Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 24 entries.
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Entry
Reference
Affirmation Gadamer I 136
Affirmation/Tragedy/Aristotle/Gadamer: The tragic melancholy reflects (...) a kind of affirmation, a return to oneself, and if, as is not uncommon in modern tragedy, the hero is tinged with such tragic melancholy in his own consciousness, then he has a little part in such affirmation himself by accepting his fate. >Tragedy/Aristotle, >Catharsis/Aristotle.
But what is the actual object of this affirmation? What is affirmed? Certainly not the justice of a moral world order. The notorious tragic theory of guilt, which hardly plays a role in Aristotle, is not an appropriate explanation even for modern tragedy.
For tragedy is not where guilt and atonement correspond to each other as in a just assessment, where a moral account of guilt is resolved without remainder. Even in modern tragedy there cannot and must not be a full subjectivation of guilt and fate. Rather, the excess of tragic consequences is characteristic of the nature of tragedy.
Despite all the subjectivity of the debt, even in modern tragedy there is still a moment of that ancient supremacy of fate that is revealed as the same for all in the inequality of guilt and fate.
I 137
(...) what is affirmed by the viewer there? Obviously it is precisely the inappropriateness and terrible size of the consequences of a culpable act that represent the actual an unreasonable demand on the viewer. The tragic affirmation is the mastery of this unreasonable demand. It has the character of a real communion. It is a truly common experience of such an excess of tragic disaster. The viewer recognizes him- or herself and his or her own finite being in the face of the power of fate. What happens to the great ones has exemplary significance. The approval of tragic melancholy does not apply to the tragic course of events as such or to the justice of the fate that befalls the hero, but means a metaphysical order of being that applies to all.
The "so is it" is a kind of self-awareness of the viewer, who comes back from the delusions in which he or she lives like everyone else. The tragic affirmation is insight by virtue of the continuity of meaning into which the viewer places him- or herself back.
>Recognition/Gadamer.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Artworks Valéry Gadamer I 100
Artworks/Work of Art/Valéry/Gadamer: But how should one conceive the standard for the completion of a work of art? No matter how rational and soberly one looks at the artistic, much of what we call a work of art is not intended for use, and none at all receives the measure of its completion from such a purpose. Does the being of the work then only represent itself like the termination of a creative process that virtually points beyond it? Is it in itself not at all "completable"? Valéry: Paul Valéry did indeed see things that way. Nor has he shied away from the consequence that results for those who face a work of art and try to understand it. For if it is to be true that a work of art is not perfect in itself, then what is to be the yardstick by which the appropriateness of reception and understanding is to be measured? The accidental and arbitrary termination of a design process cannot contain anything binding(1).
Reception/Understanding: It follows from this that it must be left to the recipient to decide what he/she in turn makes of what is present. One way of understanding a structure is then no less legitimate than the other. There is no standard of appropriateness. Not only that the poet himself does not possess one - the aesthetics of the genius movement would also agree with that.
>Genius/Gadamer.
Rather, each encounter with the work has the rank and right of a new production.
GadamerVsValéry: That seems to me an untenable hermeneutic nihilism. Whenever Valéry has occasionally drawn such conclusions(2) for his work in order to escape the myth of the unconscious production of the genius, it seems to me that he has in fact become even more entangled in it. For now he transfers to the reader and interpreter the authority of absolute creation, which he himself does not want to perform.
Aesthetic experience/Gadamer: The same aporia results if one starts from the concept of aesthetic experience instead of the concept of genius.
>Aesthetic experience/Erlebniskunst/Lukacs.

1. Gadamer: Es war das Interesse an dieser Frage, das mich in meinen Goethe-Studien leitete. Vgl. »Vom geistigen Lauf des Menschen«, 1949; auch meinen Vortrag »Zur Fragwürdigkeit des ästhetischen Bewußtseins«, in Venedig 1958 (Rivista di Estetica, Ill-Alll 374-383). Vgl. den Neudruck in „Theorien der Kunst“ hrsg. von D. Henrich und W. Iser, Frankfurt 1982, dort S. 59—691.
2. Valéry, Variété Ill, Commentaires de Charmes: »Mes vers ont le sens qu'on leur prete«.

Valéry I
P. Valéry
Cahiers Vol. I Frankfurt/M. 1987


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Beauty Ancient Philosophy Gadamer I 481
Beauty/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: The Greek word for the German "schön" (engl. beautiful) is kalon. There are no complete equivalents in German, not even when we use the mediating pulchrum but Greek thinking has exerted a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with words such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautiful spirit/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon ((s) useful). Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the "how" of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon.
Practicality: The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. You cannot ask what purpose they serve. They are excellent for their own sake (di' hauto haireton) and not like the useful for the sake of something else. Already the use of language thus reveals the elevated rank of being of what is called kalon.
Ugly: But also the ordinary contrast that defines the concept of the beautiful, the contrast to the ugly (aischron), points in the same direction. Aischron (ugly) is that which cannot stand the sight.
Beautiful: Beautiful is that which can be seen, the handsome in the broadest sense of the word. "Handsome" is also a German term for greatness. And indeed, the use of the word "beautiful" - in Greek as in German - always requires a certain stately greatness.
Morality: By pointing the direction of meaning to the respectable in the whole sphere of the outwardly pleasing, the custom approaches at the same time the conceptual
Gadamer I 482
articulation that was given by the contrast to the useful (chresimon). The good: The concept of the beautiful therefore enters into the closest relationship with that of the good (agathon), in so far as it subordinates itself as an end to be chosen for its own sake, as an end that is anything but useful. For what is beautiful is not seen as a means to something else.
>Beauty/Plato.
Measure/Order/Proportion: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure.
Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order
Gadamer I 483
(taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. >Beauty/Aristotle.
Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any contrast here, which means of course that especially with regard to beauty the primacy of nature is undisputed. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way makes the beautiful nature of the order of being perfect.
But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Beauty Aristotle Gadamer I 482
Beauty/Aristotle/Gadamer: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle(1) names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order
Gadamer I 483
(taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. The close connection between the mathematical orders of essence of the beautiful and the celestial order further means that the cosmos, the model of all visible well-being, is also the highest example of beauty in the visible. Dimensional adequacy, symmetry is the decisive condition of all being beautiful. >Beauty/Plato, >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy.

