Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animals | Feminism | Braidotti I 77 Animals/Feminism: A liberal humanist like Nussbaum (2006)(1) agrees to pursue species equity. Working within the classical liberal tradition, Mary Midgley (1996)(2) does not even trust the term ‘anthropocentrism’, referring to it as ‘human chauvinism; narrowness of sympathy, comparable to national, or race or gender-chauvinism. It could also be called exclusive humanism, as opposed to the hospitable, friendly, inclusive kind’ (1996(2): 105). The alternative Midgley supports is to admit that ‘we are not self-contained and self-sufficient, either as a species or as individuals, but live naturally in deep mutual dependence’ (1996(2): 9-10). In her powerful analyses of the environmental crisis of reason, Val Plumwood (2003)(7) also calls for a new dialogical interspecies ethics based on decentring human privilege. Ecofeminism: For radical eco-feminists, both utilitarianism and liberalism are found wanting: the former for its condescending approach to non-human others, the latter in view of the hypocritical denial of humans’ manipulative mastery over animals. This critique is expanded to the destructive side of human individualism that entails selfishness and a misplaced sense of superiority, which for feminists (Donovan and Adams, 1996(3), 2007(4)) is connected to male privileges and the oppression of women and supports a general theory of male domination. Meat-eating is targeted as a legalized form of cannibalism by old and new feminist vegetarian and vegan critical theory (Adams, 1990(5); MacCormack, 2012(6)). Speciesism is therefore held accountable as an undue privilege to the same degree as sexism and racism. The pervasiveness of a ‘sex-species’ hierarchical system tends to remain unacknowledged and uncriticized even in the framework of animal rights activism. The corrective influence of feminism is valued because it emphasizes both the political importance of the collectivity and of emotional bonding. >Ecofeminism, >Posthumanism. 1. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 2. Midgley, Mary. 1996. Utopias, Dolphins and Computers. Problems of Philosophical Plumbing. London and New York: Routledge. 3. Donovan, Josephine and Carol J. Adams (eds.) 1996. Beyond Animal Rights. A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. 4. Donovan, Josephine and Carol J. Adams (eds.) 2007. The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press. 5. Adams, Carol. 1990. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A FeministVegetarian Critical Theory. New York: Continuum. 6. MacCormack, Patricia. 2012. Posthuman Ethics. London: Ashgate. 7. Plumwood, Val. 2003. Environmental Culture. London: Routledge. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Being a Bat | Putnam | V 128 Bat-Example/Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat? Thesis: we cannot imagine what it would be like to be a bat. V 128/129 Qualia/Bat: for example we want to imagine an argument: A: no bat quale is at least the same as a human quale. B: maybe there are at least some that are the same. There are also some feelings of other people that I probably cannot imagine, but that does not mean (that I see the psychological space of these other people as unimaginably different from my own). (By the way, bats can see very well, contrary to the prevailing opinion!) >Qualia, >Experience. I could at least say now: their pain is as much pain as mine. Could we come to a decision on this? The hearing center of the bat is 7/8 of the brain. ((s) Does the brain therefore have to provide completely different experience?) Example: 1. The brain of the bat has the disjunctive property P1 or P2; my brain has the disjunctive property P'1 or P'2. The respective sensations are correlated with the respective disjunctions. V 129/130 We assume: the qualitative character of the bat's sensation is identical to the qualitative character of my sensation, and both are identical (or correlated) with the more complex disjunctive property (P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2). According to the 1st theory, the bat and I have different experiences, according to the second theory, we have the same experience. However, both theories lead to the same predictions regarding the experiences of normal and abnormal human observers! Again, they are indistinguishable from an observational point of view! It is also not clear whether methodological maxims can be useful here. We also lack the principles to decide which theory is the simpler one. From our perspective we can decide which is the more "chauvinistic" one. V 129/130 Bat Example/disjunctive properties/identity theory/Putnam: Theory 1: Fl: disjunctive property P1 or P2, disjunctive property P'1 or P'2 U (assuming each correlation). Theory 2: we assume identity instead of correlation - correlation to complex property P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2. N.B.: both theories lead to the same predictions of normal as of abnormal observers. Stones always have the disjunctive property "sensation or no sensation". