Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Causal Explanation Allport Corr I 29 (XXIX)
Causal force/Causation/Psychology/Personality Traits/Allport: Allport (1937)(1) saw personality traits as possessing causal force. Traits correspond to ‘generalized neuropsychic structures’ that modulate the individual’s understanding of stimuli and choice of adaptive behaviours. Thus, traits represent more than some running average of behaviour. Cf. the philosophical discussion on causal forces and causality: >Causal forces/Philosophy, >Causal Explanation/Philosophy.

1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Causality Kripke Rorty II 131
Kripke/RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description. Causal forces are independent of description. ---
Stegmüller IV 82
Causality/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripke/Stegmüller: even an omniscient being could, if it considers the individual events, only see the sequence, but not the necessity - in the universe it encounters possible worlds where less strict laws apply.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Causality Parsons Habermas IV 309
Causality/Action/Motives/Moral/Durkheim/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons considers Durkheim's distinction between moral and causal force the decisive breakthrough VsEmpirism. Parsons: the fear of sanctions is always secondary, the sense of moral obligation is primary. (1)

1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 709.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Evolution Tomasello Genz II 173
Human/Evolution/Tomasello/Genz: Tomasello Thesis: All typical human possibilities are based on a single genetic progress. Homo sapiens: has, as the only one, the possibility of identification with others.
Genetic development: the time since the occurrence of the first human being about 1 million years ago is for a genetic development much too short.
---
II 174
Tomasello: Thesis: Only the human has the ability to understand external events through mediating intentions or causal forces. In this way he is able to predict the behavior of his conspecifics.

Tomasello I
Michael Tomasello
Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation Frankfurt/M. 2011


Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002
Flux Bigelow I 71
Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: cooperates very well with the Cartesian law of inertia. Thereafter, the same speed is not a change. Defintion law of inertia/Descartes/Bigelow/Pargetter: an object moves at a constant velocity when no forces act on it.
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we assume that any change needs a cause, the Flux doctrine revises the Aristotelian view of the movement. (FluxVsAristoteles).
Change/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the Flux-Doctrine states that a change of location is an extrinsic change for a body, because the intrinsic property of speed does not have to change for this.
Flux/explanation: for most changes flux is the better explanation.
---
I 72
Change/Bigelow/Pargetter: for a few changes, Ockham's explanation ((s) is not a vector for instantaneous velocity) better: for example twilight, for example, cooling, for example, moral improvement, simply much that people contemplated about in the Middle Ages. Impulse/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: has a body according to the Ockhamists because it had that and that position at the time.
Problem: this requires that, e.g. a meteor has a "memory".
Acceleration/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem becomes more difficult when e.g. the meteor has still an acceleration, because this still needs additional assumptions. Then the movement of the meteor depends on the distances of points in space.
Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: that the movement depends on the prehistory, cannot simply be lead ad absurdum. Only the flux doctrine is more elegant.
Impulse/Shock/Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: The meteor has the impulse according to the flux doctrine due to its instantaneous properties.
Prehistory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can play an epistemic role to explain why the body has its instantaneous speed.
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the causal cause, however, is the instantaneous velocity and not the prehistory.
VsOckhamism/VsOckham/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: For example, the perfectly homogeneous, rotating disk.
---
I 73
Motion/Bigelow/Pargetter: the movement of this disk does not lead to any change in the distribution of qualities. Nevertheless, it differs from an inactive disk. The two are distinguished by their causal forces. Explanation: change the material parts. Time sections of the rotating disk provide circles, the ones of the stationary disk do not.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: the concept of identity that is used here is controversial. It does not rely on the possibility of qualitative distinction or tracking back in time cannot rely on tracking an identifiable piece of matter. This leads to haecceitas
Haecceitism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is based on the assumption that identity cannot always be based on the same qualities. For example a perfectly rotating homogeneous disk.
Haecceitas: This-ness.
Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not resist against non-qualitative identity. We accept that the rotating disk has a pattern of changing identities.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not the whole story:
Causal forces: e.g. the rotating disk: are not provided by the non-qualitative identities.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: the individual parts of the homogeneous disk have an instantaneous speed.
---
I 74
These lead to the fact that the time sections describe circles. Universals/Physics/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is the reason why we say that instantaneous speed - a vector with magnitude and direction - is a universal that body at a time can possess. It is an intrinsic property.
