Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 44 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Adaption Gould I 198
Adaptation/Preadaption/Gould: Definition preadaption: derived from the thesis that other functions have been fulfilled in the initial stages. E.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. Gould: the concept of pre-adaptation is indispensable, but it is not appropriate to demonstrate continuity in all cases.
I 199
For example, in two genera of Biodae (giant snakes) on Mauritius there is a divided maxillary bone (with elastic connection), which is not found in any other vertebrate on earth. Here a discontinuous transition is preferable because a jaw cannot be half broken. Examples:
I 195
For example, fish with jaws are related to their ancestors without jaws. Macroevolution (the larger structural transitions) is nothing but an expanded microevolution (e. g. the change of flies in closed containers).
I 196
For example, if black moths replace whites within a century, reptiles can become birds by gently summing up countless changes over a few million years.
II 51
Adaptation/Gould: We do not have to choose between limitation and beauty of adaptation, because only both together provides the necessary tension to regulate evolution. Selection/Gould: GouldVs: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, or the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found in an organism results from the selection.
Behavior/Adaptation: Each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation. E. g. breeding behaviour of the gannet.
II 52
Behavior/Animal/Gould: The sources of organic forms and behaviours are diverse and contain at least three primary categories: a) Instantaneous adaptation (the behaviour of the offspring),
b) The potential non-adaptive consequences of basic structural designs that act as restrictions on adaptation.
c) adaptations of ancestors now used by the descendants in other ways.
II 153
Adaptation/GouldVsAdaptionism/Gould: for example, special characteristics of some abnormal human children cannot be described as adaptation. We do not inhabit a perfect world in which natural selection ruthlessly checks all organic structures and then shapes them for optimal utility. In many cases, evolution reflects more inherited patterns than current environmental demands.
II 152
We tend (incorrectly) to view each structure as if it were created for a particular purpose.
IV 27
Adaptation/Adjustment/Gould: we should not conclude that Darwin's assumed adaptability to a local environment has unrestricted power to generate theoretically optimal designs for all situations. The natural selection can only use existing material. Classic dilemma of evolutionary theory. Question: how do the intermediate steps arise?
Structuralists (like Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, 1772-1844): Thesis: First the form changes and then finds a function.
Functionalists (like Lamarck): thesis: organisms must first adopt a different way of life before the forms develop.
DarwinVsStructuralism: the environment does not pass on its requirements for adaptation directly to the organism. Rather indirectly through more survivor's descendants of those who were lucky enough to vary towards a better adaptation to their local environment.
IV 28
Lamarck: in fact, it was he who had found the right answer (like Darwin): he merely proposed a false mechanism for transferring information between the environment and the organism. His functionalist solution contains an elegant simplification that is accepted today by almost all evolutionary researchers. It is neither the shape of the body nor the form of its opponents that gives rise to the habits of the animals, but on the contrary, it is the habits and living conditions that have formed the shape of the body over time".(1)
Gould: This is considered correct today.

1. Lamarck, J.B. (1809/1984). Zoological Philosophy. Chicago: University Press.

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989

Aggression Psychological Theories Slater I 178
Aggression/imitation/psychological theories: the idea that children learn through imitation is taken for granted and regarded as obvious today. [Anyway] this was by no means the case when the Bobo doll study was published in Bandura (1961)(1). >Bobo doll study/Bandura, >Aggression/Bandura.
Notably, even today, several domains have generated fierce debate about whether children learn aggressive behavior through imitative processes. For example, in the case of children viewing violent television programs or playing violent video games, the entertainment industry has tried to argue that there is no evidence that exposure to violent media causes increases in children’s aggressive behavior (see Bushman & Anderson, 2001)(2).
Slater I 179
While Bandura et al. did not yet have an adequate theory to describe the mechanisms underlying imitative learning, Anderson and Bushman (2001)(2) developed a General Aggression Model describes how individuals’ cognition, affect, and arousal are altered through repeated exposure to violent media, thereby contributing to aggressive behavior. According to the model, each exposure to violent media teaches individuals ways to aggress, influences beliefs and attitudes about aggression, primes aggressive perceptions and expectations, desensitizes individuals to aggression, and leads to higher levels of physiological arousal. These mediating variables then lead to more aggressive behavior. Although more aggressive children tend to seek out violent media, there is also convincing empirical evidence that even controlling for initial levels of aggression, exposure to violent media contributes to increases in aggressive behavior (Huesmann, Eron, Berkowitz, & Chafee, 1991)(3). >Aggression/Developmental psychology, >Aggression/Moffitt.
Slater I 184
Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)(4). It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive.
Slater I 185
Forms of aggression: Some (…) advances in understanding aggression since the time of the Bobo doll studies have been in understanding different forms of aggression. Bandura et al. distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression: has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(5). Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. For differences between the sexes see >Aggression/Gender Studies.
Forms of aggression: Researchers today also distinguish between proactive aggression and reactive aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6).
Proactive aggression: is described as being unprovoked and goal-directed (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), and is predicted by having aggressive role models (Bandura, 1983)(8), friendships with other proactively aggressive children (Poulin & Boivin, 2000)(9), and physiological under arousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(10).
Reactive aggression: is described as being an angry retaliatory response to perceived provocation (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Precursors of reactive aggression include a developmental history of physical abuse (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997)(11), peer rejection (Dodge et al., 1997)(11), more reactive temperament (Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002)(12), and physiologic overarousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(9).
Proactive aggression is associated with evaluating aggression positively (Smithmyer et al., 2000)(13) and holding instrumental (e.g., obtaining a toy) rather than relational (e.g., becoming friends) goals in social interactions (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), whereas reactive aggression is associated with making inappropriate hostile attributions in the face of ambiguous or benign social stimuli (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6).



1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582.
2. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological Science, 12, 353—359.
3. Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Berkowitz, L., & Chafee, S. (1991). The effects of television violence on aggression: A reply to a skeptic. In P. Suedfeld & P. Tetlock (Eds), Psychology and social policy (pp.
19 2—200). New York: Hemisphere.
4. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27—
51.
5. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 6. Dodge, K. A., & Coie, J. D. (1987). Social information processing factors in reactive and proactive aggression in children’s peer groups .Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1146—1158.
7. Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social information-processing mechanisms in reactive and proactive aggression. Chi id Development, 67, 993—1002.
8. Bandura, A. (1983). Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In R. Geen & E. Donnerstein(Eds),
Aggression: Theoretical and empirical reviews, Vol. 1. Theoretical and methodological issues (pp. 1—40). New York: Academic Press.
9. Poulin, F., & Boivin, M. (2000). The role of proactive and reactive aggression in the formation and development of boys’ friendships. Developmental Psychology, 36, 233—240.
10. Scarpa, A., & Raine, A. (1997). Psychophysiology of anger and violent behavior. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 20, 3 75—394.
11. Dodge, K. A., Lochman, J. E., Harnish, J. D., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1997). Reactive and proactive aggression in school children and psychiatrically impaired chronically assaultive youth. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 106,37—51.
12. Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., & Tremblay, R. E. (2002). Reactively and proactively aggressive children:
Antecedent and subsequent characteristics. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43,495—505.
13. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93.


Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Aggression Social Psychology Slater I 182
Aggression/Social psychology: Social information processing theory describes a series of four steps involving cognitive mechanisms that can account for whether an individual behaves aggressively or not in real time. 1) Encoding information from the social environment; individuals who have problems taking in relevant information to be able to understand situations fully are more likely to behave aggressively (Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990)(1).
2) Making attributions for why other people behaved as they did or why an event occurred; individuals who make hostile, as opposed to benign, attributions are more likely to behave aggressively (Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990)(2).
3) Generating possible responses to a given situation; individuals who generate fewer possible responses overall and who generate more aggressive responses are more likely eventually to behave aggressively (Asarnow & Callan, 1985)(3).
4) Evaluating different possible responses; individuals who believe that aggression will lead to desired instrumental and interpersonal outcomes and that it is a good way to behave in a given situation are more likely to behave aggressively (Smithmyer, Hubbard, & Simons, 2000)(4).


1. Dodge, K. A., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1990). Mechanisms in the cycle of violence. Science, 250,
1678—1683.
2. Dodge, K. A., Price, J. M., Bachorowski, J., & Newman, J. P. (1990). Hostile attributional biases in severely aggressive adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 99, 385—392. 3. Asarnow, J. R., & Callan, J. W. (1985). Boys with peer adjustment problems: Social cognitive processes. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 53, 80—87.
4. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93.


Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Aggression Gender Studies Slater I 185
Aggression/Gender Studies: Bandura et al. (1961)(1) distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(2). Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. Early work suggested that girls were more likely to engage in relational aggression than boys (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(2), but more recently, there has been controversy in the literature regarding whether there are gender differences in relational aggression (Delveaux & Daniels, 2000(3); Salmivalli & Kaukiainen, 2004(4); Underwood, Galenand, & Paquette, 2001(5)).


