Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 28 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Rorty VI 9
Truth/Rorty: truth is absolute - in contrast: relative: justification is relative. >Justification.
Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - ((s) a criterion for truth is not available. >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion.
Truth/Rorty: truth is undefinable (like Davidson).
VI 28
Correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the Absolute - so the idealism deprived the term of correspondence of its very substance. >Correspondence theory.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

As if James Horwich I 24
As if/correspondence/pragmatism/James: one can say that scientific ideas agree with the reality "as if" they existed, e.g. as if reality consisted of ether, atoms or electrons, etc. We do not have to accept them literally. (1) > See Literal Truth.
1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Conceptual Schemes Rorty Horwich I 454
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVscorrespondence/Rorty: we get rid of all these intermediate elements together with the correspondence: - E.g. conceptual scheme, "perspective", language, culture, "point of view", "tertia" - this intentionalist terms are the sources of skepticism. >Perspective, >Language, >Culture, >Skepticism.
Horwich I 454
Scheme/content/conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the dualism scheme/content: possible forms: "conceptual frame", "intended interpretation": these are not causally linked to the things they organize - they vary independently of the rest of the universe - without them we look at our own beliefs as in the Radical Interpretation. >Radical interpretation.
Horwich I 454
RI/conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: examining ourselves with the RI makes a correspondence relation, "intended beliefs" etc. superfluous. >Radical Interpretation.
Rorty I 300
Conceptual scheme/3rd dogma/ Rorty: as soon as conceptual schemes became something transitory, the distinction between scheme and content itself was in at risk. - Then science does not become possible through an a priori contribution of our knowledge.
I 330
Conceptual scheme/Davidson/Rorty: talk of the scheme or conceptual system attempts to separate the concept of truth from the concept of meaning and therefore has to fail - then there would have to be an "alternative conceptual scheme" that would be true, but untranslatable. - That is incomprehensible. >Truth, >Meaning, >Content.
I 338
Rorty: there is no neutral basis from which various schemes can be compared. - Nor do we have the right to assume a common scheme. - Solution: without 3rd Dogma (scheme/content) we restore the direct reference to the objects.
VI 64
Conceptual schemes/point of view/Putnam/Rorty we must always use a specific system of concepts (we cannot do otherwise) - but we must not claim that this is actually not the way in which things behave.
VI 127
Conceptual scheme/DavidsonVs3rd Dogma/Rorty: we must stop sorting statements by whether they are "made" true by "the world" or by "us". DavidsonVsVs conceptual scheme/DavidsonVsQuine.
VI 129
Conceptual scheme/content/Rorty: the distinction is not to be confused with the distinction "is"/"seems to be". >Perception, >Appearance.
VI 135
We can not specify which "moves" of nature belong to the scheme and which belong to content.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Millikan I 107
Correspondence/correspondence relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon.
2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides!
3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value.
N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance).
Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole).
E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar.
I 108
Transformation/sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair).
Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations.
I 307
Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways.
Cf. >Picture theory.
I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty.
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. >Representation.
Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked.
>Reference, >Interpretation.
Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers.
Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself,
E.g.
COW
Or by holding up a different sign, e.g.
REFERS
Or maybe
CAUSES.
Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know":
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head,
((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general").
PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer.
>Intentionality.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Correspondence Theory Austin Horwich I 185
Correspondence Theory/Austin: purified version: thesis: a proposition is true; = a speech (episode) is conventionally based on something outside itself. Correspondence/Austin: Always conventional.
StrawsonVsAustin: eliminate Correspondence theory!
StrawsonVsAustin: we cannot always equate statements with events (episodes) - Possibility of an event is enough.(1)

>Correspondence theory/Strawson, cf. >Coherence theory.


1. John L. Austin, "Truth, (1950) " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24: 111–128, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Davidson Rorty I 328
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson it is a relation without ontological preferences, it can connect any words with any object. Nature prefers no mode of presentation. (VsAnthropic Principle).
Rorty VI 134
Correspondence: does not add anything enlightening to the simple concept of being true. Perhaps we should rather say "mostly true" and admit that people have different views on questions of detail. Match/Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: does not add anything intelligible to the concept of "being true".

Horwich I 497
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/VsCausal Theory of Reference/DavidsonVsKripke: if, conversely, reference was fixed by a physical relation, the correspondence between the two correspondences would need an explanation - because according to causal theory it would be possible that we often refer to things that we cannot reliably report - then it would be an empirical ((s) contingent) fact that our beliefs are mostly true. >Beliefs/Davidson.

Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory James Diaz-Bone I 88
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: Conformity in James, the dichotomy true/false is softened. (> realization,> adjustment). ---
Horwich I 22
Correspondence/accordance/pragmatism/James: only here does he begin to distinguish himself from "intellectualism": Accordance/James: accordance means first "to copy", but e.g. our word for clock is not a copy, but a symbol, which can replace a representation image very well.
Symbol/James: for many things there are no "copies" at all, only symbols: e.g. "past", "force", "spontaneity", etc.
Correspondence: can only mean proper guidance here. Namely, practically as well as intellectually.
Horwich I 23
It leads to consistency, stability and fluid human communication. (1)

1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Millikan I 86
Intentionality/Correspondence/Millikan: Intentionality is not a sharply defined phenomenon. It is not one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an eigenfunction. It has not so much to do with what is actual. >Intentionality.
Intentionality/Millikan: intentionality has generally to do with mapping rules between signs and things.
>Picture theory.
Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty.
Definition pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: a pure correspondence theory would be one that asserts that a correspondence would be true only because there is a mapping relation.
This does not work, because there can be mathematically infinitely many different mapping relations.
On the other hand:
Representations: are not so ubiquitous and diverse.
>Representation/Millikan.
I 87
Correspondence theory/Millikan: in order for the correspondence theory to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the mapping relations that map representations on the represented. Mapping relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Correspondence Theory Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: No thing makes sentences true (> truthmakers). Quine: stimuli do not make it true, but lead to beliefs.
II 85
Science maintains a certain claim to a correspondence theory of truth, thanks to the connection with observation sentences; ethics, on the other hand, obviously has a theory of coherence.
VI 112
Proposition/Actuality/Correspondence/Quine: a more cultivated theory postulates facts to which true sentences should then correspond as a whole.
VI 113
But: QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: for an explanation of the world, objects are needed in abundance, abstract as well as concrete, but apart from such a false foundation of a correspondence theory, facts do not contribute the least. We can simply delete "it is a fact that" from our sentences. ((s) > Facts/Geach).
VI 115
Correspondence Theory/Quine: as the theory of >semantic ascent already suggests, the truth predicate ("is true") is a link between words and the world.
X 18
Sentence Meaning/Quine: is apparently identical to facts: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That sounds like the correspondence theory, but as such it is empty talk.
QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence exists only between the two intangible elements to which we have referred to as intermediaries between the English sentence and the white snow: Meaning and fact.
VsQuine: one could object, that this takes the links (meaning and fact) too literally.
X 19
If one speaks of meaning as a factor of truth in the sentence, one can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" had been applied to green things in English. And the reference to a fact is just a saying. Quine: this is good as long as we do not have to assume propositions.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Correspondence Theory Ramsey III 72
Correspondence/Correspondence Theory/Fact/Ramsey: which fact corresponds to e.g. Jones thinks that Smith is either a liar or an idiot if reality does not contain any such either or. >Disjunction, cf.>Disjunctive predicates.
If we believe that reality contains no such "either or," we must change our approach.
>Objects of belief, >Objects of thought.
But that does not necessarily speak against Correspondence Theory.
We have given a truth definition without any correspondence.
((s) >Tarski per correspondence (explicitely))
>Correspondence theory/Tarski.
Ramsey: we can rewrite the truth definition with correspondence, though.
>Truth definition.
Fact/Ramsey: if A is B, then by common usage we can say that it is a fact that A is B and then say that it corresponds to the belief that A is B.
>Facts.
Fact/falsity/Ramsey: if A is not b, there is no fact corresponding to it. ((s) RamseyVsNegative Fact).
>Negative fact.
Problem: we cannot describe the nature of this correspondence unless we know the analysis of the propositional reference of "believe that A is B".
>Reference, >Propositional attitude, >Thought content.

