Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Rorty | VI 9 Truth/Rorty: truth is absolute - in contrast: relative: justification is relative. >Justification. Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - ((s) a criterion for truth is not available. >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion. Truth/Rorty: truth is undefinable (like Davidson). VI 28 Correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the Absolute - so the idealism deprived the term of correspondence of its very substance. >Correspondence theory. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Criteria | Rorty | III 26 Criteria/Rorty: the search for criteria is the search for a hidden nature. Horwich I 447 Criterion of truth/idealism/Rorty: coherence. >Truth criterion, >Coherence theory, >Coherence. V 25 Criterion/Justification/Rorty: E.g. criteria-less justification: Democracy/Churchill: is the worst form that you can imagine, except for all the others that have been tried - ((s) >Lists instead of criteria.) VI 8f Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth. >Justification. Truth/Rorty: undefinable. (like Davidson). >Truth/Rorty, >Truth/Davidson. VI 58f Criterion/Criteria/Rorty: our criteria are determined by our purposes - not by nature - nature is not divided into inputs. >Definition/Criteria, >Pragmatism, >Purposes. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Criteria | Schurz | I 29 Definition/criterion/Schurz: a definition does not provide a criterion for finding the defined objects. Criterion: can be found this way: Determine the empirical consequences of the hypothesis and test it with observations. E.g., I must be able to pick out the object indicated by the ostensive term "this flower" and the quality expressed by "red" to be able to check the truth of the corresponding proposition. >Definitions, >Definability,, >Hypotheses, >Observation. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Criteria | Tarski | Horwich I 130 Truth criterion/criteria/Tarski: we will probably never find a critoron for truth. - But equally not for most other concepts including physics.(1) >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 Skirbekk I 177 Criterion of truth/Tarski: there is no tuth criterion that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory. ((s) The criterion cnnot be found in the sttements - these are different.) Tarski: Common feature of true propositions: truth, not a criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow.(2) Cf. >Truth/Quine. 2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 Berka I 492 Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong. That works in the class calculus. A structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite. ((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide). >general criterion of truth. >Definitions/Tarski, >Correctness, >Provability. I 502 Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from §3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope. >Term scope. Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals).(3) >Semantic categories. 3. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Definitions | Goodman | I 124 Definition/Goodman: a definition is not symmetrical: usually a definiens describes that to which it applies in more detail than the definiendum. It provides an analysis and introduces means for a systematic integration. >Asymmetries. --- III 61 Definition coextensive, but not identical/Goodman: coextensive but not identical are e.g. featherless bipeds and definitions. III 96 Definition/criterion/Goodman: the definition of hydrogen does not provide us with a test of how much of that is in this room. III 126f Definition/Goodman: even though a definition always unambiguously determines which objects it is in accordancce with, it rarely, in turn, is clearly justified by each of its individual cases. You can see, the table, to which I point, as a "steel table", "steel thing" then finally put it into a class with cars. In such a way that no label in this range applies to both. Such flexibility cannot be allowed in the case of scores. III 169f None of our common natural languages is a notation system. E.g. a wheelbarrow belongs to many performance classes of object-English: "wooden object", "means of transport with wheel", etc. In such a language, there is no such thing as the definition. In a system of notation, however, all scores for a given performance are coextensive, all have the same performances as a fulfillment object. III 191f Definition/Goodman: the difference between real and nominal defining still applies, as is already illustrated by the difference between writing a score for a pre-existing work and composing a new work. In the first case, a score is uniquely determined by a performance, in the second case a score determines a class of performances clearly. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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