Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Atomism Logic Texts Read III 28ff
Atomism: the leading thought is that facts are autonomous. The truth of the conjunction is simply the result of the truth of each member of the conjunction. Reduction: each link corresponds to a fact.  
The dream of the logical atomists, Russell and Wittgenstein, was to thus retain the truth of atomic and elementary statements after a great reduction.
Wittgenstein later abandoned atomism (as well as realism and correspondence theory).

VsReductionism: this would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be inconsistent with "Ruby killed Kennedy".
RussellVsVs: Russell objected to such argumentation that recourse is threatened: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C, which would be incompatible with "C is incompatible with A", and so on.
Read III 31
ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be conjunctive or disjunctive.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Bare Truth Dummett II 94
"Simply true"/bare truth/Dummett: irreducible - If a sentence is not simply true, its truth sentence is non-trivial: i.e. the truth sentence for the sentence S does not have S itself on the right side. (Cf. >Truth definition).
II 100
Important Argument: counterfactual conditionals (>counterfactual conditional) cannot be simply true means: we cannot imagine what the ability of identifying the truth would have to look like.
II 95
"Barely true": model: observation, we know what it means for the tree to be taller than the other one.
II 106
Simply true/Dummett: a sentence is simply true if there is no set of sentences out of which none is a trivial variant of the original sentence, and the truth of all of which defines the original sentence as true. - Then the trivial Tarski scheme fits: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white. "True because"/True/Dummett: Some sentences that cannot be simply true: E.g. conjunction: is the true because of both conjuncts - disjunction: true because of one of the disjuncts - universal quantification: true because of all instances. - This has led some philosophers to to say that there is no "disjunctive fact". - N.B.: this allows to characterize the concept of reduction of a class of sentences to another class.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Being a Bat Putnam V 128
Bat-Example/Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat? Thesis: we cannot imagine what it would be like to be a bat.
V 128/129
Qualia/Bat: for example we want to imagine an argument: A: no bat quale is at least the same as a human quale.
B: maybe there are at least some that are the same. There are also some feelings of other people that I probably cannot imagine, but that does not mean (that I see the psychological space of these other people as unimaginably different from my own). (By the way, bats can see very well, contrary to the prevailing opinion!) >Qualia, >Experience.

I could at least say now: their pain is as much pain as mine. Could we come to a decision on this?
The hearing center of the bat is 7/8 of the brain. ((s) Does the brain therefore have to provide completely different experience?)
Example: 1. The brain of the bat has the disjunctive property P1 or P2;
my brain has the disjunctive property P'1 or P'2. The respective sensations are correlated with the respective disjunctions.
V 129/130
We assume: the qualitative character of the bat's sensation is identical to the qualitative character of my sensation, and both are identical (or correlated) with the more complex disjunctive property (P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2). According to the 1st theory, the bat and I have different experiences,
according to the second theory, we have the same experience.
However, both theories lead to the same predictions regarding the experiences of normal and abnormal human observers! Again, they are indistinguishable from an observational point of view!
It is also not clear whether methodological maxims can be useful here. We also lack the principles to decide which theory is the simpler one. From our perspective we can decide which is the more "chauvinistic" one.
V 129/130
Bat Example/disjunctive properties/identity theory/Putnam: Theory 1: Fl: disjunctive property P1 or P2, disjunctive property P'1 or P'2 U (assuming each correlation). Theory 2: we assume identity instead of correlation - correlation to complex property P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2. N.B.: both theories lead to the same predictions of normal as of abnormal observers. Stones always have the disjunctive property "sensation or no sensation".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Bridge Laws Davidson Glüer II 135ff
DavidsonVsFodor: There are no covering laws. - Anomalous monism: anomalous monism is token correspondence, not type-correspondence. - There ist no nomological identity of mental events with physical events. Nevertheless we have token identity. (> Anomalous monism/Davidson).
II 138
Laws/identity theory/Davidson/Glüer: Whether there can be laws regulating type identity, identity of a few tokens or disjunctiveness of the events described: Davidson must show that there can be no nomological type identity: because that would mean that for every intentional predicate M there would be a physical predicate P.
II 139
A corresponding law would be the so-called "bridge law" required for a reduction. According to Davidson, whether such bridge laws can exist is not an empirical question, but can be decided a priori. The individuation procedures of the intentionalist and the physicalist discourse show a fundamental incommensurability. The intentionalistic predicates are essentially inherent in normativity.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Decision Tree Norvig Norvig I 698
Def Decision tree/Norvig/Russell: A decision tree represents a function DECISION TREE that takes as input a vector of attribute values and returns a “decision”—a single output value. The input and output values can be discrete or continuous. A decision tree reaches its decision by performing a sequence of tests. Each internal node in the tree corresponds to a test of the value of one of the input attributes, Ai, and the branches from the node are labeled with the possible values of the attribute, Ai =vik. Each leaf node in the tree specifies a value to be returned by the function. A Boolean decision tree is logically equivalent to the assertion that the goal attribute is true
if and only if the input attributes satisfy one of the paths leading to a leaf with value true.
Writing this out in propositional logic, we have
Goal ⇔ (Path1 ∨ Path2 ∨ · · ·) ,
where each Path is a conjunction of attribute-value tests required to follow that path. Thus, the whole expression is equivalent to disjunctive normal form. ((s) >Normal form/logic.)
Unfortunately, no matter how we measure size, it is an intractable problem to find the smallest
consistent tree; there is no way to efficiently search through the 22n trees. With some simple heuristics, however, we can find a good approximate solution: a small (but not smallest) consistent tree. The decision tree learning algorithm adopts a greedy divide-and-conquer strategy: always test the most important attribute first. This test divides the problem up into smaller subproblems that can then be solved recursively.
“Most important attribute”: the one that makes the most difference to the classification of an example.
Decision tree learning algorithm: see Norvig I 702.
Norvig I 705
Problems: the decision tree learning algorithm will generate a large tree when there is actually no pattern to be found. Overfitting: algorithm will seize on any pattern it can find in the input. If it turns out that there are 2 rolls of a 7-gram blue die with fingers crossed and they both come out 6, then the algorithm may construct a path that predicts 6 in that case.
Solution: decision tree pruning combats overfitting. Pruning works by eliminating nodes that are not clearly relevant.
Norvig I 706
Missing data: In many domains, not all the attribute values will be known for every example.
Norvig I 707
Multivalued attributes: When an attribute has many possible values, the information gain measure gives an inappropriate indication of the attribute’s usefulness. In the extreme case, an attribute such as exact time has a different value for every example, which means each subset of examples is a singleton with a unique classification, and the information gain measure would have its highest value for this attribute. Continuous and integer-valued input attributes: Continuous or integer-valued attributes such as height and weight, have an infinite set of possible values. Rather than generate infinitely many branches, decision-tree learning algorithms typically find the split point that gives the highest information gain.
Continuous-valued output attributes: If we are trying to predict a numerical output value, such as the price of an apartment, then we need a regression tree rather than a classification tree. A regression tree has at each leaf a linear function of some subset of numerical attributes, rather than a single value.
>Learning/AI Research.
Norvig I 758
History: The first notable use of decision trees was in EPAM, the “Elementary Perceiver And Memorizer” (Feigenbaum, 1961)(1), which was a simulation of human concept learning. ID3 (Quinlan, 1979)(2) added the crucial idea of choosing the attribute with maximum entropy; it is the basis for the decision tree algorithm in this chapter. Information theory was developed by Claude Shannon to aid in the study of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949)(3). (Shannon also contributed one of the earliest examples of machine learning, a mechanical mouse named Theseus that learned to navigate through a maze by trial and error.) The χ2 method of tree pruning was described by Quinlan (1986)(4). C4.5, an industrial-strength decision tree package, can be found in Quinlan (1993)(5). An independent tradition of decision tree learning exists in the statistical literature. Classification and Regression Trees (Breiman et al., 1984)(6), known as the “CART book,” is the principal reference.

1. Feigenbaum, E. A. (1961). The simulation of verbal learning behavior. Proc. Western Joint Computer
Conference, 19, 121-131.
2. Quinlan, J. R. (1979). Discovering rules from large collections of examples: A case study. In Michie,
D. (Ed.), Expert Systems in the Microelectronic Age. Edinburgh University Press.
3. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of
Illinois Press.
4. Quinlan, J. R. (1986). Induction of decision trees. Machine Learning, 1, 81-106. 5. Quinlan, J. R. (1993). C4.5: Programs for machine learning. Morgan Kaufmann.
6. Breiman, L., Friedman, J., Olshen, R. A., and Stone, C. J. (1984). Classification and Regression Trees.
Wadsworth International Group.

Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010

Definitions Rorty Frank I 590
Theory / Rorty when "mental" is only "unknown", then "immaterial" makes no sense - even as a definition of "a or b" it is meaningless - e.g. "mental" = "either physically or mentally" (-> Disjunctive Predicates).

Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Disjunction Armstrong III 15
Disjunction of prop > disjunctive predicates/Armstrong: a single predicate "M" could be used for "A or B or C" > "grue"/Armstrong: simplified form: green becomes blue and at the same time blue becomes green - new pair of pred: bleen/grue: nothing changes relative to the pair: green> blue: remains bleen, blue> green. Remains grue - but: a thing that remains blue changes relative to the new pair bleen/grue - Question: what kind of predicates priority?
III 68
Disjunction/Disjunctive Properties/System/Order/F.o.Th./Armstrong: Example, a natural system contains three fundamental laws: Fs are Gs, Hs are Js, Ks are Ls - these are united as follows: we define M: "an F or an H or a K" N: "a G or a J or an L" - then we have a single "fundamental law": "Ms are Ns" - then "F is an N": less informative but apparent improvement: G = J = L: no more information than "F is G v J v L". But if "N" is a true property, then "G", "J", "L" are merely artificial subdivisions (Armstrong pro) (f.o.th disjunction, identity) (>grue) - (s) otherwise we would always have to say "yellow or black Banana").
III 151
Disjunctive properties: being G or H": ArmstrongVs - Problem: disj. laws: does not the unrealized alternative need to be missing first? - disjunctional predicates always possible, but no real relation

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Disjunction Chisholm I 172
Disjunction of facts / disjunctive fact / Chisholm: even if there were an entity that would be the disjunction of "Miller or Smith," I am not in relation to it that in that it is either sick or gone. - (> Fodor, no disjunctive law). - Solution: the belief that either Miller is ill or Smith is absent, is a feature that I simply ascribe to myself - not a complex subject is required. (> Self-ascription/Chisholm).

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Disjunction Davidson I (e) 102
Disjunctive Predicate/state of mind/brain state/Davidson/(s): there is no physical difference between the state e.g. to mean that there is a "short-beaked Echidna" or a "short-beaked echidna or porcupine" - is a psychological difference. >Disjunctive predicates.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Disjunction Fraassen I 127
Contrast-class/Bromberger/Explanation/Fraassen: E.g. why (it is the case that) P in contrast to (other elements of) X? - X: Contrast-Class - set of alternatives - P may belong to X or not - e.g. why this temperature instead of another? - ((s)> disjunctive predicates). - E.g. why is this person suffering from paresis - because previously Syphilis - why from this syphilis patient: here there is no answer - Individual/Fraassen: is never explained - only qua event of a certain type - Vscontrast class: dos not exclude irrelevance - still a problem: asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Disjunction Lewis V 191
Disjunction/Lewis: each event can be described as a disjunction. But Go-or-talk that cannot be taken as the cause. >Events/Lewis.
V 212
Disjunction/events/Lewis: an event cannot be disjunction of events, because then the (double) event would always have to occur in every region where one or the other disjunct occurs, i.e. it would have to happen twice in a possible world - impossible.
V 263
Events not disjunctive when different definitions are possible, but then the event still does not consist in their disjunction.
V 266
Definition disjunction of events/Lewis: e is a disjunction of events f1, f2 .. iff. e necessarily occurs in a region, iff. either f1 or f2 or... occurs here - as a set the disjunction is simply the unification - some events are disjunctions of other events - e.g. stamping - of left and right foot - the disjuncts must not vary too much - the disjunctions as a whole are in non-causal counterfactual dependence on their referents, the disjuncts - without one, the whole thing would not be - but the individual disjuncts are not in this counterfactual dependence - disjunction: not based on different definitions - E.g. Disposition: Breaking of the window could be caused by many things - none of the possible events is significantly associated with the fragility - if there are no extrinsic disjunctive events, there may still be disjunctive truths - and this can be explained causally.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Disjunction Putnam III 125
Disjunction/definition/science/Putnam: e.g. different color combinations can produce the same perceived color. Any non-disjunctive predicate can be converted into a disjunctive predicate through conversion (by switching the current basic concepts terms in each case, and vice versa). Therefore disjunctivity is not a refutation that no >universal exists. ---
V 122
Disjunction/property/Putnam: the disjunction of properties is itself a third property: neither A nor B is a sensation state, but only their disjunction. >Properties/Putnam.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Disjunction Searle I 66
Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness and intentionality (SearleVs). Searle: meanings are in your head (intentionality). Intentionality is biologically teleological.
I 67
SearleVs: when there is a confusion, words like "horse or cow" are required. > Disjunctive predicates.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Distinctions Lyons I 69/70
Distinctions/sound/relativity/Lyons: the difference between[b] and[p] is not absolute but relative. I.e. we are dealing with sound ranges. Lyons: the difference between[b] and[p] varies constantly (from the phonetic point of view.)
Absolute/Lyons: the difference between the utterance elements /1/ and /2/ is absolute! That is, there is no word in the middle in terms of its grammatical function or meaning, and it is marked by a medium sound. ((s) > disjunctive/Goodman, analog/Goodman).
Sound/conclusion: since the utterance units must not be confused, there must be a safety distance between the sound ranges they realize.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Distribution Lyons I 72
Def Distribution/Linguistics/Lyons: each linguistic unit has a characteristic distribution, namely the set of contexts in which it can stand. Distribution equivalent: two expressions can be in the same context. Correspondingly distribution-complementary or distribution-overlapping.
If two units are at least partially distribution equivalent, they cannot contrast with each other.
I 145
Distribution/Grammar/Lyons: We can take distribution as a starting point for a grammatical description: expressions have meaning when they are used in an appropriate context.
I 147
Distribution analysis/grammar/Lyons: a list would not be the most direct description of a text: in a sufficiently large language sample there will be a considerable overlap in the distribution of different words. Distribution classes: Classes of words that can be used for each other in a sentence. Example "I drink beer": liquor, milk, water... and so forth
General/formal: e.g. we assume a material corpus of 17 "sentences": ab,ar,,pr,qab,dpb,aca,pca,pcp,qar,daca,dacp,dacqa,dacdp,acqp,acdp.
Letters: stand here for words.
I 148
Problem: we still have no distinction between "grammatically correct" and "meaningful" (useful). In our example, a and p have certain contexts in common (namely -r,pc-, dac-), b and r (a-,qa) and d and q (dac-a,-aca, ac-p)
c: is unique in its distribution (a-a,p-c,p-p,qa-a,da-a,da-p), because no other word can be found in the same context as c.
X: we now merge a and p in the class CX and insert this class name everywhere where either a or p occur. Sentences that differ only in that o is where the other sentence has a are thus grouped into a class. ((s) "disjunctive"): Xb,Xr,(ar,pr), qXb,dXb,XcX, (aca, pca, pcp), qXr, qXcX,dXcX (daca,dacp), dXcqX,dXcdX,qXcdX,XcdX,XcqX,XcdX,XcdX.
Y: we set Y for b and r,
Z: for d and q.
Then we get
1. XY, (Xb,Xr)
2. ZXY (qXb, qXr, dXb)
3. XcX,
4. ZXcX (qXcX, dXcX)
5. ZXcZX (dXcqX, dXcdX, qXcdX) 6. XcZX (XcqX, XcdX).
N.B.: with this we can capture the 17 sentences of our corpus through six structural formulas. (c is a one-membered class). They specify which consequences of word classes are acceptable. The consequences are linear. (see below).
Grammatically correct: are sentences in our example, that result from these structure rules. This is only achieved by the fact that the sentences that occur are regarded as links in a superset of 48 sentences. (The number 48 is obtained by applying the syntagmatic length formulas (see I 82 above) to each of the six sentence types and adding the results).
I 149
Generative/generative grammar/Lyons: the "grammar" in our example is generative in that it assigns a certain structural description to each sentence that appears in the "sample", for example pr is a sentence with the structure XY, pcda is a sentence with the structure XcZY, etc. Grammar/Lyons: as it is understood here, it is nothing else than the description of the sentences of a language as combinations of words and word groups due to their affiliation to distribution classes. It is a kind of "algebra" in which the variables are the word classes and the constants or the values assumed by the variables in certain sentences are the individual words.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Empty Set Bigelow I 374
Empty set/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: how we transfer the plural essence to them. Solution: "rival theory" about which universals constitute sets.
Thesis: Sets result from the relations of coextensiveness between universals. That is, a set is what is shared by coextensive universals. In general: if two universals are not coextensive, they can still have something in common that makes them overlap. This is the set of things that both instantiate ((s) average).
Definition set/rival theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: is then a property of properties. This is something different than the plural essence.
Plural essence/Bigelow/Pargetter: this needs not to be a property of properties, but could be a simple universal that is instanced by individuals. But it can also be instituted by universals, because universals of every level have plural essences.
N.B.: but the fact that it can be instanced by individuals makes the set construction by plural essence to something other than that by coextensiveness.
Definition theory of higher level/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we call the rival theory. (sets of coextensivity).
Advantage: it makes the empty set easier to define.
Empty Set/Coextensive Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. Suppose a pair of universals whose extensions are disjoint. These two still have something in common: what all disjoint sets have in common: the empty set. Then we have reason to believe in their existence.
---
I 375
Theory of higher level/Bigelow/Pargetter: can derive plural essences: Plural essence: E.g. Suppose some things x, y, etc. instantiate a property F, and this in turn instances a property G.
This structure now induces extra properties of the original things x, y, etc., and these properties, although they are instantiated by individuals of lower level, still involve the property of higher level G.
Extra property: here: to have a property of the G-type.
Alternatively: Suppose x has F which again has G. Suppose something else, e.g. z has another property, H, which also has G. We can assume that x has neither H nor G, but z does not have F and not G. Then it follows that x and z have something in common. But this is neither F nor G nor H, but:
Commonality: to have a property that has property G. (As above, the "extra property").
Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: this can be applied to sets, we say that x, y, etc., instantiate a universal, e.g. F which, in turn, instantiates a universal G.
G: that's what we call provisionally a set.
Set: is a better candidate for the "extra property" than a property of properties.
Definition element relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is here simply instantiation.
---
I 376
It is an advantage of our theory that it explains the elemental relationship so simply. Property of Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: is separated by a layer in the type hierarchy. And yet x should also be an element of G. So then element-property could not be an instantiation.
Definition quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then plural essences induced by characteristics of properties.
Definition Empty set/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a property of properties, more precisely: a relation between universals. It is what disjunctive couples of universals have in common. This time, however, no extra property of things is induced two levels below. Therefore, it cannot be constructed as a plural essence.
Nevertheless, the empty set exists. Thus we have all that justifies the infinity axiom.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Existence Statements Wittgenstein Hintikka I 72
Wittgenstein goes further than Frege: individual existence is inexpressible, only by existential quantifier (higher-order predicate) - but possible situations are considered possible (Tractatus). ---
I 126
Disjunction/disjunctive/existence/existence theorem/expressions/inexpressibility/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: since existence of a single thing (particular, object) is not expressible: disjunction plus existential quantifier for types. ---
Tetens VII 137
Present King of France/Russell/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Tetens: solution: as an existence sentence it is not meaningless: - "there is exactly one object x, x is the current King ...." - then the sentence is just wrong - error: to interpret it as a predication: - logical form: Fa - in this case the object would have to exist, so that the sentence can make sense.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Tetens I
H. Tetens
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994