Property/Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we have to explain what kind of property this is that has a size and direction.
Size/Direction/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to the flux doctrine, the size and direction of a vector are more difficult to explain. We cannot explain the necessary instantaneous velocity by the pattern of the earlier positions.
Solution/flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need a theory of relations between properties.
Size/direction/vector/Ockham/Bigelow/Pargetter: can simply say that both are given by the previous history of the earlier positions.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Forces Cartwright I 59
Composition / causes / forces / Physics / Cartwright: E.g. mix of electromagnetics and gravity. - Vector addition: is a calculation! - It is not nature, what "adds" the forces - because the "component forces" are not there! - MillVs: the partial forces exist. - CartwrightVsMill: Partial forces do not exist - not even - "partial movement towards the north and the east" where the body moves to the northeast. - I 61 solution / Cartwright: we have to give up the "facts-view": In the vector addition causal forces are added - no physical forces - then not "behavior" of the body, but "ability" to behave" - problem: so easily the "facts" cannot be abandoned.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Forces Danto I 309
Force/Causality/Cause/Effect: Causal processes contain states of representation as causes or effects. We evaluate a causal process as an action only if the effect is not only caused by the representation but makes the representation true at the same time.
I 310
Causality takes place only between material states. "Make true"/Danto: Causality is always material, representation is made true, embodied.
Idealist: is just as right: if no representations were embodied, we would be purely physical systems.
Truth becomes a causal force, so to speak. The way we represent the world becomes a factor of the way the world is.


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Measurements Davidson I (b) 23
Propositional objects/Davidson: Thesis: attribution of propositional objects to other persons is analog to measuring. E.g. objects of wishes, beliefs, intentions.
They have no causal forces and therefore they cannot affect our mind and our brain, or us at all.
In what relation can we stand to them at all?
These are the two tools that allow a finite vocabulary to cover infinite regions. Objects allow us to get adjectives under control. Events do the same for some adverbs. And when measuring, this task is fulfilled by the numbers.
Now we can separate the semantic need for objects by which one can specify the content of propositions from the idea that there must be any objects at all with which someone who has a propositional attitude is in psychic contact.
E.g.: weights of different objects: some weigh the same, some weigh twice as much, some nothing. The introduction of a scale does not change this.
The only objects we need are the numbers and the things that have weight. With the statement: in Karat, the weight of the diamond is 109, we do not specify weights in the sense of objects.
According to this, there is no alternative for the conceptions of doctrines as relational sentences.
This "relativism", however, contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real".
I (b) 26
Measuring/Davidson: a scale does not alter the fact of weight or ratios - numbers are needed but do not belong to the object - ontology: weight is nothing objectual - analogy to measurement: attribution of intentional states - numbers: here only the proportions have to be preserved - however: if there is no contradiction between 0° Celsius and 32° Fahrenheit, this does not show that the measured properties are not "real".

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Negation Millikan I 221
Not/"not"/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: Thesis: "not" is an operator who operates on the rest of the sentence by changing the sense of the entire sentence. Negative sentence/negation/existence/Millikan: negative sentences cannot have non-existent facts as the real value.
Reason: Negative facts do not have causal forces that could play a role in a normal explanation.
Negative sentence/Millikan: we could assume that negative sentences are not representations. E.g. "not-p" is called "the fact that -p does not exist" In a similar way, Wittgenstein has understood it as well.
N.B.: we had said above, that existence sentences are not representations.
Image theory/picture theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but understood sentences of the form "x
does not exist" are understood in this way as to map a non-existent fact. Then the variable
"x" in "x does not exist" does not go via names of single objects (objects, elementary objects) but via representations of possible states (possible facts).
Meaning/Non-existence/Negation/Wittgenstein/Millikan: so it was possible for him to maintain that sentences of the form "x does not exist" have a meaning ((s)> Non-Existence/Meinong).
Millikan: in our terminology it means that they are representations (MillikanVs).
---
I 222
And at the same time, he could claim that the most basic elements of all propositions correspond to real objects. N.B.: that made it possible that he could say "x does not exist" is always equivalent to a sentence of the form "not-p".
Millikan: could we not maintain at least half of this equivalence? The from "not-p" to "that -p does not exist"?
