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Incarnation | Gadamer | I 422 Incarnation/Christianity/Language/Gadamer: There is (...) a thought which is not a Greek thought and which does better justice to the being of language, so that the language-forgetfulness of Western thinking cannot become a complete one. It is the Christian thought of incarnation. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy. Incarnation is obviously not "Einkörperung" (English, literally: process of becoming subsumed into a body, embodimet). Neither the concept of the soul nor the concept of God, which are connected with such a "Einkörperung", correspond to the Christian concept of incarnation. The relationship between soul and body, as it is thought in these theories, such as in Platonic-Pythagorean philosophy, and corresponds to the religious idea of the transmigration of souls, sets rather the complete otherness of the soul in relation to the body. In all "Einkörperungen" it retains its being for itself, and the detachment from the body is regarded as purification, i.e. as restoration of its true and actual being. Also the appearance of the divine in human form, which makes the Greek religion so human has nothing to do with incarnation. God does not become a human there, but shows himself to man in human form, while at the same time retaining his superhuman form completely. In contrast to this, the incarnation of God, as taught by the Christian religion, includes the sacrifice that the Crucified One, as the Son of Man, takes upon himself, but that is to say, a mysteriously different relationship, the theological interpretation of which takes place in the doctrine of the Trinity. >Trinity/Gadamer. I 423 Gadamer: [The incarnation is closely connected with the] problem of the word. The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task facing the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is already in the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in the university scholasticism based on the human relationship between speaking and thinking. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from its spirituality, which at the same time signifies his cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). >Word of God. Already the way, how in Patristics theological speculation about the mystery of the Incarnation is connected to Hellenistic thinking, is characteristic of the new dimension at which it aims. Thus, at the beginning, one tries to make use of the stoic concept of the inner and the outer logos (logos endiathetos - prophorikos)(2). This distinction was originally intended to distinguish the stoic world principle of the logos from the outwardness of mere repetition(3). For the Christian faith of revelation, the opposite direction now immediately becomes of positive importance. The analogy of the inner and outer word, the utterance of the word in the "vox", now gains exemplary value. >Word/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy. 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. In the following I refer to the teaching article "Verbe" in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, as well as to Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité. 3. Die Papageien: Sext. adv. math. V Ill, 275. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Predication | Geach | I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. I 70 Contradictory predications like "Fa" and "~Fa" refer to a common subject - there are no "contradictory subjects". >Beliefs/Geach, >Belief ascription. I 252 Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-clause or in an or-clause, a term P can be predicated from a thing without naming the thing with "P". E.g. "If that what the police officer has said, is true, then he was driving faster than 60". This does not name the police officer's sentence as true. - (> Conditional). - Predication/naming: century-old error: the predicate is predicated from the thing - Frege: Difference >Designation, >Denotation, >Predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicated in a non-asserting sub-clause (subset) - therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. I 290 Predication/Geach: wrong: to read "SiP" as "a thing is a predicate" - (origin: "Two-Names-Theory, Aristotle) a subject cannot be negated - sentence negation: negation of the predicate. I 291 GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Names-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to the named with relation of the predicate to what it is stated from -> false doctrine of the Trinity. I 295 Prediction/Theology/Thomas Aquinas: the expression after "as" is predicative: e.g., "Christ inasmuch as he is human". - Distinction between subject and predicate, VsTwo-Name-Theory. >Thomas Aquinas. False: Two-Name-Theory: E.g.: "His godly nature is immortal, his human nature is mortal". Aquinas: can distinguish "Christ as human is God". False: Two-name-theory: cannot do this because "human" and "God" are merely two names. >Two name theory: see above). VsOckham: E.g. for him, "humanitas" is not more than "majesty": a disguised name for a concrete thing. Problem: for Ockham, humanity is no longer human when viewed as the Son of God. VsOckham: because it is not genuinely abstract, e.g. the mayor's office becomes the mayor. >William of Ockham. I 300 Predication/Thomas Aquinas/Geach: Subject: refers to a suppositum (an "accepted") predicate: refers to a form or nature. Predication: unequal naming: E.g. "The Prime Minister became Prime Minister" - Nonsense: "which Prime Minister?". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Terminology | Geach | I 52 Two-Names-Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat") - ((s) E.g. "The person who stabbed Ceasar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus"). Geach: besides, a binding element would be needed. Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" is supposed to be true, because the same thing is named. Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher". I 54 Two-Classes-Theory/TCT/GeachVs: even worse than the Two-Name-Theory: the general term "philosopher" means "class of philosophers" - Socrates is then only a part of the class. Vs: The element-relation is quite different from the subclass-relation: E.g. a parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament. But: "is a philosopher" means exactly the same in both applications. - copula: fallacy of division: as if there were two varieties of "is": one for "is a philosopher," and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers" - Geach: equivalent sentences need not be able to be divided into equivalent sub-sets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians". I 122 Latin prose theory/Geach: the relative pronoun is treated as a connection of a binding word with a bound pronoun: "the" is translated as "so that": E.g. the king sent emissaries to make them ask for peace. E.g.(Bach-Peters phrases) solution : A boy kissed a girl, and she really loved him, but he was only pretending (this is still ambiguous). but Solution: e.g. Every true Englishman reveres __ above all ... and __ is his queen. I 239 Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I only name predicates like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables". I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates which are indistinguishable with respect to the two objects in a given theory. If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, the I-predicate does not change its meaning, it is no longer an I-predicate. E.g. "uniform" for (different, but not yet differentiated) tokens of words, later tokens are distinguished, but still "uniform". I 245 "Surman"/Geach: (should be identical, if they have the same family name) are not counted twice because in different theories differently provided with predicates and thus counted differently. ((s) identified as different by the theory.) E.g. applicable in the universe with the same right: "is the same token as ..", "is the same type as ... "- "is the same lexicon entry as...". I 250 Ascription theory/Geach: Vs "acts of will": attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs) - Oxford: Thesis: to say that an action is willful is not a description of the action but an attribution. I 291 GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Name-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to named with the relation of the predicate to from what it is said. -> false Doctrine of the Trinity. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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