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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atoms | Quine | IX 7f Atomic schemas: E.g. "Fxy", "Gx" etc: can represent any number of complex statements. I 218 Atomic Facts/Quine/Cresswell: "Quine has no interest in a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of all others. Quine: correct. See also >Atomism/Quine. XIII 12 Atom/Atoms/Quine: Worlds/Possible Worlds/Best World/Leibniz/Quine: according to Leibniz we are blessed with the "best of the worlds". But "the best" according to what criteria? He gives a hint: Def Perfection/perfect/Leibniz/Quine: wealth of purposes and economy of means. The number of components and forces with which the observed wealth of the world is attainable must be as small as possible. Science: similar procedure. Theory/Quine: is always more complicated than you want, but the scientist is committed to his/her stubborn data and does what he/she can. Leibniz/Quine: was himself a scientist, so he came up with it. Atomism/Atom/Democritus/Leukipp/Quine: also their atomism was motivated by the pursuit of economy. They limited the possible variability of the building blocks of nature. The atoms differed only in shape and size. XIII 13 Point event/four-dimensionalism/space-time points/Quine: pro: 1. because it turned out that the basic building blocks (quarks, etc.) are not as uniform as one had hoped from the atoms. 2. because there are problems identifying a particle from one moment to another (identity in time, temporal identity, elementary particles). Individuality/Particle Physics/Quine: the statistical interchangeability of particles threatens their individuality. Atom/Atomism/Quine: but which decisive move should make a theory atomistic anyway? XIII 14 Solution/Quine: Thesis: there are an infinite number of particles, but not an infinite number of types of particles. Identity/elementary particles/species/Quine: particles of the same species play an identical role within the laws of theory. Only this allows the theory to be suitable for measuring information. Def point event/Quine: are atoms whose types are the different states in which a point can be, according to prevailing physics. The atoms are the minimal space-time localizations and the species are the few things that can happen in such a place. Point/Linguistics/Atom/Quine: for linguists the point is the phoneme. Not the phonemes themselves, (their sound is individual to each speaker) but their classifiability! Def Phonem/Quine: is not a single sound, but a type of sound. They are then equivalent for all purposes in the particular language, even if they are not phonetically identical! Atoms/Speeche/Quine: Atoms fall under phonemes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Existence | Leibniz | Holz I 48/49 Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason. Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum). >Inside/outside/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means: Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one." Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason. Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle. >Totality/Leibniz. Holz I 70 Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it. Holz I 71 "We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self). >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole). Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. >Necessity/Leibniz. In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Holz I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" are in a very specific follow-up ratio: The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. Holz I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. Holz I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Holz I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. Holz I 91 Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason. 2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause. 3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought. 4. So there is a cause! Holz I 92 5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving). 7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible. 8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others. 9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities. 10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content. 11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world). 12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety. Holz I 93 13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory). Holz I 120 World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself. Holz I 12 Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well. Then we can reformulate the question: Why does this world exist and not another? >Possible world/Leibniz, >Possibility/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Reality | Leibniz | Holz I 61 Reality/Leibniz: what is possible to think of is reasonable and could be, purely logical, possible as well. >Possibilty/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. I 125 Perfection/existence/Leibniz: e.g. suppose A, B, C, D are equal, but D is incompatible with A and B, the others are all compatible with each other except D, then it follows that A, B, and C exist if D is excluded. This is the principle of composibility. >Principles/Leibniz. Reality/Leibniz: reality always has the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio". Best world/best of all possible worlds/Leibniz: that is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which results from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not mutually prevent each other. To this extent, this world is by no means accidently the same as it is. Translating this into theology, it means that God has created the world neccessarily according to his own rationality because it is the optimization of the processes caused by this rationality. >Possible world/Leibniz. VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Ironization of Leibnizian Theory. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Anselm of Canterbury | Lewis Vs Anselm of Canterbury | IV 30 Existence of God/Ontology/Anselm/Lewis: Problem: the ontologist cannot claim that our world is the best world in comparison to other worlds, e.g. this would be the same as a historian who states that he/she lives in a "remarkable time", i.e. the present. >Proof of God's existence. Actual World: the actual world is not special in itself, but there is a particular relationship for the ontologist. And therein lies the problem: Other worlds have the exact same relationship/connection to other ontologists! Therefore, there is absolutely no reason for the ontologist to assume that his/her world is the best in comparison to other possible worlds. LewisVsAnselm: e.g. regarding the size of the object of the worlds, e.g. "the place of the largest size". The only remaining valid argument is 3A (see below). IV 13 Existence of God/Anselm/Lewis: 3 premises: there is a thing that is understandable; its size cannot be surpassed by a being, not even if we imagine one. Size: is relative in the possible world, i.e. it belongs to the objects paired with worlds. What do we then mean if speaking about the size of x? What size of x? In what possible world? Different answers lead to different non-modal translations of premise 3. A: size should be then what cannot be surpassed in the actual world. This is naturally what we mean if we do not mention worlds. This also means, however, when other worlds are discussed as well, that it is plausible... IV 14 ...that we are always speaking about our actual world if we do not explicitly state otherwise. Notation of the actual world: @. Logical Form: 3 A e.g.(Vx & ~EwEy(Ww & ywGx@)) There is a thing x that can be imagined, so there is no world w and no thing y in which w can be surpassed by the size of x in the actual world. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Verschiedene Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Metz II 70 Bieri: you could say VsLeibniz: 1. what is happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is lawlike linked to events outside, it represents by virtue of this link, 2. the fact that the events in question give the whole person an adequate behavior in a certain situation. But our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but content of experience. Leibniz I 125 Perfection/Existence/Leibniz: for example, assuming that A,B,C,D are of equal rank, but D is incompatible with A and B, but the others are all compatible with each other except with D, then it follows that A,B and C exist to the exclusion of D. This is the principle of compressibility. Reality/Leibniz: in each case the highest degree of factual content (realization): "perfectio". Best world/best of all possible worlds/possible world/Leibniz: this is the meaning of the thesis that we live in the best of the worlds: it is simply the realization of most possibilities, which follows from the fact that all possibilities are realized which do not exactly hinder each other. In this respect, it is not by chance that this world is the way it is. Translated into theology this means that God necessarily created the world according to his own rationality, because it is the optimization of the processes conditioned by this rationality. VoltaireVsLeibniz: "Candide". Vs "Best of the Worlds". Kripke I 9 Leibniz' Principle of the Indistinguishability of the Identical/Kripke: always seemed evident to me. VsLeibniz: when some philosophers doubted it, it always turned out that areas were confused that do not express real properties in contexts, or it concerned the collapse of individuals, with which identity was confused between individuals. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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