Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Coextensive Carnap VI 43/4
Def Coextensive/Carnap: coextensive properties belong to the same class - pre-range: class of possible antecedents. Def homogenous: is a relation, if pre- and post-range are isogenous.
Def constitute: reduce a concept to another one (reduction) - Problem: transformation rule.
>Element relation, >Comprehension, >Sets, >Set theory, >Subsets.
---
VI 48
Def Logical Complex/Carnap: if an object can be reduced to another one, we call it a complex of the other objects. Classes and relations are complexes. They do not consist of their elements. >Complex/Carnap.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Coextensive Fodor I 143
Coextension/Fodor: coextension can be made convincingly only by enumeration. Identity of properties is a stronger claim than event identity. ((s) The latter does not enumerate all of the properties.) >Lists, >Strength of theories.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Coextensive Kripke III 394
Truth/Coextension/Accuracy/Kripke: for any determined (given) statement f in any language and any predicate A(x) the finding that A(f) ↔ f is the same as the statement that A(x) coincides with truth where f is concerned. Even if A(f) ↔ f is correct as a scheme for all f, A(x) is coextensive with truth. ((s) >truth / >correctness).

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Coextensive Quine XII 51
Predicate/coextensive/synonymy/Quine: coextensive predicates are e.g. an equilateral/equiangular triangle or a featherless biped/rational animal: It was never clear when to say here that the predicates have the same meaning. The extension (here = reference) is secure. The meaning: the intension: is insecure. There is an indeterminacy of translation across the distinction extension/intension. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Extensionalism Verschiedene Vs Extensionalism Lewis IV 256
Lewis: I really do not know what the Intensionalist (I) Vs Extensionalism (E) should say! I know several unsatisfactory arguments. ("I" in the English text also for "I, Lewis") (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 1. one could say that the extensionalism is more complicated. It needs two more categories and one more lexicon object.
VsVs: this is bad for two reasons:
a) Extensionality itself is generally regarded as an important dimension of simplicity.
b) I agree with E that a complete approach must also take into account the speaker's pause  at the beginning of the sentence. E has already done this with its syntax and semantics! The intensionalist still has to find a place for it.
(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 2. One could object that it goes against our paradigm that extensions must be shared: Example "Boston" simply names Boston and not instead a function of indices.
Problem: this paradigm applies to English, Polish, German, etc. but not necessarily to unexplored indigenous languages.
Even if the intensionalist suspected that the language is very related to ours, one cannot expect E to agree that the paradigms are applicable! For E and I do not agree which language is theirs!
Tarski's convention W: does not help here: because the native language does not correspond by the way not uncontroversially to our metalanguage of their language. Therefore the only versions of these principles that are applicable are stated in translations of these terms.
Example E and I may agree that a meta-linguistic sentence of the form
"_____ designates ___ in their language" or
IV 256/257
"_____ is a name that has ____ as an extension in your language." should be true whenever the first blank space is filled with a name (in our language) with a name  of the native language and the second with a translation of  into our language.
But that does not lead us anywhere, because we do not agree at all about names and what their correct translations are!
(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 3. I could try to argue that native language cannot be extensional because in it some inference patterns are invalid that are valid in any extensional language.
For example, identity: inferences with Leibniz's identity (Leibniz' Law) or existential generalization lead from true premises to false conclusions in native language.
Extensionalist/VsLewis: should agree that Leibniz's law receives truth in every extensional language and that it is not preserved in my counter-examples (which?).
But he should not agree that such inferences are cases of Leibniz identity!
Identity/Leibniz/Lewis: an inference with Leibniz' law needs an identity premise and how to identify it? Not by looking at three or four horizontal lines!
Semantic: an expression with two gaps expresses identity, if and only if 1. the result of inserting names into the gaps is a sentence,
2. the sentence thus formed is true if the names are coextensive, otherwise false.
Def Identity Premise: is a sentence thus formed.
Problem: since E and I disagree on what the coextensive names are, they disagree on what the expressions are that express identity, which propositions are the identity premises, and which inferences are real instances of Leibniz's law.
We are ignoring the difference of opinion here about whether a phrase S must be introduced by a  pause to be a sentence at all. To be precise, if ",/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Li, then " ,/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Le. The original version without  is no inference at all in Le, because its "premises" and "conclusions" are S names and not sentences.
((s) Extensional Language/(s): how is it possible at all, if no predicates (properties) are allowed - then is not the form subject predicate at all?)
Vs: the form is then: a is an element of the set B.
(in vain) VsExtensionalism: 4. I could argue ad hominem that E has not really escaped intentionality because the things he takes as extensions are intensional entities.
Functions of indices to truth values are usually identified with propositions (especially if the indices consist of possible worlds and little more).
