Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertive Force | Assertive force: potential of an assertion for changing inferences in which an assertion appears. This is not primarily about truth. See also speech act theory, speech acts, force. |
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| Assertive Force | Brandom | I 142 Force/Brandom: assertive force is important because the word "true" is not important, but the assertive force with which the sentence is pronounced - difference: whether one refers to an object, or says something about it, i.e. states a fact. >Facts, >Judgments. I 142 Assertive force instead of the word "true" - reason: assertive force has inferential power - derivation scheme, not substantive fact - force: pragmatic significance. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Assertive Force | Geach | I 262 Assertive force/assertoric force/Geach: assertive force is demonstrated by the fact that a sentence is not included in a longer one. Cf. >Brandom: free-standing content. The assertion stroke adds no idea - so it should not be confudes with "it’s true that .."; ("true"can occur even in a not assertive sentence without changing its meaning). >Truth value, >Truth predicate, >Redundancy theory, >Assertion stroke. Error: to infer from this that "exist" adds no concept. (GeachVsHume). >Existence predicate. The sssertion stroke is a indefinable basic concept, cannot be explained. VsAttribution-theory: the predicate "poor" has no more claiming force than any other predicate, namely, none. >Predicates/Geach, >Predication/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Davidson Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 180/181 According to Davidson everything Frege referred to as "force", can be attributed to the non-language sector. It is sufficient to know the truth conditions of the utterance. Cf. >assertive force, >theory of force, >truth conditions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Theory | Wiggins, D. | Avramides I 26 Meaning Theory / Wiggins: (95) layer model of the m.th.: 1st level: isolated what was said literally. (for example, in terms of truth conditons). (Level of meaning, formal theories, Frege, Davidson, etc., "semantics") I 27 2nd level: is about the assertive force. (Use theories, "pragmatics") Other levels: perlucotionary effect, conversational implicatures, etc. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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