1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582.
2. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722.
3. Delveaux, K. D., & Daniels, T. (2000). Children’s social cognitions: Physically and relationally aggressive strategies and children’s goals in peer conflict situations. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 46, 672—
692.
4. Salmivalli, C., & Kaukiainen, A. (2004). “Female aggression” revisited: Variable- and person-centered approaches to studying gender differences in different types of aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 30,
15 8—163.
5. Underwood, M. K., Galenand, B. R, & Paquette, J. A. (2001). Top ten challenges for understanding gender and aggression in children: Why can’t we all just get along? Social Development, 10, 248—266.

Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Assets Neoclassical Economics Mause I 225
Assets/Neoclassics/Monetarism: Assets are money, bonds, shares as well as existing and newly created real capital up to human assets. In terms of microeconomic theory, the portfolio is in equilibrium if the marginal return of each form of investment is identical. If this situation leads to an expansionary monetary policy, the rate of return on money decreases. Households will transfer their assets into other forms of assets. The neoclassical and monetarist approaches assume a high interest rate reactivity of all forms of investment and thus also of investment demand.
All economic policy interventions are therefore also assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Attachment Theory Bowlby Corr I 29 (XXIX)
Personality/attachment theory/Bowlby: Bowlby’s insight was that the child’s pattern of relationships with its primary care-giver affected adult personality; secure attachment to the care-giver promoted healthy adjustment in later life. The theory references many of the key themes of this review of personality. Attachment style may be measured by observation or questionnaire; a common distinction is between secure, anxious and avoidant styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)(1). It also corresponds to standard traits; for example, secure attachment correlates with Extraversion and Agreeableness (Carver 1997)(2). Attachment likely possesses biological aspects (evident in ethological studies of primates), social aspects (evident in data on adult relationships), and cognitive aspects (evident in studies of the mental representations supporting attachment style).

1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: a psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
2. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83



Corr I 228
Attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby 1973(1), 1980(2), 1982/1969(3)) was then elaborated and empirically tested by Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978(4)). See also Attachment theory/Ainsworth. Question: why separations from mother early in life causes so much psychological difficulty for children, adolescents and adults later in life (e.g., Bowlby 1951(5), 1958(6)).


1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books
2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books
3. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)
4. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
5. Bowlby, J. 1951. Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: World Health Organization
6. Bowlby, J. 1958. The nature of the child’s tie to his mother, International Journal of Psychoanalysis 39: 350–73


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Bandura Psychological Theories Slater I 183
Bandura/aggression/Bobo doll study/psychological theories: Bandura’s Bobo doll studies (Bandura 1961(1)) (>Aggression/Bandura) have been criticized since for methodological and ethical reasons. 1) Some critiques have questioned whether Bandura’s study would have been approved by a 21st century IRB [Institutional Review Boards] given the explicit modeling of aggression to which the children were exposed as well as the provocation in denying them access to the attractive toys that was meant to elicit the children’s own aggressive responses.
2) Scholars have questioned the generalizability of the findings given that the child participants were all recruited from the Stanford University preschool, and, thereby, more socioeconomically advantaged than the general population. The original study does not provide information about the children’s race, ethnicity, parents’ education, or other sociodemographic variables that are typically reported in the literature today.
Subsequent research has documented sociodemographic differences in children’s mean levels of aggression. For example, children with more educated parents (Nagin & Tremblay, 2001)(2), from families with fewer stressors (Sanson, Oberklaid, Pedlow, & Prior, 1991)(3), and from two-parent households (Vaden-Kiernan, Ialongno, Pearson, & Kellam, 1995)(4), on average, demonstrate lower levels of aggression than do children with less educated parents, from families with more stressors, and from single parent households, respectively.
However, the lack of attention to sociodemographic characteristics of the children in the original study would only pose a problem if these characteristics moderated links between exposure to an aggressive model and one’s own imitative learning of aggression. To date, evidence of this kind of moderation does not exist. >Aggression/Bandura.
Slater I 184
Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)(5). It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive.

1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582.
2. Nagin, D. S., & Tremblay, R. E. (2001). Parental and early childhood predictors of persistent physical aggression in boys from kindergarten to high school. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 389—394.
3. Sanson, A., Oberklaid, F., Pedlow, R., & Prior, M. (1991). Risk indicators: Assessment of infancy predictors of pre-school behavioral maladjustment. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 609—
626.
4. Vaden-Kiernan, N., Ialongno, N. S., Pearson, J., & Kellam, S. (1995). Household family structure and children’s aggressive behavior: A longitudinal study of urban elementary school children. Journal of
Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 553—568.
5. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology,, 53, 27-
51.

Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Cap and Trade System Stavins Stavins I 157
Cap-and-Trade Systems/Aldy/Stavins: A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emission allowances—in sum equal to the overall cap—and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover their emissions (Stavins, 2007)(1). Faced with the choice of surrendering an allowance or reducing emissions, firms place a value on an allowance that reflects the cost of the emission reductions that can be avoided by surrendering an allowance. Regardless of the initial allowance distribution, trading can lead allowances to be put to their highest valued use: covering those emissions that are the most costly to reduce and providing the incentive to undertake the least costly reductions (Hahn & Stavins, in press(2); Montgomery, 1972)(3). Cap-and-trade sets an aggregate quantity, and through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s mitigation incentives. VsCap-and-Trade: In an emission trading program, cost uncertainty—unexpectedly high or volatile
allowance prices—can undermine political support for climate policy and discourage
Stavins I 158
investment in new technologies and research and development. Therefore, attention has turned to incorporating “cost-containment” measures in cap-and-trade systems, including offsets, allowance banking and borrowing, safety valves, and price collars. Increasing certainty about mitigation cost [through the above methods] reduces certainty about the quantity of emissions allowed. 1. VsVsCap-and-Trade: Smoothing allowance prices over time through banking and borrowing reduces the certainty over emissions in any given year, but maintains certainty of aggregate emissions over a longer time period. A cost-effective policy with a mechanism insuring against unexpectedly high costs—either through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax—increases the likelihood that firms will comply with their obligations and can facilitate a country’s participation and compliance in a global climate agreement.
In the case of a cap-and-trade regime, the border adjustment would take the form of an import
allowance requirement, so that imports would face the same regulatory costs as domestically produced goods.
2. VsCap-and-Trade: However, border measures under a carbon tax or cap-and-trade raise questions about the application of trade sanctions to encourage broader and more extensive emission mitigation actions globally as well as questions about their legality under the World Trade Organization (Brainard & Sorking, 2009(4); Frankel, 2010(5)). >Carbon Pricing/Stavins.
Stavins I 172
Cap-and-Trade Linkages/Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: Because linkage between tradable permit systems (that is, unilateral or bilateral recognition of allowances from one system for use in another) can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems with each other. There are not only benefits but also concerns associated with various types of linkages (Jaffe, Ranson, & Stavins, 2010)(6). A major concern is that when two
Stavins I 173
cap-and-trade systems are directly linked (that is, allow bilateral recognition of allowances in the two jurisdictions), key cost-containment mechanisms, such as safety valves, are automatically propagated from one system to the other. Because some jurisdictions (such as the European Union) are opposed to the notion of a safety valve, whereas other jurisdictions (such as the United States) seem very favorably predisposed to the use of a safety valve, challenging harmonization would be required. This problem can be avoided by the use of indirect linkage, whereby two cap-and-trade systems accept offsets from a common emission-reduction-credit system, such as the Clean Development Mechanism. As a result, the allowance prices of the two cap-and-trade systems converge (as long as the ERC market is sufficiently deep), and all the benefits of direct linkage are achieved (lower aggregate cost, reduced market power, decreased price volatility), but without the propagation from one system to another of cost-containment mechanisms. (...) it is important to ask whether a diverse set of heterogeneous national, subnational, or regional climate policy instruments can be linked in productive ways. The basic answer is that such a set of instruments can be linked, but the linkage is considerably more difficult than it is with a set of more homogeneous tradable permit systems (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(7). Another form of coordination can be unilateral instruments of economic protection, that is, border adjustments. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins.



1. Stavins, R. N. (2007). A U.S. cap-and-trade system to address global climate change (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
2. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (in press). The effect of allowance allocations on cap-and-trade system performance. Journal of Law and Economics.
3. Montgomery, D. W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418.
4. Brainard, L., & Sorking, I. (Eds.). (2009). Climate change, trade, and competitiveness: Is a collision inevitable? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
5. Frankel, J. (2010). Global environment and trade policy. In J. E. Aldy & R. N. Stavins (Eds.), Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement (pp. 493-529). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
6.Jaffe, J., Ranson, M., & Stavins, R. (2010). Linking tradable permit systems: A key element of emerging international climate policy architecture. Ecology Law Quarterly, 36, 789-808.
7. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1999). What has the Kyoto Protocol wrought? The real architecture of international tradeable permit markets. Washington, DC: The AEI Press.



Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

Carbon Pricing Fankhauser Fankhauser I 1
Carbon Pricing/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: (…) to keep the rise in global mean temperatures well below 2°C above preindustrial levels (…) requires a variety of policy interventions, including subsidies to support the breakthrough of low-carbon technologies, regulatory standards to drive down the energy use of buildings, cars and appliances, and financing schemes to overcome capital constraints (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(1). However, an effective carbon price is essential to avoid more severe interferences with the climate system (Stiglitz et al., 2018)(2). Only if the emitters of greenhouse gases face the full environmental costs of their actions will they manage their carbon emissions effectively. Carbon pricing alters relative prices, leading to an automatic adjustment in behavior by firms and consumers, and creating a continuous incentive for investments in low-carbon technological improvements. It works as a decentralized policy, in that it does not require regulators to have information on marginal abatement costs. Agents react to the carbon price based on their marginal abatement cost. By exploiting heterogeneity in marginal abatement costs, carbon pricing allows reducing the overall abatement cost (Weitzman, 1974)(3). Emissions Trading: Until now, emissions trading has been the carbon pricing instrument of choice in most jurisdictions. In the European Union, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) covers almost half of total greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon is also traded in Canada, China, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, although most of these schemes are limited in their regional or sectoral scope (World Bank, 2016)(4). >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser.



1. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar.
2. Stiglitz, J. E., Stern, N., Duan, M., Edenhofer, O., Giraud, G., Heal, G., La Rovere, E. L., Morris, A., Moyer, E., Pangestu, M., Shukla, P. R., Sokona, Y., & Winkler, H. (2018). Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition.
3. Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477–491.
4. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author.


Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.

Fankhauser I
Samuel Fankhauser
Stefano Carattini
Maria Carvalho,
Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018

Carbon Taxation Fankhauser Fankhauser I 1
Carbon Taxation/EU/US/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing
Fankhauser I 2
emissions outside the EU ETS [Emissions Trading System], where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment Agency (2016)(1). In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US $40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017)(2). >Emissions Trading. A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016)(3). With their high transaction costs, such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings (Goulder & Parry, 2008)(4). Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets (Aldy & Stavins, 2012(5); Baranzini et al., 2017(6); Baumol & Oates, 1971(7); Goulder & Parry, 2008(4); Mankiw, 2009(8); Metcalf, 2009(9); Weitzman, 2015(10)).
Fankhauser I 4
The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11).
Fankhauser I 2
VsCarbon Taxation/VsCarbon Tax/Objections to Carbon Taxation/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. Carbon tax proposals have been undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and 2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). Objections to carbon taxation are often not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006)(12) and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015)(13). Factoring them into the design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass. Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental issues (Oates & Portney, 2003)(14), and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. Other studies, for instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004)(15), Van Asselt and Brewer (2010)(16), Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017)(17), and Neuhoff et al. (2015)(18), provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times.
Fankhauser I 3
Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature. 1. VsCarbon Taxation: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(19) found that people associate carbon taxes with higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini, Scasny, and Bigano (2016)(20) showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015)(21) similarly expected higher payoffs from subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018(22); Odeck & Bråthen, 2002(23); Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010(24)). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull” measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012(25); Rosentrater et al., 2012(26); Steg et al., 2006(27)).
2. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes can be regressive. [Voters] perceive, rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini et al., 2017)(28).
3. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017(29); Thalmann, 2004(30)). While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. [This] may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012)(31).
4. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior (…) (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006(32); Steg et al., 2006(27)). [Individuals] consider low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. [They] believe that the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Carattini et al., 2017(29); Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008(33); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(34); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(35)).
Fankhauser I 4
5. VsCarbon Taxation: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. [Individuals] assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006)(32). Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration, but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(36); Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007(37); Hammar & Jagers, 2006(38)). VsVs: Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson, 2015(39); Baranzini & Carattini, 2014(40); Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014(41)) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017)(17). On the other hand, voters are right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11). It is also the case that carbon taxes are often regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan Collins, & Smith, 2012(42); Metcalf, 2009(9); Speck, 1999(43); Sterner, 2011(44)). (…) the accuracy of public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable policies. People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011)(45). Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers.


1. European Environment Agency (2016). Chapter 1. Overall progress towards the European Union's 20-20-20 climate and energy targets. In Trends and projections in Europe 2016—Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets (pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium: Author.
2. Baker, J. A. III, Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M. Jr., Schultz, G. P., … Walton, R. (2017). The conservative case for carbon dividends. Washington, DC: Climate Leadership Council.
3. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author.
4. Goulder, L. H., & Parry, I. W. H. (2008). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2), 152–174.
5. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), 152–180.
6. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227.
7. Baumol, W. J., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The use of standards and prices for protection of the environment. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(1), 42–54.
8. Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Smart taxes: An open invitation to join the Pigou club. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(1), 14–23.
9. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83.
10. Weitzman, M. L. (2015). Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly (NBER Working Paper No. 20925). Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
11. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar.
12. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904.
13. Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies: A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 1–20.
14. Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K.-G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Handbook of environmental economics (pp. 325–354). Elsevier Science B.V.
15. Hammar, H., Löfgren, A., & Sterner, T. (2004). Political economy obstacles to fuel taxation. The Energy Journal, 25(3), 1–17.
16. van Asselt, H., & Brewer, T. (2010). Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38(1), 42–51.
17. Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017). The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206.
18. Neuhoff, K., Ancygier, A., Ponssardet, J., Quirion, P., Sartor, O., Sato, M., & Schopp, A. (2015). Modernization and innovation in the materials sector: Lessons from steel and cement. Berlin, Germany: Climate Strategies and DIW Berlin. Retrieved from http://climatestrategies.org/publication/modernization-and-innovation-in-thematerials-
sector-lessons-from-steel-and-cement/
19. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237.
20. Alberini, A., Scasny, M., & Bigano, A. (2016). Policy vs individual heterogeneity in the benefits of climate change mitigation: Evidence from a stated-preference survey (FEEM Working Paper No. 80.2016). Milan, Italy: FEEM
21. Heres, D. R., Kallbekken, S., & Galarraga, I. (2015). The role of budgetary information in the preference for externality-correcting subsidies over taxes: A lab experiment on public support. Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(1), 1–15.
22. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., & Lalive, R. (2018). Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a supreme court decision. Ecological Economics, 148, 131–151.
23. Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, the failures and perspectives for the future. Transport Policy, 9(3), 253–260.
24. Schuitema, G., Steg, L., & Forward, S. (2010). Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 44(2), 99–109.
25. de Groot, J. I. M., & Schuitema, G. (2012). How to make the unpopular popular? Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy, 19–20, 100–107.
26. Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Hanss, D., & O'Connor, R. E. (2012). Efficacy trade-offs in individuals' support for climate change policies. Environment and Behavior, 45(8), 935–970.
27. Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environment and Behavior, 38(1), 92–111.
28. Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: Seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4), 1–17.
29. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128.
30. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217.
31. Spash, C. L., & Lo, A. Y. (2012). Australia's carbon tax: A sheep in wolf's clothing? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 23(1), 67–86.
32. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916.
33. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619.
34. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190.
35. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966–2973.
36. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929.
37. Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for climate change policy: Social psychological and social structural influences. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185–214. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144.
38. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625.
39. Andersson, J. (2015). Cars, carbon taxes and CO2 emissions (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 212/Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 238). London, England: London School of Economics and Political Science.
40. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2014). Taxation of emissions of greenhouse gases: The environmental impacts of carbon taxes. In B. Freedman (Ed.), Global environmental change (pp. 543–560). Heidelberg, Germany and New York, NY: Springer.
41. Martin, R., de Preux, L. B., & Wagner, U. J. (2014). The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 1–14.
42. Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2012). The distribution of total greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London, England: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
43. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667.
44. Sterner, T. (Ed.). (2011). Fuel taxes and the poor: The distributional effects of gasoline taxation and their implications for climate policy. Abingdon, England: Routledge.
45. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64.


Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.