1. Arist. Met. M 4, 1078 a 3—6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich of Strasbourg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Beauty Plato Gadamer I 482
Beauty/Plato/Gadamer: In Platonic philosophy [we] (...) find (...) a close connection and not seldom an interchange of the idea of the good with the idea of the beautiful. Cf. >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy.
Both are beyond all that is conditioned and many: the beautiful in itself meets the loving soul at the end of a path leading through the manifold beauty as the one, unifying, exuberant ("Symposion"), just as the idea of the good is beyond all that is conditioned and many, which is only good in certain respects ("Politeia").
The beautiful in itself shows itself to be beyond all that exists as well as the good in itself (epekeina).
Order/Being: The order of being, which consists in the order of the one good, thus agrees with the order of the beautiful. The path of love that Diotima teaches leads via the beautiful bodies to the beautiful souls and from there to the beautiful institutions, customs and laws, finally to the sciences (e.g. to the beautiful numerical relations of which the theory of numbers knows), to this "wide sea of beautiful speeches"(1) - and leads beyond all this.
Gadamer: One can ask oneself whether the transgression of the sphere of the sensually visible into the real means a differentiation and enhancement of the beauty of the beautiful and not merely that of the existing, which is beautiful. But Plato obviously means that the teleological order of being is also an order of beauty, that beauty appears more pure and clearer in the intelligible realm than in the visible, which is clouded by the immoderate and imperfect.
Middle Ages: In the same way, medieval philosophy closely connected the concept of beauty with that of good, bonum, so closely that a classical Aristotle passage about kalon was not understandable in the Middle Ages because the translation here simply rendered the word kalon with bonum.(2)
Measure/Proportion: The basis of the close connection between the idea of the beautiful and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato defines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order. >Beauty/Aristotle.
Gadamer I 484
The Good/Beauty/Plato: As closely Plato (...) linked the idea of the beautiful with that of the good he also has in mind a difference between the two, and this difference contains a peculiar advantage of the beautiful. (...) the inconceivability of the good [finds] a correspondence in the beautiful, i.e. in the moderation of the existing and the revelation that belongs to it (aletheia) (...), inasmuch as a final exuberance also belongs to it. However, Plato can also say that in the attempt to grasp the good itself, the same flees into the beautiful(1). Thus, the beautiful differs from the absolutely intangible good in that it is more easily grasped. It has to be something appearing in its own essence. In the search for goodness, beauty is manifested. This is first
Gadamer I 485
a distinction of the same for the human soul. Virtue/Appearance: That which shows itself in perfect form attracts the desire for love. The beautiful immediately takes on a life of its own, whereas the models of human virtue are otherwise only darkly recognizable in the murky medium of appearances, because they possess, as it were, no light of their own, so that we often fall into the impure imitations and illusory forms of virtue. This is different with beauty.
Beautiful/Plato: It has its own brightness, so that we are not seduced here by distorted images. For "beauty alone has been granted this, that it is the most luminous (ekphanestaton) and lovable thing"(3).
Ontology/Rank/Order: Obviously, it is the distinction of the beautiful from the good that it presents itself from itself, makes itself immediately obvious in its being.
Thus it has the most important ontological function that can exist, namely that of mediating between idea and appearance.
Appearance/Idea/Mediation: There is the metaphysical crux of Platonism. It is condensed in the concept of participation (methexis) and concerns both the relationship of appearance to the idea as well as the relationship of the ideas to each other. As "Phaidros" teaches, it is no coincidence that Plato particularly likes to illustrate this controversial relationship of "participation" by the example of the beautiful. >Methexis/Plato.
Beauty does not only appear in what is sensually visible, but in such a way that it is actually there, i.e. that it stands out as one out of all. The beautiful is really "most luminous" in itself (to ekphanestaton). ((s) see above ontological rank).
Thus "emergence" is not only one of the qualities of what is beautiful, but constitutes its very essence. The distinction of what is beautiful, that it directly attracts the desire of the human soul, is rooted in its way of being. It is the moderation of being that does not only let it be what it is, but also lets it emerge as a harmonious whole that is measured in itself.
Alethia: This is the revelation (alétheia) that Plato speaks of, which belongs to the essence of the beautiful.(4)
Shine/Appearance/appear: Beauty is not simply symmetry, but the appearance itself, which is based on it. It is of the nature of appearance. Appearance, however, means: to shine on something and thus to make an appearance of that on which the appearance falls.
Gadamer I 491
Aletheia/Plato: [Plato] first of all, in the beautiful, has shown the alétheia as its essential moment, and it is clear what he means by this: the beautiful, the way in which the good appears, makes itself manifest in its being, presents itself. Cf. >Beauty/Thomas Aquinas. Representation/Presentation: What presents itself in this way is not distinguished from itself in that it presents itself. It is not something for itself and something else for others. It is also not something different. It is not the glamour poured out over a figure that falls on it from outside. Rather, it is the very condition of being of the figure itself, to shine in this way, to present itself in this way. It follows from this that, with regard to being beautiful, the beautiful must always be understood ontologically as an "image".
Idea and appearance: It makes no difference whether "it itself" or its image appears. As we had seen, the metaphysical distinction of beauty was that it closed the hiatus between idea and appearance. It is "idea" for sure, that is, it belongs to an order of being.


1. Symp. 210 d: Reden Verhältnisse. I Vol. „Unterwegs zur Schrift“, Ges. Werke 7.1
2. Arist. Mead. M 4, 1078 a 3-6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich von Straßburg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty.
3. Phaidr. 250 d 7.
4. Phil. 51 d.

Bubner I 35
Beauty/Good/Plato/Bubner: in the beautiful, we are content to have the illusion. In the good, we cannot be content with the illusion.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Causal Explanation Bigelow I 320
Explanation/Hempel/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: Hempel's explanations are generally correct but do not exhaust all cases. >C. Hempel.
Individual case causation/individual event/Lewis: (1986e)(1) need not to be explained according to Hempel's style.
>Single case causation.
Probabilistic explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: here applies: a cause does not necessarily increase the probability of the effect. If one assumes the opposite, one must assume that the explanation itself is the cause. This is because the explanation makes the result more likely.
BigelowVsProbabilistic Explanation (see above). Instead. Approach by Lewis:

Causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (1986e)(1) 5 stages:
1. Natural laws as input for a theory of counterfactual conditionals.
I 321
2. Used counterfactual conditionals to define a relation between events, namely, counterfactual dependency. 3. Used counterfactual dependency to explain causation by two principles:
(1) Thesis: Counterfactual dependency is causation
(2) the cause of a cause is a cause.
Causes/Lewis: is transitive.
4. Lewis constructs a causal history of an event. (Tree structure, it may be that more distant causes are not connected by counterfactual dependency, i.e. another cause could have taken the place, but in fact it is the cause.)
5. Definition Causal explanation/Lewis: is everything that provides information about the causal history. This can also be partial. E.g. maternal line, paternal line. E.g. information about a temporal section of the tree: this corresponds to the explanation by Hempel.
>Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactual dependency, >Natural laws, >Events, >Causation, >Causes, >Causality, >Transitivity.
I 322
Causal explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: our theory is similar to that of D. Lewis, but also has differences: Lewis: used laws to explain counterfactual conditionals.
Bigelow/Pargetter: we use degrees of accessibility for both.
>Accessibility, >Degrees/Graduals.
Lewis: needs counterfactual conditionals to explain causation
Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not. For that, we assume forces - Lewis does not.
>Forces.
Transitivity: causation: Lewis pro, BigelowVs.
Causal Explanation/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: because we do not recognize any transitivity, the causal history will not be traced back to the past. Otherwise, Adam and Eve are an explanation for everything. Somewhere the causal connection has to be broken.
BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: the main difference is that for Lewis information about the causal history is sufficient for a causal explanation, but for us only information about causes and thus about forces.
Appropriateness/causal explanation/pragmatic/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: The adequacy of an explanation must be decided pragmatically. Bigelow/Pargetter dito.
>Science, >Arbitrariness, >Acceptability, >Objectivity.
I 323
Why-explanation/why/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: no explanation can do entirely without a why-explanation. This in turn needs a how-explanations. >Why-questions.

1. Lewis, D.K. (1986e). Causal Explanation. In: Philosophical Papers Vol. II. pp. 214-40. New York Oxford University Press.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Concepts Evans McDowell I 73
Concept/term / Evans: a term is activated only in the judgment, not in the perception or experience. By the judgment a new type of content comes into play. >Perception, >Language use, >Content, >Judgments.