And these functions are identified equally with individual terms. How can such intensional entities then be extensions?
LewisVsVs: this is just a mix-up! Intension is relational!
((s) It depends on the consideration whether something is an intension or an extension).
Intensions are things ((s) entities) that play a certain role in semantics and not things of a certain sort.
E and I agree that in a suitable language the same thing that is the intention of one expression is also the extension of another.
For example, when we speak technical English in a fragment that is suitable as the meta-meta-language of a smaller fragment, we agree that one and the same thing is both, the intention of expression in the object language "my hat"
IV 258
and the extension of the metaphorical expression "intension of "my hat"". ((s) The same thing, not the same expression).
Lewis: the thing itself is neither extension nor intension.
It is true that some entities can only serve as extensions, while other functions of indices can serve as both.
But there is no thing that would be unsuitable to be an extension.
Ontology/(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 5. one might think that the extensionalist attributes an extravagant ontology to the natives:
For example, if the intensionalist says that a word of the natives designates a concrete material mountain, then E says he designates something more esoteric: a set-theoretical object, formed from a realm of individuals that includes unrealized possibilities.
But also E and I believe in esoteric things if they do not want to contradict themselves. We have no doubt that we can name them.
We agree that the natives have names for even more far-fetched things like gods (according to the Intensionalist) or functions of indices to such gods (according to the Extensionalist).
Ontology/Vs Extensionalism: I should perhaps argue better that certain unesoteric things are missing!
Ontology/Kripke: (conversational, 1972): it is wrong to attribute to someone an ontology that contains sets without elements or functions without arguments and values, etc.
LewisVsVs: this is a plausible principle. But did E violate it by saying that the names of the natives are functions of indices and not names of concrete things? I do not think so.
The ascribed ontology is not the same as the ascribed set of name carriers. For example, if our language is attributed an ontology, it contains all natural numbers, not just the small minority of them that actually bear names!
It is not significant that the amount of name carriers violates Kripke's closure principle unless it can be shown that this is the totality of the attributed ontology. But it is difficult to say what ontology, if any, is attributed by the use of Le.
One should look at the range of quantifiers, but Le has no quantifiers at all!
Quantifiers: make sentences. But in Le only the predicate does that and that is not a quantifier.
The transformation Lp of Parsons is different: it has a range. The set D, so that we get intended truth conditions for the propositions of Lp that transform the propositions of Li, then and only when D is included in the range of bound variables.
(This assumes that the predicates of Lp have intended interpretations).
The set D is the same as the set of extensions of expressions in Le. It violates Kripke's closing principle ((s) that no empty sets should be attributed, see above), so it cannot be attributed to anyone as ontology. ((s) because there are no bound variables in Le.).
I.e. if an extensionalist claims that the native speaks Lp, veiled by transformations, we have a remedy against him.
But E himself does not represent that!
Perhaps one can show that if it is bad to attribute the use of Lp,
IV 259
that it is also bad to attribute the use of Le? But I do not see that yet.





Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Field, H. Soames Vs Field, H. I 467
Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results
b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth.
Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things:
(i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages.
(ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically
(iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes.
Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example
(1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true.
b. Church's theorem is true
c. Everything he said is true.
I 468
SoamesVsPropositions.
Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists.
Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example).
Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say:
(6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all....
I 470
SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise:
(7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S.
I 472
Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar.
2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation.
The result is a sentence of the metalanguage:
(8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S).
FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong!
Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions
I 474
of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation.
Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct.
FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient.
"Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9):
(9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston
b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only)
c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent)
Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now.
Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage).
Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different!
N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts.
Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept.
Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses).
I 475
Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages:
1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above)
2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory.
Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent.
Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts).
2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference.
SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)!
Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1).
Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except:
L1: here "R" applies to round things
L2: here on red things.
Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages:
(11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round
b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red.
Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list.
FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers.
SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski
I 476
in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true,
L2: ...if A and B are true.
FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning).
FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior).
Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts:
(13) the term of a name referring to an object
The term of a predicate that applies to an object.
The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms
...
I 477
Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b:
(14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s).
b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is ....
Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary.
SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price.
Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition).
New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories.
SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms.
Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either
a) define about truth, or
b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms.
SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now!
a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular.
b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s].
Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing.
Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent.
Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable.
SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough.
I 478
It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior).
Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer).
(15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals).
(16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc.
((s) Both times reference)
Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16)
that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition.
I 481
Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms.
Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories.
Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects.
((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence).
Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language).
I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions.
I 483
SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities.
I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example
Negation/Field
(21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence).
SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts).
Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have.
Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar:
Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage.
Solution/Soames:
(22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence).
"Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value.

