Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Climate History | Neukom | Neukom I 550 Climate History/Climate Coherence/Climate Periods/Climate Epochs/Global Warming/Neukom: Here we test the hypothesis that there were globally coherent climate epochs over the Common Era by using a collection of probabilistic, global temperature reconstructions for the period 1–2000 ad, derived from a set of six different ensemble field reconstruction methodologies (…). At the original annual resolution, the reconstruction ensemble mean shows no clear indication of a long period of years with globally consistent below-average temperatures relative to the mean for 1–2000 ad (…). Of the years before 1850, 97% had at least 10% of the globe experiencing above-average temperatures, and 10% of the globe experiencing below-average temperatures. It is only if the reconstructed time series are smoothed over multi-decadal timescales (…). I 551 To quantify the spatial coherence of cold and warm epochs, we consider the time of occurrence of a climate anomaly as the variable to be characterized within a probabilistic framework. We calculate the most probable period of peak warming or cooling during each of the five climatic epochs (…) (>Climate Periods/Neukom). (…) we identify the warmest 51-year average within the epochs commonly referred to as warm [and] we identify the coldest 51-year average for the DACP [Dark Ages Cold Period] and LIA [Little Ice Age] cold epochs. Findings: There is considerable spatial heterogeneity in the timing of temperature maxima and minima. No preindustrial epoch shows global coherence in the timing of the coldest or warmest periods. There is, however, regional coherence. I 552 In contrast to the spatial heterogeneity of the preindustrial era, the highest probability for peak warming over the entire Common Era is found in the late twentieth century almost everywhere (98% of global surface area), except for Antarctica, where contemporary warming has not yet been observed over the entire continent(1). Thus, even though the recent warming rates are not entirely homogeneous over the globe, with isolated areas showing little warming or even cooling(1,2) the climate system is now in a state of global temperature coherence that is unprecedented over the Common Era. Through a bootstrapping uncertainty analysis we find that the particular spatial patterns (…) are robust. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the timing of maxima and minima is an inherent property of the input proxy data, which show a similar lack of global coherence in the timing of each putative climate epoch. (…) peak preindustrial warm and cool periods occurred at different times in different locations. By contrast, the CWP [current warm period] shows distinct temporal and spatial agreement, with the warmest multidecadal peak of the Common Era occurring in the late twentieth century. The area fraction agreeing on the timing of the CWP is significantly larger than that expected from stochastic climate variability (…). (…) as in the reconstructions, the spatial consistency seen in model simulations over the twentieth century suggests that anthropogenic global warming is the cause of increased spatial temperature coherence relative to prior eras. Vs: An important caveat to our results is that the spatiotemporal distribution of high-resolution proxy data is inherently unequal and often sparse. VsVs: However, [future] improvements are unlikely to lead to greater global coherence when the extant proxy data do not show indications of such. Conclusion: Peak warming and cooling events appear to be regionally constrained. Anomalous globally averaged temperatures during certain periods do not imply the existence of epochs of globally coherent and synchronous climate. This global asynchronicity suggests that multidecadal regional extremes are driven by regionally specific mechanisms, namely either unforced internal climate variability(3,4) or regionally varying responses to external forcing(5–7). >Climate Periods/Neukom. 1. Stenni, B. et al. Antarctic climate variability on regional and continental scales over the last 2000 years. Clim. Past 13, 1609–1634 (2017). 2. Caesar, L., Rahmstorf, S., Robinson, A., Feulner, G. & Saba, V. Observed fingerprint of a weakening Atlantic Ocean overturning circulation. Nature 556, 191–196 (2018). 3. Wang, J. et al. Internal and external forcing of multidecadal Atlantic climate variability over the past 1,200 years. Nat. Geosci. 10, 512–517 (2017). 4. Delworth, T. L. et al. The North Atlantic Oscillation as a driver of rapid climate change in the Northern Hemisphere. Nat. Geosci. 9, 509–512 (2016). 5. Hegerl, G. C., Brönnimann, S., Schurer, A. & Cowan, T. The early 20th century warming: anomalies, causes, and consequences. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Change 9, e522 (2018). 6. Abram, N. J. et al. Early onset of industrial-era warming across the oceans and continents. Nature 536, 411–418 (2016); corrigendum 545, 252 (2017). 7. Bindoff, N. L. et al. in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (eds Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 867–952 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013). Raphael Neukom, Nathan Steiger, Juan José Gómez-Navarro, Jianghao Wang & Johannes P. Werner, 2019: “No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era”. In: Nature, Vol. 571, pp. 550–554. |
Neukom I Raphael Neukom No evidence for globally coherent warm and cold periods over the preindustrial Common Era 2019 |