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Discrimination | Fanon | Brocker I 389 Discrimination/Postcolonial Structures/Postcolonies/Fanon: thesis: in young postcolonies federalism partially wins(1). Postcolonies are multilingual and ethnically plural. It is not possible to construct a transethnic citizenship. Instead, in many cases majority ethnic groups dominate the state, ethnic minorities are discriminated against: "While the national bourgeoisie competes with the Europeans, the craftsmen and the small professions begin a struggle against the non-national Africans"(2). This extends to demands for emigration and assault: "We have moved from nationalism to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, to racism"(3). >Racism/Fanon. 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 135 2. Ebenda S. 133 3. Ebenda. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Functionalism | Avramides | I 146 Functionalism/Avramidis: functionalism allows to refer to behavior with propositional attitudes, not on linguistic behavior. - It allows a subjective image of the mind. >Propositional attitudes, >Behavior, >Understanding, >Language behavior. I 147 Problem: this requires an indefinite number of further propositional attitudes. I 149 Functionalism/Lewis: we take mental concepts as theoretical terms (TT) and define our mental-theoretical terms by reference to the platitudes (commonplaces) of folk psychology. >Theoretical terms, >Folk psychology, >Everyday language, >Observation. These shall contain both, theoretical terms and the rest. - Then we transform every theoretical term into a name, replace the names with free variables. - then existential closure (of the open formulas ((s) Ramsey sentence). >Ramsey sentence, >Open formula. With that we achieve the original theory with the claim that it has a single implementation. - Then the theory has input/output concepts, but no specifically mental terminology. >Input/output. Problem/Avramides: how do we characterize input and output? BlockVsFunctionalism: either characterizes them chauvinistically or liberally. ((s) Because a purely physical characterization of the inputs and outputs would include or exclude the wrong ones.) >Philosophical chauvinism. I 153f AvramidesVsFunctionalism: if he is set to non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he has to say what distinguishes mental from non-mental systems that have the same functional organization. Avramides: we always start with mentalistically characterized behavior. - Even with the marsians we say that his behavior must have an interpretation. So if normal evidence (Ned Block: not only linguistic, but mainly linguistic behavior) is part of our theory of propositional attitudes, we are committed to a symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. >Language behavior, >Ned Block. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Knowledge | Feyerabend | I 55 Knowledge/Science/Feyerabend: no thought is old or absurd enough that it could not improve our knowledge. The entire intellectual history is incorporated into science and used to improve every single theory. Even political influences are not rejected. They are necessary to overcome scientific chauvinism, which also turns against the introduction of alternatives. Alternatives, however, must be allowed to develop into complete subcultures, which are no longer based on science and rationalism. >Progress, >Rationalism, >Science. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Power | Pareto | Brocker I 102 Power/Pareto: According to Pareto, all societies are hierarchical without exception and thus ultimately constituted as structures of power. For him, social stability is inconceivable without power. Hence, the residuals (see Terminology/Pareto) that establish power relations have a constitutive meaning, and power is considered universal. Accordingly, democracy is also an entity of power. Even communities with pronounced ideals of brotherhood or direct democratic structures - such as monastic denominations or anarchism - are never free of rankings.(1) Brocker I 103 Since the residuals (remnants of magical thinking, see Magical Thinking/Pareto) are of great relevance in the formation of structures in society, politics must take them into account in the interest of maintaining power. (2) Among these residuals are Pareto's feelings of loyalty to leaders and collectives, patriotism, chauvinism and nationalism, feelings of solidarity and justice. >Justice, >Emotion/Pareto, >Argumentation/Pareto. 1. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Florenz 1916. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale. Edizione critica a cura di Giovanni Busino, 4 Bände, Turin 1988. Dt.: Vilfredo Paretos System der allgemeinen Soziologie, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Gottfried Eisermann, Stuttgart 1962, § 1153. 2. Ibid. § 2247. