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Attribution | Millikan | Ruth G. Millikan Verschiedene Arten von zweckgerichtetem Verhalten in Dominik Perler, Markus Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 II 212 Animal/Thinking/Belief/propositional content/Millikan: what would really be necessary would not be a translation into Englisch, but an explicit description of the different representation systems that animals actually use. There are numerous possibilities between the propositional thinking of the human and the absence of any thought. >World/thinking, >Language and thought, >Animal language, >Representation. --- Millikan I 219 Indefinite Description/Belief Attribution/Millikan: E.g.: "Ralph believes that someone is a spy": this is, of course, ambiguous. A) directly as indicative by its own type on the belief type that "someone is a spy". That is, Ralph says this in his inner. B) the dependent sentence "someone is a spy" can be read as a form of belief, with a gap. "___ is a spy". N.B.: in this reading, Ralph believes of someone that he is a spy ((s) de re). Moved function: this moves the "someone" to the outside of the sentence. "He": its moved function is referential in this context. >Reference, >de re, >de dicto. I 220 Both readings are about a relation between Ralph and a belief type. In case (b), this type is not completely determined. >The Ralph case/Quine. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Attributive/referential | Millikan | I 215 Descriptive/Referential/Description/Classification/Millikan: one can force a descriptive description to function referentially, e.g. "He said that the winner was the loser". E.g. (Russell): "I thought your yacht was bigger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner", and "bigger than your yacht" must be considered as classified according to the adapted meaning. On the other hand: "The loser": probably has only descriptive meaning. "Your yacht": is classified by both: by adapted and by relational meaning, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) E.g.: "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras lies in Nicaragua". MillikanVsQuine: this is not, as Quine believes, obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational meaning in this context. Referential/descriptive/Belief attribution/intentional/Millikan: There are exceptions where the expressions are not descriptive, but also do not function purely referential, but also through relational meaning or intension. For example, "the man who drove us home" is someone who is well known to the speaker and listener. Then the listener has to assume that someone else is meant because the name is not needed. Rule: here the second half of the rule is violated for intentional contexts, "inserted any expression that receives the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is injured: "a sign has not only reference, but also meaning or intension, which must be preserved. Why would you use such a cumbersome description ("the man who drove us home") instead of the name? >Attribution, >Reference, >Predication, >Identification. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Beliefs | Cresswell | II 160 Belief/Representation/Cresswell: Representations are in the head ( they are private). Therefore they are not accessible to the speaker, who attributes propositional attitudes. - Therefore belief should be something else. >Attribution, >Belief attribution, >Other minds, >Representation, >Propositional attitudes, >Intersubjectivity. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Beliefs | Fodor | IV 114 Meaning holism/belief/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: if, according to Lewis' thesis, belief prevails over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, the following would have to be assumed: Def thesis of the primacy of belief/Lewis: the conditions of intentional attribution contain the conditions for belief attribution. Therefore, if the former is holistic, so must also be the latter. Semantic Holism/SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that the semantic holism might follow from this thesis ((s) belief holism seems plausible). IV 117 Belief holism does not lead to content holism, because content can be contradictory. Belief/Davidson: thesis: centrality of belief: there is no propositional attitude without some beliefs. Fodor/Lepore Vs: you can wish for this and that without believing this and that. Semantic holism is stronger: only semantically evaluable (true/false) states can be propositional attitudes. Belief/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: there is no connection between mental images (not true/false) and semantics (true/false). Orthogonal: belief properties: strength, vitality/representation: properties are ultimately geometric, i.e. the truth conditions are completely independent of the causal role. IV 156 Holism/Davidson: the fact that most beliefs are true implies that they are also