Ramsey I
F. P. Ramsey
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013

Ramsey II
Frank P. Ramsey
A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927

Ramsey III
Frank P. Ramsey
"The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Correspondence Theory Rorty I 255
Conformance/correspondence/Ryle: instead simply: he sees it. FodorVs: recognition is more complex and abstract, because surprisingly independent of differences.
>Recognition, >Similarity, >Identification.
I 363
Correspondence: can also mean something like relationship in general, does not have to be congruent. >Correspondence.
Objective: ambiguous:
a) conception that everyone would reach
b) things as they really are.
>Intersubjectivity, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity.

II (e) 102ff
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: the correspondence theory must be abandoned if one wants to recognize a language as privileged for representation. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between intellect and imagination, between clear and confused ideas. >Correspondence theory/Austin, >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Ayer, >Correspondence.

II (f) 126
RortyVsCorrespondence theory: misleading: it could be judged on the basis of non-words, which words are appropriate for the world. >Language use.

VI 28
Conformance/correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the absolute - with this he robbed the term of its actual core.
VI 125
Correspondence Theory/Rorty: this phrase only says that the correspondence theorist needs criteria for the appropriateness of vocabularies. He needs the notion that one somehow "clings" better to reality than the other. Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine, but not that they represent the reality in a more appropriate way!
>Vocabulary.

Horwich I 452
Correspondence/IdealismVsCorrespondence theory//Rorty: thesis: there is no correspondence between a conviction and non-conviction (object). >Beliefs/Rorty, cf. >Coherence theory.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Searle III 163
Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory. >Realism/Searle, >Realism.
III 211
Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways in which sentences refer to facts. And this verb is "corresponding" among others. Correspondence theory/Searle: the correspondence theory is not an attempt to define "true".
III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. >Correspondence theory/Strawson, >Correspondence theory/Austin.
Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (This goes back to the Tractatus image theory.) >Fact, >Picture theory.
III 215
StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities. >Fact/Strawson.
III 216
Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory.
III 217
These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory.
III 220
Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation.
Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege, was used by Quine against modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument.
III 230
Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant.
III 235
Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Correspondence Theory Sellars II 22
Correspondence/Sellars: the relation of linguistic and non-linguistic entities is an activity. It is reflecting projection. All true statements are true in the same sense (like Frege). They differ in that they construct in different ways a projection of the world in the subjects.
>World/thinking, >Reality, >World, >Truth, >Statements, >Correspondence relation.
Projection/Sellars: but the projection belongs more to the realm of thought acts than to the statements.
>Thinking/Sellars, >Language and thought.
---
II 334
Summary 1) The correspondence that we were looking for is limited to elementary statements.
2) It is about the fundamental role that actual statements (or thought acts) play. Like the pawns in chess: e.g. "Chicago is big."
3) All true statements are "true" in the same sense, but they differ in their roles:
 2 + 2 = 4 plays a different role than "this is red". The role consists in constituting a projection in the language users of the world they live in.
>Language use, >Language game, >Language community, >Meaning, >Truth value, >Fregean meaning.
Sellars: pro redundancy theory: if the picture corresponds, you are convinced that "this is green" is true, so you are convinced: this is green.
>Redundancy theory.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Correspondence Theory Wittgenstein Stegmüller IV 151
Correspondence/Kripke: presupposes that the members of the community agree as to whether or not they correspond. Justification conditions (assertibility conditions) are about correspondence as such; they are not an understanding of correspondence - the concept needs not be known. >Assertibility/Wittgenstein.
II 95
Truth/Wittgenstein: the claim that there is a certain theory of truth is wrong, because truth is not a concept. WittgensteinVsCorrespondence Theory, WittgensteinVsCoherence Theory. Further authors on >Correspondence Theory, >Coherence Theory.
II 284
Consistency/WittgensteinVsCorrespondence Theory: there is an enormous temptation to see all things as an extension of something else, we fall victim to this temptation when we say a sentence is true if it corresponds to reality.
II 285
For example, all furniture can be regarded as chairs with certain extensions.
II 286
Consistency/WittgensteinVsCorrespondence Theory: the statement that there is agreement between a sentence and reality does not mean anything because we do not know what is to be understood by agreement.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Deflationism Williams II 497
Deflationism/correspondence/M.Williams: for deflationism, a minimal correspondence is available: the one that ist assumed in the causal theory (of reference). >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Facts Millikan I 104
Facts/Real value/Millikan: the real value of a sentence is the fact in the world. Wrong sentence/correspondence/Millikan: here the singular term has an indirect, "piggyback" - relation to its referent.
N.B.: but this is not the relation of a "should-be-like-that".
Correspondence: takes place only in true sentences.
Normal relation/E.g. Unicorn/Millikan: (in the wrong sentence > non-existence) the "should-correspond" is not correspondence, but the possession of meaning! Its referring is its having a certain kind of meaning or sense.
I 222
Negative fact/Millikan: we must be able to show that a negative act is still something else than the non-existence of a positive fact. And we cannot do that. We just moved around in circles. Non-existent fact/Millikan: a non-existent fact cannot be an object of an icon and not an object of a representation.
Negative fact/Millikan: a negative would then have to be something other than a non-existent fact.
N.B.: but if we can show that, we do not even have to accept that "non-p" says "that p does not exist".
Negative sentence/image/fact/negation/Millikan: what I then have to assert is that negative sentences represent actual and/or existing world states (facts).
It is well known how to do this:
Negation/solution: one simply says that the negation is only applied to the logical predicate of the sentence ((s) internal negation). In doing so, the meaning of the predicate is changed, so that the predicate applies (maps) to the opposite as it usually does.
I 223
This can then also be extended to more complex sentences with >external negation: E.g. "No A is φ" becomes "Every A is non-φ".
MilllikanVs: the difficulties with this approach are also well-known:
1. Problem: how to interpret the function of "not" in very simple sentences of the form "x is not" E.g. "Pegasus is not (pause)" Here "not" can be interpreted as operating over predicates! Sentences of the form "x is not" are, of course, equivalent to sentences of the form "x does not exist".
Problem: we have said that "exists" is not a representation. Thus "not" cannot be interpreted as always operating on a predicate of a representative sentence.
For example, "Cicero is not Brutus" cannot operate on a logical predicate of the sentence, since simple identity sentences have no logical predicate. So "not" has to have other functions.
Problem: In which relations do these different functions stand together? For we should assume that "not" does not have different meanings in different contexts.
I 226
Negative Facts/Imperative/Indicative/Not/Negation/Millikan: E.g. "do not do A" has the eigenfunction to produce the same state as the one which would make the indicative sentence "H did not do A" true. Making true: So, it is a question of creating a state that makes a sentence true.
Millikan: It is not a question of producing non-existent things, but of creating existential things.
E.g. "John did not go to the office". This is not a question of whether one has not an opinion in the end whether John is going to the office.
Negative Belief/Millikan: if a negative belief exists in this context, it must have a positive function.
Conversely, John has done something that was contrary to going to the office.
Alternative/Negation/Millikan: there is a structured space of alternatives, in which John necessarily acts.
Alternatives/complexity: the less complex they are described, the less their number.
Negative fact/negation/not/Millikan: thesis: if something is not the case, that means something else is the case.
E.g. to obey a negative command must be something that could have also caused a positive action.
But positive facts cause positive states. So that something is not the case,...
I 227
...must always correspond to the fact that something else is the case. Otherwise we could not explain how negative intentions can be executed.
Belief/conviction/real value: here it is parallel: intentions cause their real values. Conversely, real values of beliefs cause beliefs, e.g. because John's jacket is brown, I believed that John's jacket is brown.
Negative belief: correspondingly: real value of belief that John's jacket is not red must be the belief that it is not red, or - more specifically - brown. But I do not assure myself of this by not seeing the jacket, but by seeing that the jacket has a different color.
Opposite/Millikan: only properties and relations have opposites but these are not absolute. There must be a common foundation. We should assume that "not" has not different meanings in different contexts.
I 257
Negative sentence/Millikan: a negative sentence forms a positive fact (world state), not the absence of a fact.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Facts Schlick I 93
Facts/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot determine the structure of facts. Therefore, we cannot say exactly what a comparison of them with statements is. >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Statements.
SchlickVsHempel: Example: if I count the towers of the cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a fact. If Hempel denies this, he uses the words in a different sense.
>Descriptions.
I 98
Fact/Sentence/Comparison/Match/Correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: Example -The proposition contains more parts called "words" than the cathedral has "towers". >Structures, >Grammar, >Syntax.
Problem: this does not allow us to test the proposition! There is no specific "correspondence" between these physical objects here.
Cf. >Picture theory.
I 99
"Structure of Facts"/Hempel: for example the old question whether one should allow not only rational but also irrational values (numbers) to describe physical states. (Because "nature does not make jumps"). Pseudoproblem: this is a pseudoproblem because there is no imaginable experiment at all that provides a decision between both possibilities. It is a question of syntactic convention.
>Conventions.