Frank I 569/70
Idea/concept/Evans: the two can not be equated, otherwise there is no possibility of deception. - But they can not be separated either: otherwise the appropriateness of the idea can not be justified. >Idea, >Imagination, >Correctness.


Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Correspondence Theory Rorty I 255
Conformance/correspondence/Ryle: instead simply: he sees it. FodorVs: recognition is more complex and abstract, because surprisingly independent of differences.
>Recognition, >Similarity, >Identification.
I 363
Correspondence: can also mean something like relationship in general, does not have to be congruent. >Correspondence.
Objective: ambiguous:
a) conception that everyone would reach
b) things as they really are.
>Intersubjectivity, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity.

II (e) 102ff
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: the correspondence theory must be abandoned if one wants to recognize a language as privileged for representation. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between intellect and imagination, between clear and confused ideas. >Correspondence theory/Austin, >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Ayer, >Correspondence.

II (f) 126
RortyVsCorrespondence theory: misleading: it could be judged on the basis of non-words, which words are appropriate for the world. >Language use.

VI 28
Conformance/correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the absolute - with this he robbed the term of its actual core.
VI 125
Correspondence Theory/Rorty: this phrase only says that the correspondence theorist needs criteria for the appropriateness of vocabularies. He needs the notion that one somehow "clings" better to reality than the other. Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine, but not that they represent the reality in a more appropriate way!
>Vocabulary.

Horwich I 452
Correspondence/IdealismVsCorrespondence theory//Rorty: thesis: there is no correspondence between a conviction and non-conviction (object). >Beliefs/Rorty, cf. >Coherence theory.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Dilthey Gadamer Gadamer I 246
Dilthey/Gadamer: In speculative idealism the concept of the given, of positivity, had been subjected to a fundamental critique. In the end Dilthey tried to refer to this for his life-philosophical tendency. He writes(1): "How does Fichte describe the beginning of a new? Because he starts from the
Gadamer I 247
intellectual view of the I, but does not understand it as a substance, a being, a given, but rather precisely through this view, i.e. this strained deepening of the I in itself as life, activity, energy, and accordingly understands energy concepts such as opposition, etc. realization in it." >Philosophy of life, >Given, >Criticism.
Gadamer: Likewise, Dilthey finally recognized in Hegel's concept of the spirit the vitality of a genuine historical concept.(2)
>Spirit/Hegel.
Nietzsche/Bergson/Simmel: Some of his contemporaries worked in the same direction, as we pointed out in the analysis of the concept of experience: Nietzsche and Bergson, these late descendants of the romantic criticism of the thought form of mechanics, and Georg Simmel.
Dilthey/Heidegger/Gadamer: But what radical demand for thinking lies in the inappropriateness of the concept of substance for historical being and historical recognition was only brought to general awareness by Heidegger(3). Only through him was Dilthey's philosophical intention released. With his work he tied in with the research of intentionality in Husserl's phenomenology, which was the decisive breakthrough in that it was not at all the extreme Platonism that Dilthey saw in it(4).
Intentionality/Objectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: Rather, the more one gains insight into the slow growth of Husserl's thoughts through the progression of the great Husserl edition, the clearer it becomes that with the theme of intentionality an increasingly radicalizing critique of the "objectivism" of previous philosophy - also of Dilthey(5) - began, which was to culminate in the claim of philosophy: "that intentional phenomenology for the first time made the mind as a spirit a field of systematic experience and science and
Gadamer I 248
thus achieved the total conversion of the task of knowledge."(6) >Spirit/Husserl.
>Entries for Dilthey as an author.

1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, V Il, 333.
2. Ges. Schriften Vll, 148.
3. Heidegger already spoke to me in 1923 with admiration about the late writings of Georg Simmel. That this was not only a general recognition of the philosophical personality of Simmel, but also indicates the impulses Heidegger had received in terms of content, becomes clear to everyone who reads the first of the four "Metaphysical Chapters", which summarized under the title "Philosophy of Life" what the doomed Georg Simmel had in mind as a philosophical task. There it says, roughly, that "life is really past and future"; there "the transcendence of life is described as the true absolute", and the essay concludes: "I am well aware of the logical difficulties that stand in the way of the conceptual expression of this way of looking at life. I have tried to formulate them, in the full presence of the logical danger, since, after all, the layer has possibly been reached here where logical difficulties do not easily call for silence - because it is the one from which the metaphysical root of logic first nourishes itself. «
4. Cf. Natorp's criticism of Husserl's ideas (1914) (Logos 1917) and Husserl himself in a private letter to Natorp on June 29th, 1918: "whereby I may also note that I have already overcome the stage of static Platonism for more than a decade and have put the idea of transcendental genesis as the main theme of phenomenology". The note by O. Beckers goes into the same direction in the Husserlfestschrift p. 39.
5. Husserliana VI, 344.
6. Husserliana VI, 346.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Discourse Habermas III 40
Discourse/theoretical/practical/Habermas: I myself have a tendency to adopt a cognitivist position, according to which practical questions can basically be decided on an argumentative basis. However, this position can only be defended in a promising way if we do not hastily assimilate practical discourses, which have an internal reference and interpreted needs of the persons concerned, into theoretical discourses with their relation to the interpreted experiences of an observer. >Cognitivism.
III 41
Arguments used to justify value standards do not meet the requirements of discourses. In the prototypical case they have the form of aesthetic criticism. (See also Culture/Habermas, >Argumentation.
III 45
Theoretical discourse: cognitive-instrumental - it is about the truth of propositions and the effectiveness of teleological actions Practical discourse: moral-practical - it is about the correctness of actions
Aesthetic critique: evaluative - it is about the appropriateness of value standards
Therapeutic critique: expressive - it is about the truthfulness of expressions
Explicative discourse: - this is about the comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs.
III 71
Definition Discourse/Habermas: I only speak of discourses when the meaning of the problematic claim to validity forces the participants conceptually to assume that a rational, motivated agreement could basically be achieved, whereby "basically" expresses the idealizing reservation: if the argumentation could only be led openly enough and continued for long enough.(1) >Discourse theory.

1. Das geht auf Ch. S. Peirce zurück. Vgl. dazu H. Scheit, Studien zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit, Habilitationsschrift Universität München, 1981.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Institutions Habermas IV 90
Institutions/development/HabermasVsDurkheim: in order to explain the emergence of institutions from religious rites, as Durkheim wants, we must accept linguistically shaped worldviews as an intermediary between the non-linguistic rites and the communicative action of institutions. We must take into account that everyday profane practice runs through linguistically differentiated processes of communication and requires the specification of validity claims for actions appropriate to the situation in the normative context of roles and institutions.(1)
>Validity claims, >Situations, >Appropriateness, >Acceptability,
>Context.

1.Talcott ParsonsVsDurkheim setzt an dieser Stelle ein; T. Parsons, (1967b).

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Method Hegel Gadamer I 467
Method/Hegel/Gadamer: [Hegel] has criticized the concept of a method that is performed on the thing as an action that is foreign to the thing under the concept of "external reflection": The true method is the action of the thing itself(1). For the description of the true method, which is the action of the thing itself, Hegel for his part referred to Plato, who loves to show his Socrates in conversation with young people because they are prepared to follow the logical questions of Socrates regardless of the prevailing opinions. Negative Dialectic/Socrates/Hegel: Here, dialectic is nothing other than the art of conducting a conversation and, in particular, of exposing the inappropriateness of the opinions that dominate you through the consequence of asking and asking further. So dialectic is negative here, it confuses opinions. But such confusion also means clarification, because it reveals the appropriate view of the matter. (...) so all dialectical negativity contains a factual preliminary drawing of what is true.
>Dialectic, >Dialectic/Hegel, >Negative Dialectic.
Method: That things in the consequence of thought turn around underhand and turn into their opposite, that thinking gains the power to "even know without the what
Gadamer I 468
and to draw conclusions on a trial basis from opposing assumptions"(2) that is the experience of thought to which Hegel's concept of method as the self-development of pure thought into the systematic whole of truth refers. >Thinking, >Thinking/Hegel, >Experience/Hegel.


