Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Analogies Kant Strawson V 102
Analogies of Experience/Kant: We do not find them in the axioms of intuition. "Experiences are only possible with the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions". - Transcendental Aesthetic/Kant: Principles of sensibility a priori.
Transcendental Analytic: comprises the deduction of the categories, the schematism and the principles.
Strawson V 104
Analogy: Shows how the order of the perceptions must be represented with the terms - Kant brilliantly reduces it on temporal relations - 1. between the objects 2. between the experiences.
Strawson V 105
1. Analogy/Kant: the quantum of substance in nature can be neither reduced nor increased. >Substance.
V 106
Time/Kant: All determination of time presupposes something permanent. Only space is persistent.
Strawson V 107
StrawsonVsKant: That is not a reason for the objective order to be spatial.
Strawson V 108
StrawsonVsKant: There is no need for a conservation principle! Only a re-identification principle for loci (objects). - Nowadays: We see that something burns while no substance remains.
Strawson V 112
2./3. Analogy/Kant: Question: Could perceptions also have occurred reversely? a) Events: No time indifference b) Object: time difference
Strawson V 115
2. Analogy: The order of the sequence is not only necessary, but also specific, bound by our apprehensions. Causality: If the order is necessary, the change itself is necessary. StrawsonvsKant: He unconsciously uses two terms of necessity here: conceptual/causal
Strawson V 116/117
3. Analogy/Kant: the interaction of simultaneously existing objects corresponds to a time indifference of perceptions. Strawson: unlike causality.

>Causality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Principles/Kant, >Experience/Kant.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Analogies Nagel I 142
Analogies of Experience/Kant/Nagel: the transfer to the unobserved is also drawn from the conditions of possible experience. >Imagination/Kant, >Analogies of experience/Kant, >Experience/Kant.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Principles Kant Vollmer I 197
Principles of the pure understanding/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1 Axioms of Intuition - Applicability of Euclidean geometry:
a objects,
b. states, and
c. processes
2 Anticipations of Perception:
a. Continuity of space,
b. continuity of the time,
c. continuity of physical processes.
3 Analogies of Experience:
a. persistence of substance
b. universal causality,
c. universal interaction of substances.

4. Postulates of empirical thought in general (not principles, but definitions).

>Time/Kant, >Space/Kant,
>Experience/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Knowledge/Kant, >Causality/Kant, >Substance/Kant, >Geometry/Kant.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Syntheticity Chisholm II 60
Synthetic: Existence/Kant: every existential judgment is synthetic according to Kant. Synthetic judgments a priori/Kant: make conditional existence assertion. (> Analogies of experience) - ChisholmVs.
II 61
Synthetic a priori/Kant: E.g. the space is three-dimensional. - RiemannVs: refuted - synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there are non-analytic propositions of the form All S are P. - E.g. Chisholm: All squares are form-bearing, all red is colored, nothing red is green. - But not clearly: two forms: a) all humans are mortal, b) all humans are descendants.
II 62
Chisholm: form-identical with the analytical propositions - KantVsChisholm: form differs.
II 72
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: Problem: no synthetic a priori if the definition of necessity is: p expresses a contradictory proposition which can be negated - false solution: to chose necessity as mere inclusion (understanding a includes understanding b), then contradiction: it would be possible that there is no or one possible worlds , so that non-p. - reason: E.g. "p" expresses an inclusion, then non-p is contradictory.
II 73
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: E.g. (S) All red is colored: is not a logical truth because there are no red objects in every possible world (poss.w.). - analytic/Sauer: Problem: the same happens with the analysis: from the fact that (A) "all squares are rectangles" is analytic, would follow that this is true in every possible world, but not from the simple sentence "All squares are rectangles". - Problems: see below.
II 74
If "all squares are rectangular" is true, then the property of the square exists.
II 76
The doctrine of the synthetic a priori in Kant is VsEmpiricism. The doctrine of the analytic is VsRationalism: to reach the knowledge of objects by means of consistent thinking. - ((s) No existence follows from this.)

Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Kant Vollmer Vs Kant I 25
VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity!
I 84
Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that:
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language
VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms.
Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences.
I 103
Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge.
He cannot answer the following questions:
How are our categories created?
Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories?
Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others?
Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems:
Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution?
Why can we understand each other?
How is intersubjective knowledge possible?
Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!)
Can they be scientifically justified?
I 193
Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible.
I 196
Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false).
For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws.
I 197
Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to
a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes.
2. Anticipations of Perception
a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes
3. Analogies of Experience
a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances.
4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions).
I 199
VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs).
Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause!
Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs).
Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation.
Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine.
Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them.
VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact.
Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE.
EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct.
2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success.
Kant does not make this distinction.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm.
I 304
Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer).
I 305
Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena.
I 306
Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized!
II 48
Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular).

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988