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Indeterminacy Field II IX
Indeterminacy/Correspondence/Lewis/Kit Fine/Field: Indeterminacy is not a big problem for the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory.
Solution: Supervaluation for vague languages.
>Supervaluation.
On the other hand: indeterminacy is a problem for deflationism (within one's own language) (Quine).
>Deflationism.
Some authors VsQuine: the assertion of an indeterminacy within one's own language is incoherent. Indeterminacy/mathematics/Field: indeterminacy exists in quantity theory, but not in number theory.
>Number theory, >Quantities, >Quantities (Physics).
II 180
Indeterminacy/reference/conceptual change/theory change/Field: Thesis: "Mass" was undefined and still is today. Two textbooks of the Special Relativity Theory can differ by understanding mass as "eigen mass" or "relativistic mass". Then this is either the same or different in all reference systems. >Relativity theory, >Theoretical terms, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Reference.
II 192
Indeterminacy/theory/Quine: scientific terms are meaningless outside their theory. >Immanence of truth.
Truth always only in relation to a conceptual scheme.
>Conceptual schemes.
An objective (non-relative) concept of truth could only be attempted in terms of denotation and signification, but this cannot be done if these concepts are relative to a reference system.
FieldVsQuine: Denotation is a perfectly objective relation that exists between expressions and extra-linguistic objects.
>Denotation.
Referential indeterminacy/Field: only shows that denotation is not well-defined in certain situations.
II 271 ff
Incorrect translation/Brandom/Field: E.g. Root - 1 not "i" and "-i". (+) >Reference/Brandom.
II 355
Undefined/Language/McGee/Field: = Having non-standard models. Solution: Extension by predicate: e.g. "standard natural number".
FieldVs: that is cheating.
>Expansion/Field.
New axioms with new vocabulary are not better than new axioms in the old vocabulary.
>Vocabulary, >Conservativity.
Cheating: If it was to be assumed that the new predicates have certain extensions. - (Still FieldVsIndeterminism)
II 359
Indeterminacy/translation/system/Field: For example, assuming two speakers have different assumptions about natural numbers. Then the one must ultimately assume that the other has a wider concept than he himself. Problem: Asymmetry: A foreign concept, which is assumed to be a further, cannot be translated back into its own language. - ((s) There might be an unintended interpretation.)
Field: we also have indeterminacy of the reference on each side.
>Inscrutability.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Modal Realism Bigelow I 165
Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should accept a correspondence theory for modal language. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Possible worlds exist. But we have not yet said anything about what they are made of and what they are. Different kinds of realisms will assume different kinds of possible worlds.
>Possible worlds.
Truthmaker/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have not said anything yet about how modal sentences are made true.
>Truthmakers.
Realism/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: all realisms will say that it is possible that there is a world that represents the actual world as being represented as being in a certain way. ((s) >Stalnaker). Of course, all but one of them represent it wrong.
>Realism.
Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore representations of the actual world. "Representation" is only a technical term,...
I 166
... and not exploratory. >Representation.
Possible worlds: represent not only the actual world, but also other possible worlds!
>Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality.
Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: in this way of speaking, we can then differentiate between what they see as possible worlds.
Modal Realism/Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: three varieties:
1. book theories = maximally consistent sets of truthmakers - "books".
2. replica theories = thesis: worlds are not carriers of truth but replicas ((s) i.e. objects).
Substitutes: David Lewis.
>David Lewis.
3. property theories: = thesis: worlds cannot be understood as books, they are a multitude of books. This means that there is a multitude of truths ((s) within a possible world.
There are three sets of truthmakers here:
(a) set of sentences
(b) set of propositions
(c) sets of beliefs.
Cf. >Ersatz worlds.
I 173
Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must be able to explain possible worlds without using any modal basic concepts. And that is harder than it looks at first glance. There is a thesis that this is not possible at all: modalism.
Definition Modalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the thesis that it is not possible to define modal terms in a non-modal way.
Representatives: Lycan 1979(1), Plantinga 1974(2), 1976(3), 1987(4), van Inwagen (1984(5): some modalities do not need to be defined in more fundamental terms.)
BigelowVsModalism.
Modalism: according to Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy (avant la lettre) one could express it with the slogan thesis "No must from the is". That is to say, moral desires cannot be deduced logically and entirely from outer-moral facts. Bigelow/Pargetter: from this we can gain two attitudes:
a) there are no moral truths, (moral nihilism) or
b) some moral truths we must take as undefined basic facts.
Modal logic/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problems with the moral "must" are reflected in the metaphysical "must".
>Modal logic.
Correspondence theory: is the theory which brings the problems, because without it modal basic concepts would be no problem. But since we want to keep the correspondence theory, we need better access to possible worlds.
>Correspondence theory.
I 174
Possible solution: cannot we just say that some things cannot be described without modal terms? Analogue: For example, name: a fantasy name like "Gough" could refer to something non-linguistic that is not a carrier of truth. In any case, we have to assume an individual. We are assuming correspondence with this. If we tried a description instead, it would reintroduce a name again.
>Descriptions, >Names.
Therefore, we would have to accept some names as undefined basic terms. But that would not yet be a threat to the correspondence theory.
(Question/s): many basic terms would make a correspondence relationship superfluous, because something undefined does not have to be shown?)
Modal Basic Term/Correspondence/Bigelow/Pargetter: analogously, we can assume that modal basic terms are not a threat to correspondence: e.g.
Conchita can play guitar
is true by correspondence between this statement and things in the world.
>Basic concepts.
The property of being able to play the guitar is assumed. (Bigelow/Pargetter pro).
Modal terms/Bigelow/Pargetter: their threat comes not only from the correspondence theory, but also from their supervenience of non-modal properties.
>Supervenience, >Humean Supervenience/Lewis.
I 175
Supervenience/Definability/Definition/Bigelow/Pargetter: a supervenience would guarantee the definition of modal properties in non-modal terms! >Definition, >Definability.
Problem: to do so, we would have to allow an infinite number of complex definitions. This would at least allow a characterization of modal terms.
Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the following we will consider attempts to characterize possible worlds in non-modal terms.
Characterization/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): less than a definition, from many individual cases.
Method/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: whenever a theory leads to modal basic concepts, we will put this theory aside. This is because it cannot then play an explanatory role within the Humean Supervenience. Not because the corresponding possible worlds did not exist.
>Humean supervenience.
I 187
Modal Realism/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his extremely concrete modal realism has the advantage that it would explain many things if it were true. And most people agree on that. Then why has the unbelieving gaze not disappeared? His theory has nothing irrational either. >D. Lewis, >Counterpart theory.
VsLewis: to disprove him, you would have to adopt one of two strategies:
1. the initial probability is 0 (instead of something above)
2. even if the probability increases in the course of time, the increase would be infinitesimal.
Ad 1.: the probability cannot increase from zero. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a probability of 0. Especially not Lewis' theory.
LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma:
(1) the opponents might realize that a greater intelligence has thought longer about it than they did and therefore the probability is > 0 and that he means what he says.
(2) they could assume that he does not mean what he says
(3) they could say that sometimes it is rational,...
I 188
... to assign a chance of zero to something, which a serious and intelligent authority has said. Rationality/Bigelow/Pargetter: from Lewis' Trilemma there would only be (3) left, and thus the question of rationality. Rationality should not lead us to the acceptance of (3). But it also remains, however, even if Lewis's position is only considered to be very unlikely.
>Rationality.
Problem: to deny someone rationality in an area to which, in principle, one has no better epistemic access than the critizised.
Ad 2. (the probability remains infinitesimal): i.e. it does not matter how much evidence we teach.
BayesVs: this could only happen after the Bayes-theorem,...
I 189
...if the required probability for each future document should be practically 1. And that is unacceptable. >Bayes-Theorem, >Bayesianism.