1. Hegel, Logik II. p. 330 (Lasson)
2. Arist. Met. M 4 1078 b


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Optimism Bias Experimental Psychology Parisi I 104
Optimism/Experimental psychology/Ryan-Wilkinson: (...) the well-known finding that humans are overly optimistic or overconfident on various dimensions (e.g., Weinstein 1980(1), 1989(2)) (...) is a true cognitive error, in the sense that we know that people are getting certain answers objectively wrong. For example, in Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977)(3), participants gave estimates and answers to difficult
Parisi I 105
questions and had to quantify their confidence; they were, objectively speaking, much too sure that they had answered correctly. What makes this an interesting question from a normative standpoint, though, is that even in the case of a clear bias, a phenomenon that results in wrong answers, there is extensive evidence that the bias is overall helpful and quite adaptive. Positive illusions are associated with better adjustment and coping skills (e.g., Taylor and Armor, 1996)(4); indeed, failure to show this bias has been associated with clinical depression (e.g., Allan, Siegel, and Hannah, 2007)(5). >Cognitive biases, >Problem solving.

1. Weinstein, Neil D. (1980). “Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39: 806–820.
2. Weinstein, Neil D. (1989). “Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks.” Science 246: 1232–1233.
3. Fischhoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein (1977). “Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 3: 552–564.
4. Taylor, Shelley E. and David A. Armor (1996). “Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity.” Journal of Personality 64: 873–898.
5. Allan, Lorraine G., Shepard Siegel, and Samuel Hannah (2007). “The Sad Truth About Depressive Realism.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60: 482–495.


Wilkinson-Ryan, Tess. „Experimental Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Pointing Quine V 70f
Pointing/indicative/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: how do we know which part of the area is meant, how do we recognize pointing as such. Solution: Sorting out the irrelevant by induction. Also amplification without a pointing finger or deletions with pointing finger.
X 24
Indicative Pointing/Ostension/Language Learning/Quine: both the learner and the teacher must understand the appropriateness of the situation. This leads to a uniformity of response to certain stimuli. This uniformity is a behavioural criterion for what should become an observation sentence. It also makes it possible for different scientists to check the evidence for each other.
>Language Learning/Quine, >Stimuli/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine.
XI 182
Note: Pointing/indicative/Ostension/Quine/Lauener: difference: between direct and shifted ostension:
Def shifted Ostension/Quine/Lauener: if we refer to a green leaf to explain the abstract singular term "green", we do not mean the perceptible green thing, because the word does not denote a concrete entity.
>Ostension/Quine.
XII 47
Pointing/Ostension/Color Words/Gavagai/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: for example the color word "sepia": can be learned by conditioning or induction. It does not even need to be said that sepia is a color and not a form, a material or a commodity. However, it may be that many lessons are necessary. >Colour/Quine.
XII 56
Def Direct Ostension/Pointing/Quine: the point shown is at the end of a straight line on an opaque surface. Problem: how much of the environment should count?
Problem: how far may an absent thing differ from the object shown to fall under the term declared ostensively?
XII 57
Def Shifted Ostension/Pointing/Quine: For example, pointing to the fuel gauge instead of the fuel itself to indicate how much is still there. ((s) But not that the fuel gauge is still there). Example shifted: if we point to an event (token) and mean the type.
E.g. pointing to grass to explain green.
For example, point to an inscription to explain a letter.
Double shifted: e.g. Goedel number for an expression. (1st inscription of the formula (of the expression), 2nd Goedel number as proxy for it).
XII 58
The shifted ostension does not cause any problems that are not already present in the direct version.
VII (d) 67
Pointing/indicating definition/Ostension/Identity/Quine: is always ambiguous because of the temporal extension! Our setting of an object does not tell us yet which summation of current objects is intended! When pointing again either the river or river stages can be meant!
Therefore, pointing is usually accompanied by pronouncing the words "this river". But this presupposes a concept of river.
"This river" means: "the river-like summation of momentary objects that this momentary object contains".
VII (d) 68
Pointing/Ostension/Quine: the spatial extension cannot be separated from the temporal extension when pointing, because we ourselves need time for pointing at different places.
VII (d) 74
Ostension/Pointing/objects/universals/Quine: how does pointing to space-time objects differ from pointing to universals like square and triangle?
VII (d) 75
Square: each time we point to different objects and do not assume an identity from one opportunity to another. The river, on the other hand, assumes this identity. Attribute/Quine: the "squareness" is divided by the shown objects.
But you do not need to assume entities like "attributes". Neither the "squareness" is pointed to, nor is it needed for a reference to the word "square".
The expression "is square" is also not necessary if the listener learns when to use it and when not to use it. The expression does not need to be a name for any detached object.
VII (d) 76
Pointing/concrete/abstract/Quine: general terms like "square" are very similar to concrete singular terms like "Cayster" (the name of the river) concerning the east version. With "red" you do not need to make a distinction at all!
VII (d) 77
In everyday language, a general term is often used like a proper name. >General Terms/Quine.
V 70
Pointing/Quine: is useful to introduce the anomaly. Conspicuousness/Quine/(s): should explain why from the multitude of stimuli certain stimuli are overweighted or how shapes are recognized against a background.
V 89
Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then you could still ask. "The same what?
V 102
Pointing/General Terms/Quine: Problem: unique showing requires special care in some situations. Example "this body is an animal": here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it could be that only the hull is perceived as an animal.
V 103
At the beginning we did not talk about sentences like "This body is Mama", because we have to assume a general mastery of the "is" in the predication of duration. This requires a stock of individually learned examples.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Questions Collingwood Gadamer I 376
Question/Answer/Collingwood/Gadamer: [Collingwood developed] the idea of a "logic of question and answer" in a witty and apt criticism of the "realistic" Oxford School, but unfortunately did not come to a systematic execution(1). He recognized with ingenuity what was missing in the naive hermeneutics that underlie the usual philosophical criticism. CoolingwoodVsTradition: In particular the method Collingwood found in the English university system, the discussion of statements, perhaps a good exercise in ingenuity, apparently fails to recognize the historicity inherent in all understanding. Collingwood Thesis: In truth, one can understand a text only if one has understood the question to which it is an answer. But since this question can only be derived from the text, and thus the appropriateness of the answer is the methodological prerequisite for the reconstruction of the question, the criticism of this answer, which is led from somewhere, is pure mirror fencing. Prerequisite: It is like understanding works of art. Even a work of art is only understood by presupposing its adequacy. Here, too, the question to which it responds must first be won if it is to be understood - as an answer.
Gadamer: It is indeed an axiom of all hermeneutics (...) >Perfection/Gadamer, >History/Collingwood; GadamerVsCollingwood: >Text/Gadamer.


