Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Adaption	Gould	I 198 Adaptation/Preadaption/Gould: Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions have been fulfilled in the initial stages, e.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. Gould: the concept of preadaptation is indispensable, but it is not appropriate to demonstrate continuity in all cases. I 199 For example, in two genera of Biodae (giant snakes) on Mauritius there is a divided maxillary bone (with elastic connection), which is not found in any other vertebrate on earth. Here, a discontinuous transition is preferable because a jaw cannot be half broken. Examples: I 195 For example, fish with jaws are related to their ancestors without jaws. Macroevolution (the larger structural transitions) is nothing but an expanded microevolution (e. g. the change of flies in closed containers). I 196 For example, if black moths replace whites within a century, reptiles can become birds by gently summing up countless changes over a few million years. II 51 Adaptation/Gould: we do not have to choose between limitation and beauty of adaptation, because only both together provides the necessary tension to regulate evolution. Selection/Gould: GouldVs: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, or the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found in an organism results from the selection. Behavior/adaptation: each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation, e. g. breeding behaviour of the gannet. II 52 Behavior/animal/Gould: the sources of organic forms and behaviours are diverse and contain at least three primary categories: a) instantaneous adaptation (the behaviour of the offspring), b) the potential non-adaptive consequences of basic structural designs that act as restrictions on adaptation, and c) adaptations of ancestors now used by the descendants in other ways. II 153 Adaptation/GouldVsAdaptionism/Gould: for example, special characteristics of some abnormal human children cannot be described as adaptation. We do not inhabit a perfect world in which natural selection ruthlessly checks all organic structures and then shapes them for optimal utility. In many cases, evolution reflects more inherited patterns than current environmental demands. II 152 We tend (incorrectly) to view each structure as if it were created for a particular purpose. IV 27 Adaptation/adjustment/Gould: we should not conclude that Darwin's assumed adaptability to a local environment has unrestricted power to generate theoretically optimal designs for all situations. The natural selection can only use existing material. This is the classic dilemma of evolutionary theory. Question: how do the intermediate steps arise? Structuralists (like Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, 1772-1844): thesis: first, the form changes and then finds a function. Functionalists (like Lamarck): thesis: organisms must first adopt a different way of life before the forms develop. DarwinVsStructuralism: the environment does not pass on its requirements for adaptation directly to the organism. Rather indirectly through more survivor's descendants of those who were lucky enough to vary towards a better adaptation to their local environment. IV 28 Lamarck: in fact, it was he who had found the right answer (like Darwin): he merely proposed a false mechanism for transferring information between the environment and the organism. His functionalist solution contains an elegant simplification that is accepted today by almost all evolutionary researchers. It is neither the shape of the body nor the form of its opponents that gives rise to the habits of the animals, but on the contrary, it is the habits and living conditions that have formed the shape of the body over time".⁽¹⁾ Gould: this is considered correct today. >Lamarckism. 1. Lamarck, J.B. (1809/1984). Zoological Philosophy. Chicago: University Press.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Adolescence	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 112 Adolescence/Developmental psychology/Upton: current evidence suggests that ‘storm and stress’ does not describe the typical experience of an adolescent. Puberty is a period of rapid physical change, involving hormonal and bodily changes. However, it is not a single sudden event, but rather an extended set of changes that take place over time (Dorn et al., 2006)⁽¹⁾. These changes include increases in height and weight, and reaching sexual maturity. The specific changes are different for boys and girls, as are the timings at which such changes occur. In general, girls enter puberty approximately two years before boys. Initial changes are associated with increased height and weight. On average, for girls this growth spurt begins at the age of nine years, while for boys this is closer to 11 years of age. The peak of this growth spurt happens approximately three years later, so girls are growing fastest between 12 and 13 years of age, while boys are growing fastest between the ages of 14 and 15 years. During the growth peak, girls grow by around 9cm a year and boys by 10cm. Upton I 113 The adolescent growth spurt starts on the outside of the body and works inwards, so the hands and feet are the first to expand, followed by arms and legs, which then grow longer. Following this the spine elongates. The last expansion is a broadening of the chest and shoulders in boys, and a widening of the hips and pelvis in girls. Hormonal changes: This growth spurt is triggered by a flood of hormonal changes, which is set off by the hypothalamus and pituitary gland. The main hormones associated with pubertal changes are testosterone and oestrodiol. Both of these chemicals are present in the hormonal make-up of both boys and girls, but testosterone dominates in male pubertal changes and oestrodiol in female pubertal changes. In boys, increases in testosterone are associated with an increase in height, a deepening of the voice and genital development. For girls, increasing levels of oestrodiol are linked to breast, uterine and skeletal development (e.g. widening of the hips). It has been suggested that these same hormones may contribute to psychological develop ment in adolescence (Rapkin et al.. 2006)⁽²⁾. For example, studies have shown links between testosterone levels and perceived social competence in boys (Nottelmann et al., 1987)⁽³⁾, and between oestrodiol levels and the emotional responses of girls (Inoff-Germain et al., 1988)⁽⁴⁾. (…) there is evidence that the link between behaviour and hormones may work in the opposite direction as well, since behaviour and mood have been found to influence hormone levels (Susman. 2006)(5). Indeed, it seems unlikely that hormones alone can account for the psychological changes that occur in adolescence (Rowe et al.. 2004)⁽⁶⁾. In general, (…), it seems that all adolescents show some body dissatisfaction during puberty (Graber and Brooks Gunn, 2001)⁽⁷⁾. The evidence suggests that girls tend to become increasingly dissatisfied as they move through puberty, while boys become increasingly satisfied. (McCabe et al. 2002)⁽⁸⁾. At 11 to 12 years of age, early-maturing girls tend to have greater satisfaction with their body shape than late-maturing girls. However, this changes as girls reach 15 to 16 years of age, when late-maturing girls start to Upton I 114 Report greater satisfaction with their body shape (Simmons and Blyth, 1987)⁽⁹⁾. Early-maturing girls have also been found to be more vulnerable to emotional and be havioural problems, including depression, eating disorders and engaging in risky health be haviours such as smoking, drinking and drug taking, and early sexual behaviours (Wiesner and Ittel. 2002)⁽¹⁰⁾. These girls are also more likely to have lower educational and occupational attainments (Stattin and Magnusson, 1990)⁽¹¹⁾. It seems that girls who physically mature at a younger age spend more time with their older peers and are easily drawn into problem behaviours, because they do not have the emotional maturity to recognise the long-term effects of such behaviours on their development (Sarigiani and Petersen. 2000)⁽¹²⁾. However, there is evidence to suggest that the negative psychosocial consequences of early puberty may not last into later adolescence or adulthood (Blumstein Posner. 2006)⁽¹³⁾. >Self-description/Developmental psychology. Upton I 122 Cognitive skills/adolescence: There is also evidence that changing cognitive skills reflect ongoing structural and functional brain development. Structural MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) studies, for example, have demonstrated that the brain undergoes considerable development during adolescence, particularly in the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Huttenlocher et al.. 1983)⁽¹⁴⁾. It is thought that the production of synapses in the prefrontal cortex continues up until puberty, followed by synaptic pruning during adolescence. This is accompanied by an increase in myelination in this area of the cortex. These structural changes are believed to represent the fine-tuning of this brain circuitry, so increasing the efficiency of the cognitive systems it serves (Blakernore and Choudhury, 2006)⁽¹⁵⁾. There is also some suggestion that functioning in the frontal cortex increases with age (e.g. Rubia et al.. 2000)⁽¹⁶⁾, although this has been challenged by some researchers (e.g. Durston et al., 2006)⁽¹⁷⁾. Upton I 123 (…), the ability to engage in abstract reasoning (…) increases; adolescent thinking is no longer tied to specific concrete examples as it was during late childhood, meaning that they can engage in hypothetical deductive reasoning. >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Dorn. LD. Dahi, RE. Woodward, HR and Biro. F (2006) Defining the boundaries of early adolescence: a user’s guide to assessing pubertal status and pubertal timing in research with adolescents. Applied Developmental Science, 10: 30-56. 2. Rapkin A, Tsao, JC, Turk, N Anderson, M and Zelter, LK (2006) Relationships among self -rated tanner staging, hormones, and psychosocial factors in healthy female adolescents. Journal of Pediatric Adolescent Gynecology, 19: 181-7. 3. Nottelmann, ED, Susman, EJ, Blue,JH, Inoff-Germain, G and Dorn, LD (1987) Gonadal and adrenal hormone correlates of adjustment in early adolescence, in Lerner, RM and Foch, TT (eds) Biological-psychosocial Interactions in Early Adolescence. Hifisdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 4. Inoff-Germain, G, Chrousos, G, Arnold, G, Nottelmann, E, and Cutler, G (1988). Relations between hormone levels and observational measures of aggressive behavior of young adolescents in family interactions. Developmental Psychology, 24: 1 29-39. 5. Susman, EJ (2006) Puberty revisited: models, mechanisms and the future. Paper presented at the Society for Research on Adolescence, San Francisco. 6. Rowe, R, Maughan, B, Worthman, C, Costello, E and Angold, A (2004) Testosterone, antisocial behaviour, and social dominance in boys: pubertal development and biosocial interaction. Biological Psychiatry, 55: 546-52. 7. Graber, JA and Brooks-Gunn, J (2001) Body image, in Lerner, RM and Learner, JV (eds.) Adolescence in America. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 8. McCabe, MR Ricciardelli, LA and Finemore, ¡(2002) The role of puberty, media, and popularity with peers as strategies to increase weight, decrease weight and increase muscle tone among adolescent boys and girls. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 52: 145-53. 9. Simmons, RG and Blyth, DA(1987)Moving into Adolescence: The impact of pubertal change and school context. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 10. Wiesner, M and Ittel, A (2002) Relations of pubertal timing and depressive symptoms to substance use in early adolescence. Journal of Early Adolescence, 22: 5-23. 11. Stattin, H and Magnusson, D (1990)Paths Through Life, Vol.2: Pubertal Maturation in Female Development. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 12. Sarigiani, AC and Petersen, PA (2000) Adolescence: puberty and biological maturation, in Kazdin, A (ed.) Encyclopedia of Psychology. Washington, DC, and New York: American Psychological Association/Oxford University Press. 13. Blumstein Posner, R (2006) Early menarche: a review of research on trends in timing, racial differences, etiology and psychosocial consequences. Sex Roles, 5 4(5-6): 315-22. 14. Huttenlocher. PR and Kubicek. L (1983) The source of relatedness effects on naming latency. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 9(3): 486-96. 15. Blakemore, ST and Choudhury. S (2006) Development of the adolescent brain: implications for executive function and social cognition. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47: 296-312. 16. Rubia, K, Overrnever, S, Taylor, E, Brammer, M, Williams, SC R, Simmons, A, Andrew, C and Bullmore, ET (2000) Functional frontalisation with age: mapping neurodevelopmental trajectories with fMRI. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 24 (1): 13-19. 17. Durston, S, Davidson. MC, Tottenham, N, Galvan, A, Spicer, J, Fossella, JA and Casey, BJ (2006) A shift from diffuse to focal cortical activity with development. Developmental Science, 9(1): 1-8.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Aggression	Gender Studies	Slater I 185 Aggression/Gender Studies: Bandura et al. (1961)⁽¹⁾ distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)⁽²⁾. Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. >Social groups, >Group behavior, >Social relations, >Resentment, >Social competence, >Social behavior, >Gender. Early work suggested that girls were more likely to engage in relational aggression than boys (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)⁽²⁾, but more recently, there has been controversy in the literature regarding whether there are gender differences in relational aggression (Delveaux & Daniels, 2000⁽³⁾; Salmivalli & Kaukiainen, 2004⁽⁴⁾; Underwood, Galenand, & Paquette, 2001⁽⁵⁾). 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 3. Delveaux, K. D., & Daniels, T. (2000). Children’s social cognitions: Physically and relationally aggressive strategies and children’s goals in peer conflict situations. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 46, 672— 692. 4. Salmivalli, C., & Kaukiainen, A. (2004). “Female aggression” revisited: Variable- and person-centered approaches to studying gender differences in different types of aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 30, 15 8—163. 5. Underwood, M. K., Galenand, B. R, & Paquette, J. A. (2001). Top ten challenges for understanding gender and aggression in children: Why can’t we all just get along? Social Development, 10, 248—266. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Aggression	Psychological Theories	Slater I 178 Aggression/imitation/psychological theories: the idea that children learn through imitation is taken for granted and regarded as obvious today. [Anyway] this was by no means the case when the Bobo doll study was published in Bandura (1961)⁽¹⁾. >Bobo doll study/Bandura, >Aggression/Bandura. Notably, even today, several domains have generated fierce debate about whether children learn aggressive behavior through imitative processes. For example, in the case of children viewing violent television programs or playing violent video games, the entertainment industry has tried to argue that there is no evidence that exposure to violent media causes increases in children’s aggressive behavior (see Bushman & Anderson, 2001)⁽²⁾. Slater I 179 While Bandura et al. did not yet have an adequate theory to describe the mechanisms underlying imitative learning, Anderson and Bushman (2001)⁽²⁾ developed a General Aggression Model describes how individuals’ cognition, affect, and arousal are altered through repeated exposure to violent media, thereby contributing to aggressive behavior. According to the model, each exposure to violent media teaches individuals ways to aggress, influences beliefs and attitudes about aggression, primes aggressive perceptions and expectations, desensitizes individuals to aggression, and leads to higher levels of physiological arousal. These mediating variables then lead to more aggressive behavior. Although more aggressive children tend to seek out violent media, there is also convincing empirical evidence that even controlling for initial levels of aggression, exposure to violent media contributes to increases in aggressive behavior (Huesmann, Eron, Berkowitz, & Chafee, 1991)⁽³⁾. >Aggression/Developmental psychology, >Aggression/Moffitt. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)⁽⁴⁾. It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. Slater I 185 Forms of aggression: Some (…) advances in understanding aggression since the time of the Bobo doll studies have been in understanding different forms of aggression. Bandura et al. distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression: has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)⁽⁵⁾. Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. For differences between the sexes see >Aggression/Gender Studies. Forms of aggression: Researchers today also distinguish between proactive aggression and reactive aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987)⁽⁶⁾. Proactive aggression: is described as being unprovoked and goal-directed (Crick & Dodge, 1996)⁽⁷⁾, and is predicted by having aggressive role models (Bandura, 1983)⁽⁸⁾, friendships with other proactively aggressive children (Poulin & Boivin, 2000)⁽⁹⁾, and physiological under arousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)⁽¹⁰⁾. Reactive aggression: is described as being an angry retaliatory response to perceived provocation (Dodge & Coie, 1987)⁽⁶⁾. Precursors of reactive aggression include a developmental history of physical abuse (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997)⁽¹¹⁾, peer rejection (Dodge et al., 1997)⁽¹¹⁾, more reactive temperament (Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002)⁽¹²⁾, and physiologic overarousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)⁽⁹⁾. Proactive aggression is associated with evaluating aggression positively (Smithmyer et al., 2000)⁽¹³⁾ and holding instrumental (e.g., obtaining a toy) rather than relational (e.g., becoming friends) goals in social interactions (Crick & Dodge, 1996)⁽⁷⁾, whereas reactive aggression is associated with making inappropriate hostile attributions in the face of ambiguous or benign social stimuli (Dodge & Coie, 1987)⁽⁶⁾. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological Science, 12, 353—359. 3. Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Berkowitz, L., & Chafee, S. (1991). The effects of television violence on aggression: A reply to a skeptic. In P. Suedfeld & P. Tetlock (Eds), Psychology and social policy (pp. 19 2—200). New York: Hemisphere. 4. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27— 51. 5. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 6. Dodge, K. A., & Coie, J. D. (1987). Social information processing factors in reactive and proactive aggression in children’s peer groups .Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1146—1158. 7. Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social information-processing mechanisms in reactive and proactive aggression. Chi id Development, 67, 993—1002. 8. Bandura, A. (1983). Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In R. Geen & E. Donnerstein(Eds), Aggression: Theoretical and empirical reviews, Vol. 1. Theoretical and methodological issues (pp. 1—40). New York: Academic Press. 9. Poulin, F., & Boivin, M. (2000). The role of proactive and reactive aggression in the formation and development of boys’ friendships. Developmental Psychology, 36, 233—240. 10. Scarpa, A., & Raine, A. (1997). Psychophysiology of anger and violent behavior. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 20, 3 75—394. 11. Dodge, K. A., Lochman, J. E., Harnish, J. D., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1997). Reactive and proactive aggression in school children and psychiatrically impaired chronically assaultive youth. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106,37—51. 12. Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., & Tremblay, R. E. (2002). Reactively and proactively aggressive children: Antecedent and subsequent characteristics. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43,495—505. 13. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Aggression	Social Psychology	Slater I 182 Aggression/Social psychology: Social information processing theory describes a series of four steps involving cognitive mechanisms that can account for whether an individual behaves aggressively or not in real time. 1) Encoding information from the social environment; individuals who have problems taking in relevant information to be able to understand situations fully are more likely to behave aggressively (Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990)⁽¹⁾. 2) Making attributions for why other people behaved as they did or why an event occurred; individuals who make hostile, as opposed to benign, attributions are more likely to behave aggressively (Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990)⁽²⁾. 3) Generating possible responses to a given situation; individuals who generate fewer possible responses overall and who generate more aggressive responses are more likely eventually to behave aggressively (Asarnow & Callan, 1985)⁽³⁾. 4) Evaluating different possible responses; individuals who believe that aggression will lead to desired instrumental and interpersonal outcomes and that it is a good way to behave in a given situation are more likely to behave aggressively (Smithmyer, Hubbard, & Simons, 2000)⁽⁴⁾. >Information processing. 1. Dodge, K. A., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1990). Mechanisms in the cycle of violence. Science, 250, 1678—1683. 2. Dodge, K. A., Price, J. M., Bachorowski, J., & Newman, J. P. (1990). Hostile attributional biases in severely aggressive adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 99, 385—392. 3. Asarnow, J. R., & Callan, J. W. (1985). Boys with peer adjustment problems: Social cognitive processes. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 53, 80—87. 4. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Assets	Neoclassical Economics	Mause I 225 Assets/Neoclassics/Monetarism: Assets are money, bonds, shares as well as existing and newly created real capital up to human assets. In terms of microeconomic theory, the portfolio is in equilibrium if the marginal return of each form of investment is identical. If this situation leads to an expansionary monetary policy, the rate of return on money decreases. Households will transfer their assets into other forms of assets. >Microeconomics, >Neoclassics, >Equilibrium, >Equilibirum theory, >Monetary policy, >Monetarism. The neoclassical and monetarist approaches assume a high interest rate reactivity of all forms of investment and thus also of investment demand. All economic policy interventions are therefore also assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments. >Interest rates.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Attachment Theory	Bowlby	Corr I 29 (XXIX) Personality/attachment theory/Bowlby: Bowlby’s insight was that the child’s pattern of relationships with its primary care-giver affected adult personality; secure attachment to the care-giver promoted healthy adjustment in later life. The theory references many of the key themes of this review of personality. Attachment style may be measured by observation or questionnaire; a common distinction is between secure, anxious and avoidant styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978)⁽¹⁾. It also corresponds to standard traits; for example, secure attachment correlates with Extraversion and Agreeableness (Carver 1997)⁽²⁾. Attachment likely possesses biological aspects (evident in ethological studies of primates), social aspects (evident in data on adult relationships), and cognitive aspects (evident in studies of the mental representations supporting attachment style). >Relationships, >Social relations, >Extraversion, >Affectional bond. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: a psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 2. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83 Corr I 228 Attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby 1973⁽¹⁾, 1980⁽²⁾, 1982/1969⁽³⁾) was then elaborated and empirically tested by Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall 1978⁽⁴⁾). See also Attachment theory/Ainsworth. Question: why separations from mother early in life causes so much psychological difficulty for children, adolescents and adults later in life (e.g., Bowlby 1951⁽⁵⁾, 1958⁽⁶⁾). 1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books 2. Bowlby, J. 1980. Attachment and loss, vol. III, Sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books 3. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) 4. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 5. Bowlby, J. 1951. Maternal care and mental health. Geneva: World Health Organization 6. Bowlby, J. 1958. The nature of the child’s tie to his mother, International Journal of Psychoanalysis 39: 350–73 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Autonomy	Benn	Gaus I 104 Autonomy/Benn/Gaus: As John Stuart Mill pointed out, it is ‘mere accident’ that decides the traditions into which one is inducted: ‘the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian (...) (1963a⁽¹⁾: ch. 2, para. 4). Benn: Given that we necessarily come to adulthood with values and commitments that we did not choose, Stanley Benn argues that an autonomous person is one who is engaged in an ongoing process of ‘critical adjustment within a system of beliefs in which it is possible to appraise one sector by canons drawn from another’ (1988⁽²⁾: 32; but cf. Wall, 1998⁽³⁾: 128–9). Gaus: On this view, a person who leads a selfchosen life is not really one who creates herself, but one who continually evaluates all her commitments and values to ensure that they are ones that she can continue to affirm in light of the other things she accepts. She cannot evaluate everything at once, but she can always be prepared to look critically at her values and projects to ask whether they are really things she is prepared to continue to affirm. Thus understood, a person’s life is not a freely chosen, autonomous life, if there are some parts of it she refuses to examine – if she has some commitments that she will not, or cannot, critically reflect upon. >Autonomy/Mill, >Autonomy/Gaus, >Autonomy/Young, >Autonomy/Dworkin, Gerald. Degrees of autonomy: Benn recognizes, though, that this renders personal autonomy a character ideal that can be achieved to various degrees, and that many people fall far short of. Thus, in contrast to most liberal autonomists, Benn refuses to base liberal freedoms on autonomy, seeing it as a personal ideal, but not a foundation for basic liberal justice (1988⁽²⁾: ch. 9). 1. Mill, John Stuart (1963a) On Liberty. In J. M. Robson, ed., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. XVIII, 213–301. 2. Benn, Stanley I. (1988) A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Wall, Steven (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Bandura	Psychological Theories	Slater I 183 Bandura/aggression/Bobo doll study/psychological theories: Bandura’s Bobo doll studies (Bandura 1961⁽¹⁾) (>Aggression/Bandura) have been criticized since for methodological and ethical reasons. 1) Some critiques have questioned whether Bandura’s study would have been approved by a 21st century IRB [Institutional Review Boards] given the explicit modeling of aggression to which the children were exposed as well as the provocation in denying them access to the attractive toys that was meant to elicit the children’s own aggressive responses. 2) Scholars have questioned the generalizability of the findings given that the child participants were all recruited from the Stanford University preschool, and, thereby, more socioeconomically advantaged than the general population. The original study does not provide information about the children’s race, ethnicity, parents’ education, or other sociodemographic variables that are typically reported in the literature today. Subsequent research has documented sociodemographic differences in children’s mean levels of aggression. For example, children with more educated parents (Nagin & Tremblay, 2001)⁽²⁾, from families with fewer stressors (Sanson, Oberklaid, Pedlow, & Prior, 1991)⁽³⁾, and from two-parent households (Vaden-Kiernan, Ialongno, Pearson, & Kellam, 1995)⁽⁴⁾, on average, demonstrate lower levels of aggression than do children with less educated parents, from families with more stressors, and from single parent households, respectively. However, the lack of attention to sociodemographic characteristics of the children in the original study would only pose a problem if these characteristics moderated links between exposure to an aggressive model and one’s own imitative learning of aggression. To date, evidence of this kind of moderation does not exist. >Aggression/Bandura. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)⁽⁵⁾. It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Nagin, D. S., & Tremblay, R. E. (2001). Parental and early childhood predictors of persistent physical aggression in boys from kindergarten to high school. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 389—394. 3. Sanson, A., Oberklaid, F., Pedlow, R., & Prior, M. (1991). Risk indicators: Assessment of infancy predictors of pre-school behavioral maladjustment. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 609— 626. 4. Vaden-Kiernan, N., Ialongno, N. S., Pearson, J., & Kellam, S. (1995). Household family structure and children’s aggressive behavior: A longitudinal study of urban elementary school children. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 553—568. 5. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology,, 53, 27- 51. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Cap and Trade System	Stavins	Stavins I 157 Cap-and-Trade Systems/Aldy/Stavins: A cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions of regulated sources by creating a limited number of tradable emission allowances—in sum equal to the overall cap—and requiring those sources to surrender allowances to cover their emissions (Stavins, 2007)⁽¹⁾. Faced with the choice of surrendering an allowance or reducing emissions, firms place a value on an allowance that reflects the cost of the emission reductions that can be avoided by surrendering an allowance. Regardless of the initial allowance distribution, trading can lead allowances to be put to their highest valued use: covering those emissions that are the most costly to reduce and providing the incentive to undertake the least costly reductions (Hahn & Stavins, in press⁽²⁾; Montgomery, 1972)⁽³⁾. Cap-and-trade sets an aggregate quantity, and through trading, yields a price on emissions, and is effectively the dual of a carbon tax that prices emissions and yields a quantity of emissions as firms respond to the tax’s mitigation incentives. VsCap-and-Trade: In an emission trading program, cost uncertainty—unexpectedly high or volatile allowance prices—can undermine political support for climate policy and discourage Stavins I 158 investment in new technologies and research and development. Therefore, attention has turned to incorporating “cost-containment” measures in cap-and-trade systems, including offsets, allowance banking and borrowing, safety valves, and price collars. Increasing certainty about mitigation cost [through the above methods] reduces certainty about the quantity of emissions allowed. 1. VsVsCap-and-Trade: Smoothing allowance prices over time through banking and borrowing reduces the certainty over emissions in any given year, but maintains certainty of aggregate emissions over a longer time period. A cost-effective policy with a mechanism insuring against unexpectedly high costs—either through cap-and-trade or a carbon tax—increases the likelihood that firms will comply with their obligations and can facilitate a country’s participation and compliance in a global climate agreement. In the case of a cap-and-trade regime, the border adjustment would take the form of an import allowance requirement, so that imports would face the same regulatory costs as domestically produced goods. 2. VsCap-and-Trade: However, border measures under a carbon tax or cap-and-trade raise questions about the application of trade sanctions to encourage broader and more extensive emission mitigation actions globally as well as questions about their legality under the World Trade Organization (Brainard & Sorking, 2009⁽⁴⁾; Frankel, 2010⁽⁵⁾). >Carbon Pricing/Stavins. Stavins I 172 Cap-and-Trade Linkages/Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: Because linkage between tradable permit systems (that is, unilateral or bilateral recognition of allowances from one system for use in another) can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems with each other. There are not only benefits but also concerns associated with various types of linkages (Jaffe, Ranson, & Stavins, 2010)⁽⁶⁾. A major concern is that when two Stavins I 173 cap-and-trade systems are directly linked (that is, allow bilateral recognition of allowances in the two jurisdictions), key cost-containment mechanisms, such as safety valves, are automatically propagated from one system to the other. Because some jurisdictions (such as the European Union) are opposed to the notion of a safety valve, whereas other jurisdictions (such as the United States) seem very favorably predisposed to the use of a safety valve, challenging harmonization would be required. This problem can be avoided by the use of indirect linkage, whereby two cap-and-trade systems accept offsets from a common emission-reduction-credit system, such as the Clean Development Mechanism. As a result, the allowance prices of the two cap-and-trade systems converge (as long as the ERC market is sufficiently deep), and all the benefits of direct linkage are achieved (lower aggregate cost, reduced market power, decreased price volatility), but without the propagation from one system to another of cost-containment mechanisms. (...) it is important to ask whether a diverse set of heterogeneous national, subnational, or regional climate policy instruments can be linked in productive ways. The basic answer is that such a set of instruments can be linked, but the linkage is considerably more difficult than it is with a set of more homogeneous tradable permit systems (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)⁽⁷⁾. Another form of coordination can be unilateral instruments of economic protection, that is, border adjustments. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins. 1. Stavins, R. N. (2007). A U.S. cap-and-trade system to address global climate change (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 2. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (in press). The effect of allowance allocations on cap-and-trade system performance. Journal of Law and Economics. 3. Montgomery, D. W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418. 4. Brainard, L., & Sorking, I. (Eds.). (2009). Climate change, trade, and competitiveness: Is a collision inevitable? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 5. Frankel, J. (2010). Global environment and trade policy. In J. E. Aldy & R. N. Stavins (Eds.), Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement (pp. 493-529). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 6.Jaffe, J., Ranson, M., & Stavins, R. (2010). Linking tradable permit systems: A key element of emerging international climate policy architecture. Ecology Law Quarterly, 36, 789-808. 7. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1999). What has the Kyoto Protocol wrought? The real architecture of international tradeable permit markets. Washington, DC: The AEI Press. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.	Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012
Carbon Pricing	Fankhauser	Fankhauser I 1 Carbon Pricing/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: (…) to keep the rise in global mean temperatures well below 2°C above preindustrial levels (…) requires a variety of policy interventions, including subsidies to support the breakthrough of low-carbon technologies, regulatory standards to drive down the energy use of buildings, cars and appliances, and financing schemes to overcome capital constraints (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)⁽¹⁾. However, an effective carbon price is essential to avoid more severe interferences with the climate system (Stiglitz et al., 2018)⁽²⁾. Only if the emitters of greenhouse gases face the full environmental costs of their actions will they manage their carbon emissions effectively. Carbon pricing alters relative prices, leading to an automatic adjustment in behavior by firms and consumers, and creating a continuous incentive for investments in low-carbon technological improvements. It works as a decentralized policy, in that it does not require regulators to have information on marginal abatement costs. Agents react to the carbon price based on their marginal abatement cost. By exploiting heterogeneity in marginal abatement costs, carbon pricing allows reducing the overall abatement cost (Weitzman, 1974)⁽³⁾. Emissions Trading: Until now, emissions trading has been the carbon pricing instrument of choice in most jurisdictions. In the European Union, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) covers almost half of total greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon is also traded in Canada, China, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, although most of these schemes are limited in their regional or sectoral scope (World Bank, 2016)⁽⁴⁾. >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar. 2. Stiglitz, J. E., Stern, N., Duan, M., Edenhofer, O., Giraud, G., Heal, G., La Rovere, E. L., Morris, A., Moyer, E., Pangestu, M., Shukla, P. R., Sokona, Y., & Winkler, H. (2018). Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. 3. Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477–491. 4. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.	Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018
Carbon Taxation	Fankhauser	Fankhauser I 1 Carbon Taxation/EU/US/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing Fankhauser I 2 emissions outside the EU ETS [Emissions Trading System], where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment Agency (2016)⁽¹⁾. In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US $40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017)⁽²⁾. >Emissions Trading. A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016)⁽³⁾. With their high transaction costs, such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings (Goulder & Parry, 2008)⁽⁴⁾. Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets (Aldy & Stavins, 2012⁽⁵⁾; Baranzini et al., 2017⁽⁶⁾; Baumol & Oates, 1971⁽⁷⁾; Goulder & Parry, 2008⁽⁴⁾; Mankiw, 2009⁽⁸⁾; Metcalf, 2009⁽⁹⁾; Weitzman, 2015⁽¹⁰⁾). Fankhauser I 4 The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)⁽¹¹⁾. Fankhauser I 2 VsCarbon Taxation/VsCarbon Tax/Objections to Carbon Taxation/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. Carbon tax proposals have been undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and 2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). Objections to carbon taxation are often not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006)⁽¹²⁾ and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015)⁽¹³⁾. Factoring them into the design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass. Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental issues (Oates & Portney, 2003)⁽¹⁴⁾, and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. Other studies, for instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004)⁽¹⁵⁾, Van Asselt and Brewer (2010)⁽¹⁶⁾, Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017)⁽¹⁷⁾, and Neuhoff et al. (2015)⁽¹⁸⁾, provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times. Fankhauser I 3 Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature. 1. VsCarbon Taxation: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009)⁽¹⁹⁾ found that people associate carbon taxes with higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini, Scasny, and Bigano (2016)⁽²⁰⁾ showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015)⁽²¹⁾ similarly expected higher payoffs from subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018⁽²²⁾; Odeck & Bråthen, 2002⁽²³⁾; Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010⁽²⁴⁾). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull” measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012⁽²⁵⁾; Rosentrater et al., 2012⁽²⁶⁾; Steg et al., 2006⁽²⁷⁾). 2. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes can be regressive. [Voters] perceive, rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini et al., 2017)⁽²⁸⁾. 3. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017⁽²⁹⁾; Thalmann, 2004⁽³⁰⁾). While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. [This] may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012)⁽³¹⁾. 4. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior (…) (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006⁽³²⁾; Steg et al., 2006⁽²⁷⁾). [Individuals] consider low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. [They] believe that the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽⁶⁾; Carattini et al., 2017⁽²⁹⁾; Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008⁽³³⁾; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010⁽³⁴⁾; Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011⁽³⁵⁾). Fankhauser I 4 5. VsCarbon Taxation: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. [Individuals] assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006)⁽³²⁾. Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration, but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017⁽⁶⁾; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006⁽³⁶⁾; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007⁽³⁷⁾; Hammar & Jagers, 2006⁽³⁸⁾). VsVs: Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson, 2015⁽³⁹⁾; Baranzini & Carattini, 2014⁽⁴⁰⁾; Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014⁽⁴¹⁾) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017)⁽¹⁷⁾. On the other hand, voters are right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)⁽¹¹⁾. It is also the case that carbon taxes are often regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan Collins, & Smith, 2012⁽⁴²⁾; Metcalf, 2009⁽⁹⁾; Speck, 1999⁽⁴³⁾; Sterner, 2011⁽⁴⁴⁾). (…) the accuracy of public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable policies. People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011)⁽⁴⁵⁾. Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. European Environment Agency (2016). Chapter 1. Overall progress towards the European Union's 20-20-20 climate and energy targets. In Trends and projections in Europe 2016—Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets (pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium: Author. 2. Baker, J. A. III, Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M. Jr., Schultz, G. P., … Walton, R. (2017). The conservative case for carbon dividends. Washington, DC: Climate Leadership Council. 3. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author. 4. Goulder, L. H., & Parry, I. W. H. (2008). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2), 152–174. 5. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), 152–180. 6. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227. 7. Baumol, W. J., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The use of standards and prices for protection of the environment. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(1), 42–54. 8. Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Smart taxes: An open invitation to join the Pigou club. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(1), 14–23. 9. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83. 10. Weitzman, M. L. (2015). Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly (NBER Working Paper No. 20925). Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 11. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar. 12. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904. 13. Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies: A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 1–20. 14. Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K.-G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Handbook of environmental economics (pp. 325–354). Elsevier Science B.V. 15. Hammar, H., Löfgren, A., & Sterner, T. (2004). Political economy obstacles to fuel taxation. The Energy Journal, 25(3), 1–17. 16. van Asselt, H., & Brewer, T. (2010). Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38(1), 42–51. 17. Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017). The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206. 18. Neuhoff, K., Ancygier, A., Ponssardet, J., Quirion, P., Sartor, O., Sato, M., & Schopp, A. (2015). Modernization and innovation in the materials sector: Lessons from steel and cement. Berlin, Germany: Climate Strategies and DIW Berlin. Retrieved from http://climatestrategies.org/publication/modernization-and-innovation-in-thematerials- sector-lessons-from-steel-and-cement/ 19. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237. 20. Alberini, A., Scasny, M., & Bigano, A. (2016). Policy vs individual heterogeneity in the benefits of climate change mitigation: Evidence from a stated-preference survey (FEEM Working Paper No. 80.2016). Milan, Italy: FEEM 21. Heres, D. R., Kallbekken, S., & Galarraga, I. (2015). The role of budgetary information in the preference for externality-correcting subsidies over taxes: A lab experiment on public support. Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(1), 1–15. 22. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., & Lalive, R. (2018). Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a supreme court decision. Ecological Economics, 148, 131–151. 23. Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, the failures and perspectives for the future. Transport Policy, 9(3), 253–260. 24. Schuitema, G., Steg, L., & Forward, S. (2010). Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 44(2), 99–109. 25. de Groot, J. I. M., & Schuitema, G. (2012). How to make the unpopular popular? Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy, 19–20, 100–107. 26. Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Hanss, D., & O'Connor, R. E. (2012). Efficacy trade-offs in individuals' support for climate change policies. Environment and Behavior, 45(8), 935–970. 27. Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environment and Behavior, 38(1), 92–111. 28. Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: Seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4), 1–17. 29. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128. 30. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217. 31. Spash, C. L., & Lo, A. Y. (2012). Australia's carbon tax: A sheep in wolf's clothing? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 23(1), 67–86. 32. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916. 33. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619. 34. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190. 35. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966–2973. 36. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929. 37. Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for climate change policy: Social psychological and social structural influences. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185–214. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144. 38. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625. 39. Andersson, J. (2015). Cars, carbon taxes and CO2 emissions (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 212/Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 238). London, England: London School of Economics and Political Science. 40. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2014). Taxation of emissions of greenhouse gases: The environmental impacts of carbon taxes. In B. Freedman (Ed.), Global environmental change (pp. 543–560). Heidelberg, Germany and New York, NY: Springer. 41. Martin, R., de Preux, L. B., & Wagner, U. J. (2014). The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 1–14. 42. Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2012). The distribution of total greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London, England: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 43. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667. 44. Sterner, T. (Ed.). (2011). Fuel taxes and the poor: The distributional effects of gasoline taxation and their implications for climate policy. Abingdon, England: Routledge. 45. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64. Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.	Fankhauser I Samuel Fankhauser Stefano Carattini Maria Carvalho, Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018