coherent. New: also vice versa! > Holism: New: the interpreter cannot discover that the speaker is wrong in most utterances. He/she can only interpret the sentences that are caused by events and objects of the external world. IV 157 Beliefs/radical interpretation/Davidson: most of our beliefs are true: if true, causes ipso facto (in the light of the interpreter!). Fodor/Lepore Vs: truth conditions for a sentence must not be identified with the currently prevailing truth conditions >Radical Interpretation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Compositionality | Boer | I XVII Compositional semantics/belief-attribution/Boer: thesis: the compositional semantics should not explain the logical oddity of belief attribution as a pragmatic illusion (as Boer and Lycan attempted in 1980)(1) but accept and explain it. (BoerVsBoer, self-criticism). 1. Boer, St. & Lycan, W.G. "Who? Me?" In: The Philosophical Review 89:427-66. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Context/Context Dependence | Millikan | I 213 Intentional context/says that/believes that/belief attribution/Millikan: 1. Method: to ask: what characteristics of expressions must be preserved during the translation from direct to indirect speech. E.g. translation of "John said p" to "John said that q". Millikan: thesis: the rule will be to get the reference, no matter what expression must be used. Problem: when a descriptive expression needs to be translated. Then the relational meaning must also be preserved. I 214 2. Method: every indexical expression token in intentional contexts should be read as a shifted (i.e., normal!) adapted referent from the current context, not from the original context. >Belief ascription, >Indirect speech, >Quote, >Translation, >Utterance. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Each/All/Every | Millikan | I 220 Everyone/All/Belief/Belief Attribution/Millikan: E.g. "Ralph believes that every member of our secret club is a spy". A) Ralph says in his inner language "Every member ..." B) A form with a gap: "___ is a spy" is filled each time by another member. This is e.g. also possible even if Ralph does not know anything about our club. Sense: is then the same as in the clearer example: "Of each member believes Ralph ..." Again, for both readings it applies: a relation between Ralph and a belief type is depicted. >Beliefs. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Evidence | Loar | Avr I106 Def "normal evidence"/Loar: only non-verbal behavior. - This is not sufficient for attribution of beliefs about Martians - but we have more. >Belief attribution, >Beliefs, >Behavior. Solution: knowledge of the internal organization of the Martians - which claims a deep epistemic asymmetry. >Mental states, >Other minds. Normal level of evidence: superficial epistemic symmetry: strong dependence on belief and meaning. >Language behavior, >Language community. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Intentionality | Field | II 89 Intentionality/Language/Field: Language comes into play only when "believes that" is attributed. Thesis: serious behavioral attribution works without language. >Behavior, >Behaviorism, >Attribution, >Belief attribution, >Beliefs, >Explanation. II 100 Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that suffices a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mind states (by sets of possible worlds). >Possible worlds, >Atomism. Instead: we need a systematic approach of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds. >Hyperintensionality, >Fine-gained/coarse-grained, >Content, >Intentions, >Intensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Mind-Dependence | Field | II 159 Linguistic point of view/Field: The linguistic point of view accepts no meanings as mind-independent entities. - But it attributes words of an interpreter to a speaker's words. The relations are based on different characteristics - i.e. on inferences that contain that word. What I call "meaning characteristic". >Belief attribution. E.g. Tip brackets: same meaning characteristic then (by inference) as my actual use of "rabbit". - They are adopted without presupposing any intentional entities. >Gavagai/Field, >Quotation marks, >Description levels, >Language use. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Reference | Boer | I XIV Definition mental reference/terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: to be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I 20 Mental reference/Boer: it is hardly controversial to assume that it is a participation-independent relation, i.e. weakly metaphysical intentional. It is controversial whether mental reference is also strongly metaphysical intentional. Belief attribution: in everyday life, we regard e.g. "Some people believe that Atlantis sank in the sea" as true. Problem: one may be afraid to attribute to these people an intentional relation to something non-existent. Mental reference/Boer: Thesis: after having accepted the distinction "there