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The author or concept searched is found in the following 41 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogies | Kant | Strawson V 102 Analogies of Experience/Kant: We do not find them in the axioms of intuition. "Experiences are only possible with the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions". - Transcendental Aesthetic/Kant: Principles of sensibility a priori. Transcendental Analytic: comprises the deduction of the categories, the schematism and the principles. Strawson V 104 Analogy: Shows how the order of the perceptions must be represented with the terms - Kant brilliantly reduces it on temporal relations - 1. between the objects 2. between the experiences. Strawson V 105 1. Analogy/Kant: the quantum of substance in nature can be neither reduced nor increased. >Substance. V 106 Time/Kant: All determination of time presupposes something permanent. Only space is persistent. Strawson V 107 StrawsonVsKant: That is not a reason for the objective order to be spatial. Strawson V 108 StrawsonVsKant: There is no need for a conservation principle! Only a re-identification principle for loci (objects). - Nowadays: We see that something burns while no substance remains. Strawson V 112 2./3. Analogy/Kant: Question: Could perceptions also have occurred reversely? a) Events: No time indifference b) Object: time difference Strawson V 115 2. Analogy: The order of the sequence is not only necessary, but also specific, bound by our apprehensions. Causality: If the order is necessary, the change itself is necessary. StrawsonvsKant: He unconsciously uses two terms of necessity here: conceptual/causal Strawson V 116/117 3. Analogy/Kant: the interaction of simultaneously existing objects corresponds to a time indifference of perceptions. Strawson: unlike causality. >Causality/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Principles/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Causality | Developmental Psychology | Corr I 171 Causality/developmental psychology/Ackerman: One of the (…) issues to address in terms of the relations between personality traits and intelligence is the direction of causality. Correlational analyses, per se, such as the vast majority of the data reviewed here, do not allow one to pinpoint whether positive aspects of personality have positive influences on intellectual abilities (or negative aspects of personality have negative influences on intellectual abilities), whether high or low intellectual abilities lead to more positive or negative personality patterns, or whether some other variable or variables are responsible for the co-variation of personality traits and intellectual abilities. Some developmental theories (and the few longitudinal studies) provide some theoretical basis for particular patterns of personality (e.g., high levels of Test Anxiety leading to avoidance of situations that might involve evaluation apprehension) leading to lower intellectual abilities over long-term development (see e.g., Sarason 1960)(1). Other theories of adult intellectual development (e.g., Ackerman 1996)(2) suggest that individuals will gravitate toward acquisition of knowledge and skills in domains that are most consonant with their personality patterns and a set of consistent vocational interests (e.g., individuals high on TIE (typical intellectual engagement, see >Intelligence/psychological theories) tending to acquire more general knowledge about the world than individuals low on TIE. 1. Sarason, I. G. 1960. Empirical findings and theoretical problems in the use of anxiety scales, Psychological Bulletin 57: 403–15 2. Ackerman, P. L.1996. A theory of adult intellectual development: process, personality, interests, and knowledge, Intelligence 22: 229–59 Phillip L. Ackerman, “Personality and intelligence”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Consciousness | Deacon | I 438 Consciousness/Brain/Deacon: in the relationship between brain and consciousness, three problems are often treated separately: I 439 The educational problem: how can the separate activities of millions of brain cells produce a coherent subjective experience of the self? >Self, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. 2. Problem of foundation: how is it ensured that our thoughts and words have a connection to the outside world? >World/Thinking, >Foundation. 3. Problem of agency: How do we explain the experience we have in creating and controlling our thoughts and behavior? Cf. >D. Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Brain/Deacon, >Brain States, >Thinking. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Consciousness | Strawson | I 114 Consciousness/Strawson: why do we attribute it to a subject at all? - Why do we always atribute our experiences to the same subject? Descartes: body plays a unique role for everyone. Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 115 Strawson: face experiences depend on three things: 1) whether eyes opened, 2) where directed, 3) position of the body E.g. subject with three bodies: whether eyelids of A and B open irrelevant for whether C can see something. I 119 Possession of my body does not explain my concept of a self. >Body, >Self. I 120f Consciousness/Strawson: Descartes/Wittgenstein: both: attribution to body is a linguistic deception. 1) Descartes: "Person" refers to two very different substances, with types of states which are mutually exclusive. >Descartes, >Person. 2) Wittgenstein: "It thinks". (Strawson: ditto) >Consciousness/Wittgenstein, >Thinking/Wittgenstein. I 127 Consciousness/Self/I/Strawson: attributing states of consciousness and experiences to ourselves is a necessary condition for attributing them also to others. >Intersubjectivity, >Recognition, >Other minds >Community. Basis: notion of a class of predicates which require distinct individuals to whom they can be attributed. >Predicates/Strawson. I 129 Other individuals must be identified +through body, not merely as carriers of consciousness. - But this is not a simple refutation of Descartes, because s already presupposes that I have found a simple relation between my experiences and body M, which I'm still looking for. I 147 Consciousness/Strawson: pointless to speak of a single consciousness. I 171 Consciousness/Strawson: only possible as a secondary, non-basic particular. >Particulars/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Criminal Law | Becker | Parisi I 17 Criminal Law/Gary Becker/Miceli: [there is a] normative analysis [an economic approach to crime control] based on the economic theory of law enforcement as first formalized by Becker (1968)(1) and elaborated on by Polinsky and Shavell (2000(2), 2007(3)), among others. [Becker-Polinsky-Shavell, BPS model]. Parisi I 18 1) (...) the BPS model says that the optimal sanction, whether a fine or imprisonment, should be maximal. The reason this is true for a fine is clear: offenders only care about the expected sanction, pf, and since it is costly to raise the probability of apprehension, p, but not the fine, f, it is cost-minimizing to raise the fine as much as possible (up to the offender’s wealth) before raising the probability. Less obviously, when the sanction is prison only, the optimal prison term should also be maximal. Intuitively, expected costs can be lowered by increasing the prison term and lowering the probability of apprehension proportionally (thereby holding deterrence fixed) because the punishment, although costly, is imposed less often. In terms of actual punishment policy, however, it is clear that fines and prison terms are not set at their maximal levels for most crimes. >Jurisdiction, >Jurisprudence. In this sense, the model is not descriptive of actual legal practice. 2) (...) the BPS model predicts that imprisonment should only be used after fines have been used up to the maximum extent possible (for example, up to the offender’s wealth), and only then if additional deterrence is cost-justified. Again, the logic is clear: fines are costless to increase while prison is costly, so it is optimal to exhaust the costless form of punishment first. 1. Becker, Gary (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217. 2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2000). “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law.” Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45–76. 3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2007). “The Theory of Public Law Enforcement,” in A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, 403–454. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Criminal Law | Economic Theories | Parisi I 17 Criminal Law/economc theories/Miceli: [there is a] normative analysis [an economic approach to crime control] based on the economic theory of law enforcement as first formalized by Becker (1968)(1) and elaborated on by Polinsky and Shavell (2000(2), 2007(3)), among others. [Becker-Polinsky-Shavell, BPS model]. The economic approach to crime control is based on the assumption that rational offenders decide whether or not to commit an illegal act by comparing the dollar value of the gains from the act to the expected cost, which is equal to the magnitude of the sanction multiplied by the probability of apprehension and conviction. Cf. Hand test: >Tort law/Learned Hand. BPS model: Given the goal of deterrence, the optimal law enforcement policy prescribed by the BPS model involves choosing the probability of apprehension, the Parisi I 18 type of criminal sanction (a fine and/or prison), and its magnitude, to minimize the overall cost of crime. The standard BPS model asserts that efficiency is the (primary) norm for deriving the optimal enforcement policy. 