Carbon Taxation Strategies	Geroe	Geroe I 18 Carbon Taxation Strategies/Business Tax/Investment Incentives/Geroe: Adjustments to business taxes to mitigate the commercial impacts of a carbon tax could be implemented so as to maximize emissions reductions. Rather than an across-the-board approach under which all liable entities received a fixed reduction in specified other taxes, a tiered approach could be adopted. For example, power generators could earn reductions in other taxes on the basis of percentage of certified reductions in emissions under a coal-fired generation baseline. So, potentially, a solar power station could obtain close to a 100% tax exemption, a hybrid solar-natural gas station say a 30% reduction, or a coalfired power station with carbon geosequestration 5% to 80% reduction based on the actual proportion of emissions verifiably sequestered. This approach could support emissions reductions at significantly lower levels of carbon taxation/prices than would otherwise be the case. It would also enable financing of currently expensive clean energy technologies at a significantly reduced rate of subsidy, FIT [federal income tax], or other state-based support. This approach is comparable with the Clean Energy Target design recommended by the Finkel report on energy security for the Australian government, under which certificates would be based on percentage reductions below an emissions intensity baseline (Finkel, Moses, Effeney, & O’Kane, 2017)⁽¹⁾. Various tax incentives have been used to incentivize low-carbon investments more generally, such as energy efficiency projects. In terms of both social equity and political feasibility, this tax reduction approach is superior to taxing low-carbon projects at a rate equal to high-polluting industries and passing on higher costs for clean energy (under RPS, FIT, and carbon pricing policies) to consumers. In addition, trade-exposed (and other) industries could receive enhanced tax write-offs for energy efficiency expenditures, as an alternative either to exemption from scheme coverage, receipt of free permits (‘‘grandfathering’’) under an ETS, or to mitigate compensation requirements. This approach would maintain the incentive to invest in low-emissions technology Geroe I 19 inherent in a price on carbon while also mitigating carbon leakage and loss of international competitiveness. >Carbon Taxation Strategies/Fankhauser. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Finkel, A., Moses, K., Effeney, T., & O’Kane, M. (2017). Independent review into the future security of the national electricity market (Report for the Australian Commonwealth Government). Retrieved from https://www.energy.gov.au/government-priorities/energy-markets/independent-review-future-security-national-electricity-market. Steven Geroe, 2019: “Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 28/1, pp. 3-27.	Geroe I Steven Geroe Addressing Climate Change Through a Low-Cost, High-Impact Carbon Tax 2019
Central Bank	Taylor	Taylor III Inflation targeting/interest rates/central banking/Wages/Economics/TaylorVsSummers/TaylorVsStansbury/Lance Taylor: Regarding inflation, both central banks and [Summers and Stansbury] ignore the facts that inflation is a cumulative process driven by conflicting claims to income and wealth and that for the past five decades profits have captured almost all the claims. >Inflation targeting/Summers. Consider the real “product wage,” the nominal or money wage divided by a producer price index (PPI) to correct for cost inflation confronting business. A little algebra (…) shows that the labor or wage share of output, which equals real “unit labor cost,” is equal to the real wage divided by productivity or the output/labor ratio. The profit share equals one minus the wage share. (…) the profit share and growth rates of real wages and productivity have varied over time (…). The growth rate of nominal unit labor cost is the difference between rates of wage and productivity growth. As with the other labor market indicators, cost growth slowed after 2000. To unravel the dynamics, we need a theory of inflation. Around the turn of the 20th century the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell pointed out that inflation is a “cumulative process” involving feedback between price and wage inflation rates. Even after their long decline [it] shows that labor payments still make up 55% of production costs and have to enter inflation accounting. The “real balance effect” (or the “inflation tax” in a dynamic version) says that a jump in the price level will reduce the real value of assets with prices fixed in nominal terms – money is the usual example. Wealth is eroded and households are supposed to save more as a consequence. Along with a wage lag, the real balance effect is the key adjustment mechanism in Milton Friedman’s (1968) “inflation” model which still underlies contemporary monetary policy. “Forced saving” happens when a price jump against a constant money wage reduces real payments to wage-earners. If their capacity to borrow is limited, they have to cut consumption, sliding the demand curve downward. If an expansionary package does drive up the price level, middle class and low income households who rely on wages would be the ones to suffer. Conflict arises because price increases are controlled by business while the money wage is subject to bargaining between business and labor. Both sides seek to manipulate the labor share as a key distributional indicator. In an overall inflationary environment, business can respond immediately to increases in the wage share or output by pushing up the rate of price increase in Phillips curve fashion along the “Inflation” schedule (…). Money wages on the other hand are not immediately indexed to price inflation so that they will follow with a lag. Labor will push for faster wage inflation when the wage share is low. Suppose that there is an initial inflation equilibrium (…). The [Summers and Stansbury] proposal to use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand would shift the inflation locus upward (…) with more rapid inflation and a somewhat lower wage share in macro equilibrium (…) along the stable share schedule. In light of the vanishing NAIRU [Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment] over the past two decades, it is not clear how strong this upward shift could be. The way that expansionary policy could pay off in terms of inequality and (possibly) faster inflation would be though an upward movement in the stable share schedule if the labor market tightens, leading to greater bargaining power for labor. The new Keynesian inventors are now the ruling elders of macroeconomics, unlikely to change their minds. (…) [Summers and Stansbury] might remember with Max Planck that science advances one funeral at a time. They are certainly correct in saying that “the role of particular frictions and rigidities in underpinning economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand.” (…) many of the correct observations that [Summers and Stansbury] make about the likely ineffectiveness of interest rate changes were raised almost 90 years ago by Keynes’s colleague Piero Sraffa (1932a⁽¹⁾, 1932b⁽²⁾) in a controversy with Friedrich von Hayek. Sraffa’s main emphasis was on the inapplicability of a “natural rate” of interest, a point amplified by Keynes in the General Theory. The natural rate, nevertheless, remains a topic of great interest to left-leaning new Keynesians. How they reconcile that idea with the fiscalist Keynesian perspective adoped by [Summers and Stansbury] remains to be seen. >Central banking/Summers. 1. Sraffa, Piero (1932a) “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal, 42: 42-53. 2. Sraffa, Piero (1932b) “Money and Capital: A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal, 42: 249-25. Taylor, Lance: Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession	EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016
Climate Data	Edwards	I 56 Climate data/Edwards: For long-term climate analyses - particularly climate change analyses - to be accurate, the climate data used must be homogeneous. A homogeneous climate time series is defined as one where variations are caused only by variations in weather and climate. Unfortunately, most long-term climatological time series have been affected by a number of non-climatic factors that make these data unrepresentative of the actual climate variation occurring over time. These factors include changes in: instruments, observing practices, station locations, formulae used to calculate means, and station environment.⁽¹⁾ Edwards: to decide whether you are seeing homogeneous data or “non-climatic factors,” you need to examine the history of the infrastructure station by station, year by year, and data point by data point, all in the context of changing standards, institutions, and communication techniques. >Infrastructure/Edwards. Since the 1950s, standardization and automation have helped to reduce the effect of “non-climatic factors” on data collection, and modeling techniques I 57 have allowed climatologists to generate relatively homogeneous data sets from heterogeneous sources.⁽²⁾ But it is impossible to eliminate confounding factors completely. I 58 (…) only about ten percent of the data used by global weather prediction models originate in actual instrument readings. The remaining ninety percent are synthesized by another computer model: the analysis or “4-dimensional data assimilation” model, which creates values for all the points on a high-resolution, three-dimensional global grid. >Reanalysis/Climatology. I 356 Data globalization: (…) making data global is an ex post facto mode of standardization, dealing with deviation and inconsistency by containing the entire standardization process in a single place—a “center of calculation,” in Bruno Latour’s words.⁽³⁾ >Weather forecasting/Edwards. I 381 Time/assimilation: Analysis produced through 4-D data assimilation thus represented an extremely complex model of data, far removed from the raw observations. With many millions of gridpoint values anchored to fewer than 100,000 observations, one could barely even call the analysis “based” on observations I 382 in any ordinary sense. As the data assimilation expert Andrew Lorenc put it, “assimilation is the process of finding the model representation which is most consistent with the observations.” >Weather forecasting/Edwards, >Homogenization/climatology, >Model bias/climatology. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. T. C. Peterson et al., “Homogeneity Adjustments of In Situ Atmospheric Climate Data: A Review,” International Journal of Climatology 18 (1998): 1493– 2. D. R. Easterling et al., “On the Development and Use of Homogenized Climate Datasets,” Journal of Climate 9, no. 6 (1996): 1429–; T. Karl et al., “Long-Term Climate Monitoring by the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS),” Climatic Change 31 (1995): 135–; Peterson et al., “Homogeneity Adjustments”; R. G. Quayle et al., “Effects of Recent Thermometer Changes in the Cooperative Station Network,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 72, no. 11 (1991): 1718–. 3. B. Latour. 1987. Science in Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 4. Lorenc A.C. (2002) Atmospheric Data Assimilation and Quality Control. In: Pinardi N., Woods J. (eds) Ocean Forecasting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22648-3_5.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Corporate Law	Economic Theories	Parisi I 50 Corporate Law/Economic theories/Gelbach/Klick: One area of law and economics where empirical work has been slow to adopt the modern quasi-experimental approach is corporate law and economics. In this area, the standard approach to empirical inquiry involves the use of event studies to deduce the effect of various public policies or internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm value.* Event studies/model: Event studies in this literature generally follow a fairly simple recipe. A researcher identifies the timing of the event of interest and assumes that the effect of this event will be capitalized into the value of the asset in question, Parisi I 51 appealing to the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency. The researcher then estimates a time series model of the asset’s returns based upon the historical relationship between the asset’s returns and other covariates, usually including some proxy for the market return. Based upon this model, the researcher predicts the asset’s return at the time of the event. The researcher then calculates the excess return for the event date, which is the difference between the actual return at the time of the event and the predicted counterfactual return. This excess return is then standardized to account for the volatility of the asset (i.e., the excess return is normalized by dividing by some measure of volatility of the asset’s return such as the standard deviation of non-event day excess returns), and statistical inferences are made. (see Bhaghat and Romano 2002)⁽³⁾, (see Gelbach, Helland, and Klick, 2013)⁽⁴⁾. Event studies: Expressed this way, it is easy to see that event studies are functionally equivalent to estimating a simple before-and-after time series model with no comparison group. Manne’s hypothesis/hostile takeover: It has also been used by Jonathan Klick and Robert Sitkoff to study Henry Manne’s market-for-corporate-control hypothesis (Klick and Sitkoff, 2008)⁽⁵⁾. This hypothesis states that for publicly held firms, the possibility of a hostile takeover will discipline a firm’s managers, forcing them to maximize firm value even if the firm’s board is less than perfect in its monitoring. Klick and Sitkoff exploit the political economy dynamics that surrounded an attempt to sell the controlling interest in the Hershey Company in 2002. Parisi I 52 Results from Klick and Sitkoff’s study offer credible support for the Manne hypothesis, even though they amount to standard before-and-after analysis, because the events in question did not appear to be confounded by any other systematic changes. Literature: As Vladimir Atanasov and Bernard Black discuss in a recent literature review, it is rare for empirical research in corporate finance, including research done by law and economics scholars, to focus on the kinds of natural experiments (...). (Atanasov and Black, 2014)⁽⁶⁾. >Economic models/Gelbach/Klick. Comparison: While comparison groups are sometimes used indirectly for so-called falsification tests, or as general control variables, it is rare that they are used to generate difference in differences estimates. One notable exception is provided by Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2006)⁽⁷⁾, who re-examine the issue of mandatory disclosure that had previously been studied at least as far back as George Stigler’s famous 1964 study (Stigler, 1964)⁽⁸⁾. Contrary to findings in much of the previous literature that had not employed counterfactual comparison groups, these authors found that mandatory disclosure had significant effects on the returns of the affected firms. * Fama et al. (1969)⁽¹⁾ is often credited as the first event study. However, as noted by Newhard (2014), Armen Alchian had performed one in 1954 while he was working at Rand to deduce the fusion fuel being used in the newly developed hydrogen bomb using stock prices of firms providing the candidate fuels. This paper was never published since it was deemed a threat to national security. 1. Fama, Eugene, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard Roll (1969). “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information.” International Economic Review 10(1): 1–21. 2. Newhard, Joseph Michael (2014). “The Stock Market Speaks: How Dr. Alchian Learned to Build the Bomb.” Journal of Corporate Finance 27: 116–132. 3. Bhagat, Sanjai and Robert Romano (2002). “Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation.” American Law and Economics Review 4(1): 141–168. 4. Gelbach, Jonah, Eric Helland, and Jonathan Klick (2013). “Valid Inference in Single-Firm Single-Event Studies.” American Law and Economics Review 15(2): 495–541. 5. Klick, Jonathan and Robert Sitkoff (2008). “Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off.” Columbia Law Review 108(4): 749–838. 6. Atanasov, Vladimir and Bernard Black (2014). “Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance Research.” Northwestern Law and Economics Research Paper 11-08. 7. Greenstone, Michael, Paul Oyer, and Annette Vissing-Jorgenson (2006). “Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2): 399–460. 8. Stigler, George J. (1964). “Public Regulation of the Securities Markets.” Journal of Business 37(2): 117–142. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Correspondence Theory	James	Diaz-Bone I 88 PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> realization,> adjustment). --- Horwich I 22 Correspondence/accordance/pragmatism/James: only here does he begin to distinguish himself from "intellectualism": Accordance/James: accordance means first "to copy", but e.g. our word for clock is not a copy, but a symbol, which can replace a representation image very well. Symbol/James: for many things there are no "copies" at all, only symbols: e.g. "past", "force", "spontaneity", etc. Correspondence: can only mean proper guidance here. Namely, practically as well as intellectually. Horwich I 23 It leads to consistency, stability and fluid human communication. ⁽¹⁾ 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994	James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Death	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 159 Death/Developmental psychology/Upton: There are enormous differences in children’s understanding of loss and how they cope with bereavement. This has often been understood in terms of the children’s cognitive development. Most researchers believe that infants have no understanding of death, but as infants develop an attachment to a carer they can experience loss or separation. Between the ages of three and five, children have little idea of what death is. They may confuse death and sleep, and believe that the dead can be brought back to life. In middle to late childhood, understanding about death becomes more realistic. However, research suggests that it is not until nine years and over that children really understand the finality of death (Cuddy-Casey and Orvaschel. 1997)⁽¹⁾. Kastenbaum (2000)⁽²⁾ suggests that the confusion and misunderstanding about death that has been observed in children simply reflects their attempts to try to come to terms with and fully understand what death is and what it means. It has also been observed that children begin to develop a more logical understanding of what death is through experience - for example, when a grandparent or even a much-loved pet dies (Hayslip and Hansson, 2003)⁽³⁾. If this is true, Kellehear (2005)⁽⁴⁾ is right to be concerned about the distancing of death and dying from the family and community (…). >Dying. 1. Cuddy-Casey, M and Orvaschel, H (1997) Children’s understanding of death in relation to child suicidality and homicidality. Clinical Psychology Review, 17: 33-45. 2. Kastenbaum, R (2000) The Psychology of Death. New York: Springer Link. 3. Hayslip, B and Hansson, RO (2003) Death awareness and adjustment across the life span, in Bryant, CD (ed.) Handbook of Death and Dying. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 4. Kellehear, A. (2005) Compassionate Cities: Public health and end of life care. Milton Park: Routledge.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Demand for Money	Tobin	Mause I 225 Demand for Money/Keynesianism/Tobin: The Keynesian theory of money demand in the tradition of James Tobin⁽¹⁾ largely takes up the considerations of monetarist theory. (Economic policy/Monetarism: Thesis: All economic policy interventions are (...) assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments.) Tobin: Thesis: Market participants have a wealth of different investment opportunities for their assets. However, the portfolio theoretical transmission process calls into question the high substitutability between the individual asset classes. (...) This restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy. >Monetary policy, >Stock market, >Markets. 1. James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 38 (3), 1956, S. 241– 247.	EconTobin I James Tobin The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Description Levels	Quine	IX 188 Predicate Calculus 2nd order: this predicate calculus compromises individuals and classees of individuals. V 33 Similarity/Perception/Ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perception similarity brings ontological clarity. Perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted. >Perception/Quine. V 34 Similarity/Quine: Perceptual similarity differs from reception similarity. The latter is purely physical similarity. Three digit relation: Episode a resembles b more than episode c. Perceptual similarity: on the other hand, is a bundle of behavioral dispositions of the 2nd order (to react). The contrast can be eliminated by using the reception similarity, but not only speaking of individual episodes a, b, c, but more generally of episodes that have a reception similarity with these. VI 71 Levels of Uncertainty: the uncertainty of the reference is not identical to the uncertainty of the translation, nor is it as serious. Translation indeterminacy is more serious because it is holophrastic (it refers to whole sentences): it can produce divergent interpretations that remain unexplored even at the level of whole sentences. VI 72 The uncertainty of the reference can be illustrated by examples of compensating adjustment manoeuvres within a sentence. X 20 QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/Sentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation has no objective sense at the level of sentences.	Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Desire	Appraisal Theory	Corr I 62 Desires/appraisal theory/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)⁽¹⁾. These assumptions entail that the emotional reaction to a concrete event should be influenced by the degree to which superordinate desires are affected by this event, as well as the strength of these desires. >Motives, >Motivation. A number of tests of this assumption have been made. For example, Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001)⁽²⁾ asked participants to recall the single most satisfying event experienced during the last month and to rate the extent to which this event satisfied each of ten candidate basic desires (e.g., the desire for competence, security, relatedness, popularity and personal autonomy). Other research has focused on an intermediate level of the motive hierarchy, where the top-level desires (e.g., the achievement motive) are concretized to more specific desires that represent what the person wants to attain in her current life situation (e.g., getting good grades; see Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998)⁽³⁾. For example, Emmons (1986)⁽⁴⁾ related these intermediate-level desires, called personal strivings, to emotions using an experiencing-sampling method… (for additional information, see Emmons 1996⁽⁵⁾; Brunstein, Schultheiss and Maier 1999⁽⁶⁾. Corr I 63 Beyond relating positive and negative emotions to desire fulfilment and desire frustration, respectively, appraisal theorists have linked particular emotions to particular kinds of desires (e.g., Lazarus 1991⁽⁷⁾; Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988⁽⁸⁾; Roseman 1979)⁽⁹⁾. An important distinction in this context is that between wanting versus diswanting a state of affairs (Roseman 1979(9)), or between having an approach goal versus an avoidance goal. Several theorists (e.g., Gray 1994⁽¹⁰⁾; see Carver 2006⁽¹¹⁾ for a review) proposed (a) that the pursuit of approach versus avoidance goals activates one of two different, basic motivational systems, a behavioural approach system (BAS) or a behavioural inhibition (BIS) system; and (b) that people differ in central parameters of these systems, specifically in the relative strength of their general approach and avoidance motivation. Carver (2004)⁽¹²⁾ found that a measure of inter-individual differences in general approach motivation (BAS sensitivity) predicted the intensity of sadness and anger in response to frustration (the non-occurrence of an expected positive event). >Reinforcement sensivity, >Jeffrey A. Gray. 1. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam 2. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y. and Kasser, T. 2001. What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80: 325–39 3. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508 4. Emmons, R. A. 1986. Personal strivings: an approach to personality and subjective well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 1058–68 5. Emmons, R. A. 1996. Striving and feeling: personal goals and subjective well-being, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 313–37. New York: Guilford Press 6. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Maier, G. W. 1999. The pursuit of personal goals: a motivational approach to well-being and life adjustment, in J. Brandtstädter and R. M. Lerner (eds.), Action and self-development: theory and research through the life span, pp. 169–96. New York: Sage 7. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 8. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Gray, J. A. 1994. Three fundamental emotion systems, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 243–8. Oxford University Press 11. Carver, C. S. 2006. Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action, Motivation and Emotion 30: 105–10 12. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Discrimination	Pariser	I 137 Discrimination/Software/Pariser: Problem: a software that, for example, examines a company's hiring practices and randomly picks out nine white persons could specify that this company is not interested in hiring persons of color and filter them out from the outset. ⁽¹⁾ This problem is called "over-adjustment" among programmers. I 139 Over-adjustment/Pariser: becomes a central and irreducible problem of the filter bubble, because over-adjustment and stereotyping are synonymous here. I 140 Such stereotypes can cause your creditworthiness to be downgraded because your friends do not pay their debts on time. 1. Dalton Conley, Elsewhere, U. S. A.: How We Got from the Company Man, Family Dinners, and the Affluent Society to the Home Office, BlackBerry Moms, and Economic Anxiety, New York: Pantheon, 2008, S. 164.	Pariser I Eli Pariser The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think London 2012