1. Lycan, W.G. (1979). The trouble with possible worlds. In: The possible and the actual. (ed. M.J. Loux), pp. 274-316. Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press.
2. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
3. Plantinga, A. (1976). Actualism and possible worlds. Theoria 42, pp. 139-60.
4. Plantinga, A. (1987). Two concepts of modality. Modal realism and modal reductionism. Philosophical Perspectives Vol I: Metaphysics (ed. J. E. Tomberlin). pp.189-231. Atascadero, Calif., Ridgeview.
5. van Inwagen, P. (1985). Two concepts of possible worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp.185-92.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Naturalism Millikan I 87
Naturalism/Millikan: Problem: naturalistic theories cannot be proved as true against Cartesian skepticism. >Skepticism.
Correspondence/Millikan: no one doubts that sentences of world correspond, unless one gives up correspondence theory as a whole.
Image: it is less clear that correspondence has to do with mapping rules.
Problem: it is not clear how to describe the corresponding ontology.
>Correspondence/Millikan, >Correspondence theory.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Physicalism Rorty Horwich I 447
Physicalism/correspondence/Rorty: physicalism requires a correspondence relation. >Correspondence.
Horwich I 452
Physicalism/Rorty: is not reductionist. >Reductionism, >Reduction, >Reducibility, cf. >Identity theory, >Materialism.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Picture Theory Millikan I 102
Mapping Relation/Language/Millikan: we begin by coordinating at least some words with objects. Correspondingly, true sentences correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: wrong sentences do not correspond to any fact. Question: How can words which correspond individually to objects very well be composed that at the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
E.g. "Theaitetos flies": "Theaitetos" corresponds to "Theaitetos", "flies" corresponds to "fly".
Wrong solution: to say that the problem would be in the relation between Theaitetos and the flying. For the relation corresponds already with something, this can be instantiated (e.g. between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiated. Everything corresponds with something - but not the entire sentence "Theaitetos flies".
Solution/Frege: he combined singular terms with "values" which were the objects in the world.
>World/Thinking/Millikan, >Predication.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: Frege interpreted it in the same way as names, as complex signs, which at the end described the true or the wrong. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant!") >Sentence/Frege.
Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan: (Millikan: better than Frege): Complex aRb, whereby in the case of wrong sentences the correspondence with the world is missing.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another sense of "corresponds"! That is, words should correspond to things differently than sentences with the world.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Sense Millikan I 6
Sense/Millikan: sense is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not a reference and also not an intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: we cannot a priori know what we think! Because the meaning is not defined by reference! This provides support for realism.
Given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: this also rejects the correspondence theory...
I 7
...not only as a "test for truth" but also as a "nature of truth". In any case, according to a popular point of view. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the abilities of a knowing person are a product of nature, as the knowing person itself. Knowledge must be something that one does in the world. It is a natural relation to the world.
>Correspondence theory, >Correspondence/Millikan.
I 11
Sense/Meaning/Millikan: sense is not "intension": and also not Quinean "meaning". Also not Fregean sense. >Meaning/Millkan.
Intension/Millikan: intension has to do with a network of concluding rules.
Sense: has taken over the task of "intension", but sense is not completely in contrast with "reference".
>Intension/Millikan.
Reference: having a referent will be the same as having "sense".
Referents: are another thing.
>Reference/Millikan.
I 111
Def sense/sense/intentional icons/Fregean sense/Millikan: an intentional icon has sense and each of the variable and invariant mapping elements or aspects also have sense. Also every element of a family of such an element has sense. Having sense: corresponds to having normal conditions for the exercise of the direct eigenfunction.
Definition sense/sense/Fregean sense/short/Millikan: is the normal mapping rule. The sense of an icon are the rules according to which the icon maps something.
---
I 141
Sense/Intension/Summary/Millikan: 1. Neither stimulus meaning nor explicit intension (if any is present) determine the sense.
2. The sense determines neither the stimulus meaning nor the explicit intension (if there is one).
3. Expressions in the idiolect can therefore have different stimulus meanings and/or intensions, and still have the same meaning. Even the same stimulus meaning and/or intension and different senses.
4. Neither stimulus meaning nor intension are infallible. They do not need that because they are not "criteria". For the referent nothing depends on them.
5. Senses - also of thoughts - can be ambiguous and also empty.
6. A term in the idiolect can have multiple intensions and yet have a clear meaning.
7. Sense: an expression is not the same as the sense of one of the explicit intensions.
8. The sense of an expression can be ambiguous or empty, and yet its explicit intension can have a clear meaning.
9. If one can say that an empty term has a meaning (somehow related to intentionality), then only because it has an intension that makes sense on its part. Sense, not intension is the root of all intentionality, intension is only secondary "meaning".
10. It may be that one has two expressions in the idiolect but does not know that they have the same meaning, for example, Hesperus/Phosphorus. That is, knowledge of the synonymy in an idiolect is not knowledge a priori. Knowledge of the ambiguity of the Fregean sense is also no knowledge a priori.
I 235
Sense/Complex/Complexity/composed/Expression/Millikan/(s): to have sense, an expression must be composed ((s) in a predication).

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Sentence Meaning Millikan I 11
Definition sentence meaning/sense/Millikan: are the mapping functions (informally "rules") in accordance with which one would have to map it to the world if one wanted to perform its eigenfunction in accordance with a normal ((s) biological) explanation. >Terminology/Millikan.
I 104
Sentence meaning/sense/sentence/Millikan: the meaning of a sentence is that it should correspond to something, not the one to which it corresponds to. >Meaning/Millikan, >Correspondence/Millikan.
Sentence/word/meaning/Millikan: what is the difference between the way the combined elements of a sentence have sense and the way how "Theaitetos" has meaning?
Sentence: from the fact that it is intended to correspond to something, it does not follow that there is something to which it corresponds.
S: be a sentence,
R: Correspondence relation. If the sentence is true, it is only that what is true of the sentence:
Usually, (Ex)sRx. ((s) Normally there is a referent)
On the other hand:
Singular term/word/name/Millikan: from the fact that a name should normally correspond, follows however, that there is something to which it is to correspond!
Should be: depends on the fact that the family of the term has a history that includes the actual correspondence with the referent.
w: simple referring term
r: referent.
Then the following is true of w:
(Ex) (Normally wRx).
((s) There is an object that normally corresponds.)
R: is the correspondence relation, not the reference relation! It is the relation between w and r that is fulfilled by the fact that normally wRr - this is something quite different!
>Singular term/Millikan.
I 106
Reference/Millikan: the sentence meaning depends on much more fundamental types of relations than the correspondence or reference. For example, the relation of a true sentence to what it maps in the world cannot be analyzed as a reference, just as e.g. "blood pumping" cannot be analyzed as "blood pumping". ((s) > Naturalistic fallacy).