| Coherence | Millikan | I 8 Coherence/Millikan: one will have to explain why coherence is good, how it helps us, not just what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in a total theory about the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of his task, it has not succeeded in overcoming the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. >Empiricism. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealism are very simple: VsRealism: "To find the meaning of a word, one must see what would justify its application, or what an application would cause. But the application is justified by earlier applications! And it was caused by past beliefs! ((s) also VsCausal theory, VsCorrespondence theory). >Causal theory of knowledge. >Realism, >Correspondence theory. Correspondence: does not play any role in the justification or the causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: this can be turned around just as well: Correspondence theory: pro: Correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond in a certain way to a part of the world. The fact that correspondence plays no role in the justification of an utterance can equally well be turned around: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification. (Millikan pro!). Sentence Meaning/Meaning/Millikan: are the special mapping functions of the sentence. But since we reject correspondence as a test for truth, the mapping function cannot exist in rules in the head. I 10 It cannot be the "user" who "assumes" that his sentences represent the world so and so. In addition, the "assumes" (the "should") that determines the meaning must be a different "assumes" ("should") than that of "assuming" from a person that it behaves in accordance with the expectation of others according to rules. ("Should behave"). Mapping function/image/meaning/Millikan: the questions become more and more difficult: What kind of things are that that map sentences? What kind of mapping functions are involved? What is the "should"? Knowledge/Self/Meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way, as I justify my utterances, defines my meanings, how can I grasp what I think myself? >Self-knowledge. Thesis: We will have to give up that we know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of consistency (the essence of coherence) fits into nature. For this I need Fregean sense as the main concept. As one can be mistaken in knowledge, so also in meaning. I 324 Coherence/Millikan: coherence is essentially consistency (consistent, consistency). The lack of contradictions can be a test for the adequacy of terms. Namely, before the theories were developed at all. Perception judgement/repetition/Millikan: if a judgment can be repeated, it is a test in which no conclusion (inference) plays a role at all. Then it is only about coherence (of judgments, not of theories). >Perception, >Judgment. Coherence/Millikan: can therefore also be viewed as a test for truth, without necessitating a holism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Coherence | Easton | Brocker I 491 Coherence/Theory/Easton: more general theories are more coherent. (1) Coherence consists in the elaboration of a conceptual structure (2), i.e. a logically integrated set of concepts. The general public consists in that the theory can be applied to all past, present and possibly also conceivable [...]. systems. ((s) Context: Easton's own political theory, See >Politics/Easton, Theory/Easton.) 1. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York 1965, 7 2. Ibid. p. 10. Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Coherence Theory | Ayer | I 21 AyerVsCoherence theory: there could be different systems of coherent statements. I 293 Coherence/Carnap/Ayer: Carnap tried to rescue the coherence theory: pragmatism: what serves our goals? - AyerVsCarnap: that ultimately only one of the competing culturally distinct systems is acceptable, already exceeds the coherence theory itself. >Pragmatism, cf. >Correspondence theory. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Coherence Theory | Maturana | I 220 Coherence/Maturana: Coherence needs no justification. - >Justification. The observer necessarily operates in a field of effective action. >Observation/Maturana. Errors would be to distinguish only for a second observer. >Levels(Order), >Description levels. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Coherence Theory | Russell | II 65 Russell VsCoherence Theory/Russell: the truth definition presupposes the meaning of "coherence" - many scientific theories are not entirely coherent. Def coherence theory/Russell: Characteristic of the falsity of a thought is: if it does not place itself without contradiction in the totality of our opinions. According to this, the essence of any truth is to be part of a completely closed system which is "The Truth". (RussellVs). RussellVsCoherence Theory/Russell: 1 There is no reason to assume that only a set of coherent opinions is possible at all. Not so unusual in science. VII 66 The definition of truth according to the coherence theory already presupposes the meaning of "coherence", whereas in reality "coherence" presupposes the truth of the laws of logic. If we now wanted to try to subject the proposition of contradiction itself to a coherence test, we would find that - assuming it was wrong - there could be no incoherence at all between propositions! >Contradiction, >Truth/Russell, cf. >Coherence. IV 107 RussellVsCoherence Theory: An imaginative writer could invent a coherent new past that is consistent with everything we know and yet quite different from the real past. IV 109 There is no evidence that there is any one coherent system. Coherence/Russell: is not actually the meaning of truth, but it can provide an important criterion. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Coherence Theory | Strawson | IV 116 Coherence theory/coherence/Strawson: beliefs are always in the context of other beliefs. - You cannot correct a translation without forming a new translation. >Holism. >Context, >Coherence, >Meaning, >Beliefs. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Coherence Theory | Rescher | From Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 I 346 Coherence Theory/Rescher: if you do not know the meaning of an allegedly true proposition, you need other propositions. - Intuitive methods: observation - (>intuitionist theory) - ((s) Observation >criteria pragmatism: the equating of "true" and "useful to believe" needs a distinction definition/criterion. (>Criteria). Coherence/Bradley: is not the meaning of truth, but its referee (sic). I 362 Coherence/Rescher: is not the meaning of truth. I 366 Blanshard: truth consists of coherence. - Then coherence is also the definition of truth - RescherVsBlanshard: the step from coherence to facts is not a necessary step - coherence is also perfectly possible in fiction. I 377 Problem: lots of independent propositions can be represented as coherent. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Consistency | Feyerabend | I 39 Consistency/FeyerabendVsCoherence Theory/Coherence/Feyerabend: the consistency condition, according to which new hypotheses must coincide with accepted theories, is irrational. Diversity of theories is fruitful for science, uniformity paralyzes its critical power. >Theories. Theory/Physics/Absence of Contradiction/Duhem/Feyerabend: E.g. the theory of Newton contradicts the case law of Galileo and Kepler's laws. For example, statistical thermodynamics contradict 2nd law of thermodynamics. Wave optics, for example, contradict geometrical optics. >Physics. Important Point: this is a logical inconsistency. It is quite possible that the differences of the predictions are so small that they cannot be determined experimentally! Moreover, the theories are not inconsistent in themselves. I 40 Consistency Condition/Feyerabend: the consistency condition is far less generous: it does not eliminate a theory because it contradicts the facts, but because it contradicts a different theory whose confirmed entities it shares. cf. >Coherence. Thus, the still untested part of this theory is made the criterion. The only difference between this criterion and a more recent theory are age and habit! A defendant of the consistency condition would say that the only real improvement would be the acquisition of new facts. >Facts. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Contradictions | Foucault | II 213ff Coherence/Foucault: the history of ideas usually requires coherence. A heuristic rule, almost a moral constraint of research. But this coherence is also the result of research. How to define the last units that complete the analysis. >Coherence. The means employed in research are very numerous, the found coherence can be very different. It tries to achieve an ideal architecture. Coherence always plays the same role in all different forms and areas: to show that the visible contradictions are nothing but a shimmering of the surface. The analysis must therefore suppress the contradiction. Contradiction/Foucault: is far from being the appearance and randomness of the discourse. In reality, it is the real law of the existence of discourse. The discourse emerges from it. The discourse speaks at the same time to translate the contradiction and to overcome it. The contradiction changes with the discourse and escapes its own continuity. In the course of the discourse the contradiction thus fulfills the function of the principle of its historicity. Discourse: is the path from one contradiction to the next. Contradiction: for archeology, objects which, for their own sake, must be described without being examined from which point of view they can be dissolved. For example, the principle of rigidity of Linné: he was contradicted in the eighteenth century (precursor of evolution theory). The archaeological analysis is not to show that underneath this opposition everyone accepted many theses. Archeology: it describes the different spaces of the disunion. It sees the contradiction not as a general function, but as many different. Contradiction, outer: between different discursive information. Derived: inside contradiction. (The latter are significant for archaeological analysis.) Consider, for example, the totality of a plant, in the other case arbitrarily selected elements. E.g. once growth stages, then again optimal visibility. Incompatibility of terms. Exclusion. There are no new objects, no new terms, no new statement modalities. Rather, objects of another (more general or particular) level, concepts which have a different structure and a different application field, expressions of another type, without, however, altering the formation rules. >Order, >Evolution, >Function, >Parts, >Part-of-relation. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Existence Statements | Quine | VIII 24ff Existence Statement/Quine: special: "There is one thing that is so and so" (mentions the name) - general: "There is a thing that is so" (specifies a variable instead of names) - E.g. Pegasus: is a sense equivalent to description. >Descriptions, >Pegasus example, >Non-existence, >Unicorn example. XII 27 Object/Translation/Indefiniteness/Expression Conditions/Language Learning/Radical Interpretation/Quine: the expression conditions are not sufficient to be able to say with certainty what a speaker of a foreign language regards as objects. Problem: how can assertions of existence (theorems of existence) ever be empirically invalidated? Solution: the knowledge of the conditions of utterance does not ensure the reference to the subject, but it does help to clarify what serves as