Drives	Allport	Corr I 95 Stimuli/behavior/Allport/Deary: Allport emphasized that it was the trait and not the stimulus that was the driving force behind behaviour that expresses personality. >Personality traits, >Behavior. This idea was recast by Matthews, Deary and Whiteman (2003⁽¹⁾) when they articulated the key assumptions of the ‘inner locus’ and ‘causal precedence’ of personality traits. Allport suggested the definitions ‘derived drives’ or ‘derived motives’ for traits and summed up that (Allport 1931⁽²⁾, p. 369): Whatever they are called they may be regarded as playing a motivating role in each act, thus endowing the separate adjustments of the individual to specific stimuli with that adverbial quality that is the very essence of personality. Adverbs/adjectives/description/theory/Deary: Today’s trait researchers are keener on adjectives than adverbs. >Lexical hypothesis. 1.Matthews, G., Deary, I. J. and Whiteman, M. C. 2003. Personality traits, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press 2. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Economic Cycle	Neoclassical Economics	Mause I 226 Economy/Neoclassical Theory: Economic fluctuations can (...) in the sense of neo-classical theory or in the theory of real business cycles (Real Business Cycle or RBC-theory; Stadler 1994 ⁽¹⁾) also occur on the supply side of the goods markets if it comes to fluctuations in the provision of production factors. Neoclassical theory: for them, what is happening on the labour markets ((s) for economic development) is important in the medium term. NeoclassicsVsKeynesianism/NeoclassicismVsKeynesianism: Neoclassical models ((s) unlike Keynesianism, which looks at the behaviour of private households) regard the state as primarily responsible for the occurrence of economic cycles, while implying inherent stability in the private sector. An unsystematic monetary or fiscal policy leads to uncertainty and adjustment reactions of market participants, which are reflected in economic fluctuations. (See Hayek "presumption of reason", "pretense of knowledge"). >Economic Cycle/Public Choice . 1. Stadler, George W., Real business cycles. Journal of Economic Literature 32, (4) 1994, S. 1750– 1783.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Economic Policies	Monetarism	Mause I 57f Economic Policies/Monetarism/MonetarismVsKeynesianism/MonetarismVsKeynes: In contrast to the Keynesians, the monetarists (...) assume the fundamental stability of the private sector and therefore deny the need for an active stabilization policy. Instead, a stability policy in the form of reliable framework conditions and economic policy restraint on the part of the state is called for. See also Economic Policies/Friedman). Mause I 225 Economic Policy/Monetarism: all economic policy interventions are (...) assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments. See Assets/Neoclassics, See Demand for money/Tobin.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Emotions	Pinker	I 457 Emotions/Pinker: Thesis: feelings are adjustments, software modules - with their help copies of the genes should be reproduced, which they have caused. >Mind, >Perception, >Thinking, >Psychology, >Causality, >Nature, >Sensation, >Emotion system. I 499 Feelings/explanation/Trivers: strategies in retaliation game: affection: aimed at those who are apparently ready for a return favor. Anger: protects from being betrayed. Gratitude: calculates costs and benefits of the first act. Compassion: should bring us gratitude. >Compassion. Shame: should maintain a relationship. I 500 Simultaneous evolution of incentive, faking feelings. - It follows the evolution of discernment - Emotions do not help anyone, but they have helped his ancestors. - (s) Separation of situation and feeling. I 510 Emotions/PinkerVsTradition: feelings are no relic of an animal past, no fountain of creativity, not an enemy of the intellect. The intellect transmits control to the emotions, as soon as the situation is such that they can act as a guarantor for its offers, function as promises and threats. >Psychologcial theories on situations. I 522 Cognitive Dissonance/Pinker: one decreases them by inventing a new opinion to resolve an inner contradiction. E.g. so a boring job becomes retroactively interesting. - A feeling of uncertainty stemming from conflicting beliefs. I 523 PinkerVs: that is not true, there is no contradiction between "The work is boring" and "I was forced to lie". Aronson: it is about the contradiction with the statement: "I am nice and have everything under control". >Aronson, Joshua M., >Aronson, Eliot.	Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Environment	Gould	IV 43 Environment/adjustment/selection/Darwinism/Gould: according to the traditional point of view Darwinism is first and foremost a theory of natural selection. >Darwinism, >Selection. Gould: that is certainly true, but in reference to power and scope of selection we have become overzealous when we try to attribute every conceivable form and behaviour to their direct influence. Another often forgotten principle prevents any optimal adaptation: the strange and yet compelling paths of history! Organisms are subject to the constraints of inherited forms that slow down their evolution! They cannot be reshaped every time their environment changes. IV 44 History/Gould: a world that would be optimally adapted to its current environment would be a world without history, such a world could have been created as we find it now. >Evolution.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Friendship	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 105 Friendship/Developmental psychology/Upton: Middle childhood brings clear changes in the understanding of friendship. Early childhood: here, friendships are transient in nature and are often related to the availability of the other person. A friend is defined as someone you play with or with whom you share some other activity. In middle childhood, children’s relationships still tend to be with others who are similar to themselves; this is partly because children are more likely to come into proximity because of similarities in age, socio-economic status, ethnicity, etc. However, there is also evidence that children also become increasingly similar to their friends as they interact (Hartup, 1996)⁽¹⁾. >Stages of development. Middle childhood: children begin to identify the special features of friendship that supersede mere proximity. During this period of development, children begin to recognise that friendships provide companionship, help, protection and support (Azmitia et aL, 1998)⁽²⁾, are reciprocal (Selman, 1980)⁽³⁾, demand trust and loyalty (Bigelow, 1977)⁽⁴⁾ and last over time (Parker and Seal. 1996)⁽⁵⁾. >Social relations, >Relationships. That is not to say that friendships made in middle childhood endure for long periods. School-age children often have what have been called ‘fair-weather friends’, because friendships at this age are often unable to survive periods of conflict or disagreement (Rubin et al.. 1998)⁽⁶⁾. Upton I 106 Gender differences: There also appear to be gender differences in the time it takes to mend broken friendships. Azmitia et al. (1998)(2) observed that, following friendship conflict, boys would typically work it through and renew the friendship in one day, whereas girls would take about two weeks. This may be because triads are more common in the friendships of school-age girls than in those of boys, causing one member of the group to feel left out. By the end of middle childhood, friendships are becoming intimate, and are characterised by an enduring sense of trust in each other. The ability to engage in mutual role-taking and collaborative negotiation develops throughout this period, leading to greater loyalty, trust and social support. For example, Azmitia et al. (1998)⁽²⁾ found that girls’ expectations that friends would keep secrets rose from 25 per cent in eight to nine year olds, to 72 per cent in 11 to 12 year olds. However, this expectation developed slightly later in boys. Thus, the ability to form close, intimate friendships becomes increasingly important as children move towards early adolescence (Buhrmester, 1990)⁽⁷⁾. 1. Hartup. WW (1996) The company they keep: friendships and their developmental signifi cance. Child Development, 67: 1-13. 2. Azmitia, M, Kamprath, N and Linnet, J (1998) Intimacy and conflict: on the dynamics of boys’ and gir1s friendships during middle childhood and adolescence, in Meyer, L, Grenot-Scheyer, M, Harry, B, Park, H and Schwartz, I (eds) Understanding the Social Lives of Children and Youth. Baltimore, MD: PH Brookes. 3. Selman, RL (1980) The Growth of Interpersonal Understanding. New York: Academic Press. 4. Bigelow, BJ (1977) Children’s friendship expectations: a cognitive-developmental study. Child Development, 48: 246-53. 5. Parker, JG and Seal, J (1996) Forming, losing, renewing and replacing friendships: applying temporal parameters to the assessment of children’s friendship experiences. Child Development, 67(5): 2248-68. 6. Rubin, KH, Bukowski, W and Parker, JG (1998) Peer interactions, relationships, and groups, in Eisenberg, N (ed.) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development (6th edn). New York: Wiley. 7. Buhrmester, D (1990) Intimacy of friendship, interpersonal competence, and adjustment During preadolescence and adolescence. Child Development, 61: 1101-11. Upton I 120 Friendship/adolescence/Developmental psychology/Upton: Friendships are (…) gradually becoming more stable during [adolescence] (Epstein, 1986)⁽¹⁾, although they may be disrupted by transitions such as changing class or school (Wargo Aikins et al., 2005)⁽²⁾. >Peer relationships/Developmental psychology. Upton I 121 However, high-quality friendships, which are marked by intimacy, openness and warmth, are more likely to be maintained despite such transitions (Wargo Aikins et al., 2005)⁽²⁾. Indeed, there is an increased emphasis on intimacy and self-disclosure throughout adolescence (Zarbatany et al., 2000)⁽³⁾, although there is some evidence to suggest that greater levels of intimacy are reported by girls than by boys (Buhrmester, 1996)⁽⁴⁾. This increasing intimacy and self-disclosure has been suggested to be fundamentally important for the adolescent’s developing sense of self, as well as for the understanding of relationships (Parker and Gottman, 1989)⁽⁵⁾. >Self/Developmental psychology, >Youth culture/Developmental psychology. 1. Epstein, JL (1986) Friendship selection: developmental and environmental influences, in Meuller, E and Cooper, C (eds) Process and Outcome in Peer Relationship. New York: Academic Press. 2. Wargo Aitkins, J, Bierman, K and Parker, JG (2005) Navigating the transition to junior high school: the influence of pre-transition friendship and self-system characteristics. Social Development, 14:42-60. 3. Zarbatany, L, McDougall, P and Hymel, S (2000) Gender-differentiated experience in the peer culture: links to intimacy in preadolescence. Social Development, 9(1): 6 2-79. 4. Buhrmester, D (1996) Need fulfillment, interpersonal competence, and the developmental contexts of early adolescent friendship, in Bukowski, W, Newcomb, A and Hartup, W (eds) The Company They Keep. New York: Cambridge University Press. 5. Parker, J and Gottman, 1(1989) Social and emotional development in a relational context, in Bernat, T and Ladd, G (eds) Peer Relationships in Child Development. New York: Wiley and Sons.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Goals	Thomas Aquinas	Dennett I 85 Purpose/Thomas Aquinas: Thomas assumed that rain drops, volcanoes, planets behaved as if they were striving for an aim to "achieve the best result". The adjustment of the means to the purpose requires an intention: God. >God, cf. >Purposive action.	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Gold Standard	Eichengreen	Mause I 95 Goldstandard/Eichengreen: The gold standard was a rigid system of fixed exchange rates that severely limited the economic autonomy of the nation states and tended to have a procyclical effect: if a country got into economic difficulties and suffered a corresponding outflow of foreign exchange, the balance could only be restored through deflation - an adjustment path that entailed considerable social costs, especially in the form of unemployment. The international economic order based on the gold standard was only possible as long as the working class remained essentially politically excluded. ⁽¹⁾ The gold standard ensured that social policy regulation was largely a matter for the nation states, while the international economic order (despite moderately rising tariffs) remained liberal. The attempt to revive the gold standard after 1932 failed, not only for political reasons, but also because the classic neoclassical economic ideas underlying this system were increasingly challenged by approaches that suggested that the state could and had to intervene in the economic cycle in a regulatory manner. KeynesVsGold Standard, see Golla ⁽²⁾. >J.M. Keynes, >Keynesianism, >Interventions, >Neoclassical economics, >Monetary policy, >Monetarism. 1. Cf. B. Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, Hrsg. The gold standard in theory and history, Bd. 2. London 1997. 2. G. Golla, Nachfrageseitige Konzeptionen zur Zeit der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Deutschland: Keynesianer vor Keynes? Köln 1996.	EconEich I Barry J. Eichengreen Marc Flandreau The gold standard in theory and history London 1997 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Grief	Psychological Theories	Upton I 157 Grief/Psychological theories/Upton: According to Archer (1999)⁽¹⁾, a widely held belief is that grief follows an orderly series of stages or phases with distinct features. Traditional models have one main commonality - the need for grief work - which is described as an effortful process that we must go through entailing confrontation of the reality of loss and gradual acceptance of the world without the loved one (Stroebe, 1998)⁽²⁾. All models emphasize the need to experience all of these stages in order to reach an acceptance of the loss that has been experienced. Grief work models can be applied to the grief process that either adults or children will go through before reaching acceptance, although, as the next section shows, age will impact on how grief is displayed. Parkes’s (1972⁽³⁾, 1986⁽⁴⁾) four-stage model describes the phases of bereavement and, in turn, the grief work that an individual). According to this model, an individual has to work through the stages of grief in order to reach acceptance and move forward in life. Phase One: Initial reaction: shock, numbness or disbelief Phase Two: Pangs of grief, searching, anger, guilt, sadness and fear Phase Three: Despair Phase Four: Acceptance/adjustment; gaining a new identity. >Death/Developmental psychology, >Dying/Kübler-Ross. Upton I 163 Sometimes a distinction is made between grief and mourning; grief is seen as a subjective state - a set of feelings that arise spontaneously after a significant death, whereas mourning describes the way in which grief is displayed. Mourning is often constrained by the rituals or behaviours prescribed by a culture. The Western approach to bereavement is not universal and displays of grief and mourning take different forms across the world. >Grief/Cultural psychology. 1. Archer,J (1999) The Nature of Grief: The evolution and psychology of reactions to loss. New York: Routledge. 2. Stroebe, MS (1998) New directions in bereavement research: exploration of gender differences. Palliative Medicine, 12(1): 5-12. 3. Parkes, CM (1972) Bereavement: Studies of grief in adult life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 4. Parkes, CM (1986) Bereavement: Studies of grief life (2nd edn). London: Tavistock.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Homogenization	Storch	Norgaard I 116 Homogenization/Parameterization/von Storch: The climate system has different ‘compartments’ (…). (…) due to the unavoidable discrete description of the system, turbulence cannot be described in mathematical accuracy, and the equations need to be ‘closed’—the effect of friction, in particular at the boundaries between land, atmosphere, and ocean, need to be ‘parameterized’ (e.g. Washington and Parkinson 2005)⁽¹⁾. Norgaard I 117 The basic idea is that there is a set of ‘state variables’ {Ψ} (among them the temperature field at a certain time t at certain discrete positions on the globe), which describe the system, and which dynamics is given by a differential equation d{Ψ}/dt = F({Ψ}). [An] aspect of parameterizations is their strong dependence on the spatial resolution. When the model is changed to run on a higher resolution, the parameterizations need to be reformulated or respecified. There is no rule how to do that, when the spatial resolution is increased—which means that the difference equations do not converge towards a pre‐specified set of differential equations, or, in other words: there is nothing like a set of differential equations describing the climate system per se, as is the case in most physical disciplines. >Parameterization. Norgaard I 120 [Another aspect is that] the ‘instrumental’ data usually suffer from ‘inhomogeneities’ (e.g. Jones 1995⁽²⁾; Karl et al. 1993⁽³⁾). Before using such data in climate analysis, the series have to be ‘homogenized’ (e.g. Peterson et al. 1998)⁽⁴⁾. 1. Washington, W. M., and Parkinson, C. L. 2005. An Introduction to Three‐Dimensional Climate Modelling. 2nd edn., Sausalito, CA: University Science Books. 2. Jones, P. D. 1995. The instrumental data record: Its accuracy and use in attempts to identify the ‘CO2 Signal’. Pp. 53–76 in H. von Storch and A. Navarra (eds.), Analysis of Climate Variability: Applications of Statistical Techniques. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 3. Karl, T. R., Quayle, R. G., and Groisman, P. Y. 1993. Detecting climate variations and change: New challenges for observing and data management systems. J. Climate 6: 1481–94. 4. Peterson, T. C., Easterling, D. R., Karl, T. R., Groisman, P., Nicholls, N., Plummer, N., Torok, S., Auer, I., Boehm, R., Gullett, D., Vincent, L., Heino, R., Tuomenvirta, H., Mestre, O., Szentimrey, T., Saliner, J., Førland, E., Hanssen‐Bauer, I., Alexandersson, H., Jones, P., and Parker, D. 1998. Homogeneity adjustments of in situ atmospheric climate data: A review. Intern. J. Climatol. 18: 1493–517. Hans von Storch, Armin Bunde, and Nico Stehr, „Methodical Challenges of the Physics of Climate”, in: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Ignorance	Acemoglu	Acemoglu I 63 Ignorance/inequalities/economy/poorness/Acemoglu/Robinson: The ignorance hypothesis maintains that poor countries are poor because they have a lot of market failures and because economists and policymakers do not know how to get rid of them and have heeded the wrong advice in the past. Acemoglu I 64 AcemogluVsIgorance hypothesis: neither Ghana’s disappointing performance after independence nor the countless other cases of apparent economic mismanagement can simply be blamed on ignorance. After all, if ignorance were the problem, well-meaning leaders would quickly learn what types of policies increased their citizens’ incomes and welfare, and would gravitate toward those policies. Corruption instead of ignorance: It wasn’t differences in knowledge or intentions between John Smith and Cortés that laid the seeds of divergence during the colonial period, and it wasn’t differences in knowledge between later U.S. presidents, such as Teddy Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson, and Porfirio Díaz that made Mexico choose economic institutions that enriched elites at the expense of the rest of society at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries while Roosevelt and Wilson did the opposite. Rather, it was the differences in the institutional constraints the countries’ presidents and elites were facing. Similarly, leaders of African nations that have languished over the last half century under insecure property rights and economic institutions, impoverishing much of their populations, did not allow this to happen because they thought it was good economics; they did so because they could get away with it and enrich themselves (...). Acemogu I 66 The ignorance hypothesis differs from the geography and culture hypotheses in that it comes readily with a suggestion about how to “solve” the problem of poverty: if ignorance got us here, enlightened and informed rulers and policymakers can get us out and we should be able to “engineer” prosperity around the world by providing the right advice and by convincing politicians of what is good economics. [But] (...) the main obstacle to the adoption of policies that would reduce market failures and encourage economic growth is not the ignorance of politicians but the incentives and constraints Acemoglu I 67 constraints they face from the political and economic institutions in their societies. >Economic policies/Acemoglu, >Institutions/Acemoglu. The idea that ignorance explains comparative development is implicit in most economic analyses of economic development and policy reform: for example, Williamson (1990)⁽¹⁾; Perkins, Radelet, and Lindauer (2006)⁽²⁾; and Aghion and Howitt (2009)⁽³⁾. A recent, forceful version of this view is developed in Banerjee and Duflo (2011)⁽⁴⁾. 1.Williamson, John (1990). Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics. 2.Perkins, Dwight H., Steven Radelet, and David L. Lindauer (2006). Development Economics. 6th ed. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 3.Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt (2009). The Economics of Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 4.Banerjee, Abhijit V., Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster (2008). “Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System.” System.” Journal of the European Economic Association 7: 487–500.	Acemoglu II James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006 Acemoglu I James A. Acemoglu James A. Robinson Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012