Fankhauser I
Samuel Fankhauser
Stefano Carattini
Maria Carvalho,
Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018

Carbon Taxation Strategies Geroe Geroe I 18
Carbon Taxation Strategies/Business Tax/Investment Incentives/Geroe: Adjustments to business taxes to mitigate the commercial impacts of a carbon tax could be implemented so as to maximize emissions reductions. Rather than an across-the-board approach under which all liable entities received a fixed reduction in specified other taxes, a tiered approach could be adopted. For example, power generators could earn reductions in other taxes on the basis of percentage of certified reductions in emissions under a coal-fired generation baseline. So, potentially, a solar power station could obtain close to a 100% tax exemption, a hybrid solar-natural gas station say a 30% reduction, or a coalfired power station with carbon geosequestration 5% to 80% reduction based on the actual proportion of emissions verifiably sequestered. This approach could support emissions reductions at significantly lower levels of carbon taxation/prices than would otherwise be the case. It would also enable financing of currently expensive clean energy technologies at a significantly reduced rate of subsidy, FIT [federal income tax], or other state-based support. This approach is comparable with the Clean Energy Target design recommended by the Finkel report on energy security for the Australian government, under which certificates would be based on percentage reductions below an emissions intensity baseline (Finkel, Moses, Effeney, & O’Kane, 2017)(1). Various tax incentives have been used to incentivize low-carbon investments more generally, such as energy efficiency projects. In terms of both social equity and political feasibility, this tax reduction approach is superior to taxing low-carbon projects at a rate equal to high-polluting industries and passing on higher costs for clean energy (under RPS, FIT, and carbon pricing policies) to consumers. In addition, trade-exposed (and other) industries could receive enhanced tax write-offs for energy efficiency expenditures, as an alternative either to exemption from scheme coverage, receipt of free permits (‘‘grandfathering’’) under an ETS, or to mitigate compensation requirements. This approach would maintain the incentive to invest in low-emissions technology
Geroe I 19
inherent in a price on carbon while also mitigating carbon leakage and loss of international competitiveness. >Carbon Taxation Strategies/Fankhauser.

1. Finkel, A., Moses, K., Effeney, T., & O’Kane, M. (2017). Independent review into the future security of the national electricity market (Report for the Australian Commonwealth Government). Retrieved from https://www.energy.gov.au/government-priorities/energy-markets/independent-review-future-security-national-electricity-market.


Steven Geroe, 2019: “Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 28/1, pp. 3-27.

Correspondence Theory James Diaz-Bone I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> realization,> adjustment). ---
Horwich I 22
Correspondence/accordance/pragmatism/James: only here does he begin to distinguish himself from "intellectualism": Accordance/James: accordance means first "to copy", but e.g. our word for clock is not a copy, but a symbol, which can replace a representation image very well.
Symbol/James: for many things there are no "copies" at all, only symbols: e.g. "past", "force", "spontaneity", etc.
Correspondence: can only mean proper guidance here. Namely, practically as well as intellectually.
Horwich I 23
It leads to consistency, stability and fluid human communication. (1)

1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Demand for Money Tobin Mause I 225
Demand for Money/Keynesianism/Tobin: The Keynesian theory of money demand in the tradition of James Tobin(1) largely takes up the considerations of monetarist theory.
(Economic policy/Monetarism: Thesis: All economic policy interventions are (...) assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments.
Tobin: Thesis: Market participants have a wealth of different investment opportunities for their assets. However, the portfolio theoretical transmission process calls into question the high substitutability between the individual asset classes. (...) This restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy.


1. James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 38 (3), 1956, S. 241– 247.

EconTobin I
James Tobin
The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Description Levels Quine IX 188
Predicate Calculus 2nd order: compromises individuals and classees of individuals.
V 33
Similarity/Perception/Ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perception similarity brings ontological clarity: perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted.
V 34
Similarity/Quine: Perceptual similarity differs from reception similarity. The latter is purely physical similarity. Three digit relation: Episode a resembles b more than episode c. Perceptual similarity: on the other hand, is a bundle of behavioral dispositions of the 2nd order (to react).
The contrast can be eliminated by using the reception similarity, but not only speaking of individual episodes a, b, c, but more generally of episodes that have a reception similarity with these. ((s) > Similarity classes).
VI 71
Levels of Uncertainty: the uncertainty of the reference is not identical to the uncertainty of the translation, nor is it as serious. Translation indeterminacy is more serious because it is holophrastic (it refers to whole sentences): it can produce divergent interpretations that remain unexplored even at the level of whole sentences.
VI 72
The uncertainty of the reference can be illustrated by examples of compensating adjustment manoeuvres within a sentence.
X 20
QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/Sentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation has no objective sense at the level of sentences.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Desire Appraisal Theory Corr I 62
Desires/appraisal theory/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)(1). These assumptions entail that the emotional reaction to a concrete event should be influenced by the degree to which superordinate desires are affected by this event, as well as the strength of these desires. A number of tests of this assumption have been made. For example, Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001)(2) asked participants to recall the single most satisfying event experienced during the last month and to rate the extent to which this event satisfied each of ten candidate basic desires (e.g., the desire for competence, security, relatedness, popularity and personal autonomy). Other research has focused on an intermediate level of the motive hierarchy, where the top-level desires (e.g., the achievement motive) are concretized to more specific desires that represent what the person wants to attain in her current life situation (e.g., getting good grades; see Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998)(3). For example, Emmons (1986)(4) related these intermediate-level desires, called personal strivings, to emotions using an experiencing-sampling method… (for additional information, see Emmons 1996(5); Brunstein, Schultheiss and Maier 1999(6).
Corr I 63
Beyond relating positive and negative emotions to desire fulfilment and desire frustration, respectively, appraisal theorists have linked particular emotions to particular kinds of desires (e.g., Lazarus 1991(7); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(8); Roseman 1979)(9). An important distinction in this context is that between wanting versus diswanting a state of affairs (Roseman 1979(9)), or between having an approach goal versus an avoidance goal. Several theorists (e.g., Gray 1994(10); see Carver 2006(11) for a review) proposed (a) that the pursuit of approach versus avoidance goals activates one of two different, basic motivational systems, a behavioural approach system (BAS) or a behavioural inhibition (BIS) system; and (b) that people differ in central parameters of these systems, specifically in the relative strength of their general approach and avoidance motivation. Carver (2004)(12) found that a measure of inter-individual differences in general approach motivation (BAS sensitivity) predicted the intensity of sadness and anger in response to frustration (the non-occurrence of an expected positive event).


1. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam
2. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y. and Kasser, T. 2001. What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80: 325–39
3. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508
4. Emmons, R. A. 1986. Personal strivings: an approach to personality and subjective well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 1058–68
5. Emmons, R. A. 1996. Striving and feeling: personal goals and subjective well-being, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 313–37. New York: Guilford Press
6. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Maier, G. W. 1999. The pursuit of personal goals: a motivational approach to well-being and life adjustment, in J. Brandtstädter and R. M. Lerner (eds.), Action and self-development: theory and research through the life span, pp. 169–96. New York: Sage
7. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press
8. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press
9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979
10. Gray, J. A. 1994. Three fundamental emotion systems, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 243–8. Oxford University Press
11. Carver, C. S. 2006. Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action, Motivation and Emotion 30: 105–10
12. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22

Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Discrimination Pariser I 137
Discrimination/Software/Pariser: Problem: a software that, for example, examines a company's hiring practices and randomly picks out nine white persons could specify that this company is not interested in hiring persons of color and filter them out from the outset. (1) This problem is called "over-adjustment" among programmers.
I 139
Over-adjustment/Pariser: becomes a central and irreducible problem of the filter bubble, because over-adjustment and stereotyping are synonymous here.
I 140
Such stereotypes can cause your creditworthiness to be downgraded because your friends do not pay their debts on time.

1. Dalton Conley, Elsewhere, U. S. A.: How We Got from the Company Man, Family Dinners, and the Affluent Society to the Home Office, BlackBerry Moms, and Economic Anxiety, New York: Pantheon, 2008, S. 164.

Pariser I
Eli Pariser
The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think London 2012

Drives Allport Corr I 95
Drives/behavior/Allport/Deary: Allport emphasized that it was the trait and not the stimulus that was the driving force behind behaviour that expresses personality. This idea was recast by Matthews, Deary and Whiteman (2003(1)) when they articulated the key assumptions of the ‘inner locus’ and ‘causal precedence’ of personality traits. Allport suggested the definitions ‘derived drives’ or ‘derived motives’ for traits and summed up that (Allport 1931(2), p. 369): Whatever they are called they may be regarded as playing a motivating role in each act, thus endowing the separate adjustments of the individual to specific stimuli with that adverbial quality that is the very essence of personality. Adverbs/adjectives/description/theory/Deary: Today’s trait researchers are keener on adjectives than adverbs.

1.Matthews, G., Deary, I. J. and Whiteman, M. C. 2003. Personality traits, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press
2. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72

Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Economic Cycle Neoclassical Economics Mause I 226
Economy/Neoclassical Theory: Economic fluctuations can (...) in the sense of neo-classical theory or in the theory of real business cycles (Real Business Cycle or RBC-theory; Stadler 1994 (1)) also occur on the supply side of the goods markets if it comes to fluctuations in the provision of production factors. Neoclassical theory: for them, what is happening on the labour markets ((s) for economic development) is important in the medium term.
NeoclassicsVsKeynesianism/NeoclassicismVsKeynesianism: Neoclassical models ((s) unlike Keynesianism, which looks at the behaviour of private households) regard the state as primarily responsible for the occurrence of economic cycles, while implying inherent stability in the private sector. An unsystematic monetary or fiscal policy leads to uncertainty and adjustment reactions of market participants, which are reflected in economic fluctuations. (See Hayek "presumption of reason", "pretense of knowledge"). See Economic Cycle/Public Choice.


