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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autonomy | Feyerabend | I 43 Principle of Autonomy/Feyerabend: collecting the facts for examination purposes is the only thing left for the scientist to do. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether alternatives to the theory under consideration are looked at. Principle of the relative autonomy of facts. (versus theories). >Theories, >Facts. The principle does not mean that the discovery and description of facts is entirely theory-independent, but that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether alternatives to this theory are taken into account. >Discoveries, >Empirical content. ((s) I.e. that facts are autonomous, independent of theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: this principle is far too simple a point of view. Facts and theories are much more closely linked than the principle of autonomy wants to admit. E.g. it is known today that the Brownian particles are a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the second law of thermodynamics. (Henning GenzVs: that is not true.) Could this relationship between movement and theory have been shown or directly discovered? Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been discovered in this way? 2) Could it have been shown to disprove the 2nd law of thermodynamics? ((s) Nonsense: to »observe« relevance). >Relevance. Each thermometer is subject to fluctuations which are the same as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a completely different way: with the help of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of the Brownian movement. In this refutation the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the larger framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Empirical Content | Feyerabend | I 364 Empirical Content/Theory/Vienna Circle/Feyerabend: The empirical content of a theory can be found by looking at how much of it can be translated into an ideal language whose empirical properties are easily recognizable. >Theories, >Ideal language, >Translation, >Content. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Paradoxes | Lakatos | I 206 Def tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: The possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically untested proposition. >Empirical content, >Content. Solution/Lakatos: The connection of an auxiliary hypothesis generating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Def homogeneity/theory/short: a factorization ((s) splitting) of T with respect to E(T) is not possible. Logical form: Subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets. T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E(T) such that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant reinforcement is factorizable in this sense. A connection of theory T with this reinforcement H is empirically noncreative. >Theories/Lakatos, >Review/Lakatos. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 |
| Ramsey Sentence | Schurz | I 213 Ramsey-sentene/RS/Theoretical Terms/Schurz: Here Theoretical Terms are not eliminated completely, but existentially quantified over them. Given a theory , which we now take to be a single theorem T(τ1,...τn,) (the conjunction of all axioms of T. Theoretical terms: τ1,...τn. Moreover, there are various non-theoretical terms π which are not written on separately. Then the Ramsey theorem of T is: (5.8 1) R(T): EX1,...Xn: T(X1,...Xn) Everyday language translation: there are theoretical entities X1,..Xn which satisfy the assertions of the theory. Pointe: an empirical (not theoretical) proposition follows from T exactly if it follows from R(T). ((s) It follows from the theory if it follows from the Ramsey theorem of the theory, i.e., from the assumption that the theoretical entities exist.) Thus, it holds: (5.8 -2) E(R(T)) = E(T) Notation: E(T): empirical proposition that follows from theory T. Schurz: i.e. a theory and its Ramsey theorem have the same empirical content. >Carnap-sentence/Schurz, >Empirical content. Ramsey-sentence: Here no more theoretical terms occur! Instead of it: "theoretical" variables. Therefore many, including Ramsey, saw the Ramsey theorem as an empirical theorem (not as a theoretical one. Ramsey theorem: should thus be the sought empirically equivalent non-theoretical axiomatization of the theory. HempelVs/MaxwellVs/Schurz: this is problematic because the RS asserts the existence of certain entities that we call "theoretical". Ramsey theorem/interpretation/realism/instrumentalism/Schurz: the interpretation of the RS as theoretical or non-theoretical depends on whether one interprets 2nd level quantifiers realistically or instrumentally. (a) instrumentalist interpretation: here one assumes that the range of individuals D consists of empirically accessible individuals, and runs the variables Xi over arbitrary subsets of D. (There are no theoretical individuals here). >Instrumentalism/Schurz. Whether these extensions correspond to certain theoretical real properties or not is inconsequential. (Sneed 1971(1), Ketland 2004(2), 291) I 214 Ramsey-sentence/instrumentalism: is then model-theoretically an empirical theorem! Because the models that determine the truth value of R(T) are purely empirical models (D, e1,...em). " ei": extensions of the empirical terms, pi: empirical terms of T. Structuralism: calls these empirical models "partial" models (Balzer et al. 1987(3),57). Empirical model/Schurz: is easily extendible to a full model (D, e1,...em, t1,..tn), ti: are the extensions of the theoretical terms. Pointe: this does not yet mean that R(T) is logically equivalent to E(T). Because R(T) is a 2nd level proposition and E(T) contains 1st level propositions. >Structuralism/Schurz. Def Ramsey-eliminable: if there is a 1st level empirical proposition equivalent to a RS L, then the theortical term is called Ramsey-eliminable. (Sneed 1971(1), 53). b) Realist interpretation: (Lewis, 1970(4), Papineau 1996(5)): assumes that the existence quantified variables denote real theoretical entities. The models are then no longer simple realist models: >Realism/Schurz. 