MillikanVsWittgenstein: No, not even this we can do.
If Wittgenstein was right and "not-p" says "that -p does not exist," then that would mean for my position that negative sentences do not map world states and are not representations.
Millikan: instead, they would represent linguistic facts, "not-p" would then be an icon, but it does not represent, whereby a world state would have the sentence type "p" as a variant.
Protoreferent/Millikan. "p" would not be a representative of "not-p" but a protoreferent.
Question: would "not-p" be an icon of which the "p is false" ((s) linguistically) explicitly represented?
Vs: then "not" would be no operator anymore!
Not/Negation/Operator/Wittgenstein/Millikan: i.e. The mapping rule for "not-p" is a function of the mapping rule for "p".
1. If "not" is not an operator, it might happen that someone does not understand the meaning of "p," but still the sense of "not-p" absurd.
2. If "not-p" says "that -p does not exist", "not-p" must also be true if some variant in "p" is not fully determined, i.e. has no adapted meaning. E.g. "Pegasus was not a winged horse" e.g. "The present king of France is not bald" would be true sentences!
3. Certainly, it is the case that "'p' is false" at least maps (icons) that "p" has no real value. Correspondingly, "x does not exist" maps then the fact that "x" does not have referents.
N.B.: if "not-p" says "that -p does not exist" it still maps a negative fact. > Facts/Millikan.
---
I 224
Opposite/Negative Sentence/Representation/Millikan: Thesis: negative sentences, whose opposites are normal representative sentences, must themselves represent positive facts. ---
I 224
Negation/stabilization function/not/representation/Millikan: what is the stabilization function of "not" in normal representing sentences? It is not needed to "erase" the rest of the sentence. "Erase": sometimes occurs, but then it is called "Sorry" or "I did not mean that".
Negation/"not": its function is not to produce no believe. That would not be a function.
Eigenfunction: of "not" is relational. That is, it is a (mathematical) function of the eigenfunction of the sentence without "not".
Sentence: has the function of producing a belief. Likewise, a sentence with "not" has to produce something that has a potential benefit.
Negative sentence: perhaps it should eliminate a false belief? But that would be similar to "does not exist" works.
---
I 224
Negative sentence/"not"/imperative/Millikan: an imperative like "bring no dirt into the house" has very well a positive function. E.g. if you do it anyway, it is not done with an excuse "I did not want it". For the command was not, to do it without purpose.
Not sufficient: "I did not intend it".
Correct: I intended not to do it.
Not sufficient: "I did not know I did it"
Correct: you have to know that you do not do it.
Not/imperative: here the usage is not parallel to the function of "does not exist".
---
I 257
Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence maps a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Quantities (Physics) Bigelow I 74
Size/Direction/Bigelow/Pargetter: e.g. two-digit relation between velocities E.g. Two points on the homogeneous rotating disc on the same radius:
---
I 75
Then their instantaneous velocities have the same direction. At the same time, they differ in size due to the different distances from the centre.
Common/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the common is a property of the 2nd level (sic): the property to have a velocity with that and that direction.
Correspondingly the opposite for points of a circle around the center: Commonality: the property of the 2nd level to have a velocity with that and that size.
Vectors/Bigelow/Pargetter: have properties of the 2nd level (sic) i. e. properties of properties.
Equality/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: if two vectors share one of the properties of the 2nd level, say, for example, they have the same direction or the same size. (Same direction, same size).
Identity/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: two vectors are identical if they share all properties of the 2nd level (here: size and direction).
Flux/Vector: through this concept of identity, the Flux theory can understand vectors.
Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the case of vectors, we assume that both properties of the 2nd level and properties of the 2nd degree are real universals. Namely, a posteriori universals in the sense of Armstrong. Because the common denominator of the points mentioned above on the disc is not merely a linguistic phenomenon. ((s) because of the causal forces?).
---
I 76
Difference/Bigelow/Pargetter: this allows us to specify the size of differences. Grades/size/differences in size/difference/Frege/Whitehead/Wiener/Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above, similar to the quantities) (Lit. Frege 1893, Whitehead/Russell 1910 vol 3 p. 6 "Quantity", Quine 1941, Bigelow (1988a) Solution: Relations between relations.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Reduction Searle I 133 ff
Reduction/Searle: There are different types of reduction: a) property reduction: is nothing but average kinetic energy, b) theoretical reduction: is reduction between theories, e.g. recycling the gas laws to the laws of statistical thermodynamics, c) logical or ontological reduction: concerns laws of numbers on laws of quantities and...