Induction	Goodman	I 23 Defi Induction/Goodman: induction requires that some classes are seen as relevant classes by excluding others. >Relevance. --- II 82 The sharpest criticism VsHume/Goodman: Hume's analysis relates at best to the origin of predictions, not to their entitlement. II 88 The problem of induction is not a problem of proof, but a problem of definition of the difference between justified and unjustified predictions. >Justification, >Prediction. II 89 There is mutual adjustment between definition and language use. II 101f Grue/Goodman: problem: the same data supports contrasting predictions. Question: in what essential property must hypotheses be the same > law: are not in connection with e.g. an object in my pocket. "Grue" does not work as a conventional non-law-like hypotheses (it is limited in space or time) - one can reverse the derivation: red and green from gred and reen. II 109 Law-like or resumable hypotheses are not to be characterized purely syntactically. II 95 What confirms certain data, is not what is obtained by generalization of separate individual cases, but that which is obtained by generalization of the entire body of data material.	G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Inflation Targeting	Taylor	Taylor III Inflation targeting/interest rates/central banking/Wages/Economics/TaylorVsSummers/TaylorVsStansbury/Lance Taylor: Regarding inflation, both central banks and [Summers and Stansbury] ignore the facts that inflation is a cumulative process driven by conflicting claims to income and wealth and that for the past five decades profits have captured almost all the claims. >Inflation targeting/Summers. Consider the real “product wage,” the nominal or money wage divided by a producer price index (PPI) to correct for cost inflation confronting business. A little algebra (…) shows that the labor or wage share of output, which equals real “unit labor cost,” is equal to the real wage divided by productivity or the output/labor ratio. The profit share equals one minus the wage share. (…) the profit share and growth rates of real wages and productivity have varied over time (…). The growth rate of nominal unit labor cost is the difference between rates of wage and productivity growth. As with the other labor market indicators, cost growth slowed after 2000. To unravel the dynamics, we need a theory of inflation. Around the turn of the 20th century the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell pointed out that inflation is a “cumulative process” involving feedback between price and wage inflation rates. Even after their long decline [it] shows that labor payments still make up 55% of production costs and have to enter inflation accounting. The “real balance effect” (or the “inflation tax” in a dynamic version) says that a jump in the price level will reduce the real value of assets with prices fixed in nominal terms – money is the usual example. Wealth is eroded and households are supposed to save more as a consequence. Along with a wage lag, the real balance effect is the key adjustment mechanism in Milton Friedman’s (1968) “inflation” model which still underlies contemporary monetary policy. “Forced saving” happens when a price jump against a constant money wage reduces real payments to wage-earners. If their capacity to borrow is limited, they have to cut consumption, sliding the demand curve downward. If an expansionary package does drive up the price level, middle class and low income households who rely on wages would be the ones to suffer. Conflict arises because price increases are controlled by business while the money wage is subject to bargaining between business and labor. Both sides seek to manipulate the labor share as a key distributional indicator. In an overall inflationary environment, business can respond immediately to increases in the wage share or output by pushing up the rate of price increase in Phillips curve fashion along the “Inflation” schedule (…). Money wages on the other hand are not immediately indexed to price inflation so that they will follow with a lag. Labor will push for faster wage inflation when the wage share is low. Suppose that there is an initial inflation equilibrium (…). The [Summers and Stansbury] proposal to use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand would shift the inflation locus upward (…) with more rapid inflation and a somewhat lower wage share in macro equilibrium (…) along the stable share schedule. In light of the vanishing NAIRU [Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment] over the past two decades, it is not clear how strong this upward shift could be. The way that expansionary policy could pay off in terms of inequality and (possibly) faster inflation would be though an upward movement in the stable share schedule if the labor market tightens, leading to greater bargaining power for labor. The new Keynesian inventors are now the ruling elders of macroeconomics, unlikely to change their minds. (…) [Summers and Stansbury] might remember with Max Planck that science advances one funeral at a time. They are certainly correct in saying that “the role of particular frictions and rigidities in underpinning economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand.” (…) many of the correct observations that [Summers and Stansbury] make about the likely ineffectiveness of interest rate changes were raised almost 90 years ago by Keynes’s colleague Piero Sraffa (1932a (1), 1932b (2)) in a controversy with Friedrich von Hayek. Sraffa’s main emphasis was on the inapplicability of a “natural rate” of interest, a point amplified by Keynes in the General Theory. The natural rate, nevertheless, remains a topic of great interest to left-leaning new Keynesians. How they reconcile that idea with the fiscalist Keynesian perspective adoped by [Summers and Stansbury] remains to be seen. >Central banking/Summers. 1. Sraffa, Piero (1932a) “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal, 42: 42-53. 2. Sraffa, Piero (1932b) “Money and Capital: A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal, 42: 249-25. Taylor, Lance: Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession	EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016
Information	Wiener	II 83 Information/Language/Wiener: it is theoretically possible to develop the statistics of semantic and behavioural language in such a way that we obtain a good measure of the amount of information in each system. >Language, >Meaning, >Semantics, >Language behavior. In any case, we can generally show that phonetic language contains less overall information in relation to the input of data... II 84 or in any case it does not contain more than the transmission system leading to the ear and that semantic and behavioural language contains even less information. This fact is a form of the second principle of thermodynamics and is only valid if we consider the transferred information at each stage as maximum information that could be transmitted with an appropriately encrypted receiving system. >Second law of thermodynamics. II 121 The right of ownership of information suffers from the necessary disadvantage that information intended to contribute to the general state of the Community's information must say something substantially different from the community's previous general possession of information. >Innovation, >Message, >Communication. II 122 The idea that information can be stacked in a changing world without noticeably reducing its value is wrong. >Change, >Knowledge. II 123 Information is more of a dynamic matter than a stacking affair. II 124 The time factor is essential in all assessments of the information value. Brockman I 155 Information/Wiener/Kaiser: [Wiener borrowed Shannon’s insight]: if information was like entropy, then it could not be conserved – or contained. >Information/Shannon, >Entropy. Conclusion/Wiener: it was folly for military leaders to try to stockpile the “Scientific know-how of the nation in static libraries and laboratories.”⁽¹⁾ Brockman I 156 Since “information and entropy are not conserved,” they are “equally unsuited to being commodities.”⁽²⁾ Brockman I 157 KaiserVsWiener: what Wiener had in mind, was not what Shannon meant with “information”. Wiener’s treatment of “information” sounded more like Matthew Arnold in 1869⁽³⁾ than Claude Shannon in 1948—more “body and spirit” than “bit.” >Body, >Mind. Brockman I 158 [Today] [i]n many ways, Wiener has been proved right. His vision of networked feedback loops driven by machine-to-machine communication has become a mundane feature of everyday life. >Machine learning, >Human machine communication, >Robots, >Artificial intelligence. 1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. ibid. 3. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Jane Garnett (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). Kaiser, David “”Information” for Wiener, for Shannon, and for Us” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. Brockman I 179 Information/Wiener/Hillis: “Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our Brockman I 179 adjustment felt upon it.” In his words, information is what we use to “live effectively within that environment.”⁽¹⁾ For Wiener, information is a way for the weak to effectively cope with the strong. >Outer world, >Inner world, >Behavior, >Adaptation, >Niches. 1. Wiener, N. (1950) The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 17-18. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	WienerN I Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965 WienerN II N. Wiener The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952 German Edition: Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019
Infrastructure	Edwards	I 40 Infrastructure/Star/Ruhleder/Edwards: Infrastructure thus exhibits the following features, (…) summarized by Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder: -Embeddedness. Infrastructure is sunk into, inside of, other structures, social arrangements, and technologies. -Transparency. Infrastructure does not have to be reinvented each time or assembled for each task, but invisibly supports those tasks. -Reach or scope beyond a single event or a local practice. -Learned as part of membership. The taken-for-grantedness of artifacts and organizational arrangements is a sine qua non of membership in a community of practice. Strangers and outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target object to be learned about. New participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects as they become members. I 41 - Links with conventions of practice. Infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by the conventions of a community of practice. - Embodiment of standards. Infrastructure takes on transparency by plugging into other infrastructures and tools in a standardized fashion. - Built on an installed base. Infrastructure wrestles with the inertia of the installed base and inherits strengths and limitations from that base. - Becomes visible upon breakdown. The normally invisible quality of working infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout. -Is fixed in modular increments, not all at once or globally. Because infrastructure is big, layered, and complex, and because it means different things locally, it is never changed from above. Changes require time, negotiation, and adjustment with other aspects of the systems involved. Adapted from S. L. Star and K. Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems Research 7, no. 1 (1996): 111–.	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Interaction	Rutter	Slater I 208 Interaction/resilience/Rutter: Rutter (1987)⁽¹⁾ interaction effects play an important role in question of psychological resilience (>Resilience/Rutter, >Resilience/psychological theories) of interaction effects. Rutter drew on data from the work of other investigators, such as Hetherington and colleagues on divorce (Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1982⁽²⁾, 1985⁽³⁾), (…)[and] highlighted the moderating roles of individual differences in gender, cognitive skills, temperament, parenting quality, positive marriages, and positive school experiences, for example, with numerous figures illustrating interaction effects. 1. Rutter, M. (1987). Psychosocial resilience and protective mechanisms. American journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 316—331. 2. Hetherington, E. M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1982). Effects of divorce on parents and children. In M. E. Lamb (Ed.), Nontraditional families: Parenting and child development (pp. 233—288). Hilisdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3. Hetherington, E. M., Cox, M., & Cox, R. (1985). Long-term effects of divorce and remarriage on the adjustment of children. Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, 24, 518—530. Ann S. Masten, “Resilience in Children. Vintage Rutter and Beyond”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Interest Rates	Taylor	Taylor III Inflation targeting/interest rates/central banking/Wages/Economics/TaylorVsSummers/TaylorVsStansbury/Lance Taylor: Regarding inflation, both central banks and [Summers and Stansbury] ignore the facts that inflation is a cumulative process driven by conflicting claims to income and wealth and that for the past five decades profits have captured almost all the claims. >Inflation targeting/Summers. Consider the real “product wage,” the nominal or money wage divided by a producer price index (PPI) to correct for cost inflation confronting business. A little algebra (…) shows that the labor or wage share of output, which equals real “unit labor cost,” is equal to the real wage divided by productivity or the output/labor ratio. The profit share equals one minus the wage share. (…) the profit share and growth rates of real wages and productivity have varied over time (…). The growth rate of nominal unit labor cost is the difference between rates of wage and productivity growth. As with the other labor market indicators, cost growth slowed after 2000. To unravel the dynamics, we need a theory of inflation. Around the turn of the 20th century the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell pointed out that inflation is a “cumulative process” involving feedback between price and wage inflation rates. Even after their long decline [it] shows that labor payments still make up 55% of production costs and have to enter inflation accounting. The “real balance effect” (or the “inflation tax” in a dynamic version) says that a jump in the price level will reduce the real value of assets with prices fixed in nominal terms – money is the usual example. Wealth is eroded and households are supposed to save more as a consequence. Along with a wage lag, the real balance effect is the key adjustment mechanism in Milton Friedman’s (1968) “inflation” model which still underlies contemporary monetary policy. “Forced saving” happens when a price jump against a constant money wage reduces real payments to wage-earners. If their capacity to borrow is limited, they have to cut consumption, sliding the demand curve downward. If an expansionary package does drive up the price level, middle class and low income households who rely on wages would be the ones to suffer. Conflict arises because price increases are controlled by business while the money wage is subject to bargaining between business and labor. Both sides seek to manipulate the labor share as a key distributional indicator. In an overall inflationary environment, business can respond immediately to increases in the wage share or output by pushing up the rate of price increase in Phillips curve fashion along the “Inflation” schedule (…). Money wages on the other hand are not immediately indexed to price inflation so that they will follow with a lag. Labor will push for faster wage inflation when the wage share is low. Suppose that there is an initial inflation equilibrium (…). The [Summers and Stansbury] proposal to use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand would shift the inflation locus upward (…) with more rapid inflation and a somewhat lower wage share in macro equilibrium (…) along the stable share schedule. In light of the vanishing NAIRU [Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment] over the past two decades, it is not clear how strong this upward shift could be. The way that expansionary policy could pay off in terms of inequality and (possibly) faster inflation would be though an upward movement in the stable share schedule if the labor market tightens, leading to greater bargaining power for labor. The new Keynesian inventors are now the ruling elders of macroeconomics, unlikely to change their minds. (…) [Summers and Stansbury] might remember with Max Planck that science advances one funeral at a time. They are certainly correct in saying that “the role of particular frictions and rigidities in underpinning economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand.” (…) many of the correct observations that [Summers and Stansbury] make about the likely ineffectiveness of interest rate changes were raised almost 90 years ago by Keynes’s colleague Piero Sraffa (1932a⁽¹⁾, 1932b⁽²⁾) in a controversy with Friedrich von Hayek. Sraffa’s main emphasis was on the inapplicability of a “natural rate” of interest, a point amplified by Keynes in the General Theory. The natural rate, nevertheless, remains a topic of great interest to left-leaning new Keynesians. How they reconcile that idea with the fiscalist Keynesian perspective adoped by [Summers and Stansbury] remains to be seen. >Central banking/Summers. 1. Sraffa, Piero (1932a) “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal, 42: 42-53. 2. Sraffa, Piero (1932b) “Money and Capital: A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal, 42: 249-25. Taylor, Lance: Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession	EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016
Interpretation of Dreams	Ricoeur	I 17 Interpretation of dreams/Freud/Ricoeur: (...) it is not only because of its cultural interpretation that psychoanalysis stands within the great contemporary debate on the Language. By making the dream not only the main object of his research, but a model in a sense, (...) of all the hidden, substituted and fictitious expressions of the human desire, Freud challenges us to seek in the dream itself the entanglement of desire and language, in many different ways: first of all, it is not the dreamed dream that can be interpreted, but only the text of the dream narrative; this is the text that the analysis wants to replace with another text, which, as it were I 18 would be the original language of desire; the analysis moves from one sense to another sense. It is not the desire as such that is the focus of the analysis, but its language. >Sense/Freud/Ricoeur, >Dream/Ricoeur. I 27 The analyst... replaces [the narrative of the waking] with another text which, in his eyes, is the thought of the wish, what the wish would say in a prosopoe without compulsion; one must acknowledge (...) that the dream itself is close to language, since it can be told, analysed, interpreted. I 103 Dream interpretation/Freud/Ricoeur: To find the dream "thoughts" again means indeed to take a certain retrograde path, which - beyond the actual body impressions and emotions, beyond the awake memory or the remains of the day, beyond the actual desire for sleep - discovers the unconscious, that is, the oldest desires. It is our childhood that gets on the surface, with all its forgotten, suppressed, repressed urges, and with our childhood that of humanity, which is repeated in the individual's childhood, in a way abbreviated. The dream provides access to a fundamental phenomenon, (...) : [the] phenomenon of regression, whose aspects are not only temporal but also topical and dynamic. >Regression/Ricoeur. I 104 The interpretation, which is not yet identified with the deciphering work corresponding to the dream work and which is linked more to the psychological content than to the mechanism, nevertheless gradually acquires its own structure; and this structure is a mixed structure. A) On the one hand, interpretation, within the framework of meaning, is a movement from the manifest to the latent; to interpret means to shift the origin of meaning to another place. But already on this first level it is no longer possible to take interpretation for a simple relation between coded and decoded speech; one can no longer be satisfied with the proposition that the unconscious is another speech, an incomprehensible speech. The disguise, which pursues the interpretation from manifest content to latent content, reveals another disguise, namely that of desire in pictures, to which Freud dedicates Chapter IV. To use an expression from metapsychological essays: the dream is already a "drive fate" (Triebschicksal). B) Dream work: This second task requires, even more clearly than the first, the assembling of two worlds of speech, the speech of meaning and the speech of power. To say that the dream is the fulfilment of a repressed desire is to bring together two concepts that belong to two different realms: 1. fulfillment, which belongs to the speech of sense (as the relationship with Husserl testifies), and 2. repression, which belongs to the speech of power; the concept of disguise, which unites both, expresses the fusion of the two concepts, since disguise is a kind of revelation and at the same time the disguise that distorts this revelation, the violence done to the sense. The relationship of the hidden to the shown, as given in the disguise, thus demands a deformation that I 105 can only be formulated as a compromise of forces. To this mixed speech also belongs the concept of "censorship", which corresponds to that of adjustment: adjustment is the effect, censorship the cause. >Censorship/Freud/Ricoeur, >Symbol/Freud.	Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976
Knowledge	Economic Theories	Mause I 415 Knowledge/Economic Theories: Knowledge of the first kind: knowledge of functional and cause-effect relationships. Second type of knowledge: is subject to market-endogenous processes of individual knowledge generation. For example, environmental policy: The state actors have only limited knowledge of environmental policy management, although it is largely unknown on the part of the state how the management addressees (companies, private households) react to environmental policy measures in view of the subjective adjustment possibilities available to them. For this reason, the state's knowledge of environmental policy must always be renewed over time if missteering is to be avoided. In addition, the state must examine on a case-by-case basis to what extent cooperation with environmental policy stakeholders is an appropriate means of providing the state with information that cannot otherwise be obtained. ⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ 1. Thomas Döring & Thilo Pahl. Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik – eine ökonomische Sicht. In Kooperative Umweltpolitik, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens, Wolfgang Köck und Georg Kneer, S.98. Baden-Baden 2003. 2. Annette E. Töller, Warum kooperiert der Staat? Kooperative Umweltpolitik im Schatten der Hierarchie. Baden-Baden 2012.	Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Language	Peacocke	II 166 Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. >Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary. ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation. Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism. II 168 Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme T(s) ↔ p plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences. >Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction. II 171 Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. >Prima facie, >Evidence. II 168 Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention, >Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer. Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker. II 175 Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English : as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond. >Truth conditions, >Conjunction. Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p. >Conventions.	Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Memory	Forensic Psychology	Slater I 107 Memory/suggestibility/forensic psychology: Most of the child witness research on memory and suggestibility about stressful events involves non-maltreated children. Although findings on children’s memory for stressful events remain inconsistent, research examining non-maltreated children’s memory for stressful events has uncovered several predictors of children’s suggestibility. See Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, and Kuhn (1994)⁽¹⁾. Children’s lack of understanding of the event and lack of parental communication, in addition to children’s emotional reactions, were predictive of more inaccurate and more suggestible memory reports. >Suggestibility. Research conducted with participants with maltreatment histories suggests that despite association with cognitive delays in several domains, as reflected on language and intelligence tests, maltreatment history per se does not adversely affect memory ability or increase children’s suggestibility. Children with maltreatment histories have been found to be hypervigilant to negative stimuli (Pollak, Vardi, Bechner, & Curtin, 2005)⁽²⁾. >Intelligence tests, >Performance. Once engaged by such stimuli, maltreated children have a more difficult time than non-maltreated children in disengaging their attention (Maughan & Cicchetti, 2002)⁽³⁾. This focus on negative information may positively influence maltreated children’s legally relevant memory reports. Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, and Crayton (2007)⁽⁴⁾ examined maltreated children’s memory for both an anogential exam and a venipuncture and found that, overall, maltreated children performed as well as non-maltreated children in a memory interview that tapped suggestibility. 1. Goodman, G. S., Quas, J. A., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Riddlesberger, M. M., & Kuhn, J. (1994). Predictors of accurate and inaccurate memories of traumatic events experienced in childhood. Consciousness and Cognition, 3, 269–294. 2. Pollak, S. D., Vardi, S., Bechner, A. M., & Curtin, J. J. (2005). Physically abused children’s regulation of attention in response to hostility. Child Development, 76, 968–977. 3. Maughan, A., & Cicchetti, D. (2002). Impact of child maltreatment and interadult violence on children’s emotion regulation abilities and socioemotional adjustment. Child Development, 73, 1525–1542. 4. Eisen, M. L., Goodman, G. S., Qin, J., Davis, S., & Crayton, J. (2007). Maltreated children’s memory: Accuracy, suggestibility, and psychopathology. Developmental Psychology, 43, 1275–1294. Kelly McWilliams, Daniel Bederian-Gardner, Sue D. Hobbs, Sarah Bakanosky, and Gail S. Goodman, „Children’s Eyewitness Memory and Suggestibility. Revisiting Ceci and Bruck’s (1993) Review“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Method	Meehl	Corr I 15 Methods/Psychology/Meehl: Personality psychology has many concepts that cannot, themselves, be directly observed. Called hypothetical constructs in a classic theoretical description by MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948)⁽¹⁾, these theoretical terms can be inferred indirectly but are not themselves directly observable. Personality psychologists use terms like ‘adjustment’ and ‘extraversion’ and ‘self-esteem’ but cannot observe any of them directly, only indirectly through observations and measurements that are imperfect. The constructs are inferred by a network of correlations with various observations. Converging evidence affirms the reality, or at least the usefulness, of a construct. Consider ‘extraversion’: if the same people are found to be extraverted when measured by self-report, by peer-report, and by behavioural measures, then the construct of ‘extraversion’ is supported. If not, the construct may be invalid, or perhaps there is a problem with the measurement. Thus theorists propose a nomological net of associations among constructs and observables that can guide research (Cronbach and Meehl 1955)⁽²⁾. >Theoretical terms, >Theories, >Unobservables. 