1. Stadler, George W., Real business cycles. Journal of Economic Literature 32, (4) 1994, S. 1750– 1783.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Economic Policies Monetarism Mause I 57f
Economic Policies/Monetarism/MonetarismVsKeynesianism/MonetarismVsKeynes: In contrast to the Keynesians, the monetarists (...) assume the fundamental stability of the private sector and therefore deny the need for an active stabilization policy. Instead, a stability policy in the form of reliable framework conditions and economic policy restraint on the part of the state is called for. See also Economic Policies/Friedman).
Mause I 225
Economic Policy/Monetarism: all economic policy interventions are (...) assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments. See Assets/Neoclassics, See Demand for money/Tobin.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Emotions Pinker I 457
Emotions/Pinker: Thesis: feelings are adjustments, software modules - with their help copies of the genes should be reproduced, which they have caused.
I 499
Feelings/explanation/Trivers: strategies in retaliation game: affection: aimed at those who are apparently ready for a return favor - Anger: protects from being betrayed - Gratitude: calculates costs and benefits of the first act - pity: should bring us gratitude - shame: should maintain a relationship.
I 500
Simultaneous evolution of incentive, faking feelings - it follows the evolution of discernment - Emotions do not help anyone, but they have helped his ancestors. - (s) Separation of situation and feeling.
I 510
Emotions/PinkerVsTradition: feelings are no relic of an animal past, no fountain of creativity, not an enemy of the intellect. The intellect transmits control to the emotions, as soon as the situation is such that they can act as a guarantor for its offers, function as promises and threats.
I 522
Cognitive Dissonance/Pinker: one decreases them by inventing a new opinion to resolve an inner contradiction. - E.g. so a boring job becomes retroactively interesting - feeling of uncertainty stemming from conflicting beliefs.
I 523
PinkerVs: that is not true, there is no contradiction between "The work is boring" and "I was forced to lie" - Aronson: it is about the contradiction with the statement: "I am nice and have everything under control".

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Environment Gould IV 43
Environment/Adjustment/Selection/Darwinism/Gould: according to the traditional point of view Darwinism is first and foremost a theory of natural selection. Gould: that is certainly true, but in reference to power and scope of selection we have become overzealous when we try to attribute every conceivable form and behaviour to their direct influence.
Another often forgotten principle prevents any optimal adaptation: the strange and yet compelling paths of history! Organisms are subject to the constraints of inherited forms that slow down their evolution! They cannot be reshaped every time their environment changes.
IV 44
History/Gould: a world that would be optimally adapted to its current environment would be a world without history, such a world could have been created as we find it now.

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989

Goals Thomas Aquinas Dennett I 85
Purpose/Thomas Aquinas: assumed that rain drops, volcanoes, planets behaved as if they were striving for an aim to "achieve the best result". The adjustment of the means to the purpose requires an intention. God.


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Gold Standard Eichengreen Mause I 95
Goldstandard/Eichengreen: The gold standard was a rigid system of fixed exchange rates that severely limited the economic autonomy of the nation states and tended to have a procyclical effect: if a country got into economic difficulties and suffered a corresponding outflow of foreign exchange, the balance could only be restored through deflation - an adjustment path that entailed considerable social costs, especially in the form of unemployment. The international economic order based on the gold standard was only possible as long as the working class remained essentially politically excluded. (1) The gold standard ensured that social policy regulation was largely a matter for the nation states, while the international economic order (despite moderately rising tariffs) remained liberal.
The attempt to revive the gold standard after 1932 failed, not only for political reasons, but also because the classic neoclassical economic ideas underlying this system were increasingly challenged by approaches that suggested that the state could and had to intervene in the economic cycle in a regulatory manner. KeynesVsGold Standard, see Golla (2).


1. Cf. B. Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, Hrsg. The gold standard in theory and history, Bd. 2. London 1997.
2. G. Golla, Nachfrageseitige Konzeptionen zur Zeit der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Deutschland: Keynesianer vor Keynes? Köln 1996.

EconEich I
Barry J. Eichengreen
Marc Flandreau
The gold standard in theory and history London 1997


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Homogenization Storch Norgaard I 116
Homogenization/Parameterization/von Storch: The climate system has different ‘compartments’ (…). (…) due to the unavoidable discrete description of the system, turbulence cannot be described in mathematical accuracy, and the equations need to be ‘closed’—the effect of friction, in particular at the boundaries between land, atmosphere, and ocean, need to be ‘parameterized’ (e.g. Washington and Parkinson 2005)(1).
Norgaard I 117
The basic idea is that there is a set of ‘state variables’ {Ψ} (among them the temperature field at a certain time t at certain discrete positions on the globe), which describe the system, and which dynamics is given by a differential equation d{Ψ}/dt = F({Ψ}). [An] aspect of parameterizations is their strong dependence on the spatial resolution. When the model is changed to run on a higher resolution, the parameterizations need to be reformulated or respecified. There is no rule how to do that, when the spatial resolution is increased—which means that the difference equations do not converge towards a pre‐specified set of differential equations, or, in other words: there is nothing like a set of differential equations describing the climate system per se, as is the case in most physical disciplines.
Norgaard I 120
[Another aspect is that] the ‘instrumental’ data usually suffer from ‘inhomogeneities’ (e.g. Jones 1995(2); Karl et al. 1993(3)). Before using such data in climate analysis, the series have to be ‘homogenized’ (e.g. Peterson et al. 1998)(4).

1. Washington, W. M., and Parkinson, C. L. 2005. An Introduction to Three‐Dimensional Climate Modelling. 2nd edn., Sausalito, CA: University Science Books.
2. Jones, P. D. 1995. The instrumental data record: Its accuracy and use in attempts to identify the ‘CO2 Signal’. Pp. 53–76 in H. von Storch and A. Navarra (eds.), Analysis of Climate Variability: Applications of Statistical Techniques. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
3. Karl, T. R., Quayle, R. G., and Groisman, P. Y. 1993. Detecting climate variations and change: New challenges for observing and data management systems. J. Climate 6: 1481–94.
4. Peterson, T. C., Easterling, D. R., Karl, T. R., Groisman, P., Nicholls, N., Plummer, N., Torok, S., Auer, I., Boehm, R., Gullett, D., Vincent, L., Heino, R., Tuomenvirta, H., Mestre, O., Szentimrey, T., Saliner, J., Førland, E., Hanssen‐Bauer, I., Alexandersson, H., Jones, P., and Parker, D. 1998. Homogeneity adjustments of in situ atmospheric climate data: A review. Intern. J. Climatol. 18: 1493–517.



Hans von Storch, Armin Bunde, and Nico Stehr, „Methodical Challenges of the Physics of Climate”, in: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Induction Goodman I 23
Definition Induction/Goodman: requires that some classes are seen as relevant classes by excluding others.
II 82
The sharpest criticism VsHume/Goodman: his analysis relates at best to the origin of predictions, not to their entitlement.
II 86
Deduction/Goodman: is in accordance with accepted practice.
II 88
The problem of induction is not a problem of proof, but a problem of definition of the difference between justified and unjustified predictions.
II 89
Mutual adjustment between definition and language use.
II 101f
Grue/Goodman: Problem: same data support contrasting predictions - question: in what essential property hypotheses must be the same > law: not in connection with e.g. an object in my pocket. - "Grue" does not work as conventional non-law-like hypotheses (limited in space or time) - one can reverse the derivation: red and green from gred and reen.
II 109
Law-like or resumable hypotheses are not to be characterized purely syntactically.
II 95
What confirms certain data, is not what is obtained by generalization of separate individual cases, but that which is obtained by generalization of the entire body of data material.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Interaction Rutter Slater I 208
Interaction/resilience/Rutter: Rutter (1987)(1) interaction effects play an important role in question of psychological resilience (>Resilience/Rutter, >Resilience/psychological theories) of interaction effects. Rutter drew on data from the work of other investigators, such as Hetherington and colleagues on divorce (Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1982(2), 1985(3)), (…)[and] highlighted the moderating roles of individual differences in gender, cognitive skills, temperament, parenting quality, positive marriages, and positive school experiences, for example, with numerous figures illustrating interaction effects.


1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331.
2. Hetherington, E. M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1982). Effects of divorce on parents and children. In M. E.
Lamb (Ed.), Nontraditional families: Parenting and child development (pp. 233—288). Hilisdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
3. Hetherington, E. M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1985). Long-term effects of divorce and remarriage on the adjustment of children. Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, 24, 518—530.



Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Knowledge Economic Theories Mause I 415
Knowledge/Economic Theories: Knowledge of the first kind: knowledge of functional and cause-effect relationships.
Second type of knowledge: is subject to market-endogenous processes of individual knowledge generation.
For example, environmental policy: The state actors have only limited knowledge of environmental policy management, although it is largely unknown on the part of the state how the management addressees (companies, private households) react to environmental policy measures in view of the subjective adjustment possibilities available to them.
For this reason, the state's knowledge of environmental policy must always be renewed over time if missteering is to be avoided. In addition, the state must examine on a case-by-case basis to what extent cooperation with environmental policy stakeholders is an appropriate means of providing the state with information that cannot otherwise be obtained. (1)(2)



1. Thomas Döring & Thilo Pahl. Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik – eine ökonomische Sicht. In Kooperative Umweltpolitik, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens, Wolfgang Köck und Georg Kneer, S.98. Baden-Baden 2003.
2. Annette E. Töller, Warum kooperiert der Staat? Kooperative Umweltpolitik im Schatten der Hierarchie. Baden-Baden 2012.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Language Peacocke II 166
Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. - ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) - PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine given propositional adjustments must not be attributed before translation.
II 168
Interpreted language/Peacocke: T-scheme T(s) ↔ p - plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences.
II 171
Variant: is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. - Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. (> Prima facie).
II 168
Language/Community/Peacocke: on the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). - Problem: the attribution of the criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker.
II 175
Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond - problem: if English is the actual language, would also E* be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Memory Forensic Psychology Slater I 107
Memory/suggestibility/forensic psychology: Most of the child witness research on memory and suggestibility about stressful events involves non-maltreated children. Although findings on children’s memory for stressful events remain inconsistent, research examining non-maltreated children’s memory for stressful events has uncovered several predictors of children’s suggestibility. See Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, and Kuhn (1994)(1). Children’s lack of understanding of the event and lack of parental communication, in addition to children’s emotional reactions, were predictive of more inaccurate and more suggestible memory reports. Research conducted with participants with maltreatment histories suggests that despite association with cognitive delays in several domains, as reflected on language and intelligence tests, maltreatment history per se does not adversely affect memory ability or increase children’s suggestibility. Children with maltreatment histories have been found to be hypervigilant to negative stimuli (Pollak, Vardi, Bechner, & Curtin, 2005)(2). Once engaged by such stimuli, maltreated children have a more difficult time than non-maltreated children in disengaging their attention (Maughan & Cicchetti, 2002)(3). This focus on negative information may positively influence maltreated children’s legally relevant memory reports.
Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, and Crayton (2007)(4) examined maltreated children’s memory for both an anogential exam and a venipuncture and found that, overall, maltreated children performed as well as non-maltreated children in a memory interview that tapped suggestibility.



1. Goodman, G. S., Quas, J. A., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Riddlesberger, M. M., & Kuhn, J. (1994). Predictors of accurate and inaccurate memories of traumatic events experienced in childhood. Consciousness and Cognition, 3, 269–294.
2. Pollak, S. D., Vardi, S., Bechner, A. M., & Curtin, J. J. (2005). Physically abused children’s regulation of attention in response to hostility. Child Development, 76, 968–977.
3. Maughan, A., & Cicchetti, D. (2002). Impact of child maltreatment and interadult violence on children’s emotion regulation abilities and socioemotional adjustment. Child Development, 73, 1525–1542.
4. Eisen, M. L., Goodman, G. S., Qin, J., Davis, S., & Crayton, J. (2007). Maltreated children’s memory: Accuracy, suggestibility, and psychopathology. Developmental Psychology, 43, 1275–1294.



Kelly McWilliams, Daniel Bederian-Gardner, Sue D. Hobbs, Sarah Bakanosky, and Gail S. Goodman, „Children’s Eyewitness Memory and Suggestibility. Revisiting Ceci and Bruck’s (1993) Review“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Method Meehl Corr I 15
Methods/Psychology/Meehl: Personality psychology has many concepts that cannot, themselves, be directly observed. Called hypothetical constructs in a classic theoretical description by MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948)(1), these theoretical terms can be inferred indirectly but are not themselves directly observable. Personality psychologists use terms like ‘adjustment’ and ‘extraversion’ and ‘self-esteem’ but cannot observe any of them directly, only indirectly through observations and measurements that are imperfect. The constructs are inferred by a network of correlations with various observations. Converging evidence affirms the reality, or at least the usefulness, of a construct. Consider ‘extraversion’: if the same people are found to be extraverted when measured by self-report, by peer-report, and by behavioural measures, then the construct of ‘extraversion’ is supported. If not, the construct may be invalid, or perhaps there is a problem with the measurement. Thus theorists propose a nomological net of associations among constructs and observables that can guide research (Cronbach and Meehl 1955)(2).


1. MacCorquodale, K. and Meehl, P. E. 1948. On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables, Psychological Review 55: 95–107
2. Cronbach, L. J. and Meehl, P. E. 1955. Construct validity in psychological tests, Psychological Bulletin 52: 281–302


Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Models De Raad Corr I 127
Model/theory/psychology/personality/De Raad: A model of personality may represent its characteristic traits, its mechanisms, its internal processes, at different levels of abstraction, and from different domains of interest (social, biological, cognitive, etc.). However, while the expression ‘structural models of personality’ connotes intended features on the one hand, it may, on the other hand, also evoke unintended references. One such unintended reference could be an emphasis on procedures to test a model, and on the statistics involved, as in structural equation modelling. In personality research, the standard recipe to arrive at structure typically involves the use of factor analytic techniques. Models of personality:
Five-Factor Model: See there: >Five-Factor Model.
Corr I 128
Cattell/De Raad: Cattell’s original set of 35 trait variables was the result of a process of condensing a list of 171 trait descriptive items considered by Cattell (1943)(1) to summarize the complete ‘personality sphere’. That condensation took place on the basis of correlations of ratings from 100 subjects. The reduction to thirty-five variables was, in Cattell’s (1945(2), p. 70) words, ‘a matter of unhappy necessity’. Cattell (1950)(3) distinguished trait-elements (single trait words), surface traits (traits tending to cluster together in a person), and source traits (trait-factors), essentially forming a hierarchy of traits. The concept of hierarchy was extended in Cattell’s emphasis on the distinction between primary factors and higher order factors.
Corr I 129
Costa/McCrae: Costa and McCrae (1976)(4) clustered 16 PF scales on the basis of data from three different age groups, resulting into two consistent age-group independent clusters, called Adjustment-Anxiety and Introversion-Extraversion, and a third inconsistent age-group dependent cluster, which was conceptualized as an Experiential Style dimension. The three clusters formed the starting point for the development of the three-factorial NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae 1985)(5).
Corr I 130
Three factor model/Eysenck: In defining his structural conception of personality, Eysenck (1947)(6) distinguished four levels of behaviour-organization that were hierarchically organized, namely single observable behavioural acts, habitual responses (recurrent acts under specified circumstances), traits (based on intercorrelations of different habitual responses), and types of traits (based on correlations between various traits). On the basis of ratings on this ‘intentionally heterogeneous’ item list, Eysenck concluded as to two factors, a general ‘neuroticism’ factor and a factor contrasting ‘affective, dysthymic, inhibited’ symptoms and traits and ‘hysterical and asocial’ symptoms and traits. Eysenck suggested this second factor to be related to Jung’s Introversion-Extraversion distinction. >Personality traits/Eysenck, (EysenckVsCattell).

1. Cattell, R. B. 1943. The description of personality: basic traits resolved into clusters, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 38: 476–507
2. Cattell, R. B. 1945. The description of personality: principles and findings in a factor analysis, American Journal of Psychology 58: 69–90
3. Cattell, R. B. 1950. Personality: a systematic theoretical and factual study, New York: McGraw-Hill
4. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1976. Age differences in personality structure: a cluster analytic approach, Journal of Gerontology 31: 564–70
5. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1985. The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources
6. Eysenck, H. J. 1947. Dimensions of Personality. London: Kegan Paul


Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press



Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Motivation Bowlby Corr I 228
Motivation/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: BowlbyVsFreud: In explaining the motivational bases of personality development, Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) rejected Freudian and object relations versions of psychoanalytic theory that conceptualize human motivation in terms of ‘drives’ and view the mind as powered by ‘psychic energy’. Instead, he created a ‘behavioural systems’ model of motivation, borrowed from ethology and cybernetic control theory, according to which human behaviour is organized and guided by species-universal, innate neural programmes (>behavioural systems). These attachment, care-giving, exploration and sexual systems facilitate the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and thereby increase the likelihood of survival, adjustment and reproduction. Motivation: Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) viewed the systems as ‘goal directed’ and ‘goal corrected’ (i.e., corrected by changing sub-goals based on feedback about goal non-attainment). Each system was conceptualized as a servomechanism that could be turned on, or ‘activated’, by certain stimuli or situations and ‘deactivated’ or ‘terminated’ by other stimuli and situations (basically, by the attainment of what Bowlby called ‘set-goals’, which in the case of the attachment system include escape from and avoidance of threats and dangers).
Corr I 229
BowlbyVsFreud: This new conception of motivation rendered the Freudian notion of general drives (e.g., libido) unnecessary. Goal directed and goal corrected behaviours are activated not by an accumulation of psychic energy or a desire to reduce drive intensity, but by conditions within a person or the person’s environment that activated behaviour intended to achieve a certain goal state or to avoid threats and dangers.

