Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Behaviorism Pauen Pauen I 36
Logical behaviorism and eliminative materialism: empirical exploration of consciousness is superfluous because mentalistic statements can be completely replaced by physicalist statements. Identity theory: consciousness is as important as the brain, only one domain, but different description, or access.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Elimination Eliminate, Elimination, philosophy: the replacement of a linguistic expression by another in the case of a theory revision. The elimination is usually done either by a definition or by merging various observations under a common concept. See also reduction, reductionism, eliminative materialism, eliminative reductionism, meaning change, theory change, incommensurability.

Elimination Churchland Schiffer I 159
Eliminativism/Churchland/Schiffer: (Paul Churchland 1981)(1): his eliminativism is quite different from that of Quine: Here the irreducibility of intentional vocabulary is denied. Folk Psychology/Churchland: is a functional theory. Belief is a functional state, with a functional role but future neuroscience will show that no inner states have these roles and therefore the folk psychology is wrong.
Schiffer: this is a completely different route to eliminativism than that belief cannot be realized physically because our intentional vocabulary was irreducible.
I 164
... SchifferVsChurchland: his eliminativism would then have the consequence that no one believes anything.

1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Folk Psychology Churchland Schiffer I 41
Folk Psychology/Problem/Schiffer: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological terms. Functional architecture can simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981(1), Stich 1983(2), Dennett 1986).

1. Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (2, February): 67–90.
2. Stich, Stephen (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Incorrigibility Rorty Frank I 580
Incorrigibility/Rorty: is the only consistent feature of the mind - but it follows no ontological dualistic theory. - Incorrigibility is compatible with the eliminative materialism. >Eliminative Materialism. Armstrong: incorrigibility is based on logical terms.
RortyVsArmstrong: not in the sense of "implies its own truth ".
Frank I 614
Incorrigibility: reports of mental events are incorrigible, not properties (but these are almost incorrible).

Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Materialism Searle I 47
SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization).
I 18 ff
"Eliminative materialism": eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965).
I 27
Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul. It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites.
Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical.
I 40
SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >Monism, >dualism, >Cartesianism. What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances.
I 53
Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism.
I 62
Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all. Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism.
I 72
The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity.
I 112
The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural!

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Materialism Churchland II 466
"Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: says two things: 1. Materialism is most likely true.
2. Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Materialism Churchland Pauen I 100
Materialism, eliminative/VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the abandonment of the terminology of everyday psychology. This assumes, however, that the corresponding entities do not exist in fact. This is an ontological and not just a language-philosophical thesis.
Churchland claims that there are no serious objections to the eliminative materialism. That is not the case, however.
I 101
VsMaterialismus, eliminative/Pauen: 1. False claim to know that there are neural, but no mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true. There must therefore be no opinions (i.e., mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implicitly implies that the representative of a claim itself, is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: admits this performative contradiction, but sees in it only a further proof for our entanglement in the everyday psychology.
VsChurchland: that is a mere announcement that the contradiction will be solved somehow.
I 102
Performative contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: For example, the vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent asserts that there are no spirits of life. This opponent, however, is himself alive, so he must have spirits of life ...
PauenVsChurchland: that is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not depend on vitalism, but has an alternative concept.
In contrast, the defender of everyday psychology does not have to make such a presupposition: the assertion that knowledge implies an opinion (the controversial mental state), is after all no invention of everyday psychology, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
103
VsMaterialism, eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of intertheoretical reduction: everyday psychology is to be eliminated, especially because it cannot be reduced to neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: therefore the two theories must compete on the same level. E.g. Phlogiston/Chemistry.
In contrast to that, everyday psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/third person, micro/macro).
I 104
3. For example, split brain patients/Pauen: empirical evidence shows that, in particular, feelings are language-independent and thus can also be identified pre-theorytically. Patients react, but have no more conscious access. The stimuli occur in the right, unconscious, language-incapable hemisphere. Nevertheless, patients can provide correct information. They can neither be based on the generalizations of everyday psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
I 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: The latter then excludes the phenomenal states from the elimination. The everyday experience should no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this, however, diverges from the usual everyday psychology, which also includes pain. He had previously included pain in the states which would be changed by the elimination of the terms.
Moreover, he is inconsistent when he insists on the elimination of cognitive consciousness.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Physical/Psychic Rorty I 139
Mentally/physically/VsEliminative materialism / Rorty: one can hardly say, "mentally" mean in reality something "that could turn out to be something physical."
I 140
Mental/mind /mental/brain / RortyVsSearle: you could say, "sensation" and "brain process" are simply two ways to talk about the same thing - two sides of what? - Something of the mental or something physical? Or from a third element?