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Tarski Sellars Rorty VI 187
Sellars a propos Tarski/Sellars a propos Carnap: semantic statements à la Tarski and Carnap do not claim the existence of relations between linguistic and non-linguistic matters, but establish a connection between linguistic items with which we already know and other linguistic elements. >Correspondence, >Correspondence/Sellars, >Semantics, >Semantics/Sellars, >Psychological Nominalism, >Relations.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Verification Millikan I 297
Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists. With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that...
I 298
...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences. Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one.
>Correspondence/Millican, >Correspondence theory/Millikan.
Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys.
Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify.
Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism.
I 299
It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all. Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong.
>Holism/Millikan.
Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts.
>Adequacy/Millikan.
I 312
Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,...
I 313
...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules. Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
I 317
Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things.
Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan: No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa.
This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees".
I 318
Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake.
>Concept/Millikan.
I 320
Test/review/theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Vocabulary Rorty III 60ff
Nietzsche - Rorty - Derrida: we must be able to decide autonomously about our vocabulary and our speaking. >Nietzsche, >Derrida.
III 127
Def final vocabulary/Rorty: we use it to tell our life story, sometimes with hindsight, sometimes looking forward - "Final": because there is no standpoint outside of it from which it can be justified - only circular justification possible -
III 135
Def "dialectics"/Hegel/Rorty: attempt to play vocabularies against one another, rather than merely derive sentences from each other. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Hegel.
RortyVsHegel: constantly changed his vocabulary and changed the subject while doing so - he did not criticize his predecessors as misguided, but for using an outdated language.

VI 125
Vocabulary/correspondence/reality/world/language/Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine - but not that they represent reality more adequately. - ((s)> detatching language from reality.) >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >>World/thinking.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

World/Thinking Sellars Rorty I 323
Sellars/Rorty: Sellars wants to consider the human research so that the determination to "necessary final agreement" is described as a causal process which results in the creation of self-portraits of the universe. Cf. >Anthropic Principle.
Roroty: this meets with the idealistic metaphysics of the late Peirce of the evolutionary love.
>Pragmatism, >Peirce.
---
Sellars II 318
Language/world/Sellars: Vs temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo-entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" are in another sense linguistic entities themselves.
>Concepts/Sellars, >Facts/Sellars, >Psychological Nominalism.
Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has made, or must be established, as a relation (but not redundancy).
>Redundancy theory.
---
II 334
1. The correspondence, we were looking for, is limited to elementary statements. 2. It is about the fundamental role that actual statements (or act of thought) play. As pawns in chess: e.g. "Chicago is large."
3. All true statements are in the same sense "true", but they differ in their roles:
"2 + 2 = 4" plays a different role than "this is red". The role is to constitute a projection for the users of language of the world in which they live.
Sellars: pro redundancy theory: if the picture corresponds, one is convinced that "this is green" is true, so one is convinced that this is green.
>Atomism, >Atomic sentences, >Correspondence/Sellars.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Austin, John L. Strawson Vs Austin, John L. Ayer I 296
StrawsonVsAustin: surely we use the word "true" when the semantic conditions described by Austin are met. But by using this word, we do not say that they are met.
Searle III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: (Debate over 40 years ago. It is generally agreed that Strawson won this debate.) Strawson: the correspondence theory must not be cleaned, it must be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of the facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth constitutes a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic structures. (Traces back to the copy theory of the Tractatus).
Strawson II 248
Speech act theory/StrawsonVsAustin: if he was right that we ascribe the predicate "true" substantially to speech acts it should be possible to "reduce" assertions about the truth of statements in a not to speech acts related sense on assertions about the truth of speech acts. Austin: you can make different statements with the same proposition.
Strawson: you can also make the same statment with different propositions.
II 249
Example about Jones: "He is sick." to Jones: "You are sick." (Even different meaning). Def "true"/Strawson: fallacy: we could say that different people then make the same statement if the words they use in their specific situation must either preserve all or lead all to false statements. But if we say that we use "true" to clarify the expression "the same statement".
II 252
Fact/"to make true"/world/Strawson: but the said fact is not something in the world. It is not an object! By this it is of course not denied that there is something in the world about which a statment of this kind is, to which it relates, which it describes and which corresponds to the description. StrawsonVsAustin: he seems to overlook the fact that "fact" and "thing" belong to completely different types. The thing, the person, etc., to which the statements refer are the material correlate of the referring part of the statements. The condition or property is the pseudo physical correlate. The fact is the pseudo physical correlate of the statement as a whole.
II 253
Fact/Strawson: is closely associated with "that"-propositions. Facts are known, be asserted, believed forgotten, overlooked, commented, notified or noticed. Facts are what statements assert; they are that of which something is asserted! It is wrong to equate facts with true statements. Nevertheless, their roles overlap.
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: he believes a statement and a fact are something in the world.
II 254
E.g. but I cannot think of any occasion in which I would neglect the difference between the fact that my wife Mia bore me twins (at midnight) and what I say (10 minutes later), namely that my wife bore me twins. Correspondence/Austin: there is no theoretical limit to what could be truthfully said about the things in the world but there are very significant practical limits to what people can actually say about them.
Statement/fact/StrawsonVsAustin: but what could better correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? Of course, statements and facts correspond. They are made for each other.
If one removes the statements from the world one would also remove the facts from the world. But the world would not be poorer by this. By this you do not get rid of the world of which something is asserted. (> World/Strawson).
A symptom of Austin's uncertainty is his preference for the terms "situation" and "issue". Neither situations nor issues (just as facts) can namely be seen or heard, but rather are summarized or detected at a glance.
II 255
Fact/Strawson: e.g. to be worried by a fact is not the same as to be as frightened by a shadow. It means to be worried because....
II 256
World/Strawson/Strawson: why should we insist that only things and events are part of the world? Why can we not also ascribe situations and facts to the world? Answer: the temptation to talk about situations in a way that is appropriate for things and events, is overwhelming.
StrawsonVsAustin: Austin does not resist it: he smuggles the word "feature" as a synonym for "fact" in. Justification: maps are not in the same way "true" as statements because they are not entirely conventional, photographs not conventional at all.
II 260
StrawsonVsAustin: when he says that the relationship between a statement and the world is purely conventional then there are two confusions between: a) the semantic conditions and b) what is asserted. It is as absurd to say that someone who confirmed a statement confirmed that semantic conditions are fulfilled as if to say that the speaker would have said that.
II 261
Conditions/use/Strawson: by using a word we do not say that the conditions are fulfilled. StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking: how do we use the word "true"? he asks When do we use it?