is/exists", we can consider mental reference as an existence-independent relation. On the other hand: Belief/Boer: (instead of mental reference): here it is not so clear whether this is an existence-independent relation, solely because of the fact that we have the being/existent distinction. Thought content/GI: Problem: we still do not know what thought contents are. Platonism/N.B.: if we assume that thought content could be equated with propositions, states, or properties and that they would be accepted as Platonic in existence without having to participate in the world, then we would not have to assume the belief relation as existence-independent. But for this we need a proper theory of the nature of thought contents and attitude relations to them. --- I 21 Mental reference/concept dependency/Boer: is it also dependent on the concept? Concept dependency/logical form/Boer: according to (D5) would it be sufficient that mental reference (thinking about) implies that for a representation z, an intrinsic property of z and a behavior-determining relation Q: A) x has Q z z B) z contains something that expresses or maps y for x C) Whether x has the relation Q to a representation of y depends on whether the representation has one or more of a range of intrinsic features. But this presupposes believe as a concept-dependent relation. Believe/question: whether believe is a relation mediated by representations. So B) z has a fulfillment condition defined by y and C) as above. Believe/Representation/Boer: to clarify whether believe is a representational-mediated relation, we need a theory of propositional attitudes. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Terminology | Boer | I XI TI/Boer: Thesis: Believe as a 2-digit relation to a special kind of property ("thought content"). Spelling: German writing (fracture). --- I XI Stock: Relation theory: Boer pro: belief as a relation to thought content (certain property) STI/Boer: Semantics for belief attribution, which considers substitutional opacity in belief reports as a genuine semantic feature. Thesis: these two together solve many known puzzles. Object-dependent senses/Frege/Boer: these are to be defended here (Boer pro Frege). --- I 6 Participating/Participation/Boer: a thing that does not participate in the world is either e.g. a non-existent thing or a non-space-time individual, a non-existent or false proposition, a non-existent or non-persisting state, a non-existent or unexplained property or relation, or a non-existent or non-occurring event. So more precisely: (D2) R is a participation-independent relation = it is possible for an existing thing to have a relation R to a thing that does not participate in the world. E.g. mental reference: would then be intentional simply because one can think of abstract as well as of concrete individuals (also unexemplified properties, etc.). Relation/Participation/Boer: although a tolerant actualist who acknowledges the existence of relations at all, accepts that some relations are participation-independent, the relation of such relations is not limited to existing things. (D2) only requires that an existing thing has such a relation to a non-participating thing. Relation R: from the fact that someone has R to something does not follow that this something participates in the world ((s) one can think of abstract objects). Non-existence: if there are non-existent things, there is nothing in (D2) that forbids one to have a participation-independent relation like mental reference to them. ((s One can think of something non-existent) That at most will be rejected by a very strict nominalism. --- I 12 Notation/Boer: N: be an entity of a given type (E: spelling in the book: black letter) EN: be the essential property of things of this type N iff --- I 13 i) EN can be exemplified (i.e., that there may be such a thing) ii) necessary: a thing exemplifies EN iff it is identical to N. Haecceitas: of N. the property to be N. This would be trivially the essence of N. --- I 13 Definition normal/terminology/Boer: if we wanted to name things for which it is possible that they exist/that they are actual. Definition abstract/terminology/Boer: be a thing for which it is not possible that it exists/is actual. Fiction/fictitious/Boer: a) in the first sense: (mere Possibilia): normal, if non-existent. b) as essentially fictional: abstract. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