1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Personality Allport Corr I 4
Personality/Allport: Gordon Allport (1937)(1) defined personality as ‘the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment’ (Allport 1937,p.48).
I 5
McAdamsVsAllport/PalsVsAllport: A definition that gives a modern twist to this personological integration is offered by McAdams and Pals (2006)(2), who define personality as ‘an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life stories complexly and differentially situated in culture’ (McAdams and Pals 2006(2), p. 212). The emphasis on dynamics and development in these two personological definitions reminds us that some theories emphasize function and change, in contrast to the typically more static trait emphasis on description.

1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, p. 48.
2. McAdams, D. P. and Pals, J. L. 2006. A new Big Five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality, American Psychologist 61: 204–17

Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.



Corr I 43
Personality/Allport/AsendorpfVsAllport: Allport (1937) owed most of his ideas to Stern (1911) (1)
1. Stern, W. 1911. Die Differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen [Methodological foundations of differential psychology]. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth


Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.



Corr I 380
Personality/Allport/Saucier: Allport (1937)(1): ‘personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment’ (1937, p. 48). Saucier: Allport called this a ‘biophysical’ conception. It focused on ‘what an individual is regardless of the manner in which other people perceive his qualities or evaluate them’ (1937, p. 40). Phrasings like ‘within the individual’ and ‘systems that determine’ reveal an emphasis on the underlying mechanisms behind behaviour.


1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt


Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Personality Traits McCrae Corr I 103
Personality traits/McCrae/Deary: When he asserted that ‘traits are not cognitive fictions, but real psychological structures’ (McCrae 2004(1), p. 4) the supporting evidence included consensual validation, prediction of life outcomes, longitudinal stability and heritability. Almost as a provocative challenge McCrae suggests that personality traits are unaffected by the environment, and totally caused by biological factors…. McCrae’s very strong commitment to the biological underpinnings of traits is argued on the basis of substantial heritability, virtually zero contribution from shared environment, and the fact that even the residual in the ‘non-shared’ environment probably contains variance that is actually attributable to genetic and other biological variance, ‘such as intrauterine environment, disease, and aging’ (McCrae 2004(1), p. 6). The stability of personality traits over the lifespan is also cited as evidence of the strong claims made for ‘Five-Factor Theory’, cf. >Five-Factor Model.

1. McCrae, R. R. 2004. Human nature and culture: a trait perspective, Journal Journal of Research in Personality 38: 3–14

Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press



Corr I 129
Personality traits/Costa/McCrae: Costa and McCrae (1976)(1) clustered 16 PF scales on the basis of data from three different age groups, resulting into two consistent age-group independent clusters, called Adjustment-Anxiety and Introversion-Extraversion, and a third inconsistent age-group dependent cluster, which was conceptualized as an Experiential Style dimension. The three clusters formed the starting point for the development of the three-factorial NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae 1985)(2).
1. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1976. Age differences in personality structure: a cluster analytic approach, Journal of Gerontology 31: 564–70
2. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1985. The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources


Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Personality Traits Costa Corr I 129
Personality traits/Costa/McCrae: Costa and McCrae (1976)(1) clustered 16 PF scales on the basis of data from three different age groups, resulting into two consistent age-group independent clusters, called Adjustment-Anxiety and Introversion-Extraversion, and a third inconsistent age-group dependent cluster, which was conceptualized as an Experiential Style dimension. The three clusters formed the starting point for the development of the three-factorial NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae 1985)(2).
1. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1976. Age differences in personality structure: a cluster analytic approach, Journal of Gerontology 31: 564–70
2. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1985. The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources


Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Personality Traits Attachment Theory Corr I 236
Personality traits/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Studies using self-report measures of adult attachment style have found them to be coherently related to relationship quality, mental health, social adjustment, ways of coping, emotion regulation, self-esteem, interpersonal behaviour and social cognitions (see Mikulincer and Shaver 2003(1), 2007(2), for reviews). Importantly, these attachment-style variations are usually not well explained by less specific, more global personality traits such as Extraversion, Neuroticism or self-esteem (see Mikulincer and Shaver 2007(2), for a review), although there are predictable and meaningful associations between attachment orientations and personality traits (e.g., Carver 1997(3); Noftle and Shaver 2006(4)).

1. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2003. The attachment behavioural system in adulthood: activation, psychodynamics, and interpersonal processes, in M. P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. XXXV, pp. 53–152. New York: Academic Press
2. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2007. Attachment in adulthood: structure, dynamics, and change. New York: Guilford Press
3. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83
4. Noftle, E. E. and Shaver, P. R. 2006. Attachment dimensions and the Big Five personality traits: associations and comparative ability to predict relationship quality, Journal of Research in Personality 40: 179–208


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Pragmatism James Diaz-Bone I 68
Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. ---
I 68f
Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. ---
I 70
Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being.
---
I 76
Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision.
---
I 78
We do not live to think, but we think to live. ---
79
Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability.
---
I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment). ---
I 102
VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem).


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Science Kuhn I 25
Definition Normal Science/Kuhn: Research that is firmly based on one or more scientific achievements of the past. ---
I 47
Science/Kuhn: problems: Three classes of problems: - 1st determining important facts - 2nd mutual adjustment of facts and theory - 3rd articulation of theory. ---
I 182
Target/Science/Kuhn: Science does not move towards a "goal". - There must be no such destination at least. ---
I 193
Community/Science/Kuhn: Typical for group formation: shared use of symbols - e.g. mathematical formulas.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Self-Regulation (Psychology) Carver Corr I 427
Self-regulation/Carver/Scheier: the term self-regulation (Carver and Scheier 1981(1), 1998(2)) has different connotations in different contexts. When we use it, we intend to convey the sense of purposive processes, involving self-corrective adjustments as needed, and that the adjustments originate within the person. This view is not an approach to personality but a way of talking about how personality becomes expressed in behaviour. . >Feedback/Carver/Scheier, >Control processes/Carver/Scheier, >Affect/Carver/Scheier, >Goals/Carver/Scheier.
Corr I 431
The argument that affect reflects the error signal from a comparison in a feedback loop (>Affect/Carver/Scheier) has a very counter-intuitive implication concerning positive affect (Carver2003)(4). As noted, if affect reflects the error signal in a feedback loop, affect is a signal to adjust rate of progress. What about positive feelings? Here prediction is less intuitive. (…) The feelings still reflect a discrepancy (>Criteria/Carver/Scheier), and discrepancy reducing loops minimize discrepancies. Thus, such a system ‘wants’ to see neither negative nor positive affect. (…) People who exceed the criterion rate of progress (and thus have positive feelings) will automatically tend to reduce subsequent effort in this domain. They will ‘coast’ a little (cf. Frijda 1994(3), p. 113); not necessarily stop, but ease back, such that subsequent rate of progress returns to the criterion. The impact on subjective affect would be that the positive feeling itself is not sustained for very long. It begins to fade.
Generally (…) the system acts to prevent great amounts of pleasure as well as great amounts of pain (Carver 2003(4); Carver and Scheier 1998(2)).
Corr I 432
Why would a process be built in that limits positive feelings–indeed, dampens them? After all, people seek pleasure and avoid pain. We believe the adaptive value of a tendency to coast derives from the fact that people have multiple simultaneous goals (Carver 2003(4); Carver and Scheier 1998(2); Frijda 1994(3)). Given multiple goals, people generally do not optimize on any one goal, but rather ‘satisfice’ (Simon 1953)(5). >Goals/Carver/Scheier.

1. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1981. Attention and self-regulation: a control-theory approach to human behaviour. New York: Springer Verlag
2. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1998. On the self-regulation of behaviour. New York: Cambridge University Press
3. Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 112–26. New York: Oxford University Press
4. Carver, C. S. 2003. Three human strengths, in L.G. Aspinwall and U.M. Staudinger (eds.),A psychology of human strengths: fundamental questions and future directions for a positive psychology, pp.87–102. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2008.
5. Simon, H. A. 1953. Models of man. New York: Wiley1967. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition, Psychological Review 74: 29–39


Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Social Skills Developmental Psychology Corr I 181
Social Skills/social competence/developmental psychology/Rothbart: Early forms of what will later be called Extraversion or Surgency are present in the smiling and laughter and rapid approach of infants to a novel object by six months, and measures of approach tendencies and smiling and laughter at this early age predict children’s extraverted tendencies at seven years (Rothbart, Derryberry and Hershey 2000)(1). Throughout early development, children who are more extraverted also appear to express greater anger and frustration, and are more prone to externalizing disorders (Rothbart and Bates 2006(2); Rothbart and Posner 2006)(3). Lengua, Wolchik, Sandler and West (2000)(4) found that low positivity and high impulsivity in children, as well as high rejection and inconsistency in parenting, predicted conduct problems. children who are more sociable may attract warmth and responsiveness from adults, thereby protecting them from the effects of poor parenting (Werner 1985). Better social skills have also been shown for children whose temperament matched parental expectations and desires, who were more persistent, and whose parents were higher on warmth (Paterson and Sanson 1999)(5). When infants are four months of age, their distress and body movement to laboratory-presented stimulation predict later fear and behavioural inhibition. See >Fear/developmental psychology.