II 267
StrawsonVsAustin: "exaggerated" is not a relation between a statement and some of these different things in the world. (Too simple).
II 268
Then the difficulties of correspondence occur again. Austin would not say that it e.g. corresponds to a relation between a glove and a hand that is too big. He would speak of a conventional relationship. But the fact that the statement that p, is exaggerated, is not conventional in any sense! (It is perhaps the fact that 1200 people and not 2000 were there. The criticism of an exaggeration requires a previous statement.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Best Explanation Fraassen Vs Best Explanation Field I 15
Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up
b) this class of phenomena is large and complex
c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow
d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S.
Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S.
False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct":
As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc).
Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact.
(van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980)
Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things.
Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed.
I 16
Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief.
FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc.
Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such.
FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc!
I 25
VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge.
I 90
Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness.
Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true.
FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics.
2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy.
3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic?
I 91
Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity:
Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are
a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent.
b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent.
Difference:
a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention).
b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains".
Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances.
Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic.
I 92
Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal).
I 197
Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it.
Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics.
I 23
Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars).
Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Coherence Theory Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory Horwich I 488
Coherence Theory/M. Williams: has to do with skepticism. The coherence theory says that the analysis of truth in non-epistemic terms makes it inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, disquotationalism, but also the richer correspondence theory, would be excluded.
I 489
Truth/justification/acceptability/Arthur Fine: when one sees that the realistic T-concept creates a gap that keeps the epistemic approach ((s) justification) always out of reach, one might be tempted to redefine truth in epistemic terms to literally make it accessible. M. WilliamsVs: as an epistemic thesis, skepticism can only be derived under skeptical premises!
Truth/Skepticism/M. Williams: no concept of truth makes it inaccessible by itself: one always needs epistemic premises!
Gap/M. Williams: the gap Fine means is probable: even the best justified belief can be wrong.
M. WilliamsVs: nevertheless, why should this lead to radical skepticism? ((s) Everyone can be wrong, but not all can be wrong).
Correspondence Theory/Skepticism/M. Williams: combined with a Cartesian dualism it leads to skepticism.
But if representations can only be compared with other representations, this leads to the coherence theory ((s) Berkeley> Coherence Theory).
Correspondence Theory/M. Williams: modern form: tends towards naturalism and physicalism by identifying reference with a causal relation. (Causal Theory of Reference).
I 490
Correspondence Theory: argues with the impossibility of an alternative. Coherence theory does the same! M. Williams: both do not answer the question: why not be satisfied with deflationism?
Deflationism/M. Williams: can share many of the criticisms of Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory and vice versa. Because he neither shapes the idea of truth as correspondence nor shows that truth is an epistemic property.
I 495
Correspondence Theory/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: because the truth of our beliefs explains success, a correspondence theory can explain,
I 496
what is the contribution of language behaviour to the success of overall behaviour. Truth/Explanation: this is how success explains it:
(i) if we have true beliefs about our goals, we will generally achieve them.
(ii) We have true beliefs about how we achieve our goals.
(iii) We generally achieve our goals.
Horwich: admits that truth actually has an explanatory role here. Putnam would be right if there were no alternative explanation.
VsPutnam/VsCorrespondence Theory: yet there is no obvious connection between his argument and a physicalistic correspondence theory:
Truth/Law/M. Williams: you can save Putnam's argument by assuming that (i) involves a generalization that may even be lawful.
BoydVsPutnam: does not want truth to appear in any laws. ((s) The theory explains success as well as the truth of the theory. Instead, the theories could simply be listed. - Vs: that would only work without generalization.)
M. Williams: I do not believe that (i) is a law. That is because it is not really an empirical position.
Belief/Content/Truth/Davidson: determining their content is not independent of giving meaning to our general behaviour and therefore most must be true.
Ad (i): is then not an empirical law but a reflection of a condition of interpretation.
I 497
Correspondence Theory/Putnam: it is not the explanation of our success that motivates the correspondence theory itself, but the consideration of Premise (ii): that most beliefs are true.
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give (ii) meaning if we explain the reliability of learning and only realism can do that.
Causal Theory/Correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would present us as reliable signal generators. What would the truth theory contribute? It communicates that the proposition is true iff the state exists. This is the correspondence involved in causal theory, it is exactly the correspondence established by the T-Def.
Deflationism/Correspondence/M. Williams: to him this minimal correspondence is also available. I.e. Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or any other substantial theory.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory I (e) 96
So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection.
Horwich I 443
Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation."
Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world).
Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism.
Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism.
Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist.
Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism.
Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything.
Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist.
Horwich I 553
Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence").
"true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis.
Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept.
Horwich I 454
Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them.
Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition.
We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory).
DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia".
"Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation.
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true".
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world.
RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question.


Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true).

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Correspondence Theory Quine Vs Correspondence Theory VI 112
Proposition/Fact/Correspondence/Quine: a better cultivated theory postulates facts to which true sentences then should correspond as a whole.
VI 113
But: QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: Although a host of objects is needed for an explanation of the world, namely abstract and concrete ones, but apart from the pseudo-foundation of such a correspondence theory facts do not in the least contribute. We can simply cross out "It is a fact that" from our sentences.

X 18
Sentence Meaning/Quine: apparently the same as fact: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That rings of correspondence theory, but as such it is but empty talk.
QuineVsCorrespondence Theory: here: empty talk. The correspondence exists only between the two non-tangible elements to which we referred as intermediate members standing between the German sentence and the white snow: meaning and fact.
VsQuine: it could be argued that this is taking the intermediate members (meaning and fact) too literally.
X 19
When speaking of meaning as a factor of truth of the proposition, we can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" would be applied in English to green things. And the reference to a fact is just an expression. Quine: very good. As long as we do not have to assume propositions for that.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Correspondence Theory Tarski Vs Correspondence Theory Read III 40
VsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory contains a metaphysics of facts and circumstances correlated with statements. That is it’s fundamental misunderstanding. The T-scheme is neutral on this issue.
Horwich I 108
Correspondence/Truth/Tarski: Consistency with reality is a popular formulation. If we now extend the term "designation" (Tarski = denotation) not only to names but also to sentences, and then also speak of "facts", we can reformulate correspondence in this way:
A sentence is true if it designates an existing state.
TarskiVsCorrespondence Theory: all these formulations lead to misunderstandings because they are too vague.(1)

1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75

Skirbekk I 168
TarskiVsCorrespondence Theory: "Consistency with reality" is intuitively incomprehensible instead: "It snows" is true when it snows. (2)
2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977
Correspondence Theory Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory I 6
Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts.
This has an important consequence:
Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality:
Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism.
The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology.
VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected
I 7
not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes.
Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world.
I 8
Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning.
Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple:
VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory).
Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true".
MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around:
Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!).
Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind.
I 10
It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"?
Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then?
Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean.
Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept.
The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning.

I 86
Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things.
Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty.
Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation.
This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations.
On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied.
I 87
Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Disquotation Putnam Vs Disquotation Putnam VII 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism).
Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property.
---
Horwich I 455
Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
Horwich I 456
and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions.
Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions.
Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise.
Instead:
Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true).
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
---
Horwich I XIV
VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme).
Horwich I XVI
Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows.
---
Horwich I 457
Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because:
If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity".
Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game.
RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game.
Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically.
Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities.
---
Williams II 497
Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition.
Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory.
Williams II 502
Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide.
PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion.
M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that?
Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence.
PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use.
Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification.
Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth.
Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Fodor, J. Rorty Vs Fodor, J. I 245
Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply.
I 256
Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of ​​the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of ​​a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned!
Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)
I 277
Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>contingent a priori/Kripke).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Frege, G. Millikan Vs Frege, G. I 102
Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying.
wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies".
Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.).
((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.)

I 190
real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...".
focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted.
intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset.
embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence.
Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined.
Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references.
Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning.
Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified.
I 191
Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having".
I 274
Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time.
polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance.
But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property.
I 275
Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th.
Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined.
Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
I 308
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity).
I 309
Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J. Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
Brendel I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
Brendel I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.

Rorty II (b) 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II (b) 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II (b) 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.