1) (...) the BPS model says that the optimal sanction, whether a fine or imprisonment, should be maximal. The reason this is true for a fine is clear: offenders only care about the expected sanction, pf, and since it is costly to raise the probability of apprehension, p, but not the fine, f, it is cost-minimizing to raise the fine as much as possible (up to the offender’s wealth) before raising the probability. Less obviously, when the sanction is prison only, the optimal prison term should also be maximal. Intuitively, expected costs can be lowered by increasing the prison term and lowering the probability of apprehension proportionally (thereby holding deterrence fixed) because the punishment, although costly, is imposed less often. In terms of actual punishment policy, however, it is clear that fines and prison terms are not set at their maximal levels for most crimes. In this sense, the model is not descriptive of actual legal practice. 2) (...) the BPS model predicts that imprisonment should only be used after fines have been used up to the maximum extent possible (for example, up to the offender’s wealth), and only then if additional deterrence is cost-justified. Again, the logic is clear: fines are costless to increase while prison is costly, so it is optimal to exhaust the costless form of punishment first. Norms/efficiency: The reason for both of these divergences of practice from theory is almost certainly due to the importance of norms besides efficiency, such as fairness or equal treatment, that society deems relevant for the determination of optimal criminal punishment.* Equality/practise/society: (...) the idea of sentencing poor defendants to lengthier prison terms than wealthy defendants for the same crime would strike many as unacceptable (if not unconstitutional) because it would appear that the wealthy were being allowed to buy their way out of prison (Lott, 1987)(5). Society therefore apparently tolerates a costlier punishment policy for the sake of more equal treatment of offenders. >Crime/Economic theories. * See, for example, Miceli (1991)(4) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000)(2). 1. Becker, Gary (1968). “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217. 2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2000). “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law.” Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45–76. 3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell (2007). “The Theory of Public Law Enforcement,” in A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, 403–454. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 4.Miceli 1991 5. Lott, John (1987). “Should the Wealthy Be Able to ‘Buy Justice’”? Journal of Political Economy 95: 1307–1316. Miceli, Thomas J. „Economic Models of Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Dissonance Theory | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 53 Dissonance theory/psychological theories: Aronson and Mills (1959)(1) systematically varied how onerous an initiation process was in order to join a group. They predicted and found that people liked the group better the more they suffered to join it. In later research, Aronson and Carlsmith (1962)(2) showed that the effects of threats and punishments offered to children for refraining from behaving in a desired activity were also governed by the same dissonance rules. When children were warned not to play with an attractive toy and did not play with this toy, they showed more permanent attitude change by devaluing the attractive toy if they received a lower rather than higher threat. The higher the threat, the less effective was the threat on their attitudes. These studies focused on hedonic rewards and reinforcements to make dissonance theory predictions that seemed to defy common wisdom and the reinforcement notions that underlay them. >Cognitive Dissonance/Festinger. VsDissonance theory: Some flaws in the dissonance theory were found by Chapanis and Chapanis 1964(3) and Rosenberg 1965(4). The theory has been restored and broadened by Linder et al. (1967)(5). >Cognitive Dissonance/psychological theories, >Group behavior, >Groupthink, >Group cohesion. 1. Aronson, E. and Mills, J. (1959) ‘The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59: 177–81. 2. Aronson, E. and Carlsmith, J.M. (1962) ‘The effect of the severity of threat on the devaluation of forbidden behavior’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66: 584–8. 3. Chapanis, N.P. and Chapanis, A. (1964) ‘Cognitive dissonance’, Psychological Bulletin, 61: 1–22. 4 Rosenberg, M.J. (1965) ‘When dissonance fails: On eliminating evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1: 28–42. 5. Linder, D.E., Cooper, J. and Jones, E.E. (1967) ‘Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6: 245–54. Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Dissonance Theory | Social Psychology | Haslam I 53 Dissonance theory/social psychology: Aronson and Mills (1959)(1) systematically varied how onerous an initiation process was in order to join a group. They predicted and found that people liked the group better the more they suffered to join it. In later research, Aronson and Carlsmith (1962)(2) showed that the effects of threats and punishments offered to children for refraining from behaving in a desired activity were also governed by the same dissonance rules. When children were warned not to play with an attractive toy and did not play with this toy, they showed more permanent attitude change by devaluing the attractive toy if they received a lower rather than higher threat. The higher the threat, the less effective was the threat on their attitudes. These studies focused on hedonic rewards and reinforcements to make dissonance theory predictions that seemed to defy common wisdom and the reinforcement notions that underlay them. >Cognitive Dissonance/Festinger. VsDissonance theory: Some flaws in the dissonance theory were found by Chapanis and Chapanis 1964(3) and Rosenberg 1965(4). The theory has been restored and broadened by Linder et al. (1967)(5). >Cognitive Dissonance/psychological theories. 1. Aronson, E. and Mills, J. (1959) ‘The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59: 177–81. 2. Aronson, E. and Carlsmith, J.M. (1962) ‘The effect of the severity of threat on the devaluation of forbidden behavior’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66: 584–8. 3. Chapanis, N.P. and Chapanis, A. (1964) ‘Cognitive dissonance’, Psychological Bulletin, 61: 1–22. 4 Rosenberg, M.J. (1965) ‘When dissonance fails: On eliminating evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1: 28–42. 5. Linder, D.E., Cooper, J. and Jones, E.E. (1967) ‘Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6: 245–54. Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Experience | Kant | I 93 Experience/Kant: "the conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience - and therefore have objective validity in synthetic a priori judgments". >Apperception, >apprehension, >subject/Kant. --- Strawson V 19 Objects/Kant: objects are essentially spatial - experience: is essentially temporal. Strawson V 78 Experience/Kant: cannot be completely deviating due to the tautology that experiences and ideas, to belong to a single consciousness, must satisfy the conditions that belong to a single consciousness. Strawson V 90 Experience/Kant/Strawson: must leave room for the idea of the experience itself. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Explanation | Forbes | Haslam I 252 Explanation/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: Thesis: we proposed an integrated process model of stereotype threat whereby priming stereotype threat elicits a cascade of stress-based physiological, negative appraisal, self-regulatory and performance-monitoring processes as people try to make sense of and cope with this threat to their identity (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Manipulations of stereotype threat impair working memory (Schmader and Johns, 2003)(2), impair performance on working- memory-intensive tasks (Beilock et al., 2007)(3), and have their strongest effects on those with lower working-memory capacity (Régner et al., 2010)(4). Furthermore, although the original studies did not find clear evidence of increased anxiety under stereotype threat, subsequent research has established that it increases physiological biomarkers of stress including higher blood pressure (Blascovich, et al., 2001)(5) and skin conductance (Osborne, 2006(6), 2007(7)). This autonomic stress response is coupled with negative appraisal processes as stereotype-threatened individuals sometimes report heightened levels of explicit (Spencer et al., 1999)(8) and implicit anxiety (Johns et aL, 2008(9); Bosson et al., 2004(10)), negative expectations (Sekaquaptewa et al., 2007(10); Stangor et al., 1998(12)), feelings of dejection (Keller and Dauenheimer, 2003)(13), and task-related worries (Beilock et al., 2007(3); Cadinu et al., 2005(14)). >Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader, >Stereotype threat/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Schmader, T. and Johns, M. (2003) ‘Converging evidence that stereotype threat reduces working memory capacity’,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85: 440—52. 