That-Clauses | Millikan | I 211 Believes that/says that/quotation marks/Millikan: 1. in a particular context, an expression may have a shifting function that is indexical. 2. We already know three ways how expressions can be grouped into types. Could there not be another way that stands across to families or languages? E.g. "says that" instead of mentioning quotation marks? >Quotation marks/Millikan, >Quotes/Millikan, >Context, >Indexicality. I 212 E.g. "Galileo said "Eppur si muove" and not "the earth is moving". Family/function/classification/grouping/Millikan: E.g. Human hearts and fish hearts can be grouped together, although they are elements of different families. 3. Belief attribution/quote/Millikan: "believes that .." "says that ..." are representations. Could there not be a way to classify representations that stand across to the distinction inside/outside? Problem: "believes that" does not always correspond to an inner representation. E.g. John believes that Cicero is Tullius. ((s) Identity statements are not representations). So we cannot say that the term alone "believes that" indicates an own type. Classification/Millikan: if it is not to happen according to families, there are obvious alternatives: 1. Classification according to stabilization function: I 213 Question: What about the referring expressions in the sentence? These have Fregean sense. Fregean Sense/Millikan: there are two types of indexical expressions: A) relational meaning and B) adapted meaning. Intension: here, too, there are two indexical expressions. A) language-bound B) fully-developed (language-independent). Which of the four types is meant in "says that"? There will be different methods of classification. >Fregean sense, >Intension, >Classification. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Church, A. | Stalnaker Vs Church, A. | II 127 Belief attribution/belief ascription/foreign-language/foreign language/Stalnaker: if O'Leary speaks another language it makes no difference for the explanation as long as he is somehow familiar with Venus. O’Leary's belief is one about mars and hesperus, not about language. Diagonalization/Stalnaker: works here likewise. Against: Belief on language use/conviction about language/Church/Burge/Stalnaker: Church 1954, Burge 1978): e.g. Alfred believes that "a fortnight" is a period of 10 days. This is then true in all possible worlds with this semantic rule for English and wrong in others. Translation/Church: problem: there is no translation test for it! (if an error is in play). E.g. a translation into German would not express the same because there is an equivalent for "a fortnight" in German. Stalnaker: Church seems to say with this that the proposition cannot express what it seems to express. Solution/Church: metalanguage. StalnakerVsChurch: we can explain the failure of translation tests without this conclusion: II 128 Solution/Stalnaker: diagonalization: translation into another language will change the possible contexts for propositions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Instrumentalism | Field Vs Instrumentalism | II 30/31 FieldVsInstrumentalism: it is inappropriate: belief attributions can be literally true and are not just useful tools that we use for various purposes. The usefulness of the attribution of beliefs and desires does not imply that Brentano’s problem is solvable. (> Quine 1960, § 45). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Kamp, H. | Stalnaker Vs Kamp, H. | II 104 Possible worlds semantics//KampVsPossible worlds semantics/KampVsStalnaker: the approach is not rich enough to represent all differences. Kamp (1988)(1) adopts an example by Barbara Partee: Example Pronoun/pronouns/anaphora/presupposition: (2) a. Exactly one of 10 balls is not in the bag b. It is under the sofa (3) a. Exactly 9 of 10 balls are in the bag b. It is under the sofa. Kamp: Suppose the discourse takes place in the same initial context. That means 1. statement: changes the context. 2. statement: is made in the changed context. II 105 Important argument: the first statements of the two pairs (2a) and (3) are truth conditionally equivalent. – that means they are true in exactly the same set of poss.w.. Context/possible world/poss.w./Kamp: if context are now sets of poss.w. and if assertions add only the truth conditional content to the context, the context will later be the same. But the contexts on the other side must surely be different in both cases because although (2b) and (3b) are the same sentence it must express different propositions in both cases. "In the second case it cannot refer to "the ball". KampVsPossible worlds semantics: if the sentences are truth conditionally equivalent no two different sets of poss.w. can be distinguished here. StalnakerVsVs: it is true that our abstract approach does not predict this difference, namely, because it says nothing about how pronouns function. Two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: is no meaning theory. StalnakerVsKamp: it is not correct that you have to conclude from the fact that the former contexts are identical that the later contexts are also identical. By this you ignore the first way how a speech act changes the context (see above II 102 above). That a statement was made at all is sufficient, together with any information that follows from it, along with a permanent background information on conventions. Thus one can distinguish two later contexts, relative to which (2b) and (3b) are interpreted. Pronoun/Stalnaker: "it" apparently requires a context in which a particular individual is prominent. II 106 Context/possible worlds semantics/StalnakerVsKamp/Stalnaker: solution: as long as the minimal assumption makes that information to determine the content may be relevant only if it is assumed by the speaker that this information is also accessible to the listener, we can be sure that the set of poss.w. that defines the presuppositions is sufficient to represent a context. An assertion changes the context already alone by the fact that it is made! (1) Kamp, Hans (1988): Comments on Stalnaker, Belief Attribution and Context. In Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (Eds.): Contents of Thought: Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. Tucson, University of Arizona Press. pp. 156-181. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Lewis, D. | Fodor Vs Lewis, D. | Block I 163 Pain/FodorVsLewis: if you say that pain in humans and Martians is different, you are not stating on the basis of which properties both of them perceive pain. Any disjunction of physical conditions which used to mean pain in the history of the universe, is not a solution. Because that does not cover what the individuals have in common. I 215 Pain/FodorVsLewis: since the property of having the state is a functional one - and not only a functionally characterized property, Lewis is still bound by the functionalism discussed here. Pain/VsLewis: the functionalism presented here asserts a state Z that is defined as a state with such and such a causal role, and the functionalist assertion becomes: "Pain = Z". Here, Z itself is not a functional state (> Ramsey-functional Correlate). I 217 FodorVsLewis: the contrast to Lewis (functional characterization of a state rather than a functional state) can be made clearer: e.g. assuming, a condition type is a specific type of property. Namely, the property which each token of this condition has because it is a token of this type. Then, the pain condition would be identified with the property of being a pain (not of being in pain). I.e. in terms of the pain and not of the organism. Lewis: defines pain as the state that has a certain causal role ("ix"). Functionalism/Block: pain as the property of playing a certain causal role ("lx"). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 107 Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: the radical interpretation is governed by fundamental principles that tell us how belief and meanings are usually related to each other, as well as to behavior and sensory input. IV 108 These fundamental principles are nothing but a lot of platitudes of common sense. E.g. that most of the beliefs of the speaker are true. But that can only be true if the speaker has several propositional attitudes. Holism/Fodor/Lepore: then holism can be derived from the conditions for the intentional attribution! Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: (he might perhaps agree): it is not clear that anything metaphysically interesting follows from the fulfillment of conditions for the intentional attribution. IV 114 Meaning Holism/MH/belief/Fodor/Lepore: if according to Lewis’ thesis belief has primacy over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, for example, the following would have to be assumed: Def Thesis of the "Primacy of Belief"/PT/Lewis: thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions of belief attribution. Therefore: if the former is holistic, so must be the latter." Semantic Holism/SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that semantic holism might follow from this thesis (belief holism seems plausible). Primacy of Belief/Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: the thesis is so strong that semantic holism emerges even without the principle of charity. Even without any theory of interpretation! But we do not believe that the thesis is true. RI/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: his version of radical interpretation does not endorse the thesis of the primacy of belief (PT) and we do not say that he accepts it at all. We believe that the PT is not true. Holism/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: but if Lewis does not represent the primacy thesis, his arguments in favor of holism are limited. They can show that belief qua belief is holistic, but not that they are holistic qua intentional. IV 121 VsLewis: the primacy thesis is implausible. IV 131 Fodor/LeporeVsDavison/VsLewis: it could be said: because the semantics of representations is atomistic, it follows that intentional attribution as such is not determined by constitutive principles like the principle of rationality! Allowing the attribution of irrational propositional attitudes would simply be a "change of subject". That would be no intentional states! I.e if we attribute irrational things to the speaker, we change our opinion on the content of his mental states. Vs: 1) It could be made stronger, not only epistemically, by saying that even God would change the content of his attribution, before violating rationality. IV 132 2) Assuming the point was metaphysical and not only epistemic: nevertheless it does not follow from the atomistic approach to mental semantics that the principle of rationality could be ignored in the attribution. You cannot believe simultaneously that p and that not p. These principles are constitutive of belief, and also for wishes, etc. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