W VII
H. Tetens
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009
Explanation Railton Lewis V 233
Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws.
2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place.
If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability.
Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining:
1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws)
2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions.
LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach.
But that is not available!
V 233/234
Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered.
Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted!
2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event:
For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events.
3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause!
4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause.
5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it.
LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes.
V 235
LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model.
Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation.
V 236
Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it?
Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.
If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments.
But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little.
But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions.
"Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions.
LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient.
Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history.
V 238
Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of.
Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature.
LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused.
Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure.
V 239
Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs.

Railt
P. Railton
Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Facts Ayer I 285
Brandom facts = true statements - Ayer: facts do not equal true statements.
A statement cannot define a fact, because it is far too unspecific, it is compatible with all sorts of facts.

I 286
Def Fact/Ayer: that what makes a statement true - Ayer pro "make true". Facts are not some linguistic entities, but objective facts - "someone is writing in this room" is not made true but by anyone, but by me
I 286
Disjunctive Fact: many authorsVs: a statement cannot determine a fact, because it is too unspecific - negative statements are less accurate E.g. "London is not the capital of France"
I 289
Def Facts/Ayer: a fact which constitutes the objective content of the true statements of this class (>statement) - apparent circle: statements and facts mutually defined - Solution: rejection of the coherence theory.
I 297
Fact/Statement/Ayer: wrong to look for any relation - however comparison not mysterious - by understanding the sentence

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Facts Russell Armstrong II 102
General fact/Russell/Armstrong: a certain large accumulation of facts which is the totality of the facts of the first level - Lewis: if this collection of less than all possible states (facts) is 1 level, then this state of higher level automatically excludes countless states from existence. - Armstrong: the situation with nomic connections seems the same.
Armstrong II 131
General fact/Russell/Martin: this could be a uniformity or regularity, but also different or disjunctive relations. - i.e. a "mixed world": "uniform and/or non-uniform" - the disjunction itself could be general and not space-time-specific. B. Russell, ABC of Relativity Theory 144/145
Facts/Russell: can never be inferred from laws, only from other facts.
R V ~ 38
Fact/Russell/Stegmüller: it is inadmissible to regard attributes and relations together with individuals as components of facts - (violates type theory, different levels).

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Loewenheim Putnam V 54 ff
Loewenheim/reference/PutnamVsTradition: Loewenheim tries to fix the intension und extension of single expressions via the determination of the truth values for whole sentences.
V 56f
PutnamVsOperationalism: e.g. (1) "E and a cat is on the mat." If we re-interpret this with cherries and trees, all truth values remain unchanged. Cat* to mat*:
a) some cats on some mats and some cherries on some trees,
b) ditto, but no cherry on a tree,
c) none of these cases.
Definition cat*: x is a cat* iff. a) and x = cherry, or b) and x = cat or c) and x = cherry. Definition mat*: x = mat* iff. a) and x = tree or b) and x = mat or c) and x = quark.
Ad c) Here all respective sentences become false ((s) "cat* to mat*" is the more comprehensive (disjunctive) statement and therefore true in all worlds a) or b)).
Putnam: cat will be enhanced to cat* by reinterpretation. Then there might be infinitely many reinterpretations of predicates that will always attribute the right truth value. Then we might even hold "impression" constant as the only expression. The reference will be undetermined because of the truth conditions for whole sentences (>Gavagai).
V 58
We can even reinterpret "sees" (as sees*) so that the sentence "Otto sees a cat" and "Otto sees* a cat" have the same truth values in every world.
V 61
Which properties are intrinsic or extrinsic is relative to the decision, which predicates we use as basic concepts, cat or cat*. Properties are not in themselves extrinsic/intrinsic.
V 286ff
Loewenheim/Putnam: theorem: S be a language with predicates F1, F2, ...Fk. I be an interpretation in the sense that each predicate S gets an intension. Then, there will be a second interpretation J that is not concordant with I but will make the same sentences true in every possible world that are made true by I. Proof: W1, W2, ... all be possible worlds in a well-ordering, Ui be the set of possible individuals existing in world Wi. Ri be the set, forming the extension of the predicate Fi in the possible world Wj. The structure [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] is the "intended Model" of S in world Wj relative to I (i.e. Uj is the domain of S in world Wj, and Rij is (with i = 1, 2, ...k) the extension of the predicate Fi in Wj). J be the interpretation of S which attributes to predicate Fi (i=1, 2, ...k) the following intension: the function fi(W), which has the value Pj(Rij) in every possible world Wj. In other words: the extension of Fi in every world Wj under interpretation J is defined as such, that it is Pj(Rij). Because [Uj;Pj(Rij)(i=1,2...k)] is a model for the same set of sentences as [Uj;Rij(i=1,2...k)] (because of the isomorphism), in every possible world the same sentences are true under J as under I. J is distinguished from I in every world, in which at least one predicate has got a non-trivial extension.
V 66
Loewenheim/intention/meaning/Putnam: this is no solution, because to have intentions presupposes the ability to refer to things. Intention/mind State: is ambiguous: "pure": is e.g. pain, "impure": means e.g. whether I know that snow is white does not depend on me like pain (> twin earth). Non-bracketed belief presupposes that there really is water (twin earth). Intentions are no mental events that evoke the reference.
V 70
Reference/Loewenheim/PutnamVsField: a rule like "x prefers to y iff. x is in relation R to y" does not help: even when we know that it is true, could relation R be any kind of a relation (while Field assumes that it is physical). ---
I (d) 102ff
E.g. the sentence: (1) ~(ER)(R is 1:1. The domain is R < N. The range of R is S). Problem: when we replace S by the set of real numbers (in our favourite set theory), then (1) will be a theorem. In the following our set theory will say that a certain set ("S") is not countable. Then S must in all models of our set theory (e.g. Zermelo-Fraenkel, ZF) be non-countable. Loewenheim: his sentence now tells us, that there is no theory with only uncountable models. This is a contradiction. But this is not the real antinomy. Solution: (1) "tells us" that S is non-countable only, if the quantifier (ER) is interpreted in such a way that is goes over all relations of N x S.
I (d) 103
But if we choose a countable model for the language of our set theory, then "(ER)" will not go over all relations but only over the relations in the model. Then (1) tells us only, that S is uncountable in a relative sense of uncountable. "Finite"/"Infinite" are then relative within an axiomatic set theory. Problem: "unintended" models, that should be uncountable will "in reality" be countable.
Skolem shows, that the whole use of our language (i.e. theoretical and operational conditions) will not determine the "uniquely intended interpretation". Solution: platonism: postulates "magical reference". Realism: offers no solution.
I (d) 105
In the end the sentences of set theory have no fixed truth value.
I (d) 116
Solution: thesis: we have to define interpretation in another way than by models.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Natural Kinds Dennett I 574
Natural kind/natural type/indeterminacy/twin earth/reference/Putnam: E.g. cat/siamese: solution: we refer to natural types, whether we know it or not. DennettVs: but which types are natural? - Perhaps one discovers later that one must make a distinction? Which undermines the argument of the twin earth. - E.g. natural type for frogs: Fly or beads. - ((s) > disjunctive predicates.)