1. Cf. Collingwood's autobiography, which at my suggestion was published in German translation under the title "Denken" (English: "Thinking"), p. 30ff, and the unprinted Heidelberg dissertation by Joachim Finkeldei, "Grund und Wesen des Fragens", 1954; a similar position is taken by Croce (who influenced Collingwood), who in his "Logik" (German edition p. 135ff) understands every definition as an answer to a question and therefore "historical".

Coll I
R. G. Collingwood
Essays In Political Philosophy Oxford 1995


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Situations Psychological Theories Corr I 32
Situations/Psychological Theories/Funder: A. Lexical approach. One of the earliest examples of the lexical approach to the study of situations was a study by Van Heck (1984), in which he combed the dictionary for words that could be used to fill in the blank, ‘being confronted with a . . . situation’. See Edwards and Templeton (2005)(1); by Yang, Read and Miller (2006)(2) applied the lexical approach to both Chinese idioms and their English translations. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies >Everyday language, >Cultural differences, >Cultural psychology.
B. Empirical approach: For example, Endler, Hunt and Rosenstein (1962)(3) used ‘stimulus-response’ questionnaires to ask participants, ‘how anxious would you be if . . .?’. Using this method, they discovered what they felt were three kinds of situations that caused anxiety: interpersonal situations, situations of inanimate danger (e.g., hurtling car, earthquake), and ambiguous situations.
>Anxiety, >Fear.
Similarly, Fredericksen, Jensen and Beaton (1972)(4) analysed executives’ responses to a weekend in-basket exercise, resulting in a taxonomy of executive business situations with categories including evaluation of procedures, routine problems, interorganizational problems, personnel problems, policy issues and time conflicts. Along similar lines, Magnusson (1971)(5) asked students to list all the situations they had encountered during academic study, and then had all possible pairs rated for similarity.
Corr I 33
By visiting psychiatric wards, student residences and classrooms, Moos (1973)(6) was able to develop scales to measure what he called ‘perceived climate’ based upon psychosocial features. He found three broad dimensions he labelled ‘relationships’ (e.g., social support), ‘personal development’ (e.g., academic achievement) and ‘system maintenance/change’ (e.g., order and organization). Price and Bouffard (1974)(7) used student diaries but focused on physical location by categorizing situations based upon what they called ‘constraint’ – the number and kinds of behaviours that were considered appropriate within them. Researchers have sometimes asked participants to describe their hypothetical feelings or behaviours in response to hypothetical situations: Forgas and Van Heck (1992)(8) used questionnaires to measure behavioural reactions in a series of situations (e.g., ‘you are going to meet a new date’) and were then able to allocate the variance in responses to persons, situations and interactions. Vansteelandt and Van Mechelen (1998)(9) asked people about their reactions (mostly hostile) to situations classified as ‘high frustrating’, ‘moderately frustrating’ and ‘low frustrating’.
Ten Berge and De Raad (2001)(10) posit that situations are only useful in that they render the understanding of traits less ambiguous, and thus asked students to write sentences explicating how traits might be expressed in certain situations.
Rather than asking participants to rate hypothetical situations, some investigators have asked them instead to generate their own; such as Forgas (1976)(11), who asked housewives and students to provide two descriptions each for every interaction they had experienced in the previous twenty-four hours. He found a two-dimensional episode structure for housewives (intimacy/involvement and self-confidence) and a three-dimensional structure for students (involvement, pleasantness and knowing how to behave). Pervin (1976)(12) used the free-response descriptions of his participants of situations they had experienced over the past year to create a taxonomy of daily situations.
Corr I 34
C. Theoretical approach. Krause (1970)(13) drew on sociological theory in an attempt to categorize situations on theoretical grounds. Based upon the way in which he posited that cultures assimilate novel situations into traditional, generic situations, Krause suggested seven classes, including joint working, fighting and playing, among others (a classification that guided the recovery of similar factors in the study by Van Heck (1984) cited above.) >Situations/Asendorpf.

1. Edwards, J. A. and Templeton, A. 2005. The structure of perceived qualities of situations. European Journal of Social Psychology 35: 705–23
2. Yang, Y., Read, S. J. and Miller, L. C. 2006. A taxonomy of situations from Chinese idioms, Journal of Research in Personality 40: 750–78
3. Endler, N. S., Hunt, J. McV. and Rosenstein, A. J. 1962: An S-R inventory of anxiousness, Psychological Monographs 76: 1–33 (17, Whole No. 536)
4. Frederiksen N., Jensen O. and Beaton A. 1972. Prediction of organizational behaviour. New York: Pergammon
5. Magnusson, D. 1971. An analysis of situational dimensions, Perceptual and Motor Skills 32: 851–67
6. Moos, R. H. 1973. Conceptualizations of human environments, American Psychologist 28: 652–65
7. Price, R. H. and Bouffard, D. L. 1974. Behavioural appropriateness and situational constraint as dimensions of social behaviour, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30: 579–86
8. Forgas, J. P. and Van Heck, G. L. 1992. The psychology of situations, in G. V. Caprara and G. L. Van Heck (eds.), Modern personality psychology: critical reviews and new directions, pp. 418–55. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf
9. Vansteelandt, K. and Van Mechelen, I. 1998. Individual differences in situation-behaviour profiles: a triple typology model, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 751–65
10. Ten Berge, M. A. and De Raad, B. 2001. Construction of a joint taxonomy of traits and situations, European Journal of Personality 15: 253–76
11. Forgas, J. P. 1976. The perception of social episodes: categorical and dimensional representations in two different social milieus, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34: 199–209
12. Pervin, L. A. 1976. A free-response approach to the analysis of person-situation interaction, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34: 465–74
13. Krause, M. S. 1970. Use of social situations for research purposes, American Psychologist 25: 748–53


Seth A Wagerman & David C. Funder, “Personality psychology of situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Symbols Gadamer I 79
Symbols/Gadamer: (...) a metaphysical background can be found in the concept of the symbol (...), which cannot be seen in the rhetorical use of allegory. (>Allegory) It is possible to be led from the sensual up to the divine. For the sensual is not mere vanity and darkness, but the outpouring and reflection of the true.
Solger: According to Solger(1), the symbolic denotes an "existence in which the idea is recognized in some way", i.e. the intimate unity of ideal and appearance, which is specific for the work of art. The allegorical, on the other hand, allows such meaningful unity to come about only by pointing to another. >Allegory.
I 80
The symbol is the coincidence of the sensual and the non-sensual, the allegory the meaningful reference of the sensual to the non-sensual. The symbol appears as the inexhaustible, because the indefinite interpretable is the exclusive counterpart of the allegory, which has a more precise reference to meaning and is exhausted in it, like the contrast between art and not art (german: "Unkunst"). It is precisely the indeterminacy of its meaning that makes the word and concept of the symbolic rise victoriously when the rationalist aesthetics of the Age of Enlightenment succumbed to critical philosophy and the aesthetics of genius. >Genius/Gadamer, >Symbols/Kant.
I 83
The expansion of the concept of symbol to a universal aesthetic principle did not happen without resistance. For the intimate unity of image and meaning that makes up the symbol is not an absolute. The symbol does not simply remove the tension between the world of ideas and the world of the senses. It also makes us think of the disproportion between form and essence, expression and content. Especially the religious function of the symbol lives from this tension. The basis of this tension, the momentary and total coincidence of the apparition with the infinite in the cult becomes possible. This presupposes that there is an inner coherence
I 84
of finite and infinite, which the symbol fills with meaning. The religious form of the symbol thus corresponds exactly to the original purpose of symbols, to be the division of the One and the replenishment from the duality. The inappropriateness of form and essence remains essential to the symbol in so far as its meaning points beyond its sensuousness. It is in this that the character of floating, the indecisiveness between form and essence, which is inherent in the symbol, arises. >Symbols/Hegel.