3. Beilock, S.L., Rydell, R.J. and McConnell, A.R. (2007) ‘Stereotype threat and working memory: Mechanisms, alleviation, and spillover’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136(2): 256-76 4. Régner, I., Smeding, A., Gimmig, D., Thinus-Blanc, C., Monteil,J. and Huguet, P. (2010) ‘Individual differences in working memory moderate stereotype-threat effects’, Psychological Science, 21: 1646—8. 5. Blascovich,J., Spencer, S.J., Quinn, D. and Steele, C. (2001) ‘African Americans and high blood pressure: The role of stereotype threat’, Psychological Science, 12: 22 5—9. 6. Osborne,J.W. (2006) ‘Gender, stereotype threat and anxiety: Psychophysiological and cognitive evidence’, Journal of Research in Educational Psychology, 8: 109—3 8. 7. Osborne, J.W. (2007) ‘Linking stereotype threat and anxiety’, Educational Psychology, 27: 135—54. 8. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 9. Johns, M., Inzucht, M. and Schmader, T. (2008) Stereotype threat and executive resource depletion: Examining the influence of emotion regulation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137: 691—705. 10. Sekaquaptewa, D., Waidman, A. and Thompson, M. (2007) So1o status and self-construal: Being distinctive influences racial self-construal and performance apprehension in African American women’, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 13:321— 7. 11. Stangor, C., Carr, C. and Kiang, L. (1998) ‘Activating stereotypes undermines task performance expectations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75: 1 191—7. 13. Keller, J. and Dauenheimer, D. (2003) 1Stereotype threat in the classroom: Dejection mediates the disrupting threat effect on womens math performance’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29: 371—81. 14. Cadinu, M., Maass, A., Rosabianca, A. and Kiesner,J. (2005) Why do women underperform under stereotype threat?’, Psychological Science, 16: 5 72—8. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Explanation | Schmader | Haslam I 252 Explanation/stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: Thesis: we proposed an integrated process model of stereotype threat whereby priming stereotype threat elicits a cascade of stress-based physiological, negative appraisal, self-regulatory and performance-monitoring processes as people try to make sense of and cope with this threat to their identity (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Manipulations of stereotype threat impair working memory (Schmader and Johns, 2003)(2), impair performance on working- memory-intensive tasks (Beilock et al., 2007)(3), and have their strongest effects on those with lower working-memory capacity (Régner et al., 2010)(4). Furthermore, although the original studies did not find clear evidence of increased anxiety under stereotype threat, subsequent research has established that it increases physiological biomarkers of stress including higher blood pressure (Blascovich, et al., 2001)(5) and skin conductance (Osborne, 2006(6), 2007(7)). This autonomic stress response is coupled with negative appraisal processes as stereotype-threatened individuals sometimes report heightened levels of explicit (Spencer et al., 1999)(8) and implicit anxiety (Johns et aL, 2008(9); Bosson et al., 2004(10)), negative expectations (Sekaquaptewa et al., 2007(10); Stangor et al., 1998(12)), feelings of dejection (Keller and Dauenheimer, 2003)(13), and task-related worries (Beilock et al., 2007(3); Cadinu et al., 2005(14)). >Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader, >Stereotype threat/Psychological theories, >Stereotypes/Social psychology. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Schmader, T. and Johns, M. (2003) ‘Converging evidence that stereotype threat reduces working memory capacity’,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85: 440—52. 3. Beilock, S.L., Rydell, R.J. and McConnell, A.R. (2007) ‘Stereotype threat and working memory: Mechanisms, alleviation, and spillover’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136(2): 256-76 4. Régner, I., Smeding, A., Gimmig, D., Thinus-Blanc, C., Monteil,J. and Huguet, P. (2010) ‘Individual differences in working memory moderate stereotype-threat effects’, Psychological Science, 21: 1646—8. 5. Blascovich,J., Spencer, S.J., Quinn, D. and Steele, C. (2001) ‘African Americans and high blood pressure: The role of stereotype threat’, Psychological Science, 12: 22 5—9. 6. Osborne,J.W. (2006) ‘Gender, stereotype threat and anxiety: Psychophysiological and cognitive evidence’, Journal of Research in Educational Psychology, 8: 109—3 8. 7. Osborne, J.W. (2007) ‘Linking stereotype threat and anxiety’, Educational Psychology, 27: 135—54. 8. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28. 9. Johns, M., Inzucht, M. and Schmader, T. (2008) Stereotype threat and executive resource depletion: Examining the influence of emotion regulation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137: 691—705. 10. Sekaquaptewa, D., Waidman, A. and Thompson, M. (2007) So1o status and self-construal: Being distinctive influences racial self-construal and performance apprehension in African American women’, Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 13:321— 7. 11. Stangor, C., Carr, C. and Kiang, L. (1998) ‘Activating stereotypes undermines task performance expectations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75: 1 191—7. 13. Keller, J. and Dauenheimer, D. (2003) 1Stereotype threat in the classroom: Dejection mediates the disrupting threat effect on womens math performance’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29: 371—81. 14. Cadinu, M., Maass, A., Rosabianca, A. and Kiesner,J. (2005) Why do women underperform under stereotype threat?’, Psychological Science, 16: 5 72—8. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| I Think (Ich denke) | Castaneda | Frank I 171 "I think," / Castaneda: "I think" has no content, only a relation of identity. >Cogito, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I Think (Ich denke) | Rorty | IV 66 "I think"/"ich denke"/Kant/Rorty: the "i think" is merely a process - it means to have a belief or a desire automatically means to have many. >I think/Kant. IV 67 No "synthesis", but simply the fact that they belong to the same network. >Cogito, >Synthesis, >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| I Think (Ich denke) | Strawson | I 104 I think/Kant/Strawson: Kant was anxious that the analytic unity of apperception itself has no power of identity and. StrawsonVsKant: Kant could have left it out, "something is thought." >cogito, >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| I, Ego, Self | Chalmers | I 87 I/Chalmers: after I have determined that the world is much bigger than I initially thought, I sort the original experiences as my own. Cf. >apprehension, >personal identity, cf. >I/Kant. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| I, Ego, Self | Frith | I 101 I/consciousness/Frith: Problem: we are good at grasping, but we know very little about the distribution of our body parts in space. Knowing what we know about it is sometimes wrong: >false knowledge. Higher level: here, knowledge is stored about the time and type of change. Next level: is the knowledge that I am the acting person. Even here I can be wrong. >Self, >Subject, >Actions, >Authorship, >Intentionality, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. I 224 I/self/Frith: I experience myself as an island of stability in a constantly changing world. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| I, Ego, Self | McGinn | I 79 f I/McGinn: can be understood as that which gives unity to the states of consciousness. Cf. >apprehension. Question: What is the nature of this unit, by what get my states of consciousness mine and yours yours? The philosophical problem is that we cannot specify what is actually a self. >Self. I 81f I/self/McGinn: is excluded from the area of uncomplicated space filling by the close relationship with the consciousness. Through that the relationship with the body gets problematic. Self/I/McGinn: we do not have sensibility, with respect to which the selves (immediately) present themselves separately from each other. E.g. I can see that your body is different from the other, but I cannot see in the same way that you are different from it. Confidence/I/McGinn: another difficulty: the I is also systematically transcendent in the acts of self-consciousness. The thinking instance acts as a subject and can never merely be the object. So even if the reflective I and the reflected I are the same, I can never resign. But just in my being a subject is my nature. There is also no guarantee that the subject retains its essential characteristics, when it turns into the object. ... Therefore we cannot perceive it as something that belongs to the same area as the (mereological) sum of the parts of the body, as if it was composed in an understandable way of the same material as the body. (CALM: Combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings). >Terminology/McGinn. I 96f I/McGinn: The I is not composed of its mental states. In some way the I transcended its own mental states. >Consciousness, >Mind, >Mental states. But then there must be something that triggers this ontological transition. So instructions must be encoded in the genes for the production of I from living cell tissue. It may be that our concept of the person is an indefinable analytical basic concept, but the things themselves need something like an inner natural structure and a construction method. Because there can be no difference in terms of person-likeness, which would not be based on physical difference . I 104 I/consciousness/Intention/McGinn: are inextricably linked to a formidable tradition. The Self is seen as the origin of intention, the states of consciousness as the main vehicles of intention. McGinnVsTradition: but to realize that correlations exist, you do not have to accept an indissoluble link. --- II 181 I/self/McGinn: E.g. Assuming aliens change our nature and turn us into couch potatoes, to which the planet does not matter. We only have a preference for soap operas. Question: Can we be sure, that we are still ourselves? Did the aliens not simply replace you by themselves? Question: When is a cluster of cells an I? >Personality. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Nozick | II 79 I/use/Nozick: all semantic facts about what the use of "I" refers to, state necessity de dicto, not de re. Cf. >de re, >Semantic facts, >Use, >Mention, >I, Ego, Self, >Reference, >Index words, >Indexicality. II 91 I/synthesis/Nozick: Problem: how do we know that not in any moment a new I is synthesized? Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. II 104 I/unit/self/Nozick: unit is not about the act, which could have produced something else - but as a unified whole the I constitutes itself as capable of having other bodily parts or to lose memories (perhaps all). >I/Kant, >I/Fichte, >Memory, >Subject, >Self. II 105 I/self: is projected into the future, as comprising certain stages - after the scheme of the next successor the self-concept will be a listing and weighting of dimensions - but no metric (more Next are possible). >Nearest Successor/Nozick, >Terminology/Nozick, >Similarity Metrics. Nozick: Thesis: we are choosing partially by ourselves. II 112 I/Nozick: physical descriptions exclude me, because they are not reflexive. >Description. II 113 Self/I/Part/Whole/Nozick: a) self as the next successor of each act of synthesis, or b) rather an underlying, enduring self: then rather a whole, less limitations, more unit. >Castaneda: volatile egos. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Pauen | Pauen I 239 ff I, Ego, Self/empirical I/Pauen: entity of the self-attribution, not homogeneous. I/Kenny: is a "philosophical nonsense", misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun. I/Minsky: variety of agents, "only useful for the attribution of actions ". >M. Minsky, >A. Kenny, >I, Ego Self/Kant. I 242 Dennett: apparently direct everyday perception in reality complex interpretation and building of hypotheses. - "I is not independent" opinions and wishes are complexes of memes. >Memes, >I, Ego, Self/Dennett, >D. Dennett, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Intentionality. I/Susan Blackmore: no origin of wishes, but a function of the bundling. Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception, cf. >I, Ego, Self/Kant. I 246 I/Metzinger/Pauen: (following Johnson-Laird): mental models as the basis of our representation of reality. - Top model of the hierarchy: the "reality model". Subjectivity is attributed to the self-model, embedded in the model of reality. - The model is transparent in terms of content, but not its mechanisms. "Self"/Metzinger: the self is a fiction. >Th. Metzinger, >Self, >Reality, >Models, >Representation. I 248 I/Fichte/Pauen: ... perpetual change - just pictures, no sense. >I/Fichte, >J.G. Fichte. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Russell | McGinn I 86f Russell: characterizes "I as a number of classes of mental particulars" (as opposed to "needlepoint-I"). The temporal identity then boils down to saying that there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the ego. The individual states of a person are so connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. >Temporal identity, >Memory, >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Strawson | I 123 Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs) Representative of this doctrine: "OP" (our philosopher). Descartes: thesis: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it. Strason: it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing. Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing". Difference: body has experience causally, contingently. I 124 "Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong). Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject. StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term. I 125 Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that. StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I". >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 126 From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept. Cf. >Self-consciousness/Strawson, >self-identification/Strawson, >self-ascription/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Ideas | Kant | Strawson V 190 Dynamic idea/Kant: E.g. un-caused cause - Ideal of pure reason. V 191 Ideas of Reason/Kant: are projection of goals, wise author, final unit - prerequisite of knowledge, not knowledge. --- Vaihinger I 269 Ideas/Kant/Vaihinger: are "regulative principles of pure reason" - neither inside nor outside the experience - they are "just rules" for the mind - they show it imaginary points of reference. Vaihinger I 273 Ideas (e.g. God) are not inscrutable - because they are in the nature of reason. Vaihinger I 275 Idea/Kant/Vaihinger: not merely deception - but expedient - proof of expediency: the deduction. Vaihinger I 280 Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only take the idea of such a (highest) being as a basis, to consider the phenomena to be systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. >Apprehension/Kant. Vaihinger I 281 Rational idea/Kant/Vaihinger: rational ideas are not hypotheses - otherwise I would pledge myself thereby already to know about the nature of a cause of the world and another world, than I could really proof. Ideas/Kant: reason terms without object. Vaihinger I 301 Ideas/Kant/Vaihinger: E.g. people - e.g. God - (mere ideas) - (s.o.) things in themselves - freedom. >God/Kant, >Freedom/Kant. --- Vendler I 251 Regulative ideas/Kant: (E.g. language and thought themselves) can never lead to synthetic propositions a priori. --- Adorno XIII 66 Ideas/Kant/Adorno: Ideas such as God, freedom, and immortality are not only regulative ideas to which our thinking is directed, but terms which are necessary because, without them, something like proper action cannot be conceived. >Regulative ideas. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Identification | Millikan | I 195 Identity/Equation/Equality/Identification/Millikan: provisionally, it will not be wrong to say that two external terms are translated into the same inner term. I 239 Identification/Individuation/Millikan: Problem: the model of the act of identifying the real value of an intentional icon that I have offered so far was not adequate. False: to assume that an external concept is translated into an inner expression with the same meaning. Problem: how is the inner icon to be identified? (Regress). Knowledge/Thinking/Millikan: Problem: how can I then know myself what I think, or what I have in the head or the body? Or how is it for me to know that? ((s) > subjectivity). E.g. What is the difference between having a thought and distributing adrenaline? But this is not about the mystery of consciousness. Identification/Millikan: Let us describe identification here in a naturalistic vocabulary. I 240 Perception/Apprehension/Identification/Identify/Realism/Millikan: For the realist, thinking must be based on direct apprehension (perception). Thereby, a thing is presented directly, or a direct apprehension of the nature of the thing is presented to the mind, e.g. a similarity (likeness, equality). Identification/Millikan: identification happens whenever perceptions of different senses represent something, represent something common, and thus an action is controlled. E.g. you may have to see something and at the same time feel the same when you tie your shoes. This is effective precisely because certain aspects of seeing and touching overlap in real value. And this usually happens without the mediation of thinking. Identification/Millikan: E.g. identification is also necessary, if one applies earlier learned knowledge. I 241 And even if you do not have an explicit memory. Learning/Millikan: on the other hand, it seems plausible that much of the learning happens below the threshold of conscious perception and does not require the formation of internal representations ((s) and thus no identification). >Perception. Transitivity: also requires identification: e.g "x is φer than y and y is φer than z, so x is φer than z". Plan: needs identification: I must identify the object of my perception with the object of my intentions. >Intention, >Intentionality. I 242 Intention/desire/belief/conviction: the formation of an intention based on desires requires identification. Identification/logical form/Millikan: identification, in general: requires at least two intentional icons, one element of which has the same real value as one element of the other. These icons must then be used together. Then it must be referred to the fact that the real value of these elements is the same. I 243 Identification/Millikan: when an external term is translated into an inner term here, then there is the problem: what is, if the inner representation is never activated in a practical action? Were internal and external terms then identified? In any case, there must be a schema of same/different in the translation. I 244 Identification/Millikan: we can call a secondary type of identification the repetition of an inner term. (Definition secondary identification). New expression/introduction: the coining of a new term, can be provisionally called identification. I 249 Identification/Millikan: what purpose does it normally serve? Thesis: A) it is supposed to help the application of earlier knowledge on to a present case. B) it should bring together experiences that have been conveyed through a medium with experiences from another medium. E.g. Seeing and Language. Identity/Relation/Millikan: then identification must be described as essentially relational! Classical realism cannot do this. Identification/Classical Realism/Millikan: assumes that the identification of the object is involved in the thinking of it. And since thinking of an object is a momentary act, which has nothing to do with other acts, the grasping of an object under one aspect and that under another aspect, cannot at all be brought together! E.g. Knowing how Kant lived in Koenigsberg has nothing to do with knowing that he was a philosopher. I 250 Recognition/Classical Realism/Millikan: recognizing the object as the same is another performance; it has nothing to do with the repeated thought of the object. >Recognition, >Realism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Knowledge | Hume | Stroud I 105f Knowledge/proof of existence/existence/Hume/Stroud: there are two principles: 1. No one knows of the existence of something when it is not perceived directly by someone > Apprehension: is unordered or the person knows what he/she has perceived directly, is a sign of the existence of this thing. 2. No one can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she has not perceived these two things (thing and sign) directly. MooreVsHume: both principles are wrong: e.g. I know that this pencil exists. According to Hume I could not know that, so they are wrong. This is a reductio ad absurdum. StroudVsMoore: Hume's principles are valid. >Principles/Hume. Moore: for him it is relevant what is safe, the pencil or the principles. Skepticism/Stroud/(s): but skepticism is not a question of certainty. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Memory | Kant | Adorno XIII 119 Memory/recognition/Kant/Adorno: both concepts are distinguished in the second and third stage of the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding: Memory, reproduction in the imagination, denotes the simple ability to visualize the non-present. Recognition: for this, the recognition takes place when this reproduced is identified as what it has been. "I think"/Kant/Adorno: is now nothing more than the unity that is to rule between these temporal horizons or temporal moments (...). >I, Ego, Self/Kant, >Subject/Kant, >Person/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Metaphors | Ricoeur | II 46 Metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) the relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary work as a whole. >Connotation/Ricoeur. II 47 The theory of metaphor comes down to us from the ancient rhetoricians, but this theory will not fulfill the role we expect of it without one important revision. This revision, briefly stated, shifts the problem of metaphor from the semantics of the word to the semantics of the sentence. >Rhetoric/Ricoeur. II 49 Metaphor/Tradition: (1) Metaphor is a trope, a figure of discourse that concerns denomination. (2) It represents the extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of words. (3) The reason for this deviation is resemblance. (4) The function of resemblance is to ground the substitution of the figurative meaning of a word in place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in the same place. (5) Hence the substituted signification does not represent any semantic innovation. We can translate a metaphor, i.e., replace the literal meaning for which the figurative word is a substitute. In effect, substitution plus restitution equals zero. (6) Since it does not represent a semantic innovation, a metaphor does not furnish any new information about reality. This is why it can be counted as one of the emotive functions of discourse. I.A. RichardsVsTradition/Ricoeur: The first presupposition [that no new information is involved] to be rejected is that a metaphor is simply an accident of denomination, a displacement in the signification of words. With this presupposition classical rhetoric limited itself to the description of an effect of meaning that is really the result of the impact on the word of a production of meaning that takes place at the level of a complete utterance or sentence. II 50 Ricoeur: The metaphor is the result of the tension between two terms in a metaphorical utterance. (...) [this] tension in a metaphorical utterance is really not something that occurs between two terms in the utterance, but rather between two opposed interpretations of the utterance. The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of self-destruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal interpretation would be literally nonsensical. II 51 Resemblence/Tradition: It is now possible to return to the third presupposition of the classical rhetorical conception of metaphor, the role of resemblance. This has often been misunderstood. Often it has been reduced to the role of images in poetic discourse, so that for many critics, especially the older ones, studying an author‘s metaphors meant discussing the nomenclature of the images used to illustrate his ideas. RicoeurVsTradition: But if metaphor does not consist in clothing an idea in an image, if it consists instead in reducing the shock engendered by two incompatible ideas, then it is in the reduction of this gap or difference that resemblance plays a role. What is at stake in a metaphorical utterance, in other words, is the appearance of kinship where ordinary vision does not perceive any relationship. Trope/Tradition: For classical rhetoric (...) a trope was the simple substitution of one word for another. But substitution is a sterile operation, whereas in a live metaphor the tension [is] between the words (...). II 52 RicoeurVsTradition: within a tension theory of metaphor, however, such as we are here opposing to a substitution theory, a new signification emerges, which embraces the whole sentence. In this sense, a metaphor is an instantaneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no status in already established language and which only exists because of the attribution of an unusual or an unexpected predicate. Metaphor therefore is more like the resolution of an enigma than a simple association based on resemblance; it is constituted by the resolution of a semantic dissonance. Two conclusions: 1. Real metaphors are not translatable. 2. A metaphor is not anornament of discourse. It has more than an emotive value because II 53 it offers new information. >Symbol/Ricoeur. II 66 Metaphor/model/Max Black/Ricoeur: The theory of metaphor can (...) be extended in a third way in the direction of the most specific traits of symbols. Numerous authors have remarked upon the kinship between metaphors and models. This kinship plays a decisive role, for example, in the work of Max Black, which is even entitled Models and Metaphors .(1) And from his side, the English theologian Ian Ramsey has attempted to elucidate the function of religious language by revising Max Black's theory in an appropriate fashion.(2) Such a rapprochement between models and metaphors allows us to develop the theory of metaphor in a direction (...) of the referential dimension. II 67 Ricoeur: Let us apply this concept of model to metaphor. The guideline here is the relation between the two notions of a heuristic fiction and the redescription that occurs through the transference of this fiction to reality. It is this double movement that we also find in metaphor, for "a memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other. . . Thanks to this detour through the heuristic fiction we perceive new connections among things. The basis of this transfer is the presumed isomorphism between the model and its domain of application. It is this isomorphism that legitimates the "analogical transfer of a vocabulary" and that allows a metaphor to function like a model and "reveal new relationships“.