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Naturalism Searle I 66
Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness/intentionality (SearleVs: Searle is against such a separation). Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in the head (> Intentionality/Searle).

There is a thesis: intentionality is biological, teleological:
SearleVs: in a case of confusion we needed words like "horse-or-cow".
((s) > Disjunctive predicates.)

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Predicates Goodman I 127
Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular. Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.)
---
II I preface (Putnam)
Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable.
II IV Preface
No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive (VsCarnap).
II IV
Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative. This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary.
II V
More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict: E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable
II IV
Grue/Goodman: if we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t.
II 61
Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations.
II 64
A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates. When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. Because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demand too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same class.
II 74
Continuation/predicates: statement: "time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t. Variant: real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects.
II 77
One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous".
II 78
Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself.
II 79
The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and usually go further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction.
II 121
"Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Predicates Millikan I 109
Subject/predicate/picture/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of sentences map... ---
I 110
...the world, and the way in which logical predicates do this. 1. Because one can replace predicates by other predicates, e.g. "... swims" by "... flies", they are still not to be viewed as objects.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): distinction between the frame and the insertion-"gap").
2. Question: Do predicates have to correspond to universals when we treat them as substances? In any case, we must not look at them as single objects, but rather as in tradition as thought objects or as possibilities.
Universals/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature?
Predicates/Millikan: every simple predicate must reflect a historically variability rooted in nature ((s) disjunction, >disjunctive).
Complex Predicates/Millikan: They too are supposed to reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things.
Property/kind/Millikan: property and kind have only one settlement space: that is nature itself.
---
I 111
3. Relation/property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in the same way in nature as is their identity or their sameness. ---
I 227
Negation/Predicate/Logical Subject/Millikan: the common basis in the opposite corresponds to the logical subject. E.g. Bill cannot be both large and small at the same time. Negation: operates on the logical predicate. It does not change the meaning (the mapping rules). It operates on the part of the logical predicate, which is the grammatical predicate of the sentence.
E.g. "painfully disappointed, Johnny never came back".
Embedded sentence: "Johny was painfully disappointed": is embedded in the grammatical subject.
Truthmaker: Problem: e.g. "some day-active bats are not herbivores" is not made true by the fact that all bats are nocturnal.
Negative sentence: its function is to give positive information. A useful negative sentence will limit the domain of possibilities.
---
I 228
External negation: "it is not the case that ..." may also affect more than the grammatical predicate. ---
I 272
Subject/Predicate/Strawson/Millikan: (Subject and predicate in "Logic and Grammar") Millikan: I replaced "general concept" here by "properties": fundamental asymmetry: Particular: space-temporal, exemplifying properties that come from a certain domain.
Then we know for each property that it is in competition with others.
Asymmetry: there is no such competition for particulars. No individual competes with others for properties within a domain.
No things are related to each other, so that for each property that exemplifies the one, it would follow that the other does not exemplify them (even not at the same time).
MillikanVsStrawson: but what is "logical competition" among properties? It is traditionally recognized among concepts, but we cannot transfer it to properties and relations.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Properties Lewis Frank I 357
Definition property/Lewis: the set of exactly those possible beings, actual or non-actual, that do or do not have a specified property - E.g. properties that segments of a street do or do not have.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

---
Lewis IV X
Properties/Lewis: These are the appropriate objects of attitudes. ---
IV 135
Properties/Lewis: Sets of individuals - "something that segments of things (in time or space) simply have - also extrinsic properties (that things have because of their relation to other things) - in general: the property to live on one world from any set of possible worlds corresponds to these possible worlds - i.e. for each proposition there is a property to live in a world where this proposition is true. ---
Ad IV 146
Proposition/Property/Lewis/(s): Proposition: not related to people, without spatiotemporal localization - simply true in possible world - E.g. Someone is happy - not possible to wish for me, because I do not know if I’m the one - in contrast, property: related to person - I am happy. ---
Schwarz I 94
Properties/Quantity theory/Lewis: no properties: being no cat, identity, element-ship > heterology. ---
Schwarz I 97
Disjunctive property/Lewis/Schwarz: 1) Any property is equivalent with a disjunction of two properties - disjunctive property: only if even more unnatural than the members: E.g. round is not disjunctive, as it clearly is not more unnatural than round and not red - E.g. round and lonely or not round and not lonely in contrast, are disjunctive, because it is less natural than round and lonely. ---
Schwarz I 97
Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates -. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property - perf.nat.p. (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. ---
Schwarz I 101
Class/Quantity/Properties/Lewis: things with E.g. same charge have to be more common than if they were an element of the same class.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Properties Meixner I 31
Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity - "being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property. (property name)
I 42
Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties - ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!)
I 50
Exemplification/Identity/Meixner: Object X is F, this is not an identity of X and F, of the object with its property, but the property is exemplified by the object
I 73
Property/Meixner: nothing other than function. This property, when saturated with the individual Hans, again results in the fact that Hans is a human
I 75~
Property/Meixner 2nd level: Properties of properties: "the property of being a trait of x" - e.g. being egoistic is the property of being a trait - not 2nd level: e.g. being 2 meters tall - e.g. property of being a trait cannot be said of people or cities (pointless), but it can be (erroneously) said of the property of being 2 meters tall.
I 76
Individual properties ("initial properties")/Meixner: exactly expressable about individuals, not something that only individuals can have - there are cases where properties which cannot be expressed exactly about I can still apply to I.
I 78
Ontological/Property/Meixner: Distinction between relational and non-relational properties is ontological - non-ontological: distinction between negative and non-negative or between disjunctive and non-disjunctive properties.
I 150
Properties/Meixner: Identity principle for individual properties: they can be satisfied by exactly the same entities -for all individual property F and G: F is identical to G if and only if for all individuals x applies: = - for triangles: equiangular and equilateral ones are fulfilled by the same entities.
I 153 ~
Universal Name: means the property.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004

