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The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Hare | II 133 Analytical/Hare: is the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not-p' are analytically false" supposed to be analytically true? Or perhaps empirically? It is about the (empirical) use of "and not". Plato/Solution: anamnesis: the definition of a concept is similar to remembering, i.e. not to make an empirical discovery or to decide. Plato: the only thing that is correct, is what we have learned from our teachers. >Anamnesis, >Plato. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Generality | Aristotle | Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: generality emerges from the rhetorical exercise of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of general statements and individual cases. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? The concrete individual is always familiar to us from the sensory experience. But the general? Generality/Knowledge/AristotelesVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the general comes from sensory experience and epagogé. Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. They derive from induction and are to be intuitively understood. Gadamer I 318 Generalities/Aristotle/Gadamer: If the good for humans meets in each case in the concretion of the practical situation in which he or she is, moral knowledge must do just that, to look at the concrete situation, as it were, what it demands of the person. In other words, the actor must see the concrete situation in the light of what is generally demanded of him or her. But this means negatively that knowledge in general, which does not know how to apply itself to the concrete situation, remains meaningless, and even threatens to obscure the concrete demands that emanate from the situation. This fact, which expresses the essence of moral reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a methodologically difficult problem, but also gives moral relevance to the problem of method. >Ethics/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle, >The Good/Aristotle, >Techne/Aristotle, >Self-Knowledge/Aristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Interpretation | Feyerabend | I 94 Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: Natural Interpretation encompasses mental operations that are so closely linked to the senses that separation is difficult. Natural interpretations are learned! Natural Interpretation/Intellectual History/Feyerabend: depends, either a-priori presuppositions (Kant) or advantages (Bacon). 97 Natural Interpretation/Bacon/Feyerabend: Bacon wanted to remove natural interpretations (which were prejudices for him) like the peels of an onion. He believed the interpretations were simply added to perception. I 98 Natural Interpretation/Observation Language/FeyerabendVsBacon: without natural interpretation we would be completely disoriented. We cannot take apart its mesh. >Observation language. I 105 Natural Interpretation/Feyerabend: the new natural interpretations form a new and abstract observation language. They are introduced and hidden so that the completed change is not noticed (method of anamnesis). They contain the notion of the relativity of all motion and the law of inertia of circular motion. I 123 Natural Interpretation/Earth Movement/Feyerabend: this kind of interpretation is "natural" in a completely new and revolutionary sense: it does not require neither an external nor an internal drive to maintain it! The first kind of movement is necessary to explain the up and down of the stars, The second kind is used when one wishes to regard the movement as something relative, as depending on the choice of a coordinate system. >Observation, >Reference systems. I 367 Interpretation/Feyerabend: interpretation is a continuity of formal relations (logic) does not mean continuity of interpretations. E.g. Duhem: the notorious "derivation" of Newton's law of gravitation from Kepler's laws. >Natural laws. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Knowledge | Aristotle | Bubner I 118 Knowledge/Aristotle: the knowledge available outside of scientific evidence establishes the connection of science theory with general ontology. >Ontology/Aristotle, >Science/Aristotle. Bubner I 119 Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and Epagogé (nowadays controversial whether to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. >Practical Syllogism/Aristotle. Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantifications and individual cases. In Aristotle, no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal? >Prior knowledge/Today's discussion. Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé. Bubner I 149 Knowledge/Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: to know truly and definitively requires the certainty that the knowledge has come to its full extent, by even recognizing that which explains already existing knowledge. Such certainty cannot be determined from outside, it must be found in knowledge itself. >Metaphysics/Aristotle. Gadamer I 317 Knowledge/Aristotle/Gadamer: Human morality is essentially different from nature in that it is not simply the result of abilities or powers, but that the human only becomes such a being through what he or she does and how he or she behaves, Gadamer I 318 i.e. but: being so, behaves in a certain way. How can there be a theoretical knowledge of the moral being of humans (...) and what role does knowledge (i.e. "logos") play for the moral being of humans (...)? General/special: If the good for humans meets in each case in the concreteness of the practical situation in which he or she finds him- or herself, then moral knowledge must do just that, as it were to look at the concrete situation and see what it demands of that person. In other words, the actor must see the concrete situation in the light of what is generally demanded of him or her. But this means negatively that knowledge in general, which does not know how to apply itself to the concrete situation, remains meaningless, and even threatens to obscure the concrete demands that emanate from the situation. This fact, which expresses the essence of moral reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a methodologically difficult problem, but also gives moral relevance to the problem of method. >Ethics/Aristotle. Gadamer I 319 Aristotle remains a Socratic in so far as he records knowledge as an essential moment of moral being (...). Gadamer: Moral knowledge, as described by Aristotle, is obviously not objective knowledge. The knower is not confronted with a fact which he or she only ascertains, but the person is directly affected by what he or she recognizes. Science/Knowledge/Gadamer: That this is not the knowledge of science is clear. In this respect, the distinction that Aristotle makes between the moral knowledge of the "Phronesis" and the theoretical knowledge of the "Episteme" is simple, especially when one considers that for the Greeks, science, represented by the example of mathematics, is a knowledge of the unchangeable, a knowledge based on proof, and that therefore everyone can learn it. On the other hand: See >Techne/Aristotle. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Knowledge | Plato | Bubner I 35 Knowledge/Cave-Parable/Plato/Bubner: the knowledge acquired by the few should not lead to theoretical self-sufficiency. The rare insight into the nature of the good is to be implemented politically. It is not a question of the value neutrality of a supreme object. The philosophers must descend again to share life with fellow prisoners. They are committed to do this because of the peculiarities of what they have seen! (Good). Only the one who has a goal in life can act rationally (reason). Summary: the idea of the good must be understood literally. The parable-like dress does not point to an ontological secret doctrine. The philosopher who, with this question of the meaning and purpose of the theory, relativizes the possibilities of the theory itself, becomes a dialectician. (Dialectic). >Good/Plato, >Dialectic/Plato. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to this with the myth of Anamnesis. (Remembrance of the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial, whether to be seen as an induction) there is prior knowledge. >Knowledge/Aristotle, cf. >Knowledge paradox. Gaus I 311 Knowledge/governance/Plato/Keyt/Miller: in the Statesman [Politikos] the Eleatic Stranger pursues the idea of the rule of reason to its logical terminus and draws a conclusion that in the Republic remains tacit - that knowledge by itself provides sufficient warrant for the application of force, even deadly force, when persuasion fails (for the antithesis see Plt. 296bl, 304d4). It is within the bounds of justice, according to the Eleatic Stranger, for the true statesman, the man who possesses the political art and is 'truly and not merely apparently a knower' , to purge his polis, with or without law, with or without the consent of his subjects, by killing or banishing some of its members (Plt. 293a2-e2). The only true constitution is the one ruled by such a person. Since such persons are exceedingly rare (Plt. 292el-293a4, 297b7-c2), a central question is how a polis bereft of a true statesman can share in reason. The answer of the Eleatic Stranger is that it can share through law, law being an imitation of the truth apprehended by the true statesman (Plt. 300c5-7, 300el 1-301a4). Imitation: Since the true statesman rules without law, there is a better and a worse way of imitating him. The rulers of a polis can imitate reason's rule by ruling according to reason's reflection in law, or they can imitate reason's lawlessness by ruling contrary to law (Plt. 300e7-301 c5). Given that the rulers are one, few, or many, there are three good and three bad imitations of the one true constitution. Since the fewer the rulers the stronger the rule, the six imitations form a hierarchy, fewer rulers being better when rule is according to law but worse when it is contrary (Plt. 302b5- 303b5). >Governance/Plato. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Memory | Gadamer | I 21 Memory/remembering/forgetting/Gadamer: One does not correctly grasp (...) the nature of memory (...) if one sees in it nothing but a general disposition or ability. Retaining and forgetting and remembering belong to the historical constitution of man and are themselves a part of his history and education. He who exercises his memory as a mere skill - and all the technique of memory is such an exercise - does not yet have it as that, which is his own. The memory must be formed. For remembering is not memory at all and for everything. One has a memory for some things, but not for others, and one wants to keep something in one's memory as one bans others from it. >Capability, >Education, cf. >Second Nature, >Perception, >World/Thinking. Forgetting: To the relationship of keeping and remembering belongs in a long not enough considered way forgetting, which is not only a failure and a lack, but, as especially F. Nietzsche emphasized, is a life condition of the spirit(1). >Spirit/Nietzsche. Only through forgetting the spirit is given the possibility of total renewal, the ability to see everything with fresh eyes, so that the old familiar merges with the new to form a multi-layered unity. To remember is ambiguous. It contains as memory (mnemé) the relationship to memory (anamnesis). 1. F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, Zweites Stück, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, 1 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Memory | Hare | II 150 Anamnesis/Platon: anamnesis is not just remembering but rather "recalling". Hare: we know that we have understood something correctly without being able to cite reasons (knowledge/saying). The only test is to repeat it. >Anamnesis. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Recognition | Gadamer | I 119 Recognition/Imitation/Representation/Arts/Gadamer: The cognitive sense of mimesis is recognition. >Mimesis. Aristotle: Artistic representation [makes] even the unpleasant appear pleasant(1), Kant: defines art thus as the beautiful conception of a thing because it knows how to make the ugly appear beautiful(2). >Aesthetics/Kant. Gadamer: This obviously does not mean artificiality and artistry as such. One does not admire the art with which something is made, as with the artist. This is only a secondary interest, as Aristotle states(3). What one actually experiences in a work of art and what one is directed towards is rather how true it is, i.e. how much one recognizes something and how much one recognizes oneself in it. >Artworks/Gadamer. Gadamer: The joy of recognition is (...) that more is recognized than just the known. In recognition, what we know emerges from all the randomness and variability of the circumstances that cause it, as if through an enlightenment, and is grasped in its essence. It is recognized as something. Here we stand before the central motif of Platonism. Plato: in his doctrine of "anamnesis", he combined the mythical idea of recollection with the path of his dialectic, which seeks the truth of being in the logoi, i.e. in the ideality of language(4). Gadamer: Indeed, such idealism of the being is inherent in the phenomenon of recognition. This only comes into its true being and reveals itself as what it is through its recognition. As the recognized, it is that what is trapped in its essence, and that what is released from the randomness of its aspects. Cf. >Generality, >Generalization, >Idea, >Being. 