II (d) 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II (d) 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II (d) 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"

V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Hempel, C. Schlick Vs Hempel, C. I 91
Context: Schlick: The foundation of knowledge" (1934) HempelVsSchlick). HempelVsSchlick: he was a "metaphysician and poet".
Proposition/reality/HempelVsSchlick: you cannot compare statements with facts!
SchlickVsHempel: you can without being a metaphysician.
I 92
E.g. I compare this sentence in my Baedeker "This cathedral has two towers" with reality: namely simply by looking at the cathedral. If someone has something against it, it may just be that he understands "Proposition" in another sense.
Coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick/HempelVscorrespondence theorie: you can only compare propositions with each other. ((s) Not propositions with reality).
Schlick: we can distinguish between cases where a written, printed or spoken proposition is compared with another written, printed or spoken proposition.
Schlick: and I call that the comparison a proposition with a fact.
HempelVsSchlick: statements can only be compared with other statements. ((s)> coherence, > coherence theory).
SchlickVsHempel: Why? I take out the modest freedom to compare everything with everything. If propositions and facts are to be too far from each other? Too different? Should it be a mysterious property of propositions that they cannot be compared with anything?
Fact/statement/Hempel: the gap between them is only a metaphysical.
SchlickVsHempel: that may be so, but who believes because in such a gap?
I 93
Def Proposition/Schlick: is a string along with the logical rules for their use. ((s) So almost a proposition, along with the importance of rules). Proposition meaning/Schlick: these rules culminate in "deictic" definitions that make up the meaning of the proposition.
Verification/compliance/correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: to verify the proposition, I have to find out if the (meaning-) rules were followed. Why should it be impossible? E.g. I look at the cathedral and then at the proposition and realize that the symbol "two" is used in the proposition in connection with the symbol "towers" and so I will get to the same icon when applying the rules of counting the cathedral towers.
Coherence theory/fact/proposition/Compare/Schlick: sometimes it is said that "in a logical sense" propositions can be compared only with other propositions. That may be so, but I do not know what is meant by a "comparison in a logical way".
Comparison/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot say exactly what a comparison of statements and facts is,
I 94
Because we cannot determine the structure of facts. Fact/structure/SchlickVsHempel: that we cannot determine the "structure of a fact" reminds me of the metaphysics of "things in themselves". If one does not deny the existence of facts, then why deny the possibility to determine their structure?
Structure of a fact: E.g. if I count the towers of a cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a certain fact. If you wanted to say that it is meaningless to speak of "structures of facts" at all that would be merely a question of terminology. One proposition is also not per se meaningful, but only in conjunction with the rules for its use.
Fact/propositions/Compare/Vscorrespondence theory/SchlickVsHempel: that is what the whole controversy is about, if it should be impossible to compare propositions and facts, Hempel uses the words simply in a different sense. The easiest way to deny that you can compare them would be to say that there are simply no facts! (In formal speech: the rule of the word "fact" is such that it should not be used).
Or maybe the comparison is simply never applied in the sciences? I think this is true for purely logical sciences such as mathematics, but not in experimental sciences.
I 95
SchlickVsHempel: here is the psychological motivation of his criticism: it is about a vision that completely settles within the sciences. Science as a system of propositions. This should be a substitute for reality. Then "protocol statements" are used as a material, without subjecting them to an empirical test. Science/Schlick: But science is not the world! The universe of discourse is not the universe.
It's one thing to ask how their whole system is constructed and why it is generally regarded as true, and another, why I even look at them as true. This is a psychological question. But none of the "cultural subordination". My trust in science and colleagues is that I found them trustful, every time I checked their allegations.
I 96
Def confirmation/Schlick: the final step in the comparison between a statement and a fact. But one should not attach too much importance to the concept.
I 97
Fact/proposition/compare/match/correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: his example for comparison is not quite adequate. (E.g. "The cathedral has two towers"). Hempel: I agree that one can consider propositions as empirical objects that can be compared with any other empirical object. But if we take that literally it leads to something like:
I 98
E.g. "The proposition contains more parts, "the words" referred to" than the cathedral has towers". Correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: There is a different kind of comparison between proposition and fact: Comparison of symbols "two" in the sentence and the counting by looking at the cathedral.
HempelVsSchlick: so by that he compares a proposition in Baedeker with the result of an action by himself.
Coherence theory/Pointe: this result of the action is determined in a second proposition. And these two are compared! That is what I meant with "logical point".
Revision/verification/coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick: it's about whether the propositions contradict each other. This goes even without knowing the meanings of the propositions! (> Carnap: "The logical syntax of the language", "Philosophy and logical syntax"). Example, the above two propositions, both contain an icon that is shaped like "two".

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985
Idealism Davidson Vs Idealism Horwich I 449
Davidson/Rorty: can he be attributed (1) - (4)? He often asserted (3), but (4) does not seem to suit him, because he is a "realist". (2) also sounds alien to him. (see above): Theses of pragmatism/Rorty: 1) "truth" has no explanatory use 2) We understand everything about the relation belief world if we understand the causal relation with the world. Our knowledge about the use of "about" and "true of" is a spin-off of a naturalistic access to linguistic behavior. 3) There is no relation of "true-making" or "true-makers". 4) There is no dispute between realism and anti-realism, because this is based on the empty and misleading assumptios that beliefs are "made true". Rorty: although Davidson does not seem to be a pragmatist because of its proximity to Tarski, I think that one can attribute all four pragmatist theses to him. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: Thesis: the approach about the field linguists (radical interpretation) is everything that Davidson thinks is needed to understand correspondence. Language game/External/RI/Davidson: the position of the field linguist is the only one that makes it possible to position oneself outside of the language game. He tries to make sense of our linguistic behavior. In that, it is asked how the external observer uses the word "true". ((s) then you would have to ask whether the external language game really contains the situation as an internal language game.) DavidsonVsIdealism: metaphysical and seeks ontological uniformity, hopeless DavidsonVsPhysicalism: hopes to discover such a homogeneity in the future.)


Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Idealism Peirce Vs Idealism Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty: sees a gap between coherence and correspondence. It is bridged by Def Reality/Peirce: "what is designated as existing in the end". Because it reduces coherence to correspondence without metaphysics or further empirical study. It is a simple reformulation (re-analysis) of "reality".
RortyVsPeirce: I no longer think (as I did before) that is right.
PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have the error in common that "correspondence" is a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of world that must be ontologically homogeneous.
Correspondence/Idealism: everything that corresponds to a representation has to be a representation itself (inspired by Berkeley). Therefore VsSkepticism: the world only consisted of representations anyway. >Representation/Peirce.
Horwich I 448
Correspondence/Physicalism: the correspondence relation must be causal. Therefore VsSkepticism. Fodor: that's as good as saying that the correspondence theory corresponds to the reality. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory.
Solution/PericeVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: the correspondence relation can easily connect different relata ontologically, there is no problem of "ontological homogeneity".
Antirealism/PlantingaVsPeirce: does raise problems of ontological homogeneity: if objects owe their structure and if they could not exist without showing it, they also owe their existence to our creativity.
RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation:
E.g. Peirce: "if there are stones, they will end up showing their structure"
E.g. idealist: "if we had no study, there would be no stones".(1)


1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
James, W. Rorty Vs James, W. Horwich I 443
Truth/James/Rorty: Thesis: no truth theory (TT) can explain a correspondence relation.
I 444
Correspondence/James: does not exist as as something neutral between perceptual, theoretical, moral or mathematical truths. Correspondence cannot take on an explanatory role. Truth/VsJames: theories are not true, because they work, but vice versa. They work, because they are true.
JamesVsVs: these critics miss the point: Thesis: "true" is a term of respect.
Truth/Justification/RortyVsJames: Unfortunately, James did not confine himself to this negative point, but he concluded from a false premise:
If we have a concept of "justified", we do not need the concept of truth".
"True" needs to mean something like "justifiable".
This is a form of the idealistic error of inferring.
We cannot get any sense out of the concept of truth as correspondence.
Truth must exist in an ideal consistency. >Coherence.
RortyVsJames: the mistake is to assume that "true" requires a definition, and then the fact that they cannot be defined as a relation of beliefs to non-beliefs on the view that it would have to be defined as a relation between beliefs.
Naturalistic Fallacy/PutnamVsJames:
E.g. "it could be true, but not X" is always useful, no matter what is inserted for X. (Moore asserted the same in connection with "good".)
Truth/RortyVsPeirce: it was a mistake to identify it with the "end point of our examination".