1. Solger, K.W.F. Vorlesungen über Asthetik, ed. Heyse 1829, S 127.

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Symbols Hegel Gadamer I 84
Symbols/Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel's restriction of the use of the symbolic to the symbolic art of the Orient is basically based on [the] disproportion between image and meaning. >Symbols/Gadamer.
The excess of the meant meaning is supposed to characterize a special form of art(1) that differs from classical art in that it is above such disproportion.
Gadamer: But this is obviously already a conscious fixation and artificial narrowing of the concept, which (...) does not so much want to express the inappropriateness as the coincidence of image and meaning. One must also admit that the Hegelian restriction of the concept of the symbolic (despite the many successors it found) ran counter to the tendency of the newer aesthetics, which since Schelling had sought to think precisely of the unity of appearance and meaning in this concept in order to justify aesthetic autonomy against the claim of the concept(2).
>Symbols/Schelling.


1. Hegel, Ästhetik 1, (Werke 1832ff., Bd. X, 1) S. 403f.
2. Immerhin zeigt Schopenhauers Beispiel, dass ein Sprachgebrauch, der 1818 das Symbol als Spezialfall einer rein konventionellen Allegorie fasst, auch 1859 noch möglich war: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, § 50.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Terminology Baudrillard Blask I 11
Seduction/Baudrillard: the term seduction later becomes meaningful to Baudrillard. Contrary to simulation, seduction is pure pretense and not a world of signs.
Blask I 11
Fatality/Baudrillard: the fatal strategies include seduction, restoration and ecstasy. Everything is happening anyway.
Blask I 26
Simulacra = are artificial worlds of signs.
Blask I 34
Implosion/Baudrillard: the disappearance of the poles of cause and effect, of subject and object. Individual and class have no meaning anymore. Masses are only a statistical phenomenon. Implosion of the sense. Start of simulation.
Blask I 46
The symbolic exchange resolves the contrast between real and imaginary. Arbitrary interchangeability of the characters.
Blask I 47
Crisis: crisis is not a threat, but an attempt to renew confidence. Generated itself by the system.
Blask I 47
Symbolic exchange: (following Marcel Mauss): symbolic exchange is a gift without return and beyond the Equivalence Principle. No value law. One inevitably gets something back, but no value system dictates the appropriateness. Baudrillard: the system is to be challenged by a gift to which it cannot answer except through its own death and collapse.
Blask I 55
Alfred Jarry: "Pataphysics". In accordance with this, characterized and really his own work.
Blask I 57
Seduction: seduction is the bearer of reversibility. "Seduction is a pure pretense and not a sign world." It renounces the principle of representation and already establishes "the other" as opposed to the identical. Against any kind of causality and determination. The law gives way to the rule of the game, the simulation of the illusion, the communication of irony.
Seduction is more false than the false, for it uses signs that are already pseudo-forms to remove the meaning of the sign.
Blask I 58
Seduction: the starting point is the opposite: truth, results from a convulsive urge for revelation. Pornography, an example of the escalation of truth: more true than the truth. No secret. Even love stands after confession-like truth and ultimately obscenity.
Blask I 59
Seduction: seduction has no truth, no place, no sense. The seducer himself does not know the enigma of seduction. Woman: just pretense, she has a strategy of pretense.
Seduction: the strength of the seducer is not to desire. Reversibility as a counterforce to the causality principle.
Blask I 60
Seduction: seduction does not produce a law, but is based on rules of the game to which one can voluntarily engage. Love: love is individual, one-sided and selfish.
Seduction: seduction is two-sided and antagonistic, according to rules which have no claim to truth. Sexuality and love are rather resolutions of seduction. Seduction appreciates distance and is an infinite rescue of an exchange. The female is not the opposite of the male but his seducer. Seduction
Blask I 62
The Evil: the evil is not the opposite, but the deceiver of the good.
Blask I 67
Fatality/Baudrillard: Ecstasy - irony (overcomes morality and aesthetics) - superiority of the object Principle of evil - at the same time subversion.
Blask I 68
Ecstasy/Baudrillard: ecstasy lives in all things of the present. Passion for doubling and increasing. Adopts the dialectic, resolves its opposites. "Either or" no longer exists. E.g. Cancer Cells: growth acceleration, disorder and aimlessness.
Blask I 69/70
Ecstasy: ecstasy is simultaneously slowdown, laziness. End before the end and surviving at a standstill. What, dissolution and disaster. The return point has long since been crossed, the catastrophe is without consequences and thus inevitable as the purest form of the event. Small breaks replace the downfall.
Blask I 70
Indifference/Baudrillard: according to Baudrillard dreams, utopias and ideas have been played out, they have already been redeemed in reality. Everything has already taken place. The avant-garde has become as meaningless as the revolution. This is the transpolitical.
Blask I 78
The Other: is the last way out of the "Hell of the Same." (VsSartre).
Blask I 93
Asceticism/Baudrillard: The abundant society tends rather to asceticism because it wants to save what it has achieved.
Blask I 95/96
Mythic poles: myth of banality and myth of the desert. "Anything you cross with insane speed is a desert."
Blask I 102
Principle of the evil: the whole universe contradicts the principles of dialectics. In their stead, the principle of evil rules: "the malice of the object." Evil: Good and evil are not to be separated, nor distinguished as effects or intentions. Mental subversion by confusion, perversion of things, fundamental inclination to heresy. The principle of evil is the finished counterforce to logic, causality, and signification. "Say," God is evil, "is a tender truth, friendship for death, glide into space, into absence."
Blask I 104
Scene: the basis of every illusion, challenge of the real, the opponents of the obscene.
Blask I 105
Obscene: "The total obscenity of the money game."
Blask I 108
Ceremony of the world: everything is always predetermined. Need for a return.
Blask I 110
Virtual catastrophes: Schadenfreude of the machines. Delusion of prophylaxis. The last virus: the virus of sadness.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Texts Habermas Rorty III 231
Literature/Self/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the completely traditional image of the self with its three spheres is: the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic of central importance. >Self/Habermas.
This classification leads him to regard literature as a "cause of the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "judgement of taste".
Rorty III 232
Rorty: when we give up this division, we will not ask more questions like: "Does this book want to promote truth or beauty?" "Will it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" And instead ask, "What is the purpose of the book?"
>Art, >Truth of art, >Aesthetics.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truth Predicate Davidson Rorty VI 20
"True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true. >Truthmakers. "True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world".
---
Glüer II 27
Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. >Expressiveness, >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Truth theory. The truth predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: does not set up a truth definition at all.
Instead: Truth Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention truth as a criterion of appropriateness for truth-theories of natural languages.
Glüer II 28
Truth-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a truth-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth.
Glüer II
Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The truth-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - Truth-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interpreted/(s): know what a word means.
Rorty IV 22
True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence. Cf. >Correspondence theory.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Twin Studies Bouchard Corr II 158
Twin Studies/Behaviour/MISTRA/Study/Bouchard/Johnson: Researchers had realized early on that twins who were separated early in infancy and reared in different homes could offer particularly strong tests of genetic influence because, at least in the most direct sense of ‘environmental influence’ (after birth), any similarity in such pairs has to be due to genetic influence. (…) the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart (MISTRA; Segal, 2012)(1)
II 157
brought the gravitational centre of discussion ‘around the corner’ from general denial to general acceptance of the idea of genetic influences on behaviour
II 158
and psychological characteristics. At 139 pairs, MISTRA was by far the largest study of reared-apart twins. The sample was recruited beginning in 1979 over a period of 20 years, through many different sources ranging from members of the adoption movement and social work and other professionals to individuals who had recently learned they had a twin, heard of the project, and were seeking help in finding the co-twin.
II 159
The lengths of separation and contact of course also varied with age at study – older twins had more time either to be separated or in contact – which ranged from 19 to 68 years (…). (…) Bouchard fully expected that he would find that some individual characteristics would show genetic influences and others not. [He also] also expected that reared-apart twins would be distinctly less similar than reared-together twins, again more so for some characteristics than others.
II 160
MISTRA has generated almost 200 scientific papers due to its extremely extensive assessment and long-running nature. (…) perhaps one stands out as having had particular impact on the field (…): The Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart’ (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990)(2), published in Science in 1990. (…) it focused on genetic influences on IQ [and] it explored and compared reared-apart and reared-together twin similarity (…). The MISTRA [of this particular study] assessment included three independent measures of IQ. >Intelligence, >Intelligence tests, >Method, >Measurements.
Findings: The first study results were intra-class correlations of these three IQ scores in the MISTRA MZ twins. In reared-apart MZ (MZA) twins who directly/formally share effectively no environmental influences, these correlations are optimal because they are especially for data organized in groups (…).
II 161
They are direct estimates of the proportions of variance that can be attributed to genetic influence. Two were .78; the third was .69, with a mean of .75. It is suggested here that, assuming appropriateness of the assumption of no environmental similarity, genetic influences account for about 70% of population variance in IQ in adulthood. [Another possibility is that lacing separated twins in similar homes] could then induce similar behaviours and psychological characteristics in the twins. Separate indices of similarity of twins’ adoptive parent socioeconomic status (…) coupled with the associations between these home features and IQ, indicated not just no significant impact of placement similarity on IQ, but also measured its impact at effectively 0.
II 162
Twins who had been reared together and remained in closer contact in adulthood had been observed to be more similar in some ways than those maintaining less (Rose & Kaprio, 1988)(3), but there was evidence in another reared-together sample that similarity did more to encourage contact than vice-versa (Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, & Tellegen, 1990)(4). The MISTRA contact data indicated no greater similarity with greater time together before separation, time apart to first reunion, total time, or percentage of lifetime spent apart.
II 163
[The 1990 MISTRA study(2) also indicated that there is] substantial genetic variance on all the characteristics. They also, perhaps even more surprisingly, very often indicated that MZA twins are almost as similar as MZT twins, sometimes even as similar as the same person assessed twice within some rather short time-span such as a month (…).This suggested that neither common upbringing nor ongoing contact between family members does much to make them similar, at least in adulthood.
II 164
[Another implication by Bouchard et al. (1990)(2) was that] MZA twins must be so similar because their basically identical genomes lead them to experience more similar environments. (…) environmental options and the experiences and lessons they offer more often accentuate and deepen genetic influence than dampen it. >Nature versus nurture.


