Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multi-valued Logic | Dummett | II 108 Trivalent Logic: if B is false but A neither true nor false: then "If A is true then B is true" comes true, although "If A, then B" is not true! Reason: it is only because we assume, as it cannot be denied, that the sentence "A is true" is false if A is neither true nor false. New predicate for trivial axioms: "A is true": shall have the same truth value as A (not always true). II 121 Neither true nor false/Dummett: this is useful only for parts of sentences (clauses)! -> multi-value logic - independently used sentences (not complex): for these only distinction between designated and not designated truth value important. >Truth values/Dummett. III (a) 27f Third truth value/indeterminate truth value/multi-valued logic/Dummett: The "wit" (purpose) is to be able to explain "not" truth-functionally. Truth table with w, f, X. - Difference: without truth value with conditional with a false antecedent: "X" (>designated truth value) - for e.g. unicorn: "Y" (not designated truth value). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Sense | Dummett | II (b) 72ff Sense/Dummett: The sense is a property of a single sentence, not of the full use of language. I 122 Sense/Capture/DummettVsFrege: The thought is not presented directly to the consciousness - rather grasping the sense: set of skills. I 123 The fact that the glasses are in the other jacket cannot be content of consciousness. I 124 Such examples (glasses) lead to an opposite direction according to which language is explained by thoughts that are considered to be language-independent, and not vice versa (> DummettVsEvans). - Saussure s conception of language as a code will avoid such a declaration - VsFrege: sense of the word is not the same as a part of the thought. EvansVsCompositionality. III (a) 25 Sense/Dummett: from division of states of affairs: 1) where the statement could be misused. 2) where it could be not misused. ad 1) Statement: false - conditional: false - atomic sentence or without truth value. ad 2): statement: true, Conditional: true or without truth value, atomic sentence: true. III (a) 28 Sense/Dummett: entirely determined by one knowing when it has an designated truth value and when a non-designated - finer distinctions only needed in complex sentences with operators. >Truth value/Dummett. III (b) 74 Sense/Dummett: not only through verification method, but understanding what circumstances must be realized. >Circumstances. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Truth | Dummett | II 83 Truth/Dummett: truth comes from the act of asserting. - Closely related: correctness: saying something true means to say something correct. II 87ff Truth/Dummett: truth is an objective property of what a speaker says - and this is independent of the knowledge of the speaker or his utterance reasons - Truth is explainable by the more primitive notion of correctness. - (Correctness of sentences about the future, question, command). II 115 Truth/Dummett: truth is still necessary for deductive inferences - def valid/Dummett: an inference that contains truth. I 26ff Correspondence Theory/coherence Theory: meaning comes before truth. Davidson: Truth comes before meaning (truth conditions are defined later by the theory). - Dummett both together! Use/truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes concept of truth superfluous > meaning before truth. III (a) 8/9 Truth/Dummett: better: winning the game. - Therefore is necessary: in addition to declare that the goal is winning, not losing! - Part of the concept of truth is the stated goal to only make true statements. DummettVsFrege: The aim of the truth must be established before claiming, otherwise one could express the same thought, but deny it. III (a) 29 Truth/Dummett: in reality it is mostly about the distinction between designated /non-designated truth values. >Truth conditions/Dummett. III (a) 40 Truth/meaning/Dummett: "It is true that p if ... iff" is not sufficient - Use: Each conditional must be given a specific meaning. - We must be able to already understand "If P, then it is true that P" III (a) 45 Truth/Dummett: that by which a statement is true is that by which it can be recognized as true. Putnam II 214 Truth/Dummett: = Justification. - Dummett believes in final verification. PutnamVsDummett: merely idealized verification is possible. - The assertibility conditions for any sentence are not manageable. >Assertibility conditions/Searle, >Assertibility conditions/Soames. We get to know the meaning conditions by acquiring a practice; that is not an algorithm, they cannot be formalized - hence rationality cannot be formalized either. >Rationality/Putnam. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Truth Values | Dummett | I 11 f Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence. I 20f Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t. One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence. II 112 Def Non-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong. Def Designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is. The truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences. - (These are three formulations for the same fact). >Compositionality. III (a) 20 Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior. - Compared to bet/command: requires: the antecedent lies in the power of the receiver: II (a) 21 Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket. - "Unconditional command": = material conditional: here there is no gap. III (a) 20 Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: There is an asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap). Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior. III (a) 28 Designated Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, >ex falso quodlibet) Non-designated truth value: wrong or the object is nonexistent. Validity/Multi-valued logic: valid in multi-value logic are the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation. >Multi-valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Truth Values | Wright | II 239 Definition designated value/vagueness/Sorites/Wright: "a is F" has an designated value if "F" is a less misleading description as "non-F" - problem: to identify the last final object at one end of the spectrum, for which "a is F" has a designated value. -> Bivalence/Wright, >Designated truth value. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prior, A. | Kripke Vs Prior, A. | Prior I 169 Names/Prior: Thesis: Something that does not exist cannot be named, the same way as it cannot be pushed aside by a foot. And this neither by somebody who believes in the existence nor by somebody who does not believe in its existence. In circumstances in which object x is not present, x cannot be used as proper name in sentences and there are no facts with x. Names/KripkeVsPrior: Developed systems in which simple sentences with x are false if x does not exist and the designated truth values I 170 Follow specific rules, e.g. negations of these simple sentences become true. Order/Prior: This leads to an absolute differentiation between simple and complex sentences. Names/Kripke: Are logically without structure as well. But, because it is different in Lesniewski than in Kenny, an unbeliever is able to use names for the objects whose existence he is doubting. There are naturally names for the imagined or the simply possible world. E.g. it is possible that children develop fantasies based on what they imagine and an adult annoys them by bringing up other fantasies. The question is whether the same object is named. This is the problem for purely future or merely possible individuals as well. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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