(3) II 68 In the case of metaphor, [the] redescription is guided by the interplay between differences and resemblances that gives rise to the tension at the level of the utterance. It is precisely from this tensive apprehension that a new vision of reality springs forth, which ordinary vision resists because it is attached to the ordinary use of words. The eclipse of the objective, manipulable world thus makes way for the revelation of a new dimension of reality and truth. Copula/metaphor/Ricoeur: [in the metaphor] „is" signifies both is and is not. The literal "is" is overturned by the absurdity and surmounted by a metaphorical "is" equivaThus poetic language does not tell how things literally are, but what they are like. ((s) DavidsonVsRicoeur: cf. Metaphor/Davidson). Symbol/metaphor/Ricoeur: (...) we must accept two contrary propositions concerning the relationship between metaphors and symbols. On one side, there is more in the metaphor than in the symbol; on the other side, there is more in the symbol than in the metaphor. >Symbol/Ricoeur. 1. Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, 1962. Cornell University Press. 2. lan Ramsey, Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Models for Divine Activity (London: S.C.M. Press, 1973); Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957). 3. Max Black op. cit. P. 238. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Person | Nagel | III 105 Identity/person/personal identity/temporal/objectivity/subjectivity/Nagel: underlying problem: even if any set of conditions is met, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject. >Personal identity, >Identity/Henrich, >Subject. Even a metaphysical ego raises the question again - when temporal identity is only to be guaranteed by my metaphysical ego, this cannot not be the individual that guarantees my personal identity. >Temporal identity, >Individual, >Metaphysical I, cf. >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Person | Russell | Geach I 314 Definition thing/Definition person/Russell: (logical atomism): is a set of classes of particulars, and therefore a logical fiction - "Real things only last a very short time" - GeachVs: here he tried to apply two theories of classes at once: 1. the "no-classes-theory" that classes are only fictions - 2. the "composition theory": that classes are composed of their elements. >Identity, >Memory, cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Propositional Knowledge | Rorty | I 165 Propositional Knowledge/Insight/KantVsLocke/Rorty: Error: knowledge after the model of vision - confusion of the "succession of apprehensions with the apprehension of a succession": E.g. objects and properties take turns to perceive instead of the features typical of an object. False: to want to reduce "Knowing that" to the "knowledge of". - ((s)> Propositional Knowledge). Object/Kant: is always the result of a >synthesis. See also >apprehension, >Knowing how. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reason | Idealism | Adorno XIII 130 Reason/idealism/Adorno: the first transformation of the concept of reason in idealism had meant that the contents of consciousness were taken into reason, but reflected in the sense that they should be... XIII 131 ...moments of consciousness themselves. That is, that the contents are mediated in themselves through subjectivity. >Content, >Consciousness, >Identity/Idealism, >Subjectivity, >Subject/Idealism. Reason/mind/Kant/Adorno: reason is then the ability to create unity in the manifoldness - according to laws. >Laws, >Unity and multiplicity, >Unification, >Order, >Unity, >Apprehension, >Apperception. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Recognition | Kant | Strawson V 86 Recognition/Kant: is possible only because of the possibility to relate different experiences to a subject. >Apperception, >apprehension, >Subject/Kant, >Experience/Kant. Strawson: then there are also objects (accusatives) that are not independent of experiences - E.g. titillation. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Self | Sartre | Rorty VI 155 Self/UI /Sartre/Rorty: For Sartre the self has no lasting, intrinsic core. - It is changing. - There is no "real self" no "en soi" - (Rorty pro). >I, Ego, >Self, >Subject, cf. >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant, >Subject/Foucault. |
Sart I J.-P. Sartre Being and Nothingness 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Self- Consciousness | Hegel | Gadamer I 256 Self-Consciousness/Hegel/Gadamer: [Hegel had already developed] the structural correspondence between life and self-consciousness in the "Phenomenology" (...). Gadamer I 257 The fundamental fact of being alive is assimilation. The distinction is therefore at the same time a non-distinction. The foreign is appropriated. This structure of the liveliness has (...) its counterpart in the essence of self-consciousness. Its being consists in the fact that it knows how to make everything and anything the object of its knowledge and yet knows itself in everything and everyone that knows it. Thus, as knowledge, it is a "differentiation from itself" and, as self-consciousness, it is at the same time an overlapping, in that it unites itself with itself. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Method/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel, >Reflection/Hegel. Gadamer: Obviously it is more than a mere structural correspondence between life and self-consciousness. Hegel is quite right when he derives self-consciousness dialectically from life. What is alive is in fact never really recognizable to the objective consciousness, the effort of the mind that strives to penetrate the law of phenomena. Life/Hegel: Living things are not of the kind that one could ever come from outside to see them in their liveliness. The only way to grasp liveliness is rather to become aware of it. Hegel alludes to the story of the veiled image of Sais when he describes the inner self-objectivation of life and self-consciousness: "Here the inner sees the inner"(1). Gadamer: It is the way of self-feeling, the inner being of one's own vitality, in which life is experienced alone. Hegel shows how this experience flares up and goes out in the form of desire and satisfaction of desire. This self-consciousness of vitality, in which the liveliness becomes conscious of itself, is admittedly an untrue preform, a lowest form of self-consciousness, provided that the becoming conscious of oneself in desire simultaneously destroys itself through the satisfaction of desire. As untrue as it is to the objective truth, the consciousness of something foreign, it is nevertheless, as the vital feeling, the first truth of self-consciousness. >Subject/Hegel, Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, S. 128 Grenz I 38 Self-Consciousness/Hegel/Gadamer/Grenz: Gadamer draws attention to Hegel's emphasis on the universality of self-consciousness (Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p.19, Hegel Phänomenologie, p. 148). Comparability/Gadamer: comparability of the consciousness is ensured by the universality of the produced things. >Generality, >Consciousness. Höffe I 329 Self-Consciousness/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel extends the debate, which is often conducted in a purely social, legal or state theoretical manner, by three further topics: a) confrontation of humans with themselves, b) confrontation with nature and c) the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. At first, people are not finished subjects, but must first acquire the necessary self-consciousness in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and - the economic with nature. Self-Consciousness/Fight for Recognition: Self-confidence appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and leads, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, to a "fight for life and death". >Master/Slave/Hegel, >Recognition/Hegel. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Subjects | Idealism | Adorno XIII 83 Subject/idealism/Adorno: that, what is not a subject itself has, in principle, a character of incompleteness. Only the subject, which as a thinker of itself believes to be quite certain of an identical, can at all converge. >Whole, >Thinking, >Order, >World/Thinking. Adorno XIII 141 Subject/idealism/dialectics/Adorno: precisely in the radicalized analysis of the concept of the subject itself one encounters its correlative, what it demands according to its own meaning, a non-I which is different from pure unity. This, however, is not a something added from the outside, but the concept of the subject in itself has only one... XIII 142 ...meaning, insofar as it refers to a different meaning from his principle. This is an inner mediation. The two moments are not mutually related to each other, but the analysis of each one in itself points to its opposite as an imitation of a sense. >Mediation. Transcendental subject: therefore, the transcendental subject implies the Kantian "I think that must be able to accompany all my ideas", thus it implies the most formal determination of egoism, a real. >I think, >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Apprehension, >Apperception. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Subjects | Nietzsche | Ries II 75 Subject/Predicate/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: create the agitation of "offender" and "doing".(1) Ries II 97 Subject/NietzscheVsKant: Fear that the subject will prove to be something primarily multifaceted. Ries II 98 Subject/Nietzsche: Expression of our belief in unity. Fiction. (NietzscheVsKant). >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. Ries II 108 Subject/Nietzsche: "I'm early." 1. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, VI. 2. --- Danto III 133 Subject/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's idea of an object is under suspicion, and thus also the idea of a thinking object or subject. Danto III 134 Self/Nietzsche/Danto: The psychological and the grammatical subject are two sides of the same coin. Finally, we believe in our own invention and establish a "self" that is different from "one's" activities and has a causal relationship to them. Because the Ural-Altaic language family possesses a weakly developed subject form, everyone who grew up with such a language will most likely look differently into the world and can be found on other paths than Indo-Germanic or Muslim men.(1) >World/Nietzsche, >World/Thinking/Nietzsche. Danto III 134 I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the I as being, in the I as substance and projects the belief in the I-substance on all things - it creates the term 'thing'... Being is thought of everywhere as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'... (2) >Psychology/Nietzsche, >Self/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S. 29. 2. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 71. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Synthesis | Kant | Danto I 133 Synthetic a priori/Kant: before any exploration of the world recognizable - on this he builds the mere possibility of doing philosophy at all. - Because it is non-empirical- Analytically/Kant: E.g. "Every cause has an effect." - Not analytically: "All events have causes." - It does not belong to the meaning of "event" that it has a cause. - But still synthetically a priori: - E.g. "Every event has a cause". - (Variation of Leibniz's law). - It defines what it means for the universe to be intellectually understandable. >Apperception, >apprehension, >Subject/Kant, >Experience/Kant. --- Danto I 211 Experience/representation/continuity/internalism/Danto: continuity is not given in experience. - Otherwise, there would not be the question of whether existence is continuous. Solution/Kant: mental synthesis. --- Strawson V 26 Synthesis/Kant: the process of production of the unity of experience - there cannot be empirical knowledge of the synthesis - is only obtained through it. V 81 Synthesis/Kant: aware, but not how I appear to myself, but only that I am. - Thinking, not watching. - Kant/Strawson: Kant Synthesis is based on differentiation of the capabilities of sensibility and understanding. - StrawsonVs: We try without them. --- Bubner I 100 Judgment/Synthesis/Kant: the unity of the synthetically summarized gives the questionable relationship of concepts the necessary determinateness. This determinateness also bears the reference to the object, which is always included in the judgment as a knowledge claim. "Synthesis alone is what actually collects the elements into knowledge and unites them to a certain content." This is achieved by the fact that Kant equals (definition) terms with conceptual contents. >Judgment/Kant. --- I 103 Synthesis/Kant: it is originally unified and equally valid for all connections. The reference to the action also seems to answer the question of unity. ((s) because it comes from activity, not from the objects). It contains three moments: 1. the given manifold 2. the connecting 3. the unit There is no independent "unit pole", which, so to speak, appears as one of the many elements next to the connecting elements. The unity is not opposed to the many as an isolated principle. Therefore idealism speaks of the identity of identity and non-identity. --- I 104 Unity/Synthesis/Idealism/Kant: the place of unity can now be designated, it is the pure action-character of the synthesis. This action-character goes beyond all individual connections, preceds all actual combinations, and is never to be exhausted by so many synthetic acts. >Unity/Kant. --- I 108 Synthesis/Vs Kant: his successors have revealed the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this thought chain. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Terminology | Heidegger | Decease: improper form of death (fear of decease, fear of death) Ordinariness: (Average) The starting point for all investigations (from the ontic to the ontological) Fear: Fear of being in the world - Fear of being about the world (can lead to the actual being in the world) - the "what" of fear is "nothing and nowhere" but always "already there" Outstanding: e.g. debt. Death does not stand out, but is always there (factually) Obtaining: Everyday dealing with witness (caution) but also "being of existence to the world" Stock: non-substantiality of a substance, but independence of the existing self Apprehension: Being-character of the ZUHANDENEN, reference, service, usability, ontological determination of being-the inner-worldly being Cogito sum: not "I think" but "I think something" Existence: Being of the human The others: not: "the rest of the rest", but those from which one does not differ usually Ecstasy of temporality: future; past; present ("outside oneself", "actually and for oneself" "on to" "back to" "being met by") End: end of existence not "maturity"; also not "complete" Discovered-ness: does not refer to the existence-like things Determinateness: the totality of existence: anxiety-ready designing itself specifically in terms of guiltiness (not acting!) - Fear-expecting, futile grounding (GRUNDSEIN) of nothingness Openness: situated understanding Evidence: does not open up Existential: concerning the structures of being Existentials: (instead of categories) concerning the existence Existential: concerning the being Factual: always so and so decided Factuality: In fact, in the world, inner-worldly skill (including seclusion and obscurity), "already being there" Fear: (mode of mental state) approaching within the near (fear of everyday things, e.g. danger) - of inner-worldly being Caring: Being-character of being-with consideration, indulgence Birth: existentially the birth has not passed away, and death is not outstanding Speech: isolations of Man Historicity: (actual) »return of the possible« history does not provide a measurement for truth Violence: conquest of being against tendency to obscurity Expecting: improper form of the future (procure) makes the expectation possible Past: as long as existence exists, it has never passed, but has always been Conscience: Creation of the most personal can-being (openness) "good conscience" is not a conscience phenomenon at all Gewissenhabenwollen: existentielles Wählen einer Wahl Entschlossenheit - sich selbst wählen; Übernahme der Gewissenlosigkeit Gewissheit: resultiert aus dem Vorlaufen der Evidenz aus Vorhandenem überlegen Geworfenheit: Tatsache, dass wir uns die Existenz nicht selbst gewählt haben. Geworfenheit des Seins in sein »Da«: »dass es ist« (ohne woher und wohin) Geworfenheit: Tatsache, dass wir uns die Existenz nicht selbst gewählt haben Grund: Boden der bereiteten Möglichkeiten, aus dem man wählen muss Jemeinigkeit: »ich bin«, »du bist« Bedingung der Seinsmodi - eigentlich/uneigentlich, Unmöglichkeit der Vertretung im Tod Kategorien: nur auf Vorhandenes anwendbar »Man«: »Subjekt« der Alltäglichkeit, Daseinsweise der Alltäglichkeit (Existential) Metaphysik HeideggerVsMetaphysik: es gibt grundsätzlich kein »Dahinter« Mitdasein: Dasein wesenhaft Mitdasein Mitsein: existential ontologische Bestimmung des Mitdaseins (Dasein umwillen Anderer) Möglichkeit: steht höher als Wirklichkeit Neugier: Entspringen der Gegenwart (uneigentliche) Form der Zeitigung Nicht: Existentialer Sinn der Geworfenheit Nichtigkeit: nicht auch wählen können (Entwurf, Geworfenheit) - nicht Mangel; gehört zur Möglichkeit eigensten Seinkönnens Ontisch: Frageweise der positiven Wissenschaften, die Existenz betreffend Ontologisch: Frage nach dem Sein es seien den (ursprünglicher) das Existenz Verständnis betreffend Ruf (Gewissensruf): Anruf des Daseins auf sein eigenstes Selbstseinkönnen. Aufruf zum eigenen Schuldigsein (Modus der Rede) sagt nichts aus. »Es ruft« Schicksal: das in der Entschlossenheit liegende fortlaufende Sichüberliefern an den Augenblick Schuldig: Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit (Seinsart des Daseins) ursprünglich erst Verschuldung im alltäglichen; das Sein soll sich aus der Verlorenheit zurückholen Selbstheit: Weise zu existieren, nicht vorhandenes Seiendes Selbstsein: Modifikation des Man Seyn: Schreibweise im Spätwerk, Vs traditionelle Ontologie Situation: Das je in der Entschlossenheit erschlossene Da. (Eigentlich) - (Entschlossenheit bringt das Sein in die Situation) Sorge: Beweisweise des Daseins (Sinn)/ sich vorgenommen sein des Daseins zum Sein können, dass es ist. Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Freiseins Sterben: Dasein stirbt, solange es existiert in der Seinsweise des Verfallens Stimmung: Zurückbringen auf Subjekt/Objekt: bei Heidegger höchstens als Hilfsbegriffe verwendet (statt dessen Dasein und Vorhandensein) Substanz: Existenz ist die Substanz des Menschen Substanzialität: Seinscharakter der Naturdinge Tod: Eigenste, unbezüglichste, unüberholbare Möglichkeit - Eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, als äußerstes Noch nicht immer schon einbezogen Uneigentlich: (Seinsmodus) Verfallenheit, »Unbewusstes« (kein benutzter Begriff) - Alltägliches Dasein (besorgend statt sorgend) Geschäftigkeit, Genussfähigkeit (nicht wertend) Verenden: Tiere verenden, sie sterben nicht Verfallenheit: Zustand des Daseins in der Alltäglichkeit (z. B. dem Gerede glaubend) Verschlossenheit: Geworfenheit, vor die das Dasein eigentlich gebracht werden kann, bleibt verschlossen kein Nichtwissen, sondern sie konstituiert die Faktizität des Daseins Vertretbarkeit: Seinsmöglichkeit des Miteinanderseins, geht nicht im Falle des Todes Vorhandensein: alles andere Sein Vorlaufen: Ermöglichen der Möglichkeit (Möglichkeit der eigentlichen Existenz) Wahrheit: Nichtübereinstimmung, sondern Hervortreten des Verborgenen (Aleithia, Apophansis) »Welt«: ontologisch: Charakter des Daseins selbst - ontologisch: das All des Seienden das innerhalb der Welt - vorhanden sein kann Welt: ontisch: »worin« man lebt (öffentlich und privat) Werden : z. B. Reifen einer Frucht Wiederholung: eigentliches Gewesensein (uneigentliches Vergessen) Zeitigung: kein Nacheinander der Ekstasen; Zukunft nicht später als Gewesenheit, diese nicht früher als Gegenwart Zeitlichkeit: Ursprünglich ontologischer Grund der Existenzialität des Daseins Zirkel: Grundstruktur der Sorge; Zuvor Seiendes in seinem Sein bestimmen müssen und auf diesem Grund die Frage nach dem Sein erst stellen. (Heidegger verwehrt sich gegen den Vorwurf des circulus vitiosus) Zuhandensein: Zeug (was im Besorgen begegnet) Zukunft: eigentlich endlich (gewisse Priorität gegenüber Gegenwart und Gewesenheit) auf sich zu |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Thinking | Danto | I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >I think/Kant. It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind. Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension, >Thinking, >Subject, >I, Ego, Self. I 307 Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined. >Association, >Ideas, >Representation. Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it. >Logical connectives, >Causal relation. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Thinking | Foucault | I 389ff Thinking/Modernity/Foucault: no possible morality, thinking is already a "step out", no more theory. Thinking is a dangerous act, even before it sounds the alarm. (De Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud, Bataille). >Sade, >Nietzsche, >World/thinking, cf. >Laws of thinking. I 396ff Thinking/Modernity/Foucault: in modern thinking an origin can no longer be determined, work, life and language have assumed their own historicity. Man discovers himself only as connected with an already created historicity. He is never a contemporary of the origin that conceals himself. Thinking/Modernity: It closes the great square, by rediscovering the finiteness in the question of the origin: the connection of the positivities with the finiteness, the doubling of the empirical in the transcendental, the constant relation of the cogito to the unthought, the retreat and the return of the origin. I 404ff Thinking/Modernity: It no longer runs alongside the never-ending formation of the difference, but rather to the unveiling of the same which is always to be accomplished. Thought image: in modern thought, the reasons of the history of things and of man's own historicality is the distance that is kept which undermines the same, the deviation that streams it, and collects at the ends of itself. Deep spatiality. This space always allows thinking to think of time and to recognize it as a sequence. >Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Time | Peacocke | I 162 Time / Peacocke: ordering of thoughts of basic for the understanding of time - not vice versa - no underlying date system. Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. E.g. when I remember, that yesterday the interest rates have fallen, then this does not apply because of a property or identity that is about "yesterday". >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hume, D. | Moore Vs Hume, D. | Stroud I 104 Knowledge/Proof of Existence/Existence/Hume/Stroud: two principles: 1. Nobody knows of the existence of anything if he/she has not perceived it directly (apprehended >apprehension: disorderly) or that he/she knows that something he/she has perceived directly is a sign of the existence of that thing. 2. Nobody can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she did not perceive these two things (thing and sign) Stroud I 106 directly. (> StroudVsMoore: I do not understand why he accepts that (MooreVsDescartes). I also do not understand why he overlooks the consequences of sensory data theory. MooreVsHume: the two principles are wrong: for example, I know that this pen exists, but if Hume's principles were true, I could not do that. So they, one or both, are wrong. Moore/Stroud: accepts that if you start from Hume's position, it follows that he does not know that there is a pen. StroudVsMoore: both arguments are valid. And they have a common premise. For Moore, the question of what conclusion to accept amounts to whether it is safer to know that this is a pen or safer to know that Hume's principles are true. I 107 MooreVsHume: Example pen: is even the strongest argument to prove that its principles are wrong. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kant | Mackie Vs Kant | Stegmüller IV 319 KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism. IV 320 VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement! Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking? Terminology: Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless. Stegmüller IV 171 Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made. Stegmüller IV 323 Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events? The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time. metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought. MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self. Stegmüller IV 431 God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that. Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense." Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations: 1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts, 2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being. IV 432 MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law. MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted. 2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible. Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking. IV 433 MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason! Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason. MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being! MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment. The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith).. Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence. V 437 MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa! Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case. IV 438 MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently. IV 461 Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)! IV 462 Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations! Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself. MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different! IV 463 autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength. 2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will. Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense. Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will). Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem. Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so. IV 464 Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Materialism | Rorty Vs Materialism | Rorty I 98 VsMaterialism/Rorty finds no place for imperfect perception (apprehension) (that something seems to be the case). I 100 Appearance/Rorty: "Appearance" is a richer concept in our context, however! We must base it on the following premise: (P) Whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state of our own, there must be a property that we have present, and that led us to this announcement. Vs (P): the premise embodies the Cartesian dualism. I 101 What is the difference between the false description of a star and a false description of pain? We expect the appearance of the star to remain unchanged, if it turns out that it is just a hole in the sky vault. Pain, on the other hand, would have to feel different! Materialism/Rorty: every appearance of something turns out to be a brain state. According to this, the materialist would then have to argue that the "rough doubling" of a brain state presents itself as another brain state. Opponent: "Well, let us talk about the brain state which is the "act of imperfect perception" of the previous brain state. >Materialism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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