Soames I
Scott Soames
"What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Soames II
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999
Heidegger, M. Quine Vs Heidegger, M. V 127
Identity/Everyday Language/Individuation/Reference/Quine: also identity is part of our referential apparatus, but it is obscure in everyday language, because we use it without clear individuation principle. E.g. Do two editions of a novel have the same hero? How unlike may the heroes be? Or e.g. how unlike may the editions be to still be considered as versions of the same novel?
E.g. Was Baal the devil? E.g. Did the Indians rever God by worshiping the Great Spirit?
Identity/Possible Worlds/PoWo/Quine: all these examples fall under the issue of cross-world identity. Identity in various possible worlds.
Differently:
Attributes/Identity/Quine: E.g. when attributes are coextensive, they are not necessarily the same attribute. But when are they anyway?
Wrong solution: some say in case of "necessary co-extensivity" the two attributes are identical.
QuineVs: that only shifts the problem.
Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: we do not clarify ontological ambiguities by taking everyday language literally and sifting through it. (>Existence, >value of a bound variable).
((s) primacy of language not in ontology).
V 128
Solution/Quine: it is the other way round: one comes up with something and gears language towards it! Existence/Ontology/Language Learning/Quine: the existing things are genetically nothing but an interplay of grammatical analogies that cover up the differences in the forms of learning. In the center is talk of objects. Ontology begins with the generalization of object study. (see above: e.g. color words, which, as you learn, do indeed not refer to individual things).
Grammar is thus simplified, ontology is multiplied.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Redundancy Theory Fodor Vs Redundancy Theory I 138
Reduction/Fodor: since it is asymmetrical, it should turn out that physics is the fundamental science.  FodorVsReductionism: so it will turn out that reductionism is too strong a basis for the unified science.
Fodor pro token physicalism.
I 141
Def Reductionism/Fodor: the assumption that every natural kind is a physical natural kind or coextensive with it. (Every natural kind is a physical natural kind if bridge laws express characteristic identity).
I 142
 Vs: a) interesting generalizations could be made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common.  b) often it is irrelevant whether physical descriptions have something in common.
 c) the individual sciences deal primarily with generalizations of this kind.
Reductionism/Fodor: more precarious: he asserts that the coextensions are nomologically necessary. Bridge laws are laws. FodorVs. (Davidson ditto)
I 143
FodorVsReductionism: the assumption that every mental event is a physical event does not guarantee that physics can provide a suitable vocabulary for psychological theory.
I 147
Psychology/Neuroscience/Fodor: Of course we can provide evidence that neural events, that otherwise form a heterogeneous mass, have a kind of properties in common.       Such correspondences can now justify token physicalism as well as type physicalism.
FodorVsReductionism: but if this is true, the arguments which infer from token physicalism to reductionism must be wrong.
I 154 +
Reductionism/Tradition: if x and y differ in the descriptions which make them subject to the actual laws of physics, they must also differ in the descriptions by which they fall under any laws.  FodorVs: why would we believe that? Two entities may differ physically and still converge in an infinite number of properties. (> description dependent >Davidson?).
 Fodor: why should there not be some among these properties whose lawful correlation supports the generalizations of the individual disciplines?

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Superassertibility Verschiedene Vs Superassertibility Wright I 68/69
Def Superassertibility/Wright: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrarily accurate verification of its ancestry and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear".
Superassertibility/Content: the opponents of the superassertibility would have to refute the simple notion that the content of the claim that P does not include the claim that P is justified, nor that P is believed.
The thought that neither the principle
the proposition that P is justified if and only if P,
nor the principle
It is believed that P, if and only if P ((s)) is absurd)
applies a priori.
Superassertibility: their representatives must justify the validity of (Es)
(Es) It is superassertible that P, if and only if P.
I 72
Negation: this problem will be solved if it applies: (DSS) "P" is superassertible if and only if P.
From this follows, as we have seen, the negation equivalence:
It is not the case that "P" is superassertible if and only if it is not the case that "P" is superassertible.
Here we can distinguish between propositions and sentence when it comes to negation.
Then the validity of DSS depends on Es. ("It is superassertible that P...)
VsEs/VsSuperassertibility: one could object that Es cannot be valid since it mixes the validity of certain high-level evidence for P with the validity of fact.
For example, the Goldbach conjecture may be undetectably true and therefore not be superassertible.
For example a superassertible proposition (brains in a vat) can be undetectably wrong.
Since Es can be victim of counterexamples at any time, it cannot be true a priori.
Therefore, superassertibility does not claim to be a truth predicate (T-predicate).
I 73
VsSuperassertibility: the critics claim that the following equivalence cannot be established: (because of counterexamples): (F) It is true that it is ∏ that P if and only if it is true that P
(F) However, contains two occurrences of a truth predicate that must be understood as distinct from the superassertibility. ((s) "∏" should be replaceable by "superassertible", but then allegedly does not guarantee equivalence). "∏" is more neutral than "true", which can mean true or assertible.