Perry, J. | Stalnaker Vs Perry, J. | II 21 Ascription/attribution/belief attribution//propositional knowledge/index words/Heimson/Stalnaker: generally two questions have to be distinguished: 1. What is the content of belief? 2. What is the nature of the relationship between the believer and the content? The crucial indexical element lies in the answer to the second question. Solution/calibration/Stalnaker: the possible situations must be "calibrated": that means time and place have to be specified. ((s) Thus, the sets of possible worlds (poss.w.) are restricted). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: Perry distinguishes belief state and belief content. Content/StalnakerVsPerry: but this one has a different concept of content. His term does not reflect adequately the informational content of convictions. II 147 StalnakerVsPerry/Perry/Stalnaker: Belief state/Perry/Stalnaker: this one distinguishes it from belief content (content) Informational content/content/StalnakerVsPerry: with this distinction the informational content is not displayed correctly. Index words/Perry/Stalnaker: are part of the information, not part of the means of representation. II 148 Belief object/information/StalnakerVsPerry: problem: if the index words are part of the information its belief objects cannot be the informational content (or information). E.g. Ortcutt/Lingens: although according to Perry the content of the proposition "You are Rudolf Lingens" and the expressed belief and the one of the proposition "I am Rudolf Lingens" are the same this common content can, however, not be identified with the information! Common content/content/Perry/Stalnaker: according to Perry the common content is namely "Lingens is Lingens". Problem: Lingens believed that already earlier ((s) even without knowing that he himself is Lingens). Solution/Perry/Stalnaker: he believes it now in a new way. That means he is in a new belief state. ((s) Perry like Frege: way of givenness). Belief state/informational content/StalnakerVsPerry: belief states are too subjective to represent informational content because the relevant counterpart of Ortcutt is different to Lingens' belief state in which he is put by Ortcutt's information. Content/Perry: = belief object. Belief object/content/StalnakerVsPerry: Perry's belief objects are too extensional to capture the information which is delivered during communication. We need an intermediate concept: II 149 Solution/Stalnaker: proposition as intermediate concept between belief state and belief object: Proposition/Stalnaker: divides the set of possible worlds (poss.w.) (here: possible situations) into two subsets, the ones in which the proposition is true and the ones in which it is false. Belief object/Stalnaker: propositions as b.o. can reconcile the traditional doctrines (see above) with the examples for essential indexical belief. This is a more natural access than that of Perry and Lewis. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Putnam, H. | Stalnaker Vs Putnam, H. | II 23 Belief ascription/belief attribution/externalism/anti-individualism/wide content/Burge/Stalnaker: thesis: the ascription of wide content is generally only an indirect and vague way to describe underlying facts described more directly by the narrow content. Narrow content/StalnakerVsNarrow content/StalnakerVsPutnam/Stalnaker: n.c. is obscure and confused. E.g. twin earth: it are the properties of the convictions that are "wide" not the content itself. II 24 Def "organismic contribution"/Dennett: (Dennett 1982): contribution to the belief content: an intrinsic component e.g. of water. Analogy e.g. mass as it contributes to weight. Thesis: one might view intentional properties as intrinsic components of convictions. StalnakerVs: yet it is not clear whether one should establish the distinction narrow / wide in the content. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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Form/Content | Davidson, D. | Fod / Lep IV 121 Davidson: information about the form of the words, which are held to be true, are the decisive evidence for both, meaning attribution (content) and belief attribution! Thus, the epistemic conditions for both are inextricably linked. |
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Belief/content | Lewis, D. | Fod / Lep IV ~ 109 Lewis: intentional attribution: "primacy of belief": the terms of the attribution of content include the conditions of belief attribution. ((s) This is not as represented by Lewis). |
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