empirical confirmation of the truth of the whole sentence. XII 28 We then project our own acceptance of objects onto the indigenous language. We can be sure that the assumed object is an observed object in the sense that the amplified stimuli emanate quite directly from it. XII 33 Abstract/abstract object/existence/coherence/Quine: Existence assertions about abstract objects can only be judged by their coherence or by simplicity considerations. Example: to avoid paradoxes with classes. Property/Quine: the law of education for properties states that every statement that speaks about a thing ascribes a property to it (predication). This is a cultural heritage. VII (i) 167 Existence/Logic/Quine: we can dispense with such confusing notations as "a exists" because we know how to translate singular sentences of existence into more basic expressions if the singular term is contained in a description. Observation sentence: is meaningless in the past, since it is assumed that it was learned by direct conditioning. Theorem of Existence/Russell: For this reason, Russell declares singular theorems of existence pointless if their subject is a real proper name. ((s) Real proper name: "this". No, not only!"Nine" too: are names whose reference is saved. So from acquaintance, which corresponds to a descriptions. For fake names, the description corresponds to what a fiction says about it: e.g. Pegasus. "winged horse". Name/identification(s): each name corresponds to a description because no thing in the world can only be referenced by a name and for each description a name can be invented but not every description is fulfilled by an object. ((s) Precisely because of the necessary acquaintance the question whether the theorem of existence is true is pointless.) Quine: the reason is the same here. ((s) Theorem of existence (s): Example "There is Napoleon": can only refer to one learning situation. Circular, so to speak, from the very beginning. Exactly the same: e.g. "There are daisies". Davidson/(s): One could also not say meaningfully: Example: "It has turned out that this and that does not exist": because then one says only that one has learned a word wrongly. >Reference, >Learning. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Holism | Strawson | IV 116 Coherence theory/coherence/Strawson: beliefs are always in the context of other beliefs. - You cannot correct a translation without forming a new translation. >Context, >Coherence, >Meaning, >Beliefs. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Simplicity | Quine | VII (a) 17 Simplicity/Quine: is itself ambiguous and unclear. It is a double or multiple standard depending on the terminology. Immediate experiences can be presented more easily in a physical conceptual scheme. VII (d) 70 Simplicity/Ontology/Quine: we simplify our discussion, in that we make the objects as big and as few as possible - e.g. river instead of temporal river states. >Ontology. XI 135 Ontology/Existence/Theory/Quine/Lauener: decisive are simplicity considerations, but not so much about the set of objects, but rather about theory. Good chances as items are those that already play a role in language learning. While the objects, which correspond to the theoretical terms of modern physics, could fall victim to a later revision. XII 33 Abstract/abstract object/existence/coherence/Quine: Existence assertions about abstract objects can only be judged by their coherence or by simplicity considerations. Example: to avoid paradoxes with classes. >Paradoxes, >Classes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Verification | Millikan | I 297 Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists. With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that... I 298 ...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences. Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one. >Correspondence/Millican, >Correspondence theory/Millikan. Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify. Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all. Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong. >Holism/Millikan. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. >Adequacy/Millikan. I 312 Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,... I 313 ...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules. Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). I 317 Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things. Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan: No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa. This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees". I 318 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake. >Concept/Millikan. I 320 Test/review/theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bradley, F.H. | Rescher Vs Bradley, F.H. | I 370 Def Truth/Bradley (Idealist): "Truth is an ideal expression of the universe, coherent and comprehensive at the same time. I 371 RescherVsBradley: But "coherence" is a transitive verb. Any coherence must be coherence with something. Coherence/Rescher: is a property that cannot have individual propositions but only sets. In a truly coherent system, we can infer from the falsity of any proposition within the system the falsity of any other proposition. (Arithmetic). I 373 E.g. Multiplication of false results is itself a contradictory procedure. I 374 We cannot therefore argue that none of the coherent propositions can be false without all being false, but only that none can be false without some others also being false. Unless the propositions are simply redundant, they cannot all be true or false at the same time. ((s) thus not maximum consistent). |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Correspondence Theory | Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory | I 6 Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts. This has an important consequence: Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism. The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected I 7 not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world. I 8 Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple: VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory). Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around: Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!). Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind. I 10 It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"? Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then? Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept. The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning. I 86 Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things. Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty. Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation. This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations. On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied. I 87 Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Loar Vs Davidson, D. | I 20 Anomalous Monism/Davidson/Loar: there are no psychophysical laws. Loar: this does not concern me, but the argument for it does: because then there can also be no functionalist reduction. (Which is a stronger thesis). Davidson/Loar: his most important premise is: the "constitutive force of rationality" in the attribution of belief and desire. Without a certain logical consistency we cannot ascribe any attitudes at all. Davidson: Thesis: it would always be possible to find a person whose belief has a different content, with the same physical state. Therefore, a psychophysical generalization G cannot be a law. Reason: mental and physical schemata have different commitments. I 21 Mental states: are fixed on rationality Physical states: are fixed to nothing comparable. I.e. a physical state is never correlated in this way with other physical states as a mental state is with other mental states. Coherence/Davidson: concerns mental states and has no echo in the physical. Functionalism/LoarVsDavidson: shows that Davidson's argument is false. Functional States; are physical states of the 2. level Structural physical states: 1. level. LoarVsDavidson: there is a much simpler reason against adopting psychophysical laws: 1. that there is no 1:1 correlation between propositional attitude and structural physical states. Functional Role/Loar: may look different in each person depending on how they have learned something. However, people with the same attitude may also have something physical in common. But according to functionalism, this is a quality of the 2. level! I 22 2. Rationality/Loar: it would be surprising if our theory of rationality had structural parallels to the structure of a physical system. But that is not Davidson's argument and it does not convince either. It would be no wonder at all if a person had a correspondence between the physical and the mental. Functionalism/Loar: Main question: can it recognize the constitutive power of rationality? Of course! And it must! (see below chapter 4) Thesis: each predicate of the form "z believes that p" attributes a certain functional state that determines the role of the predicate in theory, including constraints on rationality. Problem: this must be said in physical vocabulary and how can we do this with propositions? I 23 Functionalism/LoarVsDavidson: functionalism is not about reducing laws to laws. There can be contingencies on both sides. I 24 Rationality: their ingredients are not contingent, but that certain physical states fulfill them is. Psychology/Unrevocability/Rationality/Davidson/Loar: other authors read Davidson's argument as follows: Rationality is constitutive of rational psychology, which is therefore irrevocable. And revisability is a central feature of scientific laws! Loar: that is not my argument. I 25 Rationality/Physical States/LoarVsDavidson/Loar: Thesis: the idea is not incoherent that certain physical states meet the conditions of rationality ((s) coherence, consistency, etc.). |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Internalism | Lehrer Vs Internalism | Brendel I 38 Internalism/Knowledge/Brendel: Thesis: It is demanded that there is a connection - known to the subject- to truth-producing facts. VsInternalism: Was sacrificed in Gettier's examples. I 219 LehrerVsInternalism/Brendel: But the internalist consistency of information with background information is also not yet sufficient for knowledge, e.g. evil demon. I 220 Demon/Internalism/Brendel: Thesis: The subject is justified to believe in simulation by a demon that the object (which is only simulated) stands before him. LehrerVsInternalism: E.g. suppose the demon forgets to manipulate the subject's brain cells for a moment: Internalism: Thesis: At that moment, the subject has knowledge. Lehrer: No, the subject does not have knowledge since it needs to recognize the situation. Solution/Lehrer: The background system must not contain any false assumptions. Externalism/Lehrer/Brendel: this is Lehrer's externalist component. Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Unrefuted justification. 4 Adequacy Conditions: 1. p is true 2. S accepts p 3. S is fully justified to accept p 4. S is fully justified to accept p in a manner that is not based on any false statement. Coherence/Lehrer/Brendel: Thesis: The central term for Lehrer is the coherence with a system of acceptance. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
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