Example: It is possible that the Goldbach conjecture is true without it being true that it is superassertible (provable), but it is certainly not evident that the conjecture could be superassertible without it being superassertible that this is the case.
Pluralism: if, as minimalism thinks, there can be a pluralism of predicates of truth, then it is to be expected that the illusion of failure can be created if each occurrence of "true" is interpreted differently.
It is as if someone wanted to prove that physical necessity cannot qualify as a real concept of necessity because the concept does not satisfy the following principle:
Necessary (AB) |= Necessary(A) Necessary (B) ((s) right side weaker)
I 74
and would then try to support his thesis by interpreting the last occurrence of "necessary" in the sense of logical necessity. ((s) There is no "logical necessity" of any object "B"!
If we want to know if there are counterexamples to (Es), the right question is not whether F is fulfilled, but whether it is, which arises when the two tendentious occurrences of "true" are replaced by those of "∏".
(G) It is ∏ that it is ∏ that is P, if and only if it is ∏ that is P. (Wright pro).
G: Truth without limitation by evidence.
F: Superassertibility.
So whether it is in fact always when it is superassertible that P is also superassertible that this is the case and vice versa.
Problem: if any true predicate of truth can fulfill the equivalence scheme a priori, its two possible forms (true and assertible, claimable) must be a priori coextensive.
Thus, no predicate F can obviously function like a T-predicate if it has to function alongside another predicate G, which is already assumed to both fulfil the equivalence scheme and potentially diverge extensionally from F. (e.g. Goldbach's conjecture).
(Since it cannot apply a priori that (P is if and only if of P F) if a priori that P applies then and only if P is G, but not a priori that (P is G if and only if P is F). (s) So coextension needs equivalence (concordance in both directions), and not only concordance in one direction.
This weakens the original objection. It applies only to the following extent: if it is shown that a discourse is dominated by a truth concept - G - not restricted by evidence, then it is shown that superassertibility - F - is not a predicate of truth for this discourse. (For, trivially, if P is superassertible, evidence for P must be available.)
But this does not justify a global conclusion.
I 75
Oversimplification: (Gs) It is superassertible that it is superassertible that P is, if and only if it is superassertible that P is.
Correct: given the equivalence scheme (see above), only the cases are counterexamples for (Es) in which (Fs) also fails:
(Fs) It is true that it is superassertible that P is if and only if it is true that P.
So if (Gs) applies, we know that there are no counterexamples to (Es) and consequently (Es) applies. But only provided that there are no competing predicates of truth besides superassertibility!
I 76
Question: So is (Gs) unrestrictedly valid? It should be shown that the existence of an entitlement for P means that there is also an entitlement for the assertion that P is superassertible (showable in the future). For example, suppose the possession of an authorization for A also means possessing an authorization for B, and vice versa, but that for a reductio A is superassertible, B on the other hand is not!
Then a total state of information I entitles to A and also all its improvements I' and hypothetically also to B.
But: since B is not superassertible, there must be some improvement of I supporting A, but not B.
This shows that (i) the coincidence of the assertibility conditions is sufficient for (ii) both statements of a pair to be superassertible if this is true for either of them.
I 77
Superassertibility: it is less clear that the possession of an authority for the assertion also means the possession of the authority to view the statement as superassertible. Question: Can the authority to claim P coexist with the lack of authority to view P as a superassertible? ((s) Can something be assertible without being superassertible?)
Assertiveness/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional view offers "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he/she uttered the sentence".





WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Conceptual Role Block, Ned Fod/Lep IV 163
Meaning/conceptual role/conceptual role semantics/CRT/Block: Thesis: The meaning of an expression is its role in a language - Fodor/Lepore: this invites to the conclusion that expressions belonging to different languages have different meanings - this leads to "translation holism" rather than to content holism. Block's argument is not transcendental but the proposal of a theory. ((s) Conceptual role is here equated with semantic or inferential role.) Fodor/Lepore: this does not lead to semantic holism, at most in connection with the analytical/synthetic distinction. Thesis: Belief must be explained causally.
IV 168
Coextension/Inference/Block: Thesis: the inferential role of coextensive expressions may differ. Thus the CRT can distinguish between morning star/evening star or between "Cicero" and "Tullius".
Personal Identity Lewis, D. IV 58
Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a specific relation and attachment among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: which of the permanent persons are identical with the former?
But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states!
(see below I-relations also exist between several things (other than identity).
Thesis: every state (of a person) is I-relative and R-relative to exactly the same states. And also for all possible problem cases.
I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: both are identical because they are coextensive!