about it. DennettVs: why do I think that is a problem? E.g. The computer can also be function if no printer is connected. Our royal road to getting to know the minds of others is language. It does not reach all the way to them, but that’s just a limitation of our knowledge, but not a limitation of their minds. Sai V 77 Identity/Sainbury: no vague relation. DennettVsSainsbury: identity is no relation!. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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