1. MacCorquodale, K. and Meehl, P. E. 1948. On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables, Psychological Review 55: 95–107 2. Cronbach, L. J. and Meehl, P. E. 1955. Construct validity in psychological tests, Psychological Bulletin 52: 281–302 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Models	De Raad	Corr I 127 Model/theory/psychology/personality/De Raad: A model of personality may represent its characteristic traits, its mechanisms, its internal processes, at different levels of abstraction, and from different domains of interest (social, biological, cognitive, etc.). However, while the expression ‘structural models of personality’ connotes intended features on the one hand, it may, on the other hand, also evoke unintended references. One such unintended reference could be an emphasis on procedures to test a model, and on the statistics involved, as in structural equation modelling. In personality research, the standard recipe to arrive at structure typically involves the use of factor analytic techniques. Models of personality: Five-Factor Model see >Five-Factor Model. Corr I 128 Cattell/De Raad: Cattell’s original set of 35 trait variables was the result of a process of condensing a list of 171 trait descriptive items considered by Cattell (1943)⁽¹⁾ to summarize the complete ‘personality sphere’. That condensation took place on the basis of correlations of ratings from 100 subjects. The reduction to thirty-five variables was, in Cattell’s (1945⁽²⁾, p. 70) words, ‘a matter of unhappy necessity’. Cattell (1950)⁽³⁾ distinguished trait-elements (single trait words), surface traits (traits tending to cluster together in a person), and source traits (trait-factors), essentially forming a hierarchy of traits. The concept of hierarchy was extended in Cattell’s emphasis on the distinction between primary factors and higher order factors. Corr I 129 Costa/McCrae: Costa and McCrae (1976)⁽⁴⁾ clustered 16 PF scales on the basis of data from three different age groups, resulting into two consistent age-group independent clusters, called Adjustment-Anxiety and Introversion-Extraversion, and a third inconsistent age-group dependent cluster, which was conceptualized as an Experiential Style dimension. The three clusters formed the starting point for the development of the three-factorial NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae 1985)⁽⁵⁾. Corr I 130 Three factor model/Eysenck: In defining his structural conception of personality, Eysenck (1947)⁽⁶⁾ distinguished four levels of behaviour-organization that were hierarchically organized, namely single observable behavioural acts, habitual responses (recurrent acts under specified circumstances), traits (based on intercorrelations of different habitual responses), and types of traits (based on correlations between various traits). On the basis of ratings on this ‘intentionally heterogeneous’ item list, Eysenck concluded as to two factors, a general ‘neuroticism’ factor and a factor contrasting ‘affective, dysthymic, inhibited’ symptoms and traits and ‘hysterical and asocial’ symptoms and traits. Eysenck suggested this second factor to be related to Jung’s Introversion-Extraversion distinction. >Personality traits/Eysenck, (EysenckVsCattell). 1. Cattell, R. B. 1943. The description of personality: basic traits resolved into clusters, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 38: 476–507 2. Cattell, R. B. 1945. The description of personality: principles and findings in a factor analysis, American Journal of Psychology 58: 69–90 3. Cattell, R. B. 1950. Personality: a systematic theoretical and factual study, New York: McGraw-Hill 4. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1976. Age differences in personality structure: a cluster analytic approach, Journal of Gerontology 31: 564–70 5. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1985. The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources 6. Eysenck, H. J. 1947. Dimensions of Personality. London: Kegan Paul Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Motivation	Bowlby	Corr I 228 Motivation/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: BowlbyVsFreud: In explaining the motivational bases of personality development, Bowlby (1982/1969)⁽¹⁾ rejected Freudian and object relations versions of psychoanalytic theory that conceptualize human motivation in terms of ‘drives’ and view the mind as powered by ‘psychic energy’. Instead, he created a ‘behavioural systems’ model of motivation, borrowed from ethology and cybernetic control theory, according to which human behaviour is organized and guided by species-universal, innate neural programmes. >behavioural systems. These attachment, care-giving, exploration and sexual systems facilitate the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and thereby increase the likelihood of survival, adjustment and reproduction. Motivation: Bowlby (1982/1969)⁽¹⁾ viewed the systems as ‘goal directed’ and ‘goal corrected’ (i.e., corrected by changing sub-goals based on feedback about goal non-attainment). Each system was conceptualized as a servomechanism that could be turned on, or ‘activated’, by certain stimuli or situations and ‘deactivated’ or ‘terminated’ by other stimuli and situations (basically, by the attainment of what Bowlby called ‘set-goals’, which in the case of the attachment system include escape from and avoidance of threats and dangers). Corr I 229 BowlbyVsFreud: This new conception of motivation rendered the Freudian notion of general drives (e.g., libido) unnecessary. Goal directed and goal corrected behaviours are activated not by an accumulation of psychic energy or a desire to reduce drive intensity, but by conditions within a person or the person’s environment that activated behaviour intended to achieve a certain goal state or to avoid threats and dangers. >Affectional bond, >Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Neo-Fisher Effect	Uribe	Uribe I 4 Def Fisher-Effect/Uribe: A large body of empirical and theoretical studies argue that a transitory positive disturbance in the nominal interest rate causes a transitory increase in the real interest rate, which in turn depresses aggregate demand and inflation (…) (see, for example, I 5 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005)(1). Similarly, a property of virtually all modern models studied in monetary economics is that a transitory increase in the nominal interest rate has no effect on inflation in the long run. By contrast, if the increase in the nominal interest rate is permanent, sooner or later, inflation will have to increase by roughly the same magnitude, if the real interest rate, given by the difference between the nominal rate and expected inflation, is not determined by nominal factors in the long run (...). This one-to-one long-run relationship between nominal rates and inflation is known as the Fisher effect. Def Neo-Fisher Effect/Uribe: The neo-Fisher effect says that a permanent increase in the nominal interest rate causes an increase in inflation not only in the long run but also in the short run. I 6 The Fisher effect, however, does not provide a prediction of when inflation should be I 8 expected to catch up with a permanent increase in the nominal interest rate. It only states that it must eventually do so. Uribe I 8 Neo-Fisher Effect/Empirical Model/New-Keynesian Model/Inflation/Interest/Uribe: Empirical model: The empirical model aims to capture the dynamics of three macroeconomic indicators (…): the logarithm of real output per capita (…), the inflation rate (…), expressed in percent per year, and the nominal interest rate (…), expressed in percent per year. [Uribe] assume[s] that [the three indicators above] are driven by four exogenous shocks: a nonstationary (or permanent) monetary shock (…), a stationary (or transitory) monetary shock (…), a nonstationary nonmonetary shock (…) and a stationary nonmonetary shock (…). I 16 [Uribe] estimate[s] the empirical model on quarterly U.S. data spanning the period 1954:Q3 to 2018:Q2. I 18 The main result [from the empirical model] is that the adjustment of inflation to its higher long-run level takes place in the short run. In fact, inflation increases by 1 percent on impact and remains around that level thereafter. On the real side of the economy, the permanent increase in the nominal interest rate does not cause a contraction in aggregate activity. Indeed, output exhibits a transitory expansion. This effect could be the consequence of low real interest rates resulting from the swift reflation of the economy following the permanent interest-rate shock. Because of the faster response of inflation relative to that of the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate falls by almost 1 percent on impact and converges to its steady-state level from below, implying that the entire adjustment to a permanent interest-rate shock takes place in the context of low real interest rates. I 22 How important are nonstationary monetary shocks? The relevance of the neo-Fisher effect depends not only on whether it can be identified in actual data, (…) but also on whether permanent monetary shocks play a significant role in explaining short-run movements in the inflation rate. I 23 [T]he empirical model assigns a significant role to this type of monetary disturbance [the nonstationary monetary shock], especially in explaining movements in nominal variables. In comparison, the stationary monetary shock explains a relatively small fraction of movements in the three macroeconomic indicators included in the model. I 25 [To summarize] the estimated empirical model predicts that a permanent increase in the nominal interest rate causes an immediate increase in inflation and transitional dynamics characterized by low real interest rates, and no output loss. >Terminology/Uribe New-Keynesian Model: In this section the presence of a neo-Fisher effect in the context of an estimated standard optimizing model in the neo-Keynesian tradition [is investigated]. [The model] is driven by six shocks: permanent and transitory interest-rate shocks, permanent and transitory productivity shocks, a preference shock, and a labor-supply shock. I 37 [Q]ualitatively, the responses implied by the New-Keynesian model concur with those implied by the empirical model (…). An increase in the nominal interest rate that is understood to be permanent by private agents (…) causes an increase in inflation in the short run, without loss of aggregate activity. By contrast, an increase in the nominal interest rate that is interpreted I 39 to be transitory (…) causes a fall in inflation and a contraction in aggregate activity. [I]n response to a permanent increase in the nominal interest rate inflation not only begins to increase immediately, but does so at a rate faster than the nominal interest rate. As a result, the real interest rate falls. By contrast, a temporary increase in the nominal interest rate causes a fall in inflation and an increase in the real interest rate. A natural question is why inflation moves faster than the interest rate in the short run when the monetary shock is expected to be permanent. The answer has to do with the presence of nominal rigidities and with the way the central bank conducts monetary policy. In response to a permanent I 40 monetary shock that increases the nominal interest rate by one percent in the long run, the central bank raises the short-run policy rate quickly but gradually. At the same time, firms know that, by the Fisher effect, the price level will increase by one percent in the long run, and that they too will have to increase their own price in the same proportion in the long run, to avoid making losses. Since firms face quadratic costs of adjusting prices, they find it optimal to begin increasing the price immediately. Since all firms do the same, inflation itself begins to increase as soon as the shock is announced. 1. Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans, “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political Economy 113, 2005, 1-45. Martín Uribe (2019): The Neo-Fisher Effect: Econometric Evidence from Empirical and Optimizing Models. In: NBER Working Paper No. 25089.	Uribe I Martin Uribe The Neo-Fisher Effect: Econometric Evidence from Empirical and Optimizing Models. NBER Working Paper No. 25089 2019
Optimism Bias	Experimental Psychology	Parisi I 104 Optimism/Experimental psychology/Ryan-Wilkinson: (...) the well-known finding that humans are overly optimistic or overconfident on various dimensions (e.g., Weinstein 1980⁽¹⁾, 1989⁽²⁾) (...) is a true cognitive error, in the sense that we know that people are getting certain answers objectively wrong. For example, in Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977)⁽³⁾, participants gave estimates and answers to difficult Parisi I 105 questions and had to quantify their confidence; they were, objectively speaking, much too sure that they had answered correctly. What makes this an interesting question from a normative standpoint, though, is that even in the case of a clear bias, a phenomenon that results in wrong answers, there is extensive evidence that the bias is overall helpful and quite adaptive. Positive illusions are associated with better adjustment and coping skills (e.g., Taylor and Armor, 1996)⁽⁴⁾; indeed, failure to show this bias has been associated with clinical depression (e.g., Allan, Siegel, and Hannah, 2007)⁽⁵⁾. >Cognitive biases, >Problem solving. 1. Weinstein, Neil D. (1980). “Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39: 806–820. 2. Weinstein, Neil D. (1989). “Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks.” Science 246: 1232–1233. 3. Fischhoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein (1977). “Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 3: 552–564. 4. Taylor, Shelley E. and David A. Armor (1996). “Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity.” Journal of Personality 64: 873–898. 5. Allan, Lorraine G., Shepard Siegel, and Samuel Hannah (2007). “The Sad Truth About Depressive Realism.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60: 482–495. Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Parameterization	Meteorology	Edwards I 393 Parameterization/meteorology/climatology/Edwards: far from expressing pure theory, analysis models are data-laden.⁽¹⁾ And the same can also be said of all forecast models and general circulation models. Stephen Schneider writes: . . . even our most sophisticated ‘first principles’ models contain ‘empirical statistical’ elements within the model structure. . . .We can describe the known physical laws mathematically, at least in principle. In practice, however, solving these equations in full, explicit detail is impossible. First, the possible scales of motion in the atmospheric and oceanic components range from the submolecular to the global. Second are the interactions of energy transfers among the different scales of motion. Finally, many scales of disturbance are inherently unstable; small disturbances, for example, grow rapidly in size if conditions are favorable.⁽²⁾ Edwards: Hence the necessity of parameterization, much of which can be described as the integration of observationally derived approximations into the “model physics.” Schneider and others sometimes refer to parameters as “semi-empirical,” an apt description that highlights their fuzzy relationship with observational data. For the foreseeable future, all analysis models, forecast models, and climate models will contain many “semi-empirical” elements. >Wheather forecasting/Edwards, >Models/meteorology, cf. >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology. Edwards I 465 Parameter: (…) the term is often used to distinguish, from dependent variables, quantities that may be more or less arbitrarily assigned values for purposes of the problem at hand” (emphasis added). So a parameter is a kind of proxy - a stand-in for something that cannot be modeled directly but can still be estimated, or at least guessed. Parameterization illustrates the interaction of computational friction with the limits of human knowledge. In an ideal climate model, the only fixed conditions would be the distribution and the altitude of continental surfaces. Virtually all other variables - sea-surface temperature, land-surface albedo (reflectance), cloud formation, etc. - would be generated internally by the model itself from the lower-level physical properties of air, water, and other basic elements of the climate system. Instead, most physical processes operating in the atmosphere require some degree of parameterization; these parameterized processes are known as the “model physics.” >Models/climatology. Parameter: (…) parameters represent a variable physical process rather than a fixed quantity. Edwards I 466 Parameterization/Example: A major parameterization in all climate models is radiative transfer. The atmosphere contains both gases (CO2, methane, nitrogen, ozone, oxygen, water vapor, etc.) and solids (particulate aerosols, ice clouds, etc.). Each one of these materials absorbs solar energy at particular frequencies. Each also emits radiation at other frequencies. Those emissions are then absorbed and re-radiated by other gases and solids. These radiative transfers play a huge role in governing the atmosphere’s temperature. Thus, models must somehow estimate how much radiation the atmosphere in a given grid box absorbs, reflects, and transmits, at every level and horizontal location. “Line-by-line models,” which combine databases of spectrographic measurements for the various gases with physical models, can carry out this summing.⁽³⁾ Edwards I 469 Ad hoc parameter/example: An example of an ad hoc parameter is “flux adjustment” in coupled atmosphere-ocean circulation models (AOGCMs). The interface between the atmospheric model and the ocean model must represent exchanges of heat, momentum (wind and surface resistance), and water (precipitation, evaporation) between the atmosphere and the ocean. These fluxes - flows of energy and matter between atmosphere and ocean—are very difficult to measure empirically. Yet they profoundly affect model behavior. Modelers spoke of flux adjustments as “non-physical” parameterizations - i.e., ones not based on physical theory—but also sometimes characterized them as “empirically determined.”⁽⁴⁾ Any given GCM’s model physics contains hundreds or even thousands of parameterizations. Edwards I 470 An entire subfield—climate model diagnosis - works out ways to isolate the origin of particular problems to specific parameterizations and their interactions. Tuning: “Tuning” means adjusting the values of coefficients and even, sometimes, reconstructing equations in order to produce a better overall model result. “Better” may mean that the result agrees more closely with observations, or that it corresponds more closely to the modeler’s expert judgment about what one modeler I interviewed called the “physical plausibility” of the change. >Models/climatology. 1. P. N. Edwards, “Global Climate Science, Uncertainty and Politics: Data-Laden Models, Model-Filtered Data,” Science as Culture 8, no. 4 (1999): 437–. 2. S. H. Schneider, “Introduction to Climate Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 3. J. T. Kiehl, “Atmospheric General Circulation Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 338. 4. 8. J. T. Houghton et al., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996).	Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Personality	Allport	Corr I 4 Personality/Allport: Gordon Allport (1937)⁽¹⁾ defined personality as ‘the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment’ (Allport 1937,p.48). I 5 McAdamsVsAllport/PalsVsAllport: A definition that gives a modern twist to this personological integration is offered by McAdams and Pals (2006)⁽²⁾, who define personality as ‘an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life stories complexly and differentially situated in culture’ (McAdams and Pals 2006⁽²⁾, p. 212). The emphasis on dynamics and development in these two personological definitions reminds us that some theories emphasize function and change, in contrast to the typically more static trait emphasis on description. >Environment, >Situations, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Personality traits. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, p. 48. 2. McAdams, D. P. and Pals, J. L. 2006. A new Big Five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality, American Psychologist 61: 204–17 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Corr I 43 Personality/Allport/AsendorpfVsAllport: Allport (1937) owed most of his ideas to Stern (1911)⁽¹⁾. >W. Stern. 1. Stern, W. 1911. Die Differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen [Methodological foundations of differential psychology]. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Corr I 380 Personality/Allport/Saucier: Allport (1937)⁽¹⁾: ‘personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment’ (1937, p. 48). Saucier: Allport called this a ‘biophysical’ conception. It focused on ‘what an individual is regardless of the manner in which other people perceive his qualities or evaluate them’ (1937, p. 40). Phrasings like ‘within the individual’ and ‘systems that determine’ reveal an emphasis on the underlying mechanisms behind behaviour. 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Allport	Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >H.S. Odbert, >G. Allport. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)⁽¹⁾, a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾, more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)⁽¹⁾ (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾. This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)⁽¹⁾. 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)⁽³⁾. [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)⁽¹⁾. One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)⁽¹⁾. II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)⁽¹⁾ in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)⁽¹⁾. II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)⁽¹⁾ and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)⁽¹⁾. The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)⁽¹⁾, having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Attachment Theory	Corr I 236 Personality traits/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: Studies using self-report measures of adult attachment style have found them to be coherently related to relationship quality, mental health, social adjustment, ways of coping, emotion regulation, self-esteem, interpersonal behaviour and social cognitions (see Mikulincer and Shaver 2003⁽¹⁾, 2007⁽²⁾, for reviews). >Emotion, >Regulation, >Self-regulation. Importantly, these attachment-style variations are usually not well explained by less specific, more global personality traits such as Extraversion, Neuroticism or self-esteem (see Mikulincer and Shaver 2007⁽²⁾, for a review), although there are predictable and meaningful associations between attachment orientations and personality traits (e.g., Carver 1997⁽³⁾; Noftle and Shaver 2006⁽⁴⁾). >About the Attachment theory. 1. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2003. The attachment behavioural system in adulthood: activation, psychodynamics, and interpersonal processes, in M. P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. XXXV, pp. 53–152. New York: Academic Press 2. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2007. Attachment in adulthood: structure, dynamics, and change. New York: Guilford Press 3. Carver, C. S. 1997. Adult attachment and personality: converging evidence and a new measure, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 865–83 4. Noftle, E. E. and Shaver, P. R. 2006. Attachment dimensions and the Big Five personality traits: associations and comparative ability to predict relationship quality, Journal of Research in Personality 40: 179–208 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Costa	Corr I 129 Personality traits/Costa/McCrae: Costa and McCrae (1976)⁽¹⁾ clustered 16 PF scales on the basis of data from three different age groups, resulting into two consistent age-group independent clusters, called Adjustment-Anxiety and Introversion-Extraversion, and a third inconsistent age-group dependent cluster, which was conceptualized as an Experiential Style dimension. The three clusters formed the starting point for the development of the three-factorial NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae 1985)⁽²⁾. >Extraversion, >Introversion, >Anxiety, >Agreeableness, >Dimensional approach. 1. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1976. Age differences in personality structure: a cluster analytic approach, Journal of Gerontology 31: 564–70 2. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1985. The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	McCrae	Corr I 103 Personality traits/McCrae/Deary: When McCrae asserted that ‘traits are not cognitive fictions, but real psychological structures’ (McCrae 2004⁽¹⁾, p. 4) the supporting evidence included consensual validation, prediction of life outcomes, longitudinal stability and heritability. Almost as a provocative challenge McCrae suggests that personality traits are unaffected by the environment, and totally caused by biological factors…. McCrae’s very strong commitment to the biological underpinnings of traits is argued on the basis of substantial heritability, virtually zero contribution from shared environment, and the fact that even the residual in the ‘non-shared’ environment probably contains variance that is actually attributable to genetic and other biological variance, ‘such as intrauterine environment, disease, and aging’ (McCrae 2004⁽¹⁾, p. 6). The stability of personality traits over the lifespan is also cited as evidence of the strong claims made for ‘Five-Factor Theory’. >Five-Factor Model, >Environment, >Heritability, >Nature versus nurture. 1. McCrae, R. R. 2004. Human nature and culture: a trait perspective, Journal Journal of Research in Personality 38: 3–14 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 129 Personality traits/Costa/McCrae: Costa and McCrae (1976)⁽¹⁾ clustered 16 PF scales on the basis of data from three different age groups, resulting into two consistent age-group independent clusters, called Adjustment-Anxiety and Introversion-Extraversion, and a third inconsistent age-group dependent cluster, which was conceptualized as an Experiential Style dimension. The three clusters formed the starting point for the development of the three-factorial NEO-PI (Costa and McCrae 1985)⁽²⁾. 1. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1976. Age differences in personality structure: a cluster analytic approach, Journal of Gerontology 31: 564–70 2. Costa, P. T., Jr and McCrae, R. R. 1985. The NEO Personality Inventory manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Odbert	Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. >Everyday language, >Concepts, >Language use, >Language community, >Personality, >Character traits. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >Relevance. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)⁽¹⁾, a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾, more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)⁽¹⁾ (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾. This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)⁽¹⁾. 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)⁽³⁾. [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. >Dispositions, >Representation. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)⁽¹⁾. One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. >Conventions, >Language use, >Language community, >Meaning, >Reference. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)⁽¹⁾. II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)⁽¹⁾ in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)⁽¹⁾. II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)⁽¹⁾ and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)⁽¹⁾. The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)⁽¹⁾, having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Pragmatism	James	Diaz-Bone I 68 Pragmatism/James: the term pragmatism is used for the first time by James 1898. He, however, refers to Peirce, 1878. Signs/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental subject: Pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and intellectual communication and clear ideas. For Peirce every thought is a sign. I 70 Pragmatism/Peirce: pragmatism is a voluntary action theory. Definition Voluntarism: Will as the basic principle of being. I 76 Pragmatism: pragmatism is like a corridor in the middle of many rooms, it belongs to all who use it. Concept/Pragmatism: He considers all concepts hypotheses. Use is always a personal decision. I 78 We do not live to think, but we think to live. 79 Science/James: Science, comon sense and individual consciousness have one thing in common: they should increase the human adaptability. I 88 PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> Realization, >adjustment). I 102 VsPragmatism: that James confuses truth with certainty: it can never be ascertained whether an observation is properly translated. (> Basic sentence problem).	James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Psychopathy	Paulhus	Corr II 247 Psychopathy/Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Psychopathy is considered the most malevolent of the Dark Triad traits (Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013⁽¹⁾; Muris, Merckelbach, Otgaar, & Meijer, 2017⁽²⁾). Although there is controversy regarding the nature and essential components of psychopathy, there is general agreement that psychopathy includes ‘certain key affective (e.g. remorselessness), interpersonal (e.g. superficial charm), and behavioral (e.g. irresponsibility) features, oftentimes in conjunction with considerable antisocial conduct’ (Edens & McDermott, 2010, p.32⁽³⁾). >Personality/Traits, >Dark Triad Traits. II 248 There are various difficulties associated with the measurement of psychopathy because individuals with high levels of psychopathy are deceitful, may have an incentive to misrepresent their psychopathic traits, and often lack insight into their own personalities (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006⁽⁴⁾). In response to these challenges, Hare developed the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980⁽⁵⁾) and the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003⁽⁶⁾). The PCL and the PCL-R are clinician-rating scales that are scored based on a semi-structured interview that is performed in conjunction with a file review. [However, this checklist] did not include the items that focused on positive adjustment. [Moreover] the PCL-R is not ideal for studying subclinical manifestations of psychopathy, which are the focus of most studies concerning the Dark Triad. Instead, Dark Triad researchers have often used the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Ill (SRP-III; Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2009⁽⁷⁾), which is based on the PCL-R. [O]ne of the most influential recent approaches to understanding psychopathy [is a] triarchic conceptualization of [a trait] (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009⁽⁸⁾). This model posits that prototypical psychopathy consists of a combination of disinhibition, meanness and boldness. >Method. 1. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 199—2 16. 2. Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Otgaar, H., & Meijer, E. (2017). The malevolent side of human nature: A meta-analysis and critical review of the literature on the Dark Triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12, 183—204. 3. Edens, J. F., & McDermott, B. E. (2010). Examining the construct validity of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised: Preferential correlates of fearless dominance and self-centered impulsivity. Psychological Assessment, 22, 3 2—42. 4. Lilienfeld, S. O., & Fowler, K. A. (2006). The self-report assessment of psychopathy: Problems, pitfalls, and promises. In C.J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of psychopathy. New York: Guilford Press. 5. Hare, R. D. (1980). A research scale for the assessment of psychopathy in criminal populations. Personality and Individual Differences, 1, 111—117. 6. Hare, R. D. (2003). Manual for the Revised Psychopathy Checklist (2nd ed.). Toronto, ON: Multi-Health Systems. 7. Pauthus, D. L., Hemphill, J. F., & Hare, R. D. (2009). Self-report psychopathy scale (SRP-III). Toronto, ON: Multi-Health Systems. 8. Patrick, C. J., Fowles, D. C., & Krueger, R. F. (2009). Triarchic conceptualization of psychopathy: Developmental origins of disinhibition, boldness, and meanness. Development and Psychopathology, 21, 9 13—938. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Psychopathy	Williams	Corr II 247 Psychopathy/Dark Triad Traits/Personality Traits/Paulhus/Williams/Zeigler-Hill/Marcus: Psychopathy is considered the most malevolent of the Dark Triad traits (Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013⁽¹⁾; Muris, Merckelbach, Otgaar, & Meijer, 2017⁽²⁾). Although there is controversy regarding the nature and essential components of psychopathy, there is general agreement that psychopathy includes ‘certain key affective (e.g. remorselessness), interpersonal (e.g. superficial charm), and behavioral (e.g. irresponsibility) features, oftentimes in conjunction with considerable antisocial conduct’ (Edens & McDermott, 2010, p.32⁽³⁾). II 248 There are various difficulties associated with the measurement of psychopathy because individuals with high levels of psychopathy are deceitful, may have an incentive to misrepresent their psychopathic traits, and often lack insight into their own personalities (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006⁽⁴⁾). In response to these challenges, Hare developed the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980⁽⁵⁾) and the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003⁽⁶⁾). The PCL and the PCL-R are clinician-rating scales that are scored based on a semi-structured interview that is performed in conjunction with a file review. [However, this checklist] did not include the items that focused on positive adjustment. [Moreover] the PCL-R is not ideal for studying subclinical manifestations of psychopathy, which are the focus of most studies concerning the Dark Triad. Instead, Dark Triad researchers have often used the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Ill (SRP-III; Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2009⁽⁷⁾), which is based on the PCL-R. [O]ne of the most influential recent approaches to understanding psychopathy [is a] triarchic conceptualization of [a trait] (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009⁽⁸⁾). This model posits that prototypical psychopathy consists of a combination of disinhibition, meanness and boldness. >Personality/Traits. 1. Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7, 199—2 16. 2. Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Otgaar, H., & Meijer, E. (2017). The malevolent side of human nature: A meta-analysis and critical review of the literature on the Dark Triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12, 183—204. 3. Edens, J. F., & McDermott, B. E. (2010). Examining the construct validity of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised: Preferential correlates of fearless dominance and self-centered impulsivity. Psychological Assessment, 22, 3 2—42. 4. Lilienfeld, S. O., & Fowler, K. A. (2006). The self-report assessment of psychopathy: Problems, pitfalls, and promises. In C.J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of psychopathy. New York: Guilford Press. 5. Hare, R. D. (1980). A research scale for the assessment of psychopathy in criminal populations. Personality and Individual Differences, 1, 111—117. 6. Hare, R. D. (2003). Manual for the Revised Psychopathy Checklist (2nd ed.). Toronto, ON: Multi-Health Systems. 7. Pauthus, D. L., Hemphill, J. F., & Hare, R. D. (2009). Self-report psychopathy scale (SRP-III). Toronto, ON: Multi-Health Systems. 8. Patrick, C. J., Fowles, D. C., & Krueger, R. F. (2009). Triarchic conceptualization of psychopathy: Developmental origins of disinhibition, boldness, and meanness. Development and Psychopathology, 21, 9 13—938. Zeigler-Hill, Virgil; Marcus, David K.: “The Dark Side of Personality Revisiting Paulhus and Williams (2002)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 245-262.	WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Punishment	Social Psychology	Parisi I 139 Punishment/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: In the absence of compelling evidence to prove guilt, juries sometimes use the fact of the defendant's prior criminal record as a reason to convict (T. Eisenberg and Hans, 2009⁽¹⁾). This is especially true when Parisi I 140 the prior crimes are similar to the current accusation (Greene and Dodge, 1995⁽²⁾; Lloyd-Bostock, 2000⁽³⁾; Wissler and Saks, 1985⁽⁴⁾). Perception: When perceiving persons, we immediately decide whether their intentions toward us are good, and how competent they are to carry out their intentions (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007)⁽⁵⁾. We also use that information to make decisions about how blameworthy an actor is. Inferences about character drive judgments of responsibility, blame, and even causation (Alicke, 1992⁽⁶⁾, 2000⁽⁷⁾; Alicke and Yurak 1995⁽⁸⁾. Nadler, 2012⁽⁹⁾; Nadler and McDonnell, 2012⁽¹⁰⁾). Personality traits: Bad motives are one source of inferring bad character, but they are not necessary. Even mildly negative personality traits spur inferences about character that influence blame judgments. For example, a woman who carelessly fails to supervise her unruly dogs is blamed more for an ensuing death if she is asocial and has an unhealthy lifestyle, compared to if she is highly social and has a healthy lifestyle (Nadler and McDonnell, 2012)⁽¹⁰⁾. Victims: The moral character of victims can also influence blame judgments. Harm to innocent victims induces more blame than harm to dangerous criminals, or victims perceived as tainted in other ways. Thus, for example, a person who shoots a stranger in his house is blamed more when the victim turns out to be his daughter's boyfriend than when the victim is a burglar, even when holding constant the shooter's perceptions of danger (Alicke, Davis, and Pezzo, 1994)⁽¹¹⁾. Moral character: A woman's allegedly questionable moral character (e.g. drinking, drug use, premarital sex, respectability) disadvantages her throughout the justice process and leads to more victim blaming as well as lighter punishment (Burt and Albin, 1981⁽¹²⁾; C. Jones and Aronson, 1973⁽¹³⁾). If they question a woman's moral character, prosecutors are less likely to file charges in the first place (Spohn et al., 2001)⁽¹⁴⁾. Additionally, convictions are less likely and sentences are shorter when a woman's sexual history is mentioned, even if she is relatively inexperienced (L'Armand and Pepiton, 1982)⁽¹⁵⁾. >Apologies/Social Psychology, >Attractiveness/Social Psychology, >Retribution/deterrence/Social Psychology. Parisi I 141 Rules/social status: Expressive theories of punishment posit that punishment communicates rules and social norms (Duff, 2011⁽¹⁶⁾; Durkheim, 2014⁽¹⁷⁾), and sends a message to victims, offenders, and third parties alike, which announces and corrects the wrong that was committed. Thus, criminal punishment involving identifiable victims can function as a device that communicates how valued and respected the victim is (Hampton, 1988⁽¹⁸⁾; 1994⁽¹⁹⁾). Punishment can serve to reset the status quo by expressing that the victim is valuable enough to justify the spending of resources to detect, prosecute, and punish the offender who has harmed her (Bilz, 2014). Bilz (2014) has shown experimentally that both victims and third parties perceive punishment as raising the victim's social standing, and failure to punish as lowering it. 1. Eisenberg, T. and V. Hans (2009). "Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes." Cornell Law Review 94: 1353. 2. Greene, E. and M. Dodge (1995). "The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making." Law and Human Behavior doi:10.1007/BF01499073. 3. Lloyd-Bostock, S. (2000). " The Effects on Juries of Hearing about the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study." Criminal Law Review 1:734-755. 4. Wissler, R. L. and M. J. Saks (1985). "On the Ineffcacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt." Law and Human Behavior 9(1): 37-48. doi:10.1007/BF01044288. 5. Fiske, S. T., A. J. C. Cuddy, and P. Glick (2007). "Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 1 (2):77—83. doi:16/ j.tics.2006.11.005. 6. Alicke, M. D. (1992). "Culpable Causation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63(3): 368-378. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.368. 7. Alicke, M. D. (2000). "Culpable Control and the Psychology Of Blame." Psychological Bulletin 126(4): 556-574. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.556. 8. Alicke, M. D. and T. J. Yurak (1995). "Perpetrator Personality and Judgments of Acquaintance Rape“.Journal of Applied Social Psychology 25(21):1900-1921. 9. Nadler, J. (2012). "Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral Emo- tion on Blame." Law and Contemporary Problems 75: 1. 10. Nadler, J. and M.-H. McDonnell (2012). "Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame." Cornell Law Review 97:255. 11. Alicke, M. D., T. L. Davis, and M. V. Pezzo (1994). "A Posteriori Adjustment of A Priori Decision Criteria." Social Cognition 12(4):281-308. 12. Burt, M. R. and R. S. Albin (1981). "Rape Myths, Rape Definitions, and Probability of Conviction.“ Journal of Applied Social Psychology 11(3):212-230. 13. Jones, C. and E. Aronson (1973). "Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of the Victim." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 26(3): 415-419. doi:10.1037/h0034463. 14. Spohn, C., D. Beichner, E. D. Frenzel, and D. Holleran (2001). Prosecutors' Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: A Multi-Site Study, Final Report (No. 197048). National Institute of Justice. 15. L'Armand, K. and A. Pepitone (1982). "Judgments of Rape A Study of Victim-Rapist Relationship and Victim Sexual History." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8(1): 134-139. doi:10.1177/014616728281021. 16. Duff, A. (2011). "Retrieving Retributivism," in M. D. White, ed., Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy, 3-24. New York: Oxford University Press. 17. Durkheim, E. (2014). The Division of Labor in society. New York: Simon and Schuster. 18. Hampton, Jean (1988). "Punishment as Defeat," in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, eds., Forgiveness and Mercy, 124—132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge. 19. Hampton, Jean (1994). "Retribution and the Liberal State." J. Contemp. Legal Issues 5: 117. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Reflective Equilibrium	Schurz	I 26 Reflexive equilibrium/reflexive reasoning equilibrium/Schurz: (Rawls 1979(1), 38,68 71), Goodman 1955/75(2), 85 89): Similar to rational reconstruction: reflexive equilibrium however purely coherence-theoretic: mutual adjustment of methodological rules and intuitions. >Rational Reconstruction. 1.Goodman, N. (1955). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. London, England: University of London. 2. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press.	Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Retirement	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 145 Retirement/Developmental psychology/Upton: It has been suggested that adults progress through a series of phases as they make the transition from worker to retiree (Atchley, 1976)⁽¹⁾. An important part of this process includes information gathering and planning for the future (Ekerdt et al.,2000)⁽²⁾. Retirement is thought to include a number of different phases as it develops. Initially, the retiree enjoys their new freedom (…), this may be followed by a disenchantment phase (…), Upton I 146 (…) individuals with positive expectations are more likely to be well adjusted in retirement (van Solinge and Henkens, 2005)⁽³⁾. Cf. >Midlife crisis/Psychological theories. 1. Atchley, R. C. (1976). The sociology of retirement. Cambridge: Schenkman. 2. Ekerdt, DJ, Kosloski, K and Deviney, S (2000) The normative anticipation of retirement by older workers. Research on Aging, 22: 3-22. 3. van Solinge, H and Henkens, K (2005) Couples’ adjustment to retirement: a multi-actor panel study. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 60(1): 511-520. Further Reading: Breeze, E, Fletcher, A, Leon, D, Marmot, M, Clarke, R and Shipley, M(2001) Do socioeconomic the advantages persist into old age? American Journal of Public Health, 91(2): 277—83. http:// ajph .aphapublications .org/cgi/reprintl 9 1 / 2 / 277 .pdf	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Review	Lakatos	Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974⁽¹⁾, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in case of conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. protective belt": every (physical ) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to make empirical predictions. These are stored like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observable that contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad-hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown confounding factors are postulated. Vs: problem: this does not explain the divergent date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the ad hoc hypothesis is introduced! ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are legitimate at all only if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. Schurz I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: A theory version is falsified only if there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "instant rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. That only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def research program/Lakatos: hard core of theory together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def negative heuristic/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only at the periphery, However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can turn on against the core. Def positive heuristic/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can cope with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Def Falsification/Schurz: A theory version is falsified, gdw. some phenomena deductively following from it were falsified by actual observation sets. (s) Schurz always speaks of propositions instead of observations. 1. Lakatos, I. (1974). "Falsifikation und die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme". In: Lakatos, I. und Musgrave, A., Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt. Braunschweig: Vieweg.	Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Science	Kuhn	I 25 Definition Normal Science/Kuhn: Research that is firmly based on one or more scientific achievements of the past. I 47 Science/Kuhn: problems: Three classes of problems: - 1st determining important facts - 2nd mutual adjustment of facts and theory - 3rd articulation of theory. >Theories/Kuhn. I 182 Target/Science/Kuhn: Science does not move towards a "goal". - There must be no such destination at least. I 193 Community/Science/Kuhn: Typical for group formation: shared use of symbols - e.g. mathematical formulas. >Paradigms/Kuhn.	Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973