Properties Millikan I 11
Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties and kind exist only in the actual world (our real world).
MillikanVsNominalism.
---
I 197
Property/Millikan: Thesis: A property is only a property by virtue of opposing properties - properties that they exclude or are incompatible with them. ((s)> disjunctive property). ---
I 264
Identity/Sameness/Property/Millikan: how can we describe the identity of a property? 1. we consider only those properties that individuals can have.
---
I 265
Leibniz Principle/Millikan: we turn around the Leibniz Principle by adding an operator for natural necessity.
(F)(G){[NN(x)Fx equi Gx] equi F = G}.
---
I 266
Properties/Identity/Millikan: The traditional objection that properties are the same when all their instances are the same is divided into two arguments. 1. Objections from those who believe that properties correspond one-to-one to possible concepts:
"Argument from the meaning"/argument from meaning/Armstrong: (Armstrong not pro):
(Has often confused the problem of universals): If universals are to be meanings, and if a semantic criterion for the identity of predicates is accepted, then it follows that every predicate type corresponds to its own universal. ((s) This can be re-invented newly infinitely many times).
Problem/Millikan/(s): already diversity of linguistic expressions entails difference in the corresponding properties.
Inflationism/Deflationism/Millikan: Realists have interpreted this argument inflationistically, and nominalists have interpreted it deflationistically.
Millikan: for this, however, one has to equate meaning with intension - that is to say, to combine meaning with the concepts that one has of the things that are mapped with the expressions.
Solution/Millikan: we differentiate meaning and intension, therefore, it can have different concepts for one and the same variant in re. Therefore, we can ignore this objection.
For example, the concepts that Hubots and Rubots have (> Terminology/Millikan) of the "square" are different variants in nature, because they are governed by different intensions. This could be misunderstood in that way that for the ancient Hesperus and Phosphorus concepts there would have been concepts of different celestial bodies,...
---
I 267
...because they were ruled by different intensions. ((s) general problem: there are too many properties in such approaches).
2. Type of objections against the view that properties are the same when their instances coincide: that there are so many counterexamples.
For example, even if it can be that every living creature with a heart is a living being with kidneys, it does not show that having the one property would be equal to having the other property.
Solution: the instances must already coincide with natural necessity.
For example, suppose there is only one single object in the world with a particular green color, and this object would also have a unique form. It would still not follow from this that the property of having this hue would be equal to the property of having this form. Certainly, there are also no principles of natural necessity that link these properties.
Millikan: but not all the counter-arguments against the inverse Leibniz principle are so easy to invalidate. E.g. Properties for materials in general:
e.g. properties that can have gold: a certain spectrum, electrical conductivity, melting point, atomic weight. Suppose each of these properties is only once applicable to gold and therefore identifies the material.
N.B.: then each of these properties necessarily coexists with the others.
Nevertheless, the properties are not identical! But how do we actually know that it is not one and the same property? How do we know that they are not like a form that is once touched and once seen? This is a question of epistemology, not of ontology. But
it cannot be answered without making ontological assumptions.
---
I 268
General Properties/Material/Millikan: in order e.g. that the particular conductivity of gold and the particular spectrum of gold could be one and the same property, the entire range of possible electrical conductivities would have to be mapped one-to-one to the entire range of possible spectra. That is, the particular conductivity could not be the same as this particular spectrum, if not other spectra coincided with other conductivities.
Properties/Millikan: Thesis: Properties (one or more digits) that fall into the same domain are characteristics that are opposite to each other.
Of course, one area can also contain a different area. For example, "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it, and "being two centimeters tall plus minus one millimeter" means "2.05 centimeters tall plus minus 1 millimeter" than excluding it.
The assumption that two properties can only be the same when the complete opposite domains from which they come coincide, suggests that the identity of a property or a property domain is tied to the identity of a broader domain from which it comes and is thus tied to the identity of its opposites. Now we are comparing Leibniz's view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all simple properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God created only the best of possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
Complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be propertes that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
---
I 271
Properties/Millikan: properties are not loners like substances. Self-identity/property: a property is itself, by virtue of the natural necessary comparison to other properties.
Representation/exemplification/Millikan: if an opposite is missing, no property is represented.
E.g "Size is exemplified by John" has no opposite. The negation is not made true by the fact that size would have a property that would be contrary to being exemplified by John. "Being exemplified by John" says of substance John that it has that property.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Reductionism Logic Texts Read III 28
Reductionism: which was central for Wittgenstein. For Russell it was quite clear that the assumption of an additional fact between two statements was absurd and unnecessary: E.g. "Kennedy is President," and "Oswald killed Kennedy," a third fact, a sort of conjunctural fact that makes the connection absurd and lavish.
III 28
If you know the two separate facts, you learn nothing new when you connect them. There is no extra fact behind the link, which is added to the separated facts. Similar to disjunctive. What makes "A or B" true is not another strange disjunctive fact, but exactly the same fact that makes one of the two limbs true! Otherwise regress.
III 30
Reductionism: would have to declare the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby did not kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy."
III 31
RussellVsReductionism: argues against such argumentation that a regress threatens: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement C which is incompatible with "C is compatible with A," and so on. ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also be valid against any conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Reference Dretske Brandom I 600
Reference/Triangulation: The crossing point of two chains can help understand reference: e.g., the views of teacher and learning person. >Triangulation. Also Dretske: e.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the temperature of the room, to the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or to the closing of the contact. (> Measuring). The practical consequences do not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and, if necessary, turns the heater on and off, the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream with the change of the room temperature and downstream with the reaction to turn the heater on or off.
---
I 951
Since the two chains intersect at two points, one must imagine them curved. BrandomVsDretske: does that really solve the problem? Is there not still the reaction to the closest disjunctive stimulus? Closing the bimetal strip or the mercury contact?
---
I 601
Concept: Mere differing ability to react (cf. > RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions, Brandom) is not enough to recognize the use of terms! Rationalistic supplementation: the inferential role of the reaction is crucial.

Dretske I
Fred Dretske
"Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske II
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997


Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Situations Cresswell I 75
Situation / Cresswell: if they are to be individuals, they must be completed. - It must be possible for a situation without an A to contain an A - but there is no individual whose existence logically isdependent on another. - I 76 bare infinitive: if relation to an event, then not disjunctive. - Event / Cresswell: are not the meanings of sentences. - E.g. someone broke into my appartment: in the sense there is nothing that tells me who. - The entities that are referenced to the bare infinitives are not semantic values ​​of sentences - but of situations.
II 169
Def situation / Cresswell: (essentially) a collection of individuals with certain characteristics, where the individuals are in certain relationships.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Situations Simons II 175
Situation/Simons: a situation does not correspond as complete to a senetence as a complex does. Negative and disjunctive situations are possible. A situation is a non-material (i.e. "non-thing") entity.
II 176
Different approach: a situation corresponds to a truth-function of an atomic sentence. We reject negative and disjunctive objects, therefore situations have a precarious thing-like character, contrary to a complex. Non-negative situation: if at least one of the atomistic complexes exists in it, we have a non-negative situation. N.B.: then situations have different parts in different worlds. Situation: a situation is mereologically variable. Complex: a complex is not variable.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Species Sellars I 50
SellarsVsLocke: he should have allowed not only conjunctive but also disjunctive ideas. Not only the idea of being A and B but also the idea of being A or B.
I 51
Disjunction: the idea of a genus is the idea of the disjunction of all its species. So the idea of the triangular is the idea of the inequilateral or equilateral. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it was the idea of the inequilateral and equilateral. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Terminology Goodman I 88
Art: There are characteristics to define a mode of symbolization that indicates whether something is a work of art. 1. Syntactic density: syntactic density is, where certain minimal differences serve to distinguish symbols, e.g. a scale free thermometer (in contrast to a digital instrument.)
2. Semantic density: semantic density is, where symbols are available for things that differ only by minimal differences from each other, e. g. not only the scale free thermometer mentioned above, but also common German, as long as it is not syntactically dense.
3. Relative fullness: relative fullness is, where comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant, e. g. the drawing of a mountain of Hokusai consisting of a single line, in which every property such as line, thickness, shape, etc. counts. Contrary to the same curve as a depiction of the stock market trend of a day, in which only the height of the values above the basis counts.
4. Exemplification: in the exemplification, a symbol, whether or not it is denoted, is symbolized by the fact that it serves as a sample of properties which it possesses literally or metaphorically.
5. Multiple and complex reference is also possible, where one symbol fulfils several related and interacting reference functions, some direct and others mediated by other symbols.
---
III 128
Definition symbol scheme: a symbol scheme consists of characters. Definition characters: characters are certain classes of utterances or inscriptions. Characteristic of the character in a notation is that its elements can be freely interchanged without any syntactic effects (class of marks). Score requires character separation. A character in a notation is an abstraction class of character indifference among inscriptions.
Definition inscriptions: inscriptions include statements. An inscription is any brand visually, auditively, etc. that belongs to a character. An inscription is atomic if it does not contain any other inscription, otherwise it is compound. For example, a letter is considered atomic, including spaces. In music, the separation in atomic/together cannot always be recognized immediately, it is more complex. The atoms are best sorted into categories: key sign, time sign, pitch sign.
III 128/129
Definition mark: a mark is an individual case of a character in a notation and it includes inscriptions. Actual marks are rarely moved or exchanged. All inscriptions of a given brand are syntactically equivalent. And this is a sufficient condition that they are "genuine copies" or replicas of each other, or are spelled in the same way. No mark may belong to more than one character (disjunctiveness) a mark that is unambiguously an inscription of a single character is still ambiguous, if it has different objects of fulfillment at different times or in different contexts. Definition type (opposite: use, Peirce): the type is the general or class whose individual cases or elements are the marks. Goodman: I prefer to do without the type altogether and instead name the cases of use of the type replica.
Definition case of use: the case of use the replica of a type ("genuine copy").
There is no degree of similarity necessary or sufficient for replicas.
Definition genuine copy: a genuine copy of a genuine copy of a genuine copy... must always be a genuine copy of "x". If the relation of being a genuine copy is not being transitive, the whole notation loses its meaning (see below: strictly speaking, a performance may not contain a single wrong note). Score requires character separation.
Definition Notation:
1. Condition is character indifference among the individual cases of each character. Character indifference is a typical equivalence relation: reflexive, symmetrical, transitive. (No inscription belongs to one character to whom the other does not belong).
2. Demand to notation: the characters must be differentiated or articulated finally. For every two characters K and K' and every mark m that does not actually belong to both, the provision that either m does not belong to K or m does not belong to K' is theoretically possible.
3. The (first) semantic requirement for notation systems is that they must be unambiguous.
Definition ambiguity: ambiguity consists of a multitude of fulfillment classes for one character.
Definition redundancy: redundancy consists of a multitude of characters for one fulfillment class.
III 133
Definition syntactically dense: a schema is syntactically dense if it provides an infinite number of characters that are arranged in such a way that there is always a third between two. Such a scheme still has gaps. For example, if the characters are rational numbers that are either less than 1 or not less than 2. In this case, the insertion of a character corresponding to 1 will destroy the density. Definition consistently dense: if there is no insertion of other characters at their normal positions, the density is destroyed.
Definition ordered syntactically: e. g. by alphabet
Definition discreetly not overlapping: note how absurd the usual notion is that the elements of a notation must be discreet: first, characters of a notation as classes must be rather disjoint! Discretion is a relationship between individuals. Secondly, there is no need for inscriptions of notations to be discreet. And finally, even atomic inscriptions only need to be discreet relative to this notation.
Definition disjunct/disjunctiveness: no mark may belong to more than one character. The disjunctiveness of the characters is therefore somewhat surprising since we do not have neatly separated classes of ordered spheres of inscriptions in the world, but rather a confusing mixture of marks.
Semantic disjunctiveness does not imply the discreetness of the objects of fulfillment, nor do syntactic disjunctiveness of the characters imply the discreetness of the inscriptions.
On the other hand, a schema can consist of only two characters that are not differentiated finally. For example, all marks that are not longer than one centimeter belong to one character, all longer marks belong to the other.
III 213
Definition fullness: the symbols in the picturial schema are relatively full, and fullness is distinguished from both the general public of the symbol and the infinity of a schema. It is in fact completely independent of what a symbol denotes, as well as the number of symbols in a scheme. Definition "attenuation": for the opposite of fullness I use attenuation.
Definition density: e.g. real numbers, no point delimitation possible. The opposite of dense is articulated.
III 232 ff
Syntactic density, semantic density and syntactic fullness can be three symptoms of the aesthetic. Syntactic density is characteristic for non-linguistic systems; sketches differ from scores and scripts.
Semantic density is characteristic of representation, description and expression through which sketches and scripts differ from scores.
Relative syntactic fullness distinguishes the more representational among the semantically dense systems from the diagrammatic ones, the less from the more "schematic" ones.
Density is anything but mysterious and vague and is explicitly defined. It arises from the unsatisfactory desire for precision and keeps it alive.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Terminology Kant I 33
Supersensible/Supernatural/Kant: E.g. the moral law. ---
I 38
The Unconditional/Kant: even unconditional condition ("Condition totality"). The system of all possibilities. Justification of a sentence by subsumption of something slightly below rules. ---
I 39
1. The unconditioned of the categorical condition unit of presentation relation belongs to the representational subject. 2. The unconditioned of the hypothetical condition unit of presentation relation relates to the objects of perception.
3. The unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis applies to objects of thought.
---
I 41
Soul/Kant: the soul idea belongs to the idea of death. With it, the ego distances itself from its body - wrong: one cannot conclude from the I to the soul. - The logically underlying (subject) is made into a being-like (ontologically) underlying (substance). ---
I 42
Pure apperception/Kant: actually comes only to God. - Direct, intellectual intuition. - Intelligible objects (for example, "I") - through mere apperception - human: in actions and internal determinations, which the human does not perceive through the senses. ---
I 98
Apperception/KantVsHume: unity of apperception: I am making all ideas aware as my ideas. - So I stay in the unity of consciousness which can accompany all my ideas. - In addition, I have to keep in mind, how I add an idea to the other! Otherwise I will scatter myself. ---
I 129/130
The Sublime/Kant: the sublime is moral beauty - it resembles moral obligation, that it initially inhibits the life forces and accumulates, in order to let them pour even stronger in a kind of emotion and to lead to moral action. - But I should exceed the nature morally, so it is about my superiority to nature. - Sublime/Burke: "in the sublime we encounter the harbingers of this king of the horrors of death". ---
Adorno XII 177
Pure/Kant/Adorno: 1. all that is pure in the subject, is that which is thought of without admixture of empirical, without admixture of a sensual.
2. The pure will is that which is pure in the sense of the principle of reason, without getting dependent on any being which is itself not rationally understandingly.
---
Adorno XIII 66
Constitution/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: the concept of constitution (...) is characterized in Kant by the fact that this mind or consciousness is not conceived as a part of the world, as a piece of existence, like every other existence. They should differ as a constituent from everything else.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
That-Clauses Cresswell II 54
Definition content: be the meaning of the that-clause - it is about contents in this book - different objects (sentences) can have the same content.
II 89
That-clause/intension/Cresswell: the intension of the that-clause is not always equal to the intension of the complement clause - (the clause following the "that"). Iterated propositional attitude: Problem: occurs when the most outside "that" operates on the sense (structure) of the complement clause - analogously: the plus sign would then contain itself as one of its arguments.
II 159
Propositional attitude/attribution/that-clause/truth conditions/content/Cresswell: thesis: the truth conditions of clauses with propositional attitudes are determined by the contents of the that-clauses - that is the only thing I want.
II 160
More than just the truth conditions of the complement clauses are involved in the attribution of propositional attitudes.
II 172
Naked infinitive/Cresswell: behaves quite differently from the that-clause - E.g. a) Fred saw Betty coming in
b) Fred saw Betty coming in and he saw Sally smoking or not smoking
Barwise/Perry: one cannot go from a) to b) Cresswell dito.
Naked infinitives have no proposition as a semantic value but a situation type - event: there are no disjunctive events.
Negation of event/negative event: also not possible: - E.g. "Fred saw Betty not smoking".
Events/Cresswell: are only used because some expressions do not behave as whole sentences.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Universals Armstrong III 82
Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation.
III 88
Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation).
2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.

Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.

Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102).

Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Universals Place Armstrong III 82
Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation.
Armstrong III 88
Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation).
2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
Armstrong III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
Armstrong III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker.
Armstrong III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.

Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.

Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102).

Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Meixner Vs Armstrong, D. State of Affairs/st.o.a./Meixner:
Def elementary instantiation fact: e.g. that Anna loves Fritz, e.g. that every living being is mortal (includes that every human being is mortal)
Def higher level state of affairs: example "that is greater than a transitive relation".
Def conjunctive state of affairs: example "that Anna loves Fritz and Is greater than a transitive relation".
Def negative state of affairs: e.g. that Nuremberg is not located between Regensburg and Munich
Def possibility state of affairs: e.g. that it is possible that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013.
Def necessity state of affairs: e.g. that it is inevitable that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013.
These classes are not unconnected: every state of affairs is an elementary instantiation state of affairs
negative state of affairs: every is also a negative state of affairs by being identical with the negation of its negation.
I 122/123
All conjunctive state of affairs are negations of disjunctions of state of affairs. All disjunctive negations of conjunctions of state of affairs, all necessity state of affairs are negations of possibility state of affairs and vice versa. All at least one state of affairs negations of all-state of affairs and vice versa.
Meixner: nevertheless it is surprisingly controversial among ontologists whether there are negative state of affairs.
Parallel to the discussion whether there are negative universals:
ArmstrongVsNegative Universals.
MeixnerVsArmstrong: pro negative state of affairs: one cannot deny the sentence A does not express a proposition and thus also a state of affairs. (Although state of affairs is not equal to propositions).
ArmstrongVsDisjunctive state of affairs
MeixnerVsArmstrong: much clearer is the occurrence of negative and disjunctive state of affairs in names for disjunctive and negative state of affairs:
For example, the police inspector is convinced that
1. the gardener or butler is involved in the murder
2. not both
3. no one who is different from both the gardener and the butler (so no one else).
Absurd: that the police inspector would not be convinced of any state of affairs as a consequence. He is rather convinced of three state of affairs.
I 124
The same can be said for all- and at least one- state of affairs: their names appear in descriptions of the exemplification of propositional attitudes. Here they cannot be eliminated.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Belnap, Nuel Cresswell Vs Belnap, Nuel HCI 299
Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: are at worst harmless. In most cases, we wish to speak of entailment. VsEntailment/VsBelnap/VsAnderson: Their system E (see above) pays too high a price with the absence of the disjunctive syllogism (see below principle C). I 300 Problem: the mere construction of such an axiom system does not provide us with a clear notion of entailment. Paradoxes of implication/Hughes/Cresswell: are even desirable: we want to be able to say: "If you accept that, you can prove anything." I.e. in a contradictory system everything can be proven. aca

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Carnap, R. Putnam Vs Carnap, R. Goodman II Putnam Foreword V
Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48).
Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself,
PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate.


Lewis IV 85
Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts.
IV 85/86
Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there.
They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas".

Putnam V 244
Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private.
PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability.
V 250
Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap).
Putnam I (a) 42
Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful.
There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them).
Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions:
1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions.
I 43
2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language".
Putnam I (a) 46
Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence.
PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"!
(I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term).
I (a) 48
Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem.
I (a) 49
Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say!

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Entailment Cresswell Vs Entailment Hughes I 267
Paradoxes of strict implication/Disjunctive syllogism/DS/Entailment/Some authors/Hughes/Cresswell: some consider the "paradoxes" to be legitimate and accept them as a price for being able to keep the disjunctive syllogism. VsEntailment: Consider the absence of the disjunctive syllogism even to be a reason for rejecting the entailment.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Hughes I
G.E. Hughes
Maxwell J. Cresswell
Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978
Fodor, J. Newen Vs Fodor, J. NS I131
Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis
2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm.
Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs.
NS I 132
Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states.
Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax).
It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories.
VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language.
NS I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early."
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations.
VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed.
Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills.
- -
NS I 160
Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional.
Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate.
VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow."
NS I 161
Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case.
VsFodor:
1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried.
FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept!
Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Goodman, N. Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. Introduction Putnam II IV
Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language.
Sainsbury V 129
Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 358
Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher.
((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.)
I 359
Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger:
1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction
2. provisional nature
3. without claim to factuality
4. expediency.
RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed.
I 360
Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95).
Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 406ff
Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery.
It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production.
407
Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura.
(Bolz pro Aura).
Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility.
Putnam I 256
Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it.





Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Hempel, C. Lewis Vs Hempel, C. V 232
Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences:
1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all
2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue.
I prefer Peter Railton's model:
Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.).
We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both
covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances.
Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument!
LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument.
V 233
Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises.
2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place.
If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability.
Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation:
1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws)
2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient
LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach.
But this cannot be achieved!
V 233/234
An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones.
e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded!
2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event:
e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified.
3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause.
4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause.
E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause.
5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it.
LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes.
V 235
LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model.
Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation.
V 236
Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them?
Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.)
If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments.
But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough.
But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions.
"Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions.
LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form.
Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration.
V 238
Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree.
Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature.
LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things.
Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure.
V 239
Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Locke, J. Sellars Vs Locke, J. I 50
SellarsVsLocke: should have allowed not only conjunctive but also disjunctive ideas. Not only the idea of the A- and B-being but also the idea of A- or B-being. (Disjunction).
I 51
Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: the idea of a class is the idea of the disjunction of all their species! So the idea of triangular is the idea of inequaliterality or equilaterality. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it would have to be the idea of the inequaliterality and the equalilaterality. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility!
Berkeley: asserts the idea of A cannot be the idea of B simultaneously. Had he taken this step it could not be regarded as deterministic thought the sensation of something crimson.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Mentalesese Peacocke Vs Mentalesese I 212
PeacockeVsMentalese: E.g. Suppose a creature whose brain is composed of layers of spatially organized "maps": here you do not need Mentalese, either. Disjunction/Belief/Peacocke: could be realized as something that can be explained with the theory of circuits. Then there could be a third state, that would be equivalent to the acceptance of both alternatives. [Fa or Gb]. (>circuit algebra).
There might be reasons to believe the whole disjunction without reasons for one side alone!
Our model also allows to explain why a person does not always draw the disjunctive consequences of their beliefs!
It is possible that a component of S Fa is not always present.
"Not always present" means that the component can be implemented quite differently. It could be a concentration of substance in an set of neurons or a question of the distribution in them.
Deduction/Mentalese/Peacocke: because of the single requirement that it must take care of analog syntactic structures of the lines, the thesis of Mentalese is obvious.
I 213
Vs: but it is not true that it is indispensable. A physical unit could register that the state S Fa v Gb is a disjunction, because it is suitably connected to two belief states. One side could be negated. (e.g., S ~Gb), then the unit could cause the system to go into the state S Fa.
In this case, no information about the contents of either of the two sides is required!
There is only the modus tollendo ponens.
PeacockeVsMentalese: therefore, we can ask in any situation where the language of the brain seems indispensable at first glance: can supposed syntactic operations be replaced by relational operations?
If so, we do not need the thesis of Mentalese.
Mentalese/Peacocke: as far as I know none of the proponents asserts that except for an assumed Mentalese sentence S that is supposed to be stored if a subject believes that p, also another Mentalese sentence S' is to stored, which means: "I believe that p." ((s) recourse).
It is generally believed that it is sufficient for belief that a stored sentence is based on perception, other states and behavior appropriately.
Peacocke: but that is exactly my replacement tactics. (Relations instead of syntax).
I 213/214
Replacement Tactics/Peacocke: can also be used to show how actions can easily be explained by states with content. Mentalese would have to adopt an additional translation module.
Peacocke: an intention that Gb may partly have its propositional content by the fact that the corresponding action is determined by the fact that the subject is in the unstructured state S Gb which has its contents by its relations to other states.
This also applies to the practical inferring: ((s) "content from relations rather than language.")
The relational model seems to conceive Mentalese as a special case among itself.
I 215
Computation/PeacockeVsMentalese: if we can be in mental states with content (by relations), without having to store sentences, then there can also be computation without internal brain language. Because
Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and causal relations, but no syntactic structure.
PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessarily apply: ​​"No representation, no computation".