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Metaphysical Realism Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism Millikan I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty.
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified.
Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously.
Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex
COW
Or by holding up another sign e.g.
REFERENCES
Or maybe
CAUSES.
To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning:
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head,
((s)> the "overarching general"/Leibniz).
PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Moore, G.E. Prior Vs Moore, G.E. I 21
Correspondence Theory/Prior: now we can handle the fact that truth and falsity are not only applied to propositions, but also to beliefs and assertions. Truth/Belief/Logical Form/Prior:
E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, and there will be one."
(X believes that) p and p. (Parenthesis).
Falsity:
E.g. "X believes that there will be a nuclear war, but there not will be one."
((s) but = and.)
X believes that p and ~p.
Correspondence Theory: Aquinas' "adaequatio intellectus et rei" goes back to the Jewish Neo-Platonist Isaac Israeli from the 10th century.
Locus classicus of modernity:
Correspondence Theory/Moore: (G. E. Moore, Some main problems of philosophy, New York 1953)
I 22
Example: Suppose a friend falsely believed that he (Moore) went on holiday and says: Moore: We should say, of course, that if this belief is true, then I must have gone on holiday,
and vice versa (conversely):
we should say that if I went, this belief is true, of course.
Prior: so far it is Aristotelian.
Now Moore continues, however, and says:
Although its absence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the belief of his friend to be true, it cannot be what is meant by saying that the belief is true! Because:
Moore: if we say "the belief that I'm gone, is true", we mean that the belief has a specific property that it shares with other true beliefs.
But if we say: "I'm gone", we do not attribute a property to any proposition!
We only express a fact, and this fact could also exist if no one believed that!
Point/Moore: if no one believes it, the belief does not exist, and then this belief must be false, even if I'm away!
((s) then it must not be false, because nothing that does not exist must be anything or have any properties per se.)
PriorVsMoore: he is forced to say that, because he assumes that belief consists in a relation between this belief and a fact. A relation that is not definable, but "familiar".
((s) > "overarching general": if the belief itself consists in a relation between (itself) the belief and a fact, the belief occurs twice. Problem: if it should be defined by this relation. But neither Moore nor Prior say that here. Instead: separating of levels. Belief/Name of the Belief).
Moore: the "name of the belief" is to be: "The belief that I'm gone."
Name of the fact: "I'm gone."
Correspondence/Moore: relation between "the name of the belief and the name of the fact" is what he calls the correspondence.
PriorVsMoore: (he probably discarded it later anyway). this is doubtful in two respects:
1) The reason he indicates for the fact that his absence should be constitutive for the truth of the belief of his friend, is at the same time the reason to say that "the former [was] no sufficient and necessary condition for the latter".
2) But if we corrected this with a truly sufficient condition, this correction would also give us a definition.
I.e. the belief is true if
X believes that p and it is the case that p.
Correspondence would not be more, then. (Simply accordance with the facts).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Representation Davidson Vs Representation I (e) 93ff
Scheme/Content: came into play as a pair (C.I.Lewis) Now we can let them get out as a pair as well. Then no objects are left behind in terms of which the question of representation could be raised! Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing! With that we are also getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth. It is faith in it which gives rise to relativistic thoughts. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something may be a map of Mexico, but only with respect to the Mercator projection or a different projection.
Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental sign system whose object reference is yet under discussion,... language has inherently no other function than making the world accessible".

Glüer II 126
Davidson: There are no facts! (as Frege: all true sentences have the same meaning: compliance with all the facts of the world). ("Big Fact"). Davidson: There are no representations that could be t/f - beliefs are true if they are caused correctly.
II 127
A true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world.
Horwich I 454
Dualism/Scheme/Content/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: the main criticism is the dualism of scheme and content. Dualism: that of scheme and content has the following possible forms, with the sides not being causally linked: "Tertia": like E.g. "conceptual framework" E.g. "intended interpretation": they are not causally connected with the things they organize or intend. They vary independently from the rest of the universe, just like the relations of the skepticist, the "correspondence" or "representation".
Horwich I 454/455
Representation/DavidsonVsRepresentation/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty: if we do not have "Tertia" such as "intended interpretation" or "conceptual framework", we have no concepts that could serve as representations and then we also do not need to ask whether they represent the world properly. Important argument: we still have beliefs, but they are now viewed from outside, just as by field linguists. Without the "Tertia" we have no "third way" anymore to see things differently. Language/Davidson/Rorty: then we see language just as we see beliefs: not as a "conceptual frame", but rather as causal interaction with the surroundings described by the field linguists. Then you can no longer ask if the language "does or does not fit" the world. At the same time you cannot formulate skepticism any longer. Scepticism cannot express itself. ((s)> Nagel: ditto, but other reasons).
Tertium/Tertia/Davidson/Rorty: therefore will not be relevant for truth claims. And the fact that there is none will not be a result of an empirical study nor an "analysis of meaning".
Correspondence/Rorty: the fact that it is delivered by coherence, according to Davidson, then comes down to the fact that from the perspective of the field linguists nothing is needed but word meaning and the world.

Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Rorty VI 194
DavidsonVsRepresentation/Rorty: encourages us to cultivate our "realistic intuitions" (Crispin Wright).

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ryle, G. Fodor Vs Ryle, G. II 118
Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking.
Language/FodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.#
---
Rorty I 256
Compliance/seeing/correspondence/behavior/Ryle: here you have to do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: Ryle might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it is just the notion of ​​the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this. Infinite: e.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned!
Either:
1) There is infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an unlearned ability.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Taylor, Ch. Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch. VI 126
World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things":
1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless).
VI 127
Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed.
VI130
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious.
RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars per representation (!)).
RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity.
VI 131
Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object.
VI 133
Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self.
But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre!
(Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice").
TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material.
Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence.
Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions).
World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences!
Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)!
Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized.
VI 134
Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us.
VI 137
Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism.
VI 139
Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general.
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated.
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Correspondence Austin, J.L. Horwich I 190
Correspondence/Relation/Austin: Thesis: the relation between words and things are different. Depending on how they are used: a) referencing.
b) descriptive. (as identification).
Strawson:
c) Statement: something is again different from referencing and describing.
Because saying something is then both referencing and describing.
N.B.: however, are
1. parts of statements, not to be equated with parts of sentences (or episodes of speech), just as little as
2. whole statements are to be equated with whole sentences (or episodes of speech).

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Th. Putnam, H. Horwich I 389
Correspondence/Putnam: (Reference and Understanding, 1976): Thesis: Correspondence between words and sets of objects can be understood as part of an explanatory model for collective speaker behavior. (formally as fulfillment relation).
Put V 75
Putnam: Pro internalism. (Coherence) VsCorrespondence! Thesis: it concerns agreement with our belief system, not with mind-independent or speech-independent "state of affairs". (Metaphysical Realism).

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Rorty, R. Horwich I 452
Correspondence/IdealismVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: Thesis: there is no correspondence between a belief and a non-belief (Object).
Rorty VI 96
RortyVsSearle: Thesis: Philosophers who deny that there is such a thing as agreement between opinion and reality at all present as little danger as theologians who deny purgatory. (VsSearle). ((s) Searle pro Korr, RortyVsKorr).

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Wittgenstein Sellars II 317
Correspondence/Tractatus/Sellars: this is the 2nd type of "correspondence" one is looking for: Thesis: that elementary statements are configurations of proper names that represent configurations of objects. This means that statements are not lists of words.
... ultimately boils down to the thesis that any statement that contains at least one reference expression and one descriptive expression can be translated into an (invented) understandable language that contains equivalents for reference expressions, but not for descriptive expressions, but a special spelling of the reference expressions into which the descriptive expressions can be translated. Once again, the essence of "illustration" has proven to be a translation!

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977