I 135
...d) causal reduction, causal powers of an entity to causal forces of another phenomenon: is the vibration in molecular lattice instead of solid bodies.
I 136
Consciousness/Searle: even a perfect science of the brain would not lead to an ontological reduction of the kind that our contemporary science can provide for heat, firmness, color and sound.
I 137
SearleVsReductionism: that changes nothing for our scientific world view.
I 139f
From the irreducibility of consciousness arises nothing important.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Robots Searle I 83
Robot/Zombie/Mind/Brain/Searle: example: imagine your brain is starting to change in a way that leads to a gradual connection. You then implant silicon chips. In the end your whole brain is replaced by such chips. A logical possibility, which cannot be excluded with a priori reasons alone, is that one continues to have all kinds of thoughts, experiences, memories etc. >Zombies, >computer model.
I 84
Variant: you notice in the course that the area of your conscious experience becomes smaller and smaller, but that this has no influence on your external behavior. (Also not to be excluded a priori). You want to shout: "I can't see anything at all; I'm totally blind." But you hear your voice say, "I see a red object in front of me." In these thought experiments, it is important to always think them through from the point of view of the first person. One loses consciousness, but receives the same behavior.
I 84/85
3rd variant: the chips do not cause any change in your spiritual life, but they become increasingly incapable of translating your thoughts, feelings and intentions into actions. The wit of these three variations is to illustrate the causal relationships.
In the first case, the silicon chips have causal forces equivalent to those of the brain.
In the second case, the mediation between the mind and the behavioral patterns was interrupted, the chips are not duplicates of the causal forces of the brain, but only duplicates of certain of the input output functions of the brain.
I 86
In the third case, the person concerned would have the same spiritual life, but the spiritual phenomena would no longer be expressed in behavior. What is the philosophical significance of these three thought experiments? What exactly is the importance of behavior for the concept of mind?
But ontologically, the phenomena in question, with all their essential characteristics, can exist in complete independence from any output behavior.
Most philosophers whom I have criticized would accept the following two statements:
1. The brain causes conscious mental phenomena.
2. There is some kind of logical or conceptual connection between conscious mental phenomena and external behavior (SearleVs).
However, we have shown that these two are not compatible with the following statements:
I 87
3. The ability of the brain to cause consciousness is conceptually different from its ability to produce motor behavior. A system could have consciousness without behavior and behavior without consciousness. We can call this "the principle of independence from consciousness and behavior". Therefore, behavior is not a necessary condition for the existence of the spiritual.
The ontology of the spiritual is essentially an ontology of the first person.
It is merely a swollen formulation that every state of mind must be someone's state of mind.
I 88
Robot Example: there is a wedge between mind states and behavior.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Science Kripke Rorty II 131
Kripke/RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description - causal powers are independent from description. RortyVsScientism: its weakness lies in the fact that it concludes from the prognosis and use of the causal forces of objects made possible by a certain descriptive vocabulary that this vocabulary is superior to others. The Kripkeans still refer to this fallacy today. (RortyVsKripke).

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Scientism Rorty II (f) 131
Scientism/Rorty: pro: its strength lies in the fact that understanding always refers to the objects described in a certain way, but the causal forces of the objects that are detrimental or beneficial to us remain unaffected by the way they are described! We get sick and die, no matter how the disease is described. (RortyVs "Christian Science"). RortyVsScientism: its weakness lies in the fact that it concludes from the prognosis and use of the causal forces of objects made possible by a certain descriptive vocabulary that this vocabulary is superior to others. The Kripkeans still refer to this fallacy today. (RortyVsKripke). >Vocabulary/Rorty.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Putnam Vs Armstrong, D. I (g) 176
Materialism/PutnamVsArmstrong: fearlessly uses the medieval "causal powers" and "built-in" similarities. Even "essence"! PutnamVs. >Causal forces, >Universals/Armstrong.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Burge, T. Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. II 171
Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term?
II 187
Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981a
Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987
Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983.
Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states.
Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects.
Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation.
II 188
Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically.
Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties.
Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence
StalnakerVsFodor:
a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers.
But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis.
Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis.
StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis.
Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor:
Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g.
h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up,
II 189
t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior.
StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic).
II 193
Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose.
II 194
Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow.
Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself.
Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and
II 195
I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal?
2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content?
3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts?

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Creary, L Cartwright Vs Creary, L I 62
Factual View/Causal forces/Lewis Creary/Cartwright: Creary tries to maintain separate causal laws and at the same time to save the facts-view by postulating an intermediate effect: physical laws/Creary: Thesis: there are two types of them: a) Laws on causal influence: E.g. law of gravity. Coulomb’s Law: they tell us, what forces or other causal impacts become effective in different circumstances. b) Laws about causal action: ("Action laws"): they tell us what results arise from such combinations. E.g. law of vector addition, provides satisfactory explanations. Composition/Creary: less satisfactory types: E.g. amplification, interference, elimination (predomination).
I 63
Truth/Physical laws/Creary/Cartwright: according to Creary these laws are true, because they correctly describe what influences are produced. Truth/Law/CartwrightVsCreary: this is a plausible representation of the structure of many causal explanations, but it has two disadvantages: 1) often there are no general laws of interaction. The dynamics of the vector addition is fortunate in this regard. Problem: irreversible processes: flux, Laws of transport (heat transport) distribution functions. The equations in statistical mechanics do not apply in 90% of cases. (Kline, Similitude and Approximation, NY, 1969, p. 140).
I 65
Creary/Cartwright: his action laws (which provide the resulting overall behavior) only apply to individual cases. CartwrightVsCreary: better correct laws like Fick’s law. Nature/Cartwright: should rather be described by many phenomenological laws which are tailored to individual situations, than ruled by first principles. (s) VsCartwright: there can be no laws for individual situations (specific situations). CartwrightVsCreary: 2) causal influence: E.g. resulting force in vector addition: Creary: Thesis: there is no force that results, but a movement (behavior). With that we can deny the reality of a resulting force.
Cartwright: We both agree that there cannot be three forces: the first two, and in addition the resulting one.
CartwrightVsCreary: but I assert the reality of the resulting force while Creary asserts the component forces.
Causal influence/Creary: is an intermediary factor between cause and what was initially thought to be the effect.
CartwrightVsCreary: this will not work in general. E.g. two laws:
a) C causes E
b) C’ causes E’.
In addition: C and C’ together cause E’’.
Then we do not want to assume three effects E, E ’and E’’, but we need to assume some other incidents F and F’ as the actual effects of the two laws a) and b). And, according to another law, these will produce E’’.
CartwrightVsCreary: this can work in individual cases, but not always. I see no reason why such intermediate factors should be found all the time. These seem to me more shadowy.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Hume, D. Cartwright Vs Hume, D. I 10
Causation/Causal explanation/CartwrightVsHume: the laws of association are not sufficient to explain the difference between effective strategies (e.g. fight against malaria) and ineffective ones. Causal laws: are needed just as well. Simpson’s Paradox/Probability//Statistics/Causal explanation/Cartwright: was used by many authors as a counter-E.g. to probabilistic models of causation.
I 42
Humeean world/Cartwright: this type of example (Figure 1) brings comfort to the representatives of the Humeean world. HumeVsCausal laws: the representatives reject them, because they have no independent access to them. They consider themselves able to determine laws of association, but they think that they will never have the causal initial information to apply condition C. If they are lucky, they do not need this initial knowledge: Perhaps they live in a world that is not a Humean world. ((s) because then this knowledge would be irrelevant). CartwrightVsHume: but a Humean world might still be one in which causal laws could be inferred from the laws of association.
I 61
Force//Hume: it is wrong to distinguish between a force and its exercise. (Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford 1978, p 311). CartwrightVsHume: we need exactly this apparent distinction here. Causal force/Law of gravity/Cartwright: says that two bodies have the power to produce a force Gm m’/r², but they do not manage to exercise it. (Because other forces are at play). So the law does not speak of the behavior of the bodies, but of the powers they have. Problem: the facts-view cannot be given up so easily.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Scientism Rorty, R. II 131
RortyVsScientism: its weakness lies in the fact that it concludes from the prognosis and use of the causal forces of objects made possible by a certain descriptive vocabulary that this vocabulary is superior to others. The Kripkeans still refer to this fallacy today. (RortyVsKripke).