1. Rothbart, M. K., Derryberry, D. and Hershey, K. 2000. Stability of temperament in childhood: laboratory infant assessment to parent report at seven years, in V. J. Molfese and D. L. Molfese (eds.), Temperament and personality development across the life span, pp. 85–119. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
2. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
3. Rothbart, M. K. and Posner, M. I. 2006. Temperament, attention, and developmental psychopathology, in D. Cicchetti and D. Cohen eds., Developmental psychopathology, vol. II, Developmental neuroscience, 2nd edn, pp. 465–501. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
4. Lengua, L. J., Wolchik, S. A., Sandler, I. N. and West, S. G. 2000. The additive and interactive effects of parenting and temperament in predicting adjustment problems of children of divorce, Journal of Clinical Child Psychology 29: 232–44
5. Paterson, G. and Sanson, A. 1999. The association of behavioural adjustment to temperament, parenting and family characteristics among 5-year-old children, Social Development 8: 293–309


Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Stimuli Allport Corr I 95
Stimuli/behavior/Allport/Deary: Allport emphasized that it was the trait and not the stimulus that was the driving force behind behaviour that expresses personality. This idea was recast by Matthews, Deary and Whiteman (2003(1)) when they articulated the key assumptions of the ‘inner locus’ and ‘causal precedence’ of personality traits. Allport suggested the definitions ‘derived drives’ or ‘derived motives’ for traits and summed up that (Allport 1931(2), p. 369): Whatever they are called they may be regarded as playing a motivating role in each act, thus endowing the separate adjustments of the individual to specific stimuli with that adverbial quality that is the very essence of personality. Adverbs/adjectives/description/theory/Deary: Today’s trait researchers are keener on adjectives than adverbs.

1.Matthews, G., Deary, I. J. and Whiteman, M. C. 2003. Personality traits, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press
2. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72

Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Temperament Developmental Psychology Corr 181
Temperament/Developmental Psychology/Rothbart: Developmental research to date indicates that the reactive systems of emotion and orienting are in place before the development of executive effortful attention (Posner and Rothbart 2007(1); Rothbart and Bates 2006)(2). Early forms of what will later be called Extraversion or Surgency are present in the smiling and laughter and rapid approach of infants to a novel object by six months, and measures of approach tendencies and smiling and laughter at this early age predict children’s extraverted tendencies at seven years (Rothbart, Derryberry and Hershey 2000)(3). Throughout early development, children who are more extraverted also appear to express greater anger and frustration, and are more prone to externalizing disorders (Rothbart and Bates 2006(2); Rothbart and Posner 2006)(4).
Lengua, Wolchik, Sandler and West (2000)(5) found that low positivity and high impulsivity in children, as well as high rejection and inconsistency in parenting, predicted conduct problems. High negative emotionality and low positive emotionality in children and rejection and inconsistency in parenting predicted child depression. Inconsistent discipline had a stronger association with conduct problems and depression for children who were high in impulsivity than children who were lower in impulsivity.


1. Posner, M. I. and Rothbart, M. K. 2007. Educating the human brain. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association
2. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
3. Rothbart, M. K., Derryberry, D. and Hershey, K. 2000. Stability of temperament in childhood: laboratory infant assessment to parent report at seven years, in V. J. Molfese and D. L. Molfese (eds.), Temperament and personality development across the life span, pp. 85–119. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
4. Rothbart, M. K. and Posner, M. I. 2006. Temperament, attention, and developmental psychopathology, in D. Cicchetti and D. Cohen eds., Developmental psychopathology, vol. II, Developmental neuroscience, 2nd edn, pp. 465–501. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
5.Lengua, L. J., Wolchik, S. A., Sandler, I. N. and West, S. G. 2000. The additive and interactive effects of parenting and temperament in predicting adjustment problems of children of divorce, Journal of Clinical Child Psychology 29: 232–44


Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press

Theories Feyerabend I 35
Theory/Feyerabend: there is no one single interesting theory that corresponds with all known facts in its field.
I 39
Theory/Feyerabend: any theory that contradicts another outside of the observations is supported by exactly the same observations and therefore also acceptable.
I 84
Theory/Hume/Feyerabend: Theories cannot be derived from facts. If we are to demand that only theories be admitted that follow from the facts, no theory remains at all.
I 86
Theory/Feyerabend: a theory may not be incompatible with the data, because it is not correct, but because the data are contaminated! They could contain, and analyzed, perceptions, which correspond only partially to external processes, or be clad in old conceptions, or judged by backward auxiliary sciences.
I 87
Theory/Observation Language/Feyerabend: even the most thorough examination of an observation sentence does not disturb the concepts by which it is expressed or the structure of the perception image. How can we examine something that is constantly used and presupposed in every statement?
I 121
Lakatos: pro ad-hoc theories. Theory/Popper: new theories have - and this must be so - excess content, which - and this should not be so - is gradually infected by ad-hoc adjustments.
Theory/Lakatos: new theories are - necessarily - ad-hoc. Excess content is created bit by bit by gradually extending the theories to new facts and areas.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Theories Lakatos Feyerabend I 238
Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion. 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors.
2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment.
3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed.
I 239
Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational.
I 240
Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. ---
Hacking I 206
Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research.
I 196
Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery.
I 197
2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery).
Solution:
Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated.
Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis!
Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content.
I 198
Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics.
Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core.
Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data.
I 199
Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery.
I 200
Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.)
I 202
Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences.
I 206
Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction.
I 207
Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets
T1UT2 = T and
E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative.

Laka I
I. Lakatos
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980


Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Correspondence Theory James Vs Correspondence Theory Diaz-Bone I 88
Pragmatism Vs correspondence theory: a match for James softens the dichotomy true/false. (> achievement, adjustment). Truth/James: analogy to money: Credit: belief can turn out to be wrong.
I 89
Wrong: something that turns out to be false after an investigation - has it always been wrong? James: Assumptions can have been real (some sort of "true"). They had a truth value that was a guide for action.

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Evolution Theory Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory Vollmer I 258
VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context.
The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept.
I 276
VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition.
VsEvolution Theory: not predictable
VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory.
Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations!
I 277
VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.)
I 278
VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world!
I 279
VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer.
I 279
VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance).
3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc.
I 282
VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism.
Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion.
Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative.
Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution.
I 284
But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction).
I 285
Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all!





Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Gould, St. J. Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. I 371
Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often.
I 388
Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! "
Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever.
Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation.
Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping).
DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process.
I 405
DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development.
I 409
DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism.
I 423
Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others.
I 424
Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements.
Münch III 379
Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1)

1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Gould, St. J. Verschiedene Vs Gould, St. J. Dennett I 383
Helena CroninVsGould: flaw: he asks, how exclusive the selection as a driver of change is. Do you have to look at all the properties of living organisms as adaptations?   Cronin: the selection may be the only thing that really brings forth adjustments, without that it must therefore have caused all properties.





Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Popper, K. Lakatos Vs Popper, K. Feyerabend I 239
Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but such. And beyond that totally irrational.
Hacking I 199
"Protective belts"/Lakatos: you only make a selection of problems you are dealing with. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: so verification still has a place! The researchers choose a few problems, refutations can then be completely uninteresting!
Hacking I 286
Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be right because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule according to which the human thinks and directs nature is not tenable. Two false assumptions: 1. there is a psychological boundary between speculative and observational sentences
2. assuming that observational evidence could be proven by facts.
Schurz I 196
Theory Revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery.
I 197
2. "Protective belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to establish empirical prognoses. These are located like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be resolved by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date that contradicts the whole theory (core + periphery).
Solution:
Def ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown interfering factors are postulated.
Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis!
Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content.
I 198
Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is falsified only when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "immediate rationality" (immediate decision) which theory is better. This only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def Research Program/Lakatos: hard theory core together with a negative and a positive heuristic.
Def Negative Heuristics/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only on the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can be directed against the core.
Def Positive Heuristics/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can be handled with recalcitrant data.
I 199
Theoretical version/Schurz: Core plus periphery.

Laka I
I. Lakatos
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Structuralism Jakobson Vs Structuralism Saussure I 42
JakobsonVsStructuralism: bad structuralism: exclusive adjustment to invariant, i.e. timeless elements. Requirement: one should understand both invariance and variations as mutual and reciprocal structures.

Jakobson I
Roman Jakobson
Fundamentals of Language 2011

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Adaptionism. Gould, St. J. Dennett I 370
Gould: The vault of St. Mark’s Basilica and the" Pangloss "principle: VsAdaptionism thesis: Adjustment is pervasive. Def "gusset" / Gould: all those biological characteristics which are not adjustments.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005