1. New theoretical individuals are added to the individual domain. New: Dt. 2. not every subset of Dt corresponds to a real property. En. Ex In the simplest case, one must assume a set Et of extensions of "genuine" theoretical properties over which 2nd level variables run. Realism/Ramsey-sentence: new: now not every empirical model of instrumentalistically interpreted RS is extensible to a model of realistically interpreted Ramsey-sentence, because the quantifiers (Exi) of R(T) can have satisfactions in the power set of Det but no satisfactions in Et. In philosophical words: an empirical model, which fulfills the RS instrumentalistically, cannot be read off whether the respective theoretical entities, whose existence is postulated by R(T), are merely useful fictions or real existing entities. Instrumentalism: Proposition: Theoretical entities are useful fictions. Realism/Ramsey Theorem: here R(T) contains more than just the empirical content of a theory, it also contains the total synthetic content: if we assume that the meaning of Theoretical Terms is not determined by anything other than this theory itself, then the assertion that T makes about the world seems to be precisely that of R(T): there are unobservable entities X1,...Xn that satisfy the total assertion of the theory T(X1,...Xn). >Carnap-sentence/Schurz. 1. Sneed, J. D. (1971). The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2. Ketland, J. (2004). "Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification", British Journal for the Philosoph y of Science 55, 287-300. 3. Balzer, W. et al (1987). An Architectonic for Science. Dordrecht: Reidel. 4. Lewis, D. (1970). "How to definie Theoretical Terms", wiederabgedruckt in ders. Philosophical Papers Vol I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Papineau, D. (1996). "Theory-dependent Terms", >Philosophy of Science 63, 1- 20. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autonomy Principle | Feyerabend Vs Autonomy Principle | I 43 Autonomy Principle/Feyerabend: the collection of facts for inspection purposes is the only thing that is left to do for the scientist. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether one takes alternatives to the theory to be tested into consideration. Principle of relative autonomy of facts. (Opposite theories). The principle does not say that the discovery and description of facts is completely independent of theories, but rather that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether one considers alternatives to this theory. ((s) i.e. that facts are autonomous, regardless of the theories.) I 44 FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: that’s a way too simple point of view. Facts and theories are far more closely linked than the principle of autonomy will admit. E.g. it is known now that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the 2nd law of thermodynamics. (GenzVs.) Could this relationship between the movement and the theory have been demonstrated or discovered directly?. Two questions: 1) Could the relevance of the movement have been detected in this way? 2) Could it have been shown that it refutes the 2nd law? ((s) nonsense: "observing" relevance. Every thermometer is subject to fluctuations that are the same scale as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a different way: by means of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian movement. In this rebuttal, the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the broader framework of statistical physics. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of FodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. FodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Observation Language | Fraassen Vs Observation Language | I 56 Empirical Content/Theory/Fraassen: we have seen that we cannot isolate the empirical content of a theory in the interpretation by saying that language consists of two parts (observation language, theoretical terms). That should not surprise us. Phenomenon/Fraassen: the phenomena are preserved if they are proven to be fragments of a larger unit. FraassenVsObservation Language: it would be very strange if the theories described the phenomena, the observable, in other terms than the rest of the world they describe. A conceptual distinction between the observable and the unobservable is always too easy. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Positivism | Feyerabend Vs Positivism | I 364 Vienna Circle: one finds the empirical content of a theory by looking into how much of it can be translated into an ideal language whose empirical properties are easily recognizable. FeyerabendVsIdeal Language: An ideal language is not achieved easily. Even the first steps lead to problems which are unknown in physics. I 366 Experiment: why should there be a terminology in which one can say that the same experiment confirms one theory and refutes the other? II 80 Vienna Circle/"Formal Speech"/Translation: E.g. question Is the world finite or infinite? In the "translation" we no longer speak of a property of the world, but of a property of sequences of explanations. So either one fundamental explanation or a never-ending sequence of explanations. FeyerabendVs: If one forgets the cosmological background (and that happens easily with philosophers) - then the matter is already decided: there are no "fundamental or ultimate" explanations. |
Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
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