Self-Regulation (Psychology)	Carver	Corr I 427 Self-regulation/Carver/Scheier: the term self-regulation (Carver and Scheier 1981⁽¹⁾, 1998(2)) has different connotations in different contexts. When we use it, we intend to convey the sense of purposive processes, involving self-corrective adjustments as needed, and that the adjustments originate within the person. This view is not an approach to personality but a way of talking about how personality becomes expressed in behaviour. . >Feedback/Carver/Scheier, >Control processes/Carver/Scheier, >Affect/Carver/Scheier, >Goals/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 431 The argument that affect reflects the error signal from a comparison in a feedback loop (>Affect/Carver/Scheier) has a very counter-intuitive implication concerning positive affect (Carver2003)⁽⁴⁾. As noted, if affect reflects the error signal in a feedback loop, affect is a signal to adjust rate of progress. What about positive feelings? Here prediction is less intuitive. (…) The feelings still reflect a discrepancy (>Criteria/Carver/Scheier), and discrepancy reducing loops minimize discrepancies. Thus, such a system ‘wants’ to see neither negative nor positive affect. (…) People who exceed the criterion rate of progress (and thus have positive feelings) will automatically tend to reduce subsequent effort in this domain. They will ‘coast’ a little (cf. Frijda 1994⁽³⁾, p. 113); not necessarily stop, but ease back, such that subsequent rate of progress returns to the criterion. The impact on subjective affect would be that the positive feeling itself is not sustained for very long. It begins to fade. Generally (…) the system acts to prevent great amounts of pleasure as well as great amounts of pain (Carver 2003⁽⁴⁾; Carver and Scheier 1998⁽²⁾). Corr I 432 Why would a process be built in that limits positive feelings–indeed, dampens them? After all, people seek pleasure and avoid pain. We believe the adaptive value of a tendency to coast derives from the fact that people have multiple simultaneous goals (Carver 2003(4); Carver and Scheier 1998⁽²⁾; Frijda 1994⁽³⁾). Given multiple goals, people generally do not optimize on any one goal, but rather ‘satisfice’ (Simon 1953)⁽⁵⁾. >Goals/Carver/Scheier. 1. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1981. Attention and self-regulation: a control-theory approach to human behaviour. New York: Springer Verlag 2. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1998. On the self-regulation of behaviour. New York: Cambridge University Press 3. Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 112–26. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Carver, C. S. 2003. Three human strengths, in L.G. Aspinwall and U.M. Staudinger (eds.),A psychology of human strengths: fundamental questions and future directions for a positive psychology, pp.87–102. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2008. 5. Simon, H. A. 1953. Models of man. New York: Wiley1967. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition, Psychological Review 74: 29–39 Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Self-Regulation (Psychology)	Scheier	Corr I 427 Self-regulation/Carver/Scheier: the term self-regulation (Carver and Scheier 1981⁽¹⁾, 1998(2)) has different connotations in different contexts. When we use it, we intend to convey the sense of purposive processes, involving self-corrective adjustments as needed, and that the adjustments originate within the person. This view is not an approach to personality but a way of talking about how personality becomes expressed in behaviour. >Feedback/Carver/Scheier, >Control processes/Carver/Scheier, >Affect/Carver/Scheier, >Goals/Carver/Scheier. Corr I 431 The argument that affect reflects the error signal from a comparison in a feedback loop (>Affect/Carver/Scheier) has a very counter-intuitive implication concerning positive affect (Carver2003)⁽⁴⁾. As noted, if affect reflects the error signal in a feedback loop, affect is a signal to adjust rate of progress. What about positive feelings? Here prediction is less intuitive. (…) The feelings still reflect a discrepancy (>Criteria/Carver/Scheier), and discrepancy reducing loops minimize discrepancies. Thus, such a system ‘wants’ to see neither negative nor positive affect. (…) People who exceed the criterion rate of progress (and thus have positive feelings) will automatically tend to reduce subsequent effort in this domain. They will ‘coast’ a little (cf. Frijda 1994⁽³⁾, p. 113); not necessarily stop, but ease back, such that subsequent rate of progress returns to the criterion. The impact on subjective affect would be that the positive feeling itself is not sustained for very long. It begins to fade. Generally (…) the system acts to prevent great amounts of pleasure as well as great amounts of pain (Carver 2003⁽⁴⁾; Carver and Scheier 1998⁽²⁾). Corr I 432 Why would a process be built in that limits positive feelings–indeed, dampens them? After all, people seek pleasure and avoid pain. We believe the adaptive value of a tendency to coast derives from the fact that people have multiple simultaneous goals (Carver 2003(4); Carver and Scheier 1998⁽²⁾; Frijda 1994⁽³⁾). Given multiple goals, people generally do not optimize on any one goal, but rather ‘satisfice’ (Simon 1953)⁽⁵⁾. >Goals/Carver/Scheier. 1. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1981. Attention and self-regulation: a control-theory approach to human behaviour. New York: Springer Verlag 2. Carver, C. S. and Scheier, M. F. 1998. On the self-regulation of behaviour. New York: Cambridge University Press 3. Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion: fundamental questions, pp. 112–26. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Carver, C. S. 2003. Three human strengths, in L.G. Aspinwall and U.M. Staudinger (eds.),A psychology of human strengths: fundamental questions and future directions for a positive psychology, pp.87–102. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2008. 5. Simon, H. A. 1953. Models of man. New York: Wiley1967. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition, Psychological Review 74: 29–39 Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, “Self-regulation and controlling personality functioning” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Social Skills	Developmental Psychology	Corr I 181 Social Skills/social competence/developmental psychology/Rothbart: Early forms of what will later be called Extraversion or Surgency are present in the smiling and laughter and rapid approach of infants to a novel object by six months, and measures of approach tendencies and smiling and laughter at this early age predict children’s extraverted tendencies at seven years (Rothbart, Derryberry and Hershey 2000)⁽¹⁾. Throughout early development, children who are more extraverted also appear to express greater anger and frustration, and are more prone to externalizing disorders (Rothbart and Bates 2006⁽²⁾; Rothbart and Posner 2006)⁽³⁾. Lengua, Wolchik, Sandler and West (2000)⁽⁴⁾ found that low positivity and high impulsivity in children, as well as high rejection and inconsistency in parenting, predicted conduct problems. children who are more sociable may attract warmth and responsiveness from adults, thereby protecting them from the effects of poor parenting (Werner 1985). Better social skills have also been shown for children whose temperament matched parental expectations and desires, who were more persistent, and whose parents were higher on warmth (Paterson and Sanson 1999)⁽⁵⁾. When infants are four months of age, their distress and body movement to laboratory-presented stimulation predict later fear and behavioural inhibition. >Fear/developmental psychology, >Social learning, >Social behaviour, >Socialization, >Stages of development. 1. Rothbart, M. K., Derryberry, D. and Hershey, K. 2000. Stability of temperament in childhood: laboratory infant assessment to parent report at seven years, in V. J. Molfese and D. L. Molfese (eds.), Temperament and personality development across the life span, pp. 85–119. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 3. Rothbart, M. K. and Posner, M. I. 2006. Temperament, attention, and developmental psychopathology, in D. Cicchetti and D. Cohen eds., Developmental psychopathology, vol. II, Developmental neuroscience, 2nd edn, pp. 465–501. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 4. Lengua, L. J., Wolchik, S. A., Sandler, I. N. and West, S. G. 2000. The additive and interactive effects of parenting and temperament in predicting adjustment problems of children of divorce, Journal of Clinical Child Psychology 29: 232–44 5. Paterson, G. and Sanson, A. 1999. The association of behavioural adjustment to temperament, parenting and family characteristics among 5-year-old children, Social Development 8: 293–309 Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Stimuli	Allport	Corr I 95 Stimuli/behavior/Allport/Deary: Allport emphasized that it was the trait and not the stimulus that was the driving force behind behaviour that expresses personality. >Behavior, >Personality traits. This idea was recast by Matthews, Deary and Whiteman (2003⁽¹⁾) when they articulated the key assumptions of the ‘inner locus’ and ‘causal precedence’ of personality traits. Allport suggested the definitions ‘derived drives’ or ‘derived motives’ for traits and summed up that (Allport 1931⁽²⁾, p. 369): Whatever they are called they may be regarded as playing a motivating role in each act, thus endowing the separate adjustments of the individual to specific stimuli with that adverbial quality that is the very essence of personality. Adverbs/adjectives/description/theory/Deary: Today’s trait researchers are keener on adjectives than adverbs. >Lexical hypothesis. 1.Matthews, G., Deary, I. J. and Whiteman, M. C. 2003. Personality traits, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press 2. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Tax Substitution	Economic Theories	Parisi I 323 Tax evasion/tax substitution/Economic theories: The literature on optimal redistributional instruments - both in law and economics and in public finance - is dominated by the tax substitution argument. The tax substitution argument shows that any redistribution effected outside the labor earnings tax system can be better accomplished by making appropriate adjustments to labor earnings taxation. >Tax systems. The implication is that the government should pursue distributional goals exclusively through the labor earnings tax system, while setting other policies without regard to their distributional impact. Both proponents and detractors of the tax substitution argument recognize that, like any argument, it requires assumptions. Controversy surrounds the nature of these assumptions. Proponents of the tax substitution argument refer to its key assumption as a “qualification” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000⁽¹⁾, p. 822). Adopting the assumption is said to generate the “natural model” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000⁽¹⁾, p. 821). Conversely, prescriptions of the model sans assumption are viewed as “exotic” (Bankman and Weisbach, 2007⁽²⁾, p. 793), or as “theoretical curiosities” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000⁽¹⁾, p. 822). Vs: Critics of the tax substitution argument regard its key assumption as result-driving, empirically ungrounded, and indeed facially implausible once clearly revealed (Sanchirico, 1997⁽³⁾; 2000⁽⁴⁾, p. 813; 2001⁽⁵⁾, p. 1058; 2010a⁽⁶⁾, pp. 874–875, 940; 2011a⁽⁷⁾). 1. Kaplow, Louis and Steven M. Shavell (2001). “Fairness Versus Welfare.” Harvard Law Review 114: 961–1388. 2. Bankman, Joseph and David A. Weisbach (2006). “The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax.” Stanford Law Review 58: 1413–1456. 3. Sanchirico, Chris William (1997). “Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Discussion Paper No. 9798-04, Columbia Economics Department, available at . 4. Sanchirico, Chris William (2000). “Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View.” Journal of Legal Studies 29: 797–820. 5. Sanchirico, Chris William (2001). “Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale.” Cornell Law Review 86: 1003–1089. 6. Sanchirico, Chris William (2010a). “A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income.” Tax Law Review 63: 867–956. Web appendix available at . 7. Sanchirico, Chris William (2011a). “Tax Eclecticism.” Tax Law Review 64: 149–228. Web appendix available at . Chris William Sanchirico. “Optimal Redistributional Instruments in Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Temperament	Developmental Psychology	Corr 181 Temperament/Developmental Psychology/Rothbart: Developmental research to date indicates that the reactive systems of emotion and orienting are in place before the development of executive effortful attention (Posner and Rothbart 2007⁽¹⁾; Rothbart and Bates 2006)⁽²⁾. Early forms of what will later be called Extraversion or Surgency are present in the smiling and laughter and rapid approach of infants to a novel object by six months, and measures of approach tendencies and smiling and laughter at this early age predict children’s extraverted tendencies at seven years (Rothbart, Derryberry and Hershey 2000)⁽³⁾. >Extraversion, >Introversion, >Personality types. Throughout early development, children who are more extraverted also appear to express greater anger and frustration, and are more prone to externalizing disorders (Rothbart and Bates 2006⁽²⁾; Rothbart and Posner 2006)⁽⁴⁾. Lengua, Wolchik, Sandler and West (2000)⁽⁵⁾ found that low positivity and high impulsivity in children, as well as high rejection and inconsistency in parenting, predicted conduct problems. High negative emotionality and low positive emotionality in children and rejection and inconsistency in parenting predicted child depression. Inconsistent discipline had a stronger association with conduct problems and depression for children who were high in impulsivity than children who were lower in impulsivity. 1. Posner, M. I. and Rothbart, M. K. 2007. Educating the human brain. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 2. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 3. Rothbart, M. K., Derryberry, D. and Hershey, K. 2000. Stability of temperament in childhood: laboratory infant assessment to parent report at seven years, in V. J. Molfese and D. L. Molfese (eds.), Temperament and personality development across the life span, pp. 85–119. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 4. Rothbart, M. K. and Posner, M. I. 2006. Temperament, attention, and developmental psychopathology, in D. Cicchetti and D. Cohen eds., Developmental psychopathology, vol. II, Developmental neuroscience, 2nd edn, pp. 465–501. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 5.Lengua, L. J., Wolchik, S. A., Sandler, I. N. and West, S. G. 2000. The additive and interactive effects of parenting and temperament in predicting adjustment problems of children of divorce, Journal of Clinical Child Psychology 29: 232–44 Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Link to abbreviations/authors
Theories	Feyerabend	I 35 Theory/Feyerabend: there is no one single interesting theory that corresponds with all known facts in its field. I 39 Theory/Feyerabend: any theory that contradicts another outside of the observations is supported by exactly the same observations and therefore also acceptable. I 84 Theory/Hume/Feyerabend: theories cannot be derived from facts. If we are to demand that only theories be admitted that follow from the facts, no theory remains at all. I 86 Theory/Feyerabend: a theory may not be incompatible with the data, because it is not correct, but because the data are contaminated! They could contain, and analyzed, perceptions, which correspond only partially to external processes, or be clad in old conceptions, or judged by backward auxiliary sciences. I 87 Theory/Observation Language/Feyerabend: even the most thorough examination of an observation sentence does not disturb the concepts by which it is expressed or the structure of the perception image. How can we examine something that is constantly used and presupposed in every statement? I 121 Lakatos: pro ad-hoc theories. Theory/Popper: new theories have - and this must be so - excess content, which - and this should not be so - is gradually infected by ad-hoc adjustments. Theory/Lakatos: new theories are - necessarily - ad-hoc. Excess content is created bit by bit by gradually extending the theories to new facts and areas. >Content, >Meaning change, >Method, >Facts, >Observation, >Incommensurability.	Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Theories	Lakatos	Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative.	Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Understanding	Gadamer	I 270 Understanding/Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger only addressed the problem of historical hermeneutics and critique in order to unfold from there in ontological intention the preliminary structure of understanding⁽¹⁾. Gadamer: Conversely, we pursue the question of how hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological inhibitions of the objectivity concept of science, is able to do justice to the historicity of understanding. Understanding/Heidegger: [One will be allowed] to ask about the consequences that Heidegger's fundamental derivation of the circular structure of understanding from the temporality of >Dasein has for hermeneutics in the humanities. These consequences (...) could (...) consist (...) in the fact that the self-understanding of understanding, which is always practiced, would be corrected and cleansed of inappropriate adjustments - a process that would at most indirectly benefit the art of understanding. >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger, >Expectations/Gadamer. I 273 How should a text be protected from misunderstanding in advance? If you look more closely, you will see (...) that even opinions cannot be understood arbitrarily. As little as we can constantly misunderstand a use of language without the meaning of the whole being disturbed, as little can we blindly stick to our own pre-opinion on the matter when we understand the opinion of another. It is not as if, when we listen to someone or start to read something, we have to forget all our pre-opinions about the content and all of our own opinions. Only openness to the opinion of the other or the text is required. Such openness, however, always implies that one puts the other opinion in relation to the whole of one's own opinions or is in relation to it. Therefore, a hermeneutically trained awareness of the otherness of the text must be receptive from the outset. But such receptiveness requires I 274 neither factual nor even self-extinction, but includes the detached appropriation of one's own prejudices and preconceptions. It is important to be aware of one's own bias so that the test presents itself in its otherness and thus has the opportunity to play off its factual truth against one's own pre-opinion. I 295 Understanding/Gadamer: Understanding itself is not so much to be thought of as an act of subjectivity, but rather as an engagement with an event of tradition in which past and present are constantly communicated. I 304 Understanding/Gadamer: The first thing that understanding begins with is (...) that something appeals to us. This is the highest of all hermeneutical conditions. We now know what is required: a fundamental suspension of one's own prejudices. All suspension of judgements, however, and therefore even more so that of prejudices, has, logically seen, the structure of the question. I 311 Merging of horizons: There is as little a contemporary horizon for itself as there are historical horizons to be gained. Rather, understanding is always the process of merging such supposedly separate horizons. >Horizon/Gadamer. I 316 It is quite absurd to base the possibility of understanding texts on the premise of "congeniality" that should unite the creator and interpreter of a work. If that were really the case, the humanities would have a bad outlook. The miracle of understanding consists rather in the fact that it does not require congeniality to recognize what is truly significant and what is originally meaningful in the tradition. Rather, we are able to open ourselves to the superior claim of the text and understand the meaning in which it speaks to us. >Legal Hermeneutics, >Theological Hermeneutics. I 346 Understandig/Application/Gadamer: Application is not a subsequent application of some given generality, which would first be understood in itself, to a concrete case, but is only the real understanding of the general itself, which the given text is for us. Understanding proves to be a way of effect and knows itself as such effect. >History of Effect/Gadamer. I 399 Understanding/Gadamer: Not only is the preferred object of understanding, the tradition, of linguistic nature - understanding itself has a fundamental relationship to linguistics. We were based on the proposition that understanding is already interpreting, because it forms the hermeneutical >horizon in which the opinion of a text is expressed. But in order to be able to express the opinion of a text in its factual content, we have to translate it into our language, i.e. we put it in relation to the whole of possible opinions in which we are speaking and are ready to express ourselves. 1. Heideger, Sein und Zeit, 312ff	Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Wiener	Hillis	Brockman I 178 Wiener/Hillis: Wiener chose to view the world from the vantage point and scale of the individual human. As a cyberneticist, he took the perspective of the weak protagonist embedded within a strong system, trying to make the best of limited powers. He incorporated this perspective in his very definition of information. “Information,” he said, “is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our Brockman I 179 adjustment felt upon it.” In his words, information is what we use to “live effectively within that environment.”⁽¹⁾ For Wiener, information is a way for the weak to effectively cope with the strong. 1. Wiener, N. The Human Use of Human Beings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), 17—18. Hillis, D. W. “The First Machine Intelligences” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press.	Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Correspondence Theory	James Vs Correspondence Theory	Diaz-Bone I 88 Pragmatism Vs correspondence theory: a match for James softens the dichotomy true/false. (> achievement, adjustment). Truth/James: analogy to money: Credit: belief can turn out to be wrong. I 89 Wrong: something that turns out to be false after an investigation - has it always been wrong? James: Assumptions can have been real (some sort of "true"). They had a truth value that was a guide for action.	James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Evolution Theory	Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory	Vollmer I 258 VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context. The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept. I 276 VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition. VsEvolution Theory: not predictable VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory. Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations! I 277 VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.) I 278 VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world! I 279 VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer. I 279 VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance). 3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative. Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution. I 284 But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction). I 285 Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all!	Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Gould, St. J.	Dennett Vs Gould, St. J.	I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.⁽¹⁾ 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Gould, St. J.	Verschiedene Vs Gould, St. J.	Dennett I 383 Helena CroninVsGould: flaw: he asks, how exclusive the selection as a driver of change is. Do you have to look at all the properties of living organisms as adaptations? Cronin: the selection may be the only thing that really brings forth adjustments, without that it must therefore have caused all properties.	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Popper, K.	Lakatos Vs Popper, K.	Feyerabend I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but such. And beyond that totally irrational. Hacking I 199 "Protective belts"/Lakatos: you only make a selection of problems you are dealing with. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: so verification still has a place! The researchers choose a few problems, refutations can then be completely uninteresting! Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be right because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule according to which the human thinks and directs nature is not tenable. Two false assumptions: 1. there is a psychological boundary between speculative and observational sentences 2. assuming that observational evidence could be proven by facts. Schurz I 196 Theory Revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to establish empirical prognoses. These are located like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be resolved by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date that contradicts the whole theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown interfering factors are postulated. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is falsified only when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "immediate rationality" (immediate decision) which theory is better. This only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def Research Program/Lakatos: hard theory core together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def Negative Heuristics/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only on the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can be directed against the core. Def Positive Heuristics/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can be handled with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theoretical version/Schurz: Core plus periphery.	Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Structuralism	Jakobson Vs Structuralism	Saussure I 42 JakobsonVsStructuralism: bad structuralism: exclusive adjustment to invariant, i.e. timeless elements. Requirement: one should understand both invariance and variations as mutual and reciprocal structures.	Jakobson I Roman Jakobson Fundamentals of Language 2011

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Vs Adaptionism.	Gould, St. J.	Dennett I 370 Gould: The vault of St. Mark’s Basilica and the" Pangloss "principle: VsAdaptionism thesis: Adjustment is pervasive. Def "gusset" / Gould: all those biological characteristics which are not adjustments.	Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005