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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proxy Function | Quine | VI 43 Proxy Function/Quine: is every explicit and reversibly unambiguous transformation f - E.g. if Px originally meant that x was a P, we therefore re-interpret Px so that it means that x is now f of a P -according for multi-digit predicates - the predicates then apply to the correlates fx instead to x - all sentences stay as they are - observation sentences remain correlated to the same stimuli - but the objects of the theory have changed dramatically - ((s) Example: There is a Gödel number of x.) >Predicates/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine VI 45 Ontology/Loewenheim/Proxy Function/Quine: the different ontologies resulting from both are unambiguously correlatable - and as a whole empirically indistinguishable. - E.g. Tabhita: is only Geach’s cat or cosmos minus cat - distinction: is relativistic: by the role that one plays relatively around the other - even the link to trained stimuli remains intact - the nodes where we assume the objects are neutral. >Ontology/Quine Lauener XI 145 Definition proxy function/Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: a function that assigns to each object of the original theory such a one from the new theory. - E.g. The Goedel number of - to reduce one theory to another. Proxy Function/(s): maintains number of digits of the predicates (fulfillment of n-tuples of arguments by n-tuples of values). - Thus it averts the trivialization of a reduction to a theory of natural numbers (> Loewenheim). XII 72 Proxy Function/PF/Reduction/Quine: must not be reversibly unambiguous. E.g. irreversible proxy function which reduces a theory of expressions and fractions: Expressions by Goedel numbers, fractions with diagonal process. Then the same number can stand for a fraction or an expression. - That is ok, because fractures and expressions are so different that the question of identity does not arise, therefore, the original theory does not benefit from the differences. -> multi-sort logic - if, in contrast, all elements of the initial theory are distinguishable. (E.g. pure arithmetic of rational or real numbers) you need a reversibly unambiguous proxy function. >Reduction/Quine XII 74 Apparent Class/Quine: is given by open formula - E.g. a proxy function can be construed as an apparent class, if it is a function as an open formula with two free variables. - (> apparent quantification). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Quantification | Quine | I 283 Indefinite singular term: quantification disappears in "something is an x such that", "everything is an x ...". I 316 Paraphrases by quantification uncover false existence assumptions. >Existence/Quine VI 41 Quantification/Quine/(s) is a postulation of objects. X 94 Quantification/variable/Quine: in the open sentence after the quantifier "x" stands at a point where a name could be - E.g. also names of numbers - the sentences do not say that names or numbers are walking- "EF" does not say, "is a predicate such and such", but an object that is called by the predicate is so and so" - this object could be a property (pro Frege ) - VsRussell: but not a predicate - mixing up of representation (schema) and quantification (talking about). >Predicates/Quine X 104 Apparent Quantification/Quine: Apparent values of the new quantifiable variables " p", " q ", etc.: truth values - then sentences are exceptionally names of these apparent objects - we can quantify over apparent objects - apparent objects arise from context definition. >Objects/Quine Lauener XI 38 Quantification/Lauener/(s): truth values can only be attributed to quantified sentences. >Truth Value/Quine |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Schiffer Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. If John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is wrong: I 138 either that or the alleged quantification for belief objects is not what it appears to be in the Quine's eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. I 235 Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer. E.g. (c) There is something that Mother Teresa, (namely modesty) is true because a substitution instance of "Mother Teresa X" is true, namely (b): Mother Teresa has the property to be modest. ontological commitment: at substitutional quantification: are only those of the true substitution instances. Universals/Quine: (On what there is, 1953, 10): it is misleading to say that red houses, red roses and red sunsets have something in common. SchifferVsQuine: for whom these everyday speech would it misleading? One can therefore say something true, assuming substitutional quantification. Similarly E.g. "there is a chance that you will win". there are/exist/substitutional quantification/substitutional quantification/Lycan: (1979): Allowed e.g. "There are many things that do not exist". E.g. Loch Ness monster, etc. Properties/Schiffer: in most books of Non-Platonists there is quantification over properties. ((s)> Second order Logic). Quine himself gives an e.g. Properties/Attribute/Existence/"There is"/quantification/second order logic/Schiffer: Quine 1966, p 164): "is valid" is a verb that can be appended to the name of a sentence, and expresses an attribute of the designated sentence. I 237 Schiffer: nobody would assume here that Quine hereby makes an ontological commitment to the existence of attributes. Solution: It is "apparent" quantification that is true, if it is understood as a substitutional quantification. |
Stephen Schiffer I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge (MIT) 1987 |
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