1. Segal, N. L. (2012). Born together, reared apart: The landmark Minnesota twin study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Bouchard, T., Jr., Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Segal, N. L., & Tellegen, A. (1990). Sources of human psychological differences: The Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart. Science, 250, 223–228.
3. Rose, R. J., & Kaprio, J. (1988). Frequency of social contact and intrapair resemblance of adult monozygotic co-twins – Or does shared experience influence personality after all? Behavior Genetics, 18, 309–328.
4. Lykken, D. T., Bouchard, T. J., Jr., McGue, M., & Tellegen, A. (1990). Does contact lead to similarity or similarity to contact. Behavior Genetics, 20, 547–561.


Johnson, Wendy: “Genetic Influences on Behaviour Revisiting Bouchard et al. (1990)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 155-170.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Validity Claims Habermas III 65
Definition validity claim/Habermas: a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of a statement are fulfilled. While yes/no opinions on claims to power are arbitrary, statements on claims of validity are characterised by the fact that the listener agrees or disagrees with a criticisable statement for reasons. They are an expression of insight. HabermasVsTugendhat: this neglects this distinction in E. Tugendhat 1976(1).
III 66
Examples of claims of validity are those of truth, correctness, appropriateness or comprehensibility (or well-formedness). These claims of validity are usually implicitly raised. >Truth, >Correctness, >Appropriateness, >Understandability, >Well-formedness.
IV 107
Validity Claim/Speech Act/Habermas: a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his/her offer independently of the normative context. >Motivation.
This is not the achievement of an effect with the listener, but a rationally motivated communication with the listener, which comes about on the basis of a criticisable validity claim. This is about a speaker's demand that the listener should accept a sentence as true or as truthful.
>Agreement.
IV 111
Norm validity/truth/Durkheim/Habermas: the idea of truth can only borrow from the concept of norm validity the determination of the impersonality deprived of time (2) of an idealized agreement, an inter-subjectivity related to an ideal communication community. >Norms, >Ideal speech community.
The authority behind knowledge does not (...) coincide with the moral authority behind norms. Rather, the concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with the claim to intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, the idea of correspondence of sentences and facts with the concept of an idealized consensus.
>Consensus, >Intersubjectivity, >Correspondence, >Facts, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Experience.
Validity Claim/Habermas: only from this connection does the term of a criticizable validity claim emerge.


1. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1976, p. 76f, 219ff
2. Vgl. 1.E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, S. 584.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Vitalism Mayr I 29
Vitalists/Vitalism/Mayr: Appropriateness (before Kant).
>Purposefulness.
"Protoplasm": a special substance that inanimate matter lacks.
I 31
Vitality, "élan vital". Fluid: (no liquid)
Debate "Preformations/Epigenesis Theory 2nd half of the 18th century.
Preformationists: believed that the parts of an adult individual were already present in smaller form at the beginning of its development. (Caspar Friedrich Wolff refuted preformation, needed causal power "vis essentialis").
I 33
Epigenetics: assumed that they appeared as products of a development, not at the beginning. >Terminology/Mayr.
Blumenbach, rejected "vis essentialis" and spoke of "educational drive" that plays a role not only in the embryo but also in growth, regeneration and reproduction.
I 35
Selection theory: made vitalism superfluous: Haeckel:"We recognize in Darwin's selection the decisive proof for the exclusive effectiveness of mechanical causes in the entire field of biology... definitive end of all teleological and vitalistic interpretations of organisms".(1)
I 35
Protoplasm: the search for it promoted a flourishing branch of chemistry: colloid chemistry. It was finally discovered that there is no protoplasm! Word and concept disappeared. Life: it became possible to explain it by means of molecules and their organisation!
Organic/inorganic: in 1828 urea was synthesized: first proof of the artificial conversion of inorganic components into an organic molecule!
I 38
Vitalism: Strange phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century vitalistic ideas arose. Bohr: in organisms, certain laws could have an effect that cannot be found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and drew on some desperate analogies.
MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing that can be considered.(Unclear only in the subatomic field).
Cf. >Eccles/Popper.