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Qualia | Chalmers | I 251 Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does! We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either! >Analogies, >Thought experiments, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 252 Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. >Functions, >Experience. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines. BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example). I 253 Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. I 254 ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. I 256 A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... I 257 ...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible. >Logical possibility, cf. >Metaphysical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Possibility. I 261 ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. I 262 Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! >Invariance, >Behavior. VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981)(5). So something must be wrong with the argument. ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented. 2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips. I 263 A system like this would be rational in any case. I 266f Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... I 267 1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences. Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers). Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time. I 268 After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference! I 269 A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes! I 270 The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle: Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism. >Skepticism. I 271 VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... I 272 ...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... I 273 ...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument. Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible. Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded. >Functionalism, >Functionalism/Chalmers. 1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980. 2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44 3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43 4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27. 5. N. Block Psychologism and behaviorism Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43 (1981). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Ramsey Sentence | Searle | I 58 Ramsey sentence: e.g. instead of "John has the belief due to the perception of p" we simply say: "John has x" (belief is eliminated) -> Black Box-functionalism, >Functionalism/Searle, SearleVs. We can eliminate the word "belief" and simply say that there is something in this and that causal relationship. Formally: we simply set a variable, "x". John has x that and x is caused by the perception that p, and x, together with the desire that q, causes the action h. Further Ramsey sentences are intended to get rid of the remaining psychological expressions such as "desire" and "perception". Thus it turned out that functionalism has the following decisive advantage: it shows that there is nothing spiritual about states of mind. >Reduction, >Funktionalism. Talking about states of mind, that is, simply: talking about neutral causal relationships; the "chauvinism" of type identity theories that only such systems could have states of mind that have such brains as we do, is now avoided by this much more liberal view. Any x system could have states of mind. >Identity theory, >chauvinism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Species | Agassiz | Gould I 176 ff Species/Louis Agassiz/Gould: Agassiz was, according to Gould, the most important American biologist in the 19th century, born in Switzerland, died in 1873, an opponent of racial discrimination, but a little chauvinistic because of his upper class background. Agassiz thesis: Species are static, created circumstances. In his day, Agassiz was practically the only non-Darwinian. At that time, questions were discussed such as: Was Adam the great-grandfather of all men or just the white men? Are black people and Indians our brothers or do they just look like us? I 179 The polygenists - including Agassiz - believed that each species was created separately. Characterizations by Agassiz: the brave, irrepressible and proud Indian next to the servile, submissive Negro and the tricky, clever and cowardly Mongolian. (1) (See also Evolution/Agassiz). 