1. Aristotle, Poet. 4, 1448 b 10. 2. Kant, Kr. d. U., S 48. 3. Aristotle, a.a.O. b 10f. 4. Plato, Phaidon. 73ff |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Recognition | Plato | Gadamer I 119 Recognition/Plato/Gadamer: The joy of recognition is (...) that more is recognized than just the known. In recognition, what we know emerges from all the randomness and variability of the circumstances that cause it, as if through enlightenment, and is grasped in its essence. >Knowledge/Plato. It is recognized as something. Here we stand before the central motif of Platonism. >Platonism. Plato: in his doctrine of "anamnesis", he combined the mythical idea of recollection with the path of his dialectic, which seeks the truth of being in the logoi, i.e. in the ideality of language(1). Gadamer: In fact, such an idealism of being is inherent in the phenomenon of recognition. This only comes into its true being and reveals itself as what it is through its recognition. As the recognized, it is that what is trapped in its essence, and that what is released from the randomness of its aspects. Cf. >Idealism. 1. Plato, Phaidon. 73ff |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Representation | Hare | II 149 Language/representation/Hare: the analogy with the e.g. dance points to our possibility of reasoning about our language usage. This is a corrective against the orthodox representation theory, according to which "facts", "characteristics" and other dubious entities such as unreliable diplomats oscillate between language and world. >Language behavior, >Use, >Speech acts, >Representation, >World/Thinking, >World, >Reality. We do not need anything like that. It is simply that people try to understand each other. >Intersubjectivity, >Communication, >Community. II 150 Anamnesis/Platon: anamnesis is not just remembering, but rather "recalling". Hare: we know that we have understood something correctly without being able to cite reasons (knowledge/saying). The only test is to repeat it. >Anamnesis. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Science | Aristotle | Gadamer I 357 Science/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle has a very nice picture for the logic of [the] process [of induction]. He compares the many observations one makes with a fleeing army. (...) if, in this general flight, one observation is confirmed through re- Gadamer I 358 peated experience, then it stops. >Experience/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle. Thus at this point, as it were, a first standstill in the general flight sets in. If others now join the flight, the whole army of the fugitives comes to a halt at the end and again obeys the unit of the command. The uniform mastery of the whole symbolizes here what science is. The picture is intended to show how science, i.e. general truth, can come about in the first place, which must not depend on the randomness of the observations, but should be valid in real generality. Bubner I 120 Epagogé/Aristotle/Bubner: Epagogé emerges from the rhetorical practice of providing examples. Introduction. Not strict induction in today's sense of the relation of universal quantification and individual cases. >Induction, >Deduction. In Aristotle: no comparable subsumption relation. Previous Knowledge/Aristotle: where does it come from? We are always already familiar with the concrete individual from the sensory experience. But the universal? >Prior knolwdge/Today's discussion. Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and Epagogé. Science/Aristotle: Principles as a basis cannot be the object of science. Form of Thought. They derive from induction, but can only be comprised intuitively. I 123 BaconVsAristotle: "Novum Organon" (! 620): Tired of scholastic formula. Turning to empiricism and sense of reality. "Once people have become dependent on the verdict of others (senators without voting rights), they no longer increase science, they limit themselves to praising certain writers ..." Bacon: pro induction from concrete sensuousness, vs infertile dialectics of Aristotle consisting of syllogisms. Science/Antiquity/Bubner: does have the peculiar features of childish discovery. Fertile in disputes, poor in works. Was stuck for centuries. Arts/Antiquity/Bubner: in contrast to science, they were strikingly lively. I 147 Science/Aristotle/Bubner: every individual science is dealing with reality, but none with reality in itself, but only with the chosen aspect. "They cut out a part of the being and look at it with regard to what is to come to it." Even the sum of the individual sciences will never overcome the limitation that lies in specialization. The question of the reality behind it cannot be asked in the surroundings of the present knowledge. >Ontology/Aristotle. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Terminology | Feyerabend | I 112 Def Anamnesis/Feyerabend: Hiding of changes. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Plato | Aristotle Vs Plato | Bubner I 23 AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king. Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects. Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. I 120 Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé. I 164 Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. I 165 Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. I 184 Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". --- Kanitscheider II 35 Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe. Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position). "Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number". II 36 Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement. First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified. World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time. AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius: Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help". Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum. II 37 Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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