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Millikan, R. Brandom Vs Millikan, R. Millikan I 109
Subject/Predicate/Illustration/Millikan: thesis: there is no difference between the way in which logical subjects of propositions
I 110
depict the world and the way logical predicates do this. 1. because one can replace predicates by other predicates e.g. "...swims" by "...flies" they are not to be regarded as objects for a long time yet.
(BrandomVsMillikan/(s): Differentiation of frame and insertion "gap").
2. Question: do predicates have to correspond to universals if we treat them like substances? In any case, we do not have to look at them as individual things, but as tradition as thought objects or as possibilities.
Universal/Millikan: universals as thought objects; are they in nature?
Predicates/Millikan: any simple predicate must reflect a variability historically rooted in nature ((s) >disjunctive).
Complex predicates/Millikan: they should also reflect variables of nature, but they do not have to be things.
Property/Type/Millikan: have only one settlement area: that is nature itself.
I 111
3. Relation/Property/Millikan: as variants within facts they receive intentionality from causal and explanatory connections! Then they must be in nature in the same way as their identity or selfhood is! (see part IV below).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Possibilia Lewis Vs Possibilia Schwarz I 87
Possibilia/Possible World/possible worlds/possibilistic structuralism/Lewis/Schwarz: (1991(1),1993d(2)) here Lewis assumed, thesis: that there are clearly less inhabitants of possible worlds (Possibilia) than sets. Set theory: so for them additional entities had to be accepted besides the Possibilia. These additional entities should then contain the sets (and classes) required by the 5th condition (see above).
Lewis later: accepts that there are at least as many Possibilia as sets. Then one could do without the additional mathematical entities (Lewis pro). Then we delete condition five. Then "many" inhabitants of possible worlds must be sets.
Schwarz I 88
Because Lewis assumes that there are more sets than individuals. Because if there are "many" individuals, then also "many" individual atoms, atoms of individuals exist. But there are more sums of individual atoms than individual atoms. Then there are also more individuals than atoms at all and then, according to conditions (1) and (3), more units than atoms, in contradiction to (2). Possibilia/Lewis/Schwarz: if they have no cardinality, not all Possibilia can be individuals.
Def possibilistic structuralism/Lewis/Schwarz: mathematical statements are not only about mathematical entities anyway, but partly also about Possibilia. Then why not just these?
Pro: not only does he get along without primitive mathematical vocabulary, but also without primitive mathematical ontology. Questions about their origin and our epistemic approach are thus resolved. If mathematical statements are about Possibilia, it results in a modal state from the logic of unlimited modality: For unlimited modal statements truth, possibility and necessity coincide.(see section 3.6 above).
Lewis: can't just delete the mathematical entities. (LewisVsField): Problem: mixed sums. For example, if some atoms in Caesar's brain are classified as single sets and others as individuals, then Caesar is a mixed sum.
Mixed Sum/Mereology/Lewis: is neither individual nor class.
Class: Sum of single sets.
Schwarz I 89
Mixed sums: are not elements of sets in Lewis' original system either. Schwarz: that is unmotivated in terms of set theory: according to the iterative view, absolutely everything has a single set. Lewis usually ignores mixed sums anyway.
Problem: not under every single set relationship is there a single set of Caesar.
Solution: a) also allow a mixed sums single set. Vs: there are more mixed sums than single sets, so that doesn't work.
b) Requirement: that all "small" mixed sums have a single set.
c) More elegant: settle mixed sums by forbidding individuals. If you identify classes with ordinary Possibilia, you could treat each atom as a single set. For example, Caesar is then always a class, his single set is the object of pure set theory.
LewisVs: this does not work in his set theory (unlike ZFC). Because we need at least one individual as an empty set.
Single set/Lewis/Schwarz: since a single individual atom is sufficient, instead of (1) (3) single set relationships, one could also determine arbitrary unambiguous images of small things in all atoms except one. This one atom is then the empty set relative to the respective single set relationship. (> QuineVsRussell: several empty sets, there depending on type).
Solution/Daniel Nolan: (2001, Kaß 7, 2004): VsLewis, VsZermelo: empty set as real part of units:
Def "Esingleton" by A/Nolan: {A} consists of 0 and a thing {A} - 0 . (Terminology: "Singleton": only card of one color).
Esingleton/Nolan: similar assumptions apply to them as in Lewis' single sets.
Mixed Sum/Nolan: this problem becomes that of sums of 0 and atoms other than Esingletons. In Nolan, these are never elements of sets.
Object/Nolan: (2004.§4): only certain "big" things can be considered as 0. So all "small" things are allowed as elements of classes.
Individual/Nolan: many "little" things are individuals according to him among all Esingleton relationships.
Empty Set/Schwarz: all these approaches are not flawless. The treatment of the empty set is always somewhat artificial.
Schwarz I 90
Empty Set/Lewis/Schwarz: set of all individuals (see above): There is a good reason for this! ((s) So there are no individuals and the empty set is needed to express that.). Subset/Lewis/Schwarz: is then defined as disjunctive: once for classes and once for the empty set.
Possibilistic structuralism/Schwarz: is elegant. Vs: it prevents set-theoretical constructions of possible worlds (e.g. as sentence sets).
If you reduce truths about sets to those about Possibilia, you can no longer reduce Possibilia to sets.


1. David Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell
2. David Lewis [1993d]: “Mathematics is Megethology”. Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 3–23. In [Lewis
1998a]

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Rey, G. Fodor Vs Rey, G. IV 219
Sentence/formula/Fodor/Lepore: Georges Rey reads Quine in a way that he reconstructs sentences as formulas, but without semantic holism (SH): 1) Sentence means formula!
2) Peirce’s thesis identified sentence meaning with empirical meaning (not with confirmation!)
i.e. the set of observation sentences that confirm them.
Def Empirical Meaning/(s): (according to Fodor/Lepore IV 219): empirical meaning corresponds to a set of observation sentences that confirm one sentence.
Important argument: an observation sentence is a formula that is conditioned/confirmed by proximal stimuli.
3) The Quine-Duhem thesis (QDT) applies.
Then it follows that no formula has any meaning outside of the overall theory!
Fodor/LeporeVsRey: this is a very strange kind of semantics: because the meaning of each sentence consists in the observation consequences of the overall theory in which they are embedded, it follows that every sentence in a theory has the same meaning as any other sentence in that same theory!
Def sentence meaning/Rey/Fodor/Lepore: sentence meaning consists in the observation consequences of the embedding overall theory.
This implies, in turn, that no theory can contain a contingent conditional (hypothetical) in such that, if a disjunctive sentence is true (false), then both disjuncts are true or false, etc.
IV 219
Furthermore, every sentence in a theory translates each sentence from an empirically equivalent theory and there are no relations between sentences from not empirically equivalent theories at all. A Quinean could accept all that and say: "so much the worse for those who insist on a semantics for individual sentences".
Fodor/Lepore: that may be true, but in any case the Quine-Duhem thesis is trivialized: the only thing you have to hold on to when changing theory is the pronunciation!

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Russell, B. Read Vs Russell, B. Read III 31 +
VsReductionism: would have to explain the truth of a negative statement like "Ruby didn't kill Kennedy" as the result of the truth of another statement that would be incompatible with "Ruby killed Kennedy". RussellVsVs: objected to such argumentation that recourse is imminent: "B is incompatible with A" is itself a negative statement. To explain its truth, we would need a third statement, C, which would be incompatible with "C is compatible with A", and so on.
ReadVsRussell: this is a strange objection, because it would also apply against every conjunction. And then truth conditions for conjunctive and disjunctive statements must not be subjunctive or disjunctive.
III 156
VsRussell: his theory cannot be right because it leads to false truth values: it says (wrongly) that any statement about non-existent objects is false. It is, however, an improvement on traditional theory, which says that all such statements are meaningless.

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Use Theory Armstrong Vs Use Theory Armstrong II (c) 92
Evan Fales: locates vagueness in the law of probability as only dependent on the irreducible probability character which has nothing to do with one result coming out instead of another. But in the Martin E.g. you don’t need a probability law!. ArmstrongVsFales: he misunderstands the role of the case of the disjunctive probability law in this case:.
II (c) 93
It was to be shown that there are cases where a counterfactual conditional can be asserted to be true, but where the consequent of the Counterfactual Conditional is undefined between different results and it is not plausible that there was a truth about a fact that resolves the ambiguity.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Holism Esfeld, M. I 2
Thesis: Holism in the philosophy of mind (HPG) and in quantum mechanics (HQM) have a common conceptual content.
I 16
Holismus/Esfeld: Question: What kind of dependency exists between the parts of a holistic system? Thesis: within a holistic system there is a generic ontological dependence.
This does not refer to the existence of the parts as such (isolated), but to the extent that they have certain properties.
Parts/Properties/Holism/Esfeld: Thesis: for each constituent part of a holistic system (constituent) there is a family of non-disjunctive, qualitative properties that make something a constituent, given a suitable arrangement with other things.
I 200
Holism/ontological/epistemic/Esfeld: the proposed social holism and persuasion holism implies the epistemological thesis that even if one has complete physical knowledge about a possible world, one cannot know whether there are beings in the world concerned who follow the rules and which rules these beings follow.