1. E. Haeckel (1869/1879). Über Entwicklungsgang und Aufgabe der Zoologie. In. Jeanuische zeitung 5 s. 353-370.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Correspondence Theory Fraassen Vs Correspondence Theory I 39
Science/Fraassen: Thesis: is a biological phenomenon: an activity of a type of organisms that facilitates their interaction with the environment. And that leads me to the fact that we need a completely different kind of explanation here. E.g. Augustinus: explains the fleeing of mouse before the cat by the fact that the mouse perceives the enemy.
VsAugustinus/VsKCorrespondence Theory/Animal: Problem: then it is again about the appropriateness ("adequacy") of ​​the mouse’s thoughts about the order of nature.
Why-Questions/DarwinismVsWhy-Question: instead: the mice with the right strategies survive without justifying the reasons.
I 40
Science/Success/Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: Similarly, I believe that the successful theories are those that survive. I.e. we do not need to explain why a theory is successful. It’s just not surprising.
I 219
Of course, you can also explain the survival of the mouse by the structure of its brain and its environment. Theories/Survival/Balmer/Fraassen: he would say the line spectrum of hydrogen survived as a successful hypothesis.
RealismVsAnti-Realism: it cannot assert either without admitting that both underlying theories are true.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J. Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
Brendel I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
Brendel I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.

Rorty II (b) 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II (b) 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II (b) 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.

II (d) 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II (d) 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II (d) 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"

V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Holism Millikan Vs Holism I 10
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning.
I 11
Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism.
properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world.
MillikanVsNominalismus.
I 13
MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed.
For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories.
Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid,
I 14
most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not.

I 67
conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction!
I 68
I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other.
MillikanVsHolismus.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However:
Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels.

I 298
Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify.
Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism.
I 299
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens.

I 318
Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses.
I 319
Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used.

I 321
Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Ordinary Language Black Vs Ordinary Language II 207
Everyday language/Austin: Passed the long test of survival of the fittest, finer distinction than theoretically designed artificial languages.
II 208
VsOrdinary language, Phil.der/Black: it is intellectually conservative.
II 161
VsLanguage/Black: There is a long tradition to rebel against alleged or actual deceptions by language: E.g. Logan Pearsall Smith: "I stood there for a while, thinking about language, about its perfidious meanness and its inappropriateness, about the shamefulness of our vocabulary and how the moralists have spoiled our words by infusing all their hatred of human happiness in the words like in little poison bottles."
"Logophobia"/Abhorrence of language/BerkeleyVsLanguage: "most of the knowledge is confusedbvand darkened by the misuse of words; since the words so much oppose understanding, I am determined to make as little use as possible of them and to try to involve them bare and naked in my ideas."
II 162
LockeVsLanguage: was so impressed by the errors, the darkness, the mistakes and the confusion which is caused by the bad use of words that he wondered if they contributed more to the improvement or prevention of knowledge. (Essay Book III, Chapter XI Section 4). WhiteheadVsLanguage: it is incomplete and fragmentary, it only represents a transitional stage beyond the monkey mentality. Main risk for philosophy: false confidence in the appropriateness of the language.
Wittgenstein: all philosophy is criticism of language.
Brigham Young: I long for the time in which the pointing of a finger or a gesture can express every idea without expression. (1854)
Swift: (trip to Balnibarbi): ... the project of the second professor was aimed at abolishing all words ...
II 163
The smartest followed the new method to express themselves through the things they carry in a bundle on their backs ...
III 166
SartreVsLanguage/Black: "disgust": Roquentin tried to retreat into silence.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Sophists Plato Vs Sophists Gadamer I 351
Sophisten/PlatonVsSophisten/Platon/Gadamer: Das Urbild aller leeren Argumentation ist die sophistische Frage, wie man überhaupt nach etwas fragen könne, was man nicht wisse. Dieser sophistische Einwand, den Plato im „Menon“(1) formuliert, wird dort bezeichnenderweise nicht durch eine überlegene argumentative Auflösung überwunden, sondern durch die Berufung auf den Mythos der Präexistenz der Seele. Das ist freilich eine sehr ironische Berufung, sofern der Mythos der Präexistenz und der Wiedererinnerung, der das Rätsel des Fragens und Suchens auflösen soll, in Wahrheit nicht eine religiöse Gewissheit ausspielt, sondern auf der Gewissheit der Erkenntnis suchenden Seele beruht, die sich gegen die Leerheit formaler Argumentationen durchsetzt. Gleichwohl ist es kennzeichnend für die Schwäche, die Plato im Logos erkennt, dass er die Kritik an der sophistischen Argumentation nicht logisch, sondern mythisch begründet. Wie die wahre Meinung eine göttliche Gunst und Gabe ist, so ist auch das Suchen und die Erkenntnis des wahren Logos kein freier Selbstbesitz des
Geistes.
Rechtfertigung durch den Mythos: (...) die mythische Legitimierung, die Plato der sokratischen Dialektik hier gibt, [ist] von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung(...). Bliebe das Sophisma unwiderlegt - und argumentativ lässt es sich nicht widerlegen -, würde dieses Argument zur Resignation führen. Es
ist das Argument der „faulen Vernunft“ und besitzt insofern wahrhaft symbolische Tragweite, als alle leere Reflexion ihrem siegreichen Scheine zum Trotz zur Diskreditierung der Reflexion überhaupt führt. Vgl. >Reflexion/Gadamer; HegelVsPlaton: >Reflexion/Hegel.


1. Menon 80 d ff.


Bubner I 37
DialekticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the effect-oriented speaker is mired in the illusion of words. (VsSophists).
Bubner I 50
Sophists/PlatoVsSophists: the sophist oscillates intangibly between different beings. The diaireses (distinctions), however, do not function by themselves, but only with the use of prior knowledge. Since the diaireses (distinction of genus and species) fail with the sophists, the insight into the inappropriateness of the method grows after a number of runs. The specifying of general terms cannot handle the sophists.
      This leads to a reflection on the appearance which always appears different from what it is, and thus remains elusive.
I 51
Logic/PlatoVsSophists: now, formal logic does not preclude pointless links. This results in the abandonment of the distinction between the philosopher and the mere sophist.
I 52
PlatoVsSophists: the ratio of the linked concepts to each other possibly obscures the relation between speech and thing. Closely related to the problem of otherness. The complex relation of otherness is no longer determinable with the sophists.       Thanks to his dialectical ability, the philosopher keeps track. Thus, dialectic is not a neutral method, either.
I 98
PlatoVsSophists: coherence theory instead of correspondence theory: not empiricism, but incompatible concepts criticize judgment

Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Semantics Brandom, R. I 297
Brandom Thesis: to understand semantics on the basis of pragmatics. The public linguistic practice of assertion and not the private mental practice of judgment is the basic activity.
II 238
Thesis: semantics must be oriented to pragmatics. Two groups: a) Correctness of use should explain appropriateness. (How to use them).
b) Behavioral: strictly non-normative.
Newen/Schrenk I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses conventional semantics. Instead of assuming, like semantics, that the correctness of the conclusion is e.g. "If Princeton lies east of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh lies west of Princeton" by the meaning of "eastern" and "western",
I 162
If he carries out a Copernican turn: Brandom: thesis: "western" and "eastern" receive their meaning precisely because they occur in such subsequent relationships. The whole network of sentence utterances in which the words occur, as well as the corresponding actions, constitute the conceptual content of the words.
Inferential Role Dummett, M. Brandom II 87
Dummett: proposes a model of conceptual content, understood as inferential role.   The use has two sides: the circumstances of its appropriateness and the consequences of its application.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001