1. L. Agassiz, |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Xenophobia | Holmes | Krastev I 74 Xenophobia/post-communist countries/Krastev/Holmes: The rise of authoritarian chauvinism and xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe has its origins in political psychology not political theory. Where populism rules, it does not do so intellectually. Whatever popularity it has stems from a deep-seated disgust at a perceived post-1989 Imitation Imperative with all of its demeaning and humiliating implications. And it is fuelled by the rejection of the minorities-centred cultural transformation that followed the 1968 protest movements in the West. >Imitation/Krastev. Anti-Liberalism: The origins of Central and Eastern European illiberalism are therefore emotional and pre-ideological, rooted in rebellion against the ‘humiliation by a thousand cuts’ that accompanied a decades-long project requiring acknowledgement that foreign cultures were vastly superior to one’s own. „Colonialism“: Illiberalism in a philosophical sense is a cover-story meant to lend a patina of intellectual respectability to a widely shared visceral desire to shake off the ‘colonial’ dependency; an inferiority implicit in the very project of Westernization. When Kaczyński accuses ‘liberalism’ of being ‘against the very notion of the nation’(1) and when Maria Schmidt says, ‘We are Hungarians, and we want to preserve our culture’,(2) their overheated nativism embodies a refusal to be judged by foreigners according to foreign standards. The same can be said of Viktor Orbán’s expressions of anti-immigrant nostalgia: ‘we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed … We want to be how we became eleven hundred years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.’(3) 1. Adam Leszczyński, ‘Poland’s Leading Daily Feels Full Force of Jarosław Kaczyński’s Anger’, Guardian (23 February 2016). 2. Cited in Oltermann, ‘Can Europe’s New Xenophobes Reshape the Continent?’. 3. Viktor Orbán, ‘Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cities with County Rights’ (8 February 2018). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Xenophobia | Krastev | Krastev I 74 Xenophobia/post-communist countries/Krastev: The rise of authoritarian chauvinism and xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe has its origins in political psychology not political theory. Where populism rules, it does not do so intellectually. Whatever popularity it has stems from a deep-seated disgust at a perceived post-1989 Imitation Imperative with all of its demeaning and humiliating implications. And it is fuelled by the rejection of the minorities-centred cultural transformation that followed the 1968 protest movements in the West. >Imitation/Krastev. Anti-Liberalism: The origins of Central and Eastern European illiberalism are therefore emotional and pre-ideological, rooted in rebellion against the ‘humiliation by a thousand cuts’ that accompanied a decades-long project requiring acknowledgement that foreign cultures were vastly superior to one’s own. „Colonialism“: Illiberalism in a philosophical sense is a cover-story meant to lend a patina of intellectual respectability to a widely shared visceral desire to shake off the ‘colonial’ dependency; an inferiority implicit in the very project of Westernization. When Kaczyński accuses ‘liberalism’ of being ‘against the very notion of the nation’(1) and when Maria Schmidt says, ‘We are Hungarians, and we want to preserve our culture’,(2) their overheated nativism embodies a refusal to be judged by foreigners according to foreign standards. The same can be said of Viktor Orbán’s expressions of anti-immigrant nostalgia: ‘we do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed … We want to be how we became eleven hundred years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.’(3) 1. Adam Leszczyński, ‘Poland’s Leading Daily Feels Full Force of Jarosław Kaczyński’s Anger’, Guardian (23 February 2016). 2. Cited in Oltermann, ‘Can Europe’s New Xenophobes Reshape the Continent?’. 3. Viktor Orbán, ‘Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Association of Cities with County Rights’ (8 February 2018). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antinaturalism | Verschiedene Vs Antinaturalism | Tetens IV 118 Tetens: Suppose we found out that machines constructed completely differently could behave just like humans. For or against naturalism, something follows only if it is clear whether the machines have mental states or not. - Well, have they? - The question is asked naively. It is we who ascribe them to the machines or not. If we deny them to the machines despite their human-like behavior (chauvinism), this has the astonishing consequence that we have to admit that mental states (conscious experience) are causally irrelevant to our behavior. Tetens IV 119 If we concede it, we could also justify it in functionalist or behaviorist terms. If we find, these machines behave noticeably different, decisive question again is, whether they have mental states (conscious experience) or not. Here at the latest, however, it becomes apparent that we lack the criteria for attributing or denying them. Tetens IV 120 The only thing that is clear is that we humans attribute mental states. Human behavior does not yet prove the incorrectness of naturalism and materialism. Otherwise, the artificial intelligence is philosophically neutral. |
Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Functionalism | Block Vs Functionalism | I 161 Functionalism: wants to individuate mental states causally. Problem: there are then organisms that have mental states according to behaviorism, (liberal view) but not according to functionalism (chauvinistic view). I 210 BlockVsFunctionalism: it is difficult to see how there can be a single characterization of the inputs and outputs that applies to all and only mental systems. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Functionalism | Fodor Vs Functionalism | Block I 162 Ironically, the physicalist excludes mindless creatures who still have a mind. FodorVsFunctionalism: but precisely this argument can also be used just as well against functionalism. If liberalism is avoided, chauvinism threatens. --- Fodor/Lepore IV 127 Functionalism/Fodor/Lepore: beliefs and wishes are both types of representations, but different in their causal (associative/computational) role ((s) within the mind). Semantics/VsFunctionalism/Fodor/Lepore: here, the semantic attributes are obtained from the relation mind/world and not from the functional (causal) role ((s) i.e. not within the mind). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Gadamer, G. | Block Vs Gadamer, G. | Avra I 149 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/BlockVsLewis: no matter how functionalism characterizes input and output, it leads into the dilemma of being either chauvinistic or liberal. ((s) liberal: attributing mind to too many systems (e.g. vending machines)/chauvinistic: too few: E.g.: deny animals mind). I 150 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/VsLewis any physical characterization of inputs and outputs is inevitably chauvinist or liberal: E.g. assuming you were seriously injured and your only way to communicate with the outside world is through electroencephalogram patterns. If you find something exciting, it produces a pattern that the others interpret as a point, if it is a bit boring, a line. Now let us imagine, on the other hand, others communicate with you by creating electronic activity that leaves long or short afterimages in you. In this case, we could say that the brain itself has become a part of the inputs and outputs! (at the top we had determined variable realization as an essential progress, however). But: Block: if this point (of variable implementation) is correct VsMaterialism, it also applies to inputs and outputs, because the physical realization itself may be an essential part of the inputs and outputs. ((s) input output devices: receptors?). I.e. there is no physical characterization which refers on inputs and output of all and only mental systems. (Block 1980b, p.295). Conclusion/Block: any physical characterization of Inputs/Outputs is either chauvinistic or liberal. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
| Leeds, St. | Field Vs Leeds, St. | II 281 Indeterminacy/Own Language/Theory Change/Leeds/Field: (Leeds, Steven 1997), Section IV) LeedsVs indeterminacy within a theory (within one language): Field: Leeds view seems to be disquotational, i.e. the reference of our own expressions should be determined according to the following scheme: (R) if b exists, then "b" refers to b and nothing else. Foreign Language/Theory Change: In this case, it only makes sense relative to a correlation between the concept of the two theories. More Moderate View/Field: we might as well have an unrelativized concept of reference that extends beyond our own concepts, this will, however, be very vague. FieldVsLeeds: it seems very reasonable to assume that the concepts of our currently best theories are vague. Simply because many aspects still have room for improvement. E.g. Ricci tensor: will probably not just refer directly to something, but it will not be without any reference either. Falseness/Theory/False Theory/Field: E.g. "mass"/"weight" makes it clear that if a theory is false, it is often because of the vagueness of terms. Correctness/Translation/Theory/Field: the concept of a "correct translation" is nonsense: E.g. root -1, "i"/"-i" "/" / "" (see above). This is not about an epistemic limitation. There is no "subtle fact" that we cannot know, it is rather the case that there is no certain fact that makes a difference. The example is interesting in the context of Leeds: it seems as if also our own terms "i" and "-i" would be indeterminate, because: Chauvinism/Theory/Theory Change/Asymmetry/Field: it would be chauvinistic to assume that our own theory is determined if we attest indeterminacy to the other theory. FieldVsLeeds: he cannot avoid the accusation of chauvinism, because he denies our own theory indeterminacy. II 282 Solution: In the process of language acquisition (learning, use) we learn to accept (R) and that creates no connection between "refers" as applied to "/" and "i". Asymmetry/Chauvinism/Field: we get this asymmetry without chauvinism: our term "i" is as indeterminate as the foreign term "/", it is just that the indeterminacy is "hidden" in our normal semantic statements, because these semantic concepts contain a compensating indeterminacy! (f..o.th. compensation). Indeterminacy/FieldVsLeeds: this dissolves the doubts regarding the indeterminacy of our own language. The fact that "i" refers to i does not show that "i" is determined, it is therefore compatible with the fact that "i" and "refers disquotationally" are both indeterminate. Caution: This only shows how a prior indeterminacy of "i" would lead to an indeterminacy of "refers disquotationally". Indeterminacy/Own Language/FieldVsLeeds: the possibility of indeterminacy of our own language can also be shown regardless of the theory of reference, and thus also of disquotationality: surely, vagueness is a kind of indeterminacy, and that is everywhere. Vagueness: it can also be problematic itself: Vagueness/Williamson’s Riddle/Field: (Williamson 1994): there are people who consider the riddle to be so serious that it would be doubtful whether II 283 the phenomenon of vagueness (or, more generally, of indeterminacy) would be a real phenomenon. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Physicalism | Fodor Vs Physicalism | Block I 164 FodorVsphysicalism: if functionalism is true, the physicalist faces a dilemma: either he may not accept mental universals like pain any more, or he denies that anything feels pain (or anger, etc.). He must also deny that mental states are brain states (> chauvinism). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Physicalism | Functionalism Vs Physicalism | Block I 162 FunctionalismVsPhysicalism: Physicalism is wrong if functionalism is true. Reason: Turing machine: you can always find a physical realization that fulfills the function but deserves a different physical description. Example: if pain is a functional state, it cannot be a brain state, because there are creatures without a brain that can realize the same Turing machine! FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus/Block: the argument aims rather at the fact that it is incomprehensible how a physical property of first order could be common to all and only all possible physical realizations of a given Turing machine state. I 162 According to that, physicalism is chauvinistic. The physicalist of all people excludes brainless creatures that still have a mind. Block I 210 FunctionalismVsPhysicalismus: it is difficult to understand how there should be a single characterization of internal states of all possible organisms that are functionally equivalent to a human being. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 |
| Vitalism | Dennett Vs Vitalism | Metz II 691 VsArtificial Consciousness/VsRobots/Dennett: Traditional ArgumentsVsArtificial Intelligence: 1) Robots are purely physical objects, while something immaterial is required for consciousness. DennettVs: That is Cartesian dualism. II 692 2) Robots are not organic, consciousness can only exist in organic brains. (Vitalism) DennettVsVitalism: Is deservedly dead, since the biochemistry showed that the properties in all organic compounds can be mechanistically reduced and therefore are also reproducible at any scale in another physical medium. 3) Robots are artifacts and only something natural, born may have consciousness. (Chauvinism of origin). DennettVsChauvinism of Origin/Forgery/Dennett: II 694 E.g. A fake cheap wine can also be a good wine if experts consider it good. E.g. A fake Cézanne is also a good picture, if "experts" consider it good. Dennett: but these distinctions represent a dangerous nonsense if they refer to alleged "intrinsic properties". (That means that the molecules would still needed the consecrations of a befitting birth; that would be racism). (By the way, the robot COG passes through a childhood period of learning). Forgery/Dennett: Whether a fake is produced artificially atom by atom, (but in the same molecule compounds) may have legal consequences with respect to a clone that does not deserve the same punishment. II 695 Dennett: E.g. The movie "Schindler’s List" could in principle be produced artificially through computer animation, because it only consists of two-dimensional gray tones on the screen. II 696 4) Robots will always be too simple to have consciousness. Dennett: this is the only acceptable argument, even if we try to refute it. The human body consists of trillions of individual parts. But wherever one looks, one discovers functional similarities at higher levels that allow us to replace hellishly complex modules with relatively simple ones. II 697 There is no reason to believe that any part of the brain could not be substituted. Robots/Dennett: Robot enthusiasts who believe it is easy to construct a conscious robot reveal an infantile understanding of the real world with the intricacies of consciousness. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Antidualism | Schiffer, St. | I 20 Anti-dualism: (40 years ago): behaviorism: the mental properties are identical with dispositions. (20 years ago): physicalism: mental properties are physical properties, resp. mental Z types are physical Z-types (type-type identity thesis). VsType-type identity: problem of multiple realization: I 21 We can not chauvinistically exclude machines. |
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