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Self- Identification Rorty Frank I 580
Incorrigibility/Rorty: incorrigibility is the only consistent feature of the mind - but no ontological-dualistic thesis follows from it. - This is compatible with the >eliminative materialism. >Incorrigibility. Self-identification/Armstrong: based on logical concepts.
RortyVs: but not in the sense of "implies its own truth."


Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Churchland, P. Fodor Vs Churchland, P. IV 189
Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space.
IV 191
FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language).
Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages!
IV 192
Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account.
IV 193
Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction.
But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies.
IV 194
Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language.
IV 195
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green.
If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it.
VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker).
One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed.
IV 196
Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions?
IV 197
E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory.
>State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed.
IV 200
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies.
IV 201
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. ---
Metzinger II 466
"Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true.
2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes.
II 467
"Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Churchland, P. Rorty Vs Churchland, P. I 138
Science/RortyVsChurchland: that in the future brain states could be measured objectively is really irrelevant. It does not depend on that. The assumption that there is an excellent response, depends on the idea before Quine that there were "necessary and sufficient conditions built in our language" for the use of terminology such as "sensation" etc.
I 139
mental/physical/VSeliminative materialism/Rorty: one can hardly say, "mental" in reality means something "that could turn out to be something physical," just as one can not say Ex "criminal behavior" means in reality so much like "behavior that may turn out to be innocent." (> Epiphenomenalism).
IV 53
Layman Psychology/RortyVsChurchland: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "convictions" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools. On the other hand elementary particles are certainly the appropriate instrument to talk about tables and make predictions about them. One can not say better "tables are real".
VI 169
Layman Psychology/DennettVsChurchland/Rorty: is not so bad, exactly because it is successful.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Churchland, P. Pauen Vs Churchland, P. Pauen I 99
Churchland/Pauen: commits sciences to a very strong notion of ​​nature as a kind of "thing in itself", ultimate authority in the decision about theories.
I 100
VsChurchland/Pauen: claim to be able to justify the renunciation of the terminology of folk psychology. However, this presupposes that the relevant entities do indeed not exist. So this is an ontological and not only a language philosophical thesis.
All the while, Churchland assumes that there are no serious objections to eliminative materialism. That's not the case, though.
I 101
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 1) false claim of knowing that there are neural, but not mental states. Performative contradiction: if this is about knowledge, then it must be true for its part. I.e. there may be no opinions (i.e. mental states).
On the other hand, however, the knowledge status implies that the representative of an assertion himself is of the opinion that the facts are true.
Patricia Churchland/Pauen: concedes this performative contradiction, but sees it as only another piece of evidence of our involvement in folk psychology.
VsChurchland: this is a mere announcement that the contradiction would eventually be dissolved.
I 102
Performative Contradiction/Churchland/Pauen: E.g. vitalism also diagnoses this contradiction: the opponent claims that there are no animal spirits. But this opponent himself is alive, so he must have animal spirits...
PauenVsChurchland: this is not the same: the contradiction does not run on the same level:
The opponent of vitalism does not make himself dependent on vitalism, but has an alternative design.
In contrast, the defender of folk psychology does not need to make such a requirement: the assertion that knowledge implies opinion (the controversial mental state) is not an invention of folk psychology after all, it is not an empirical thesis at all.
I 103
VsMaterialism, Eliminative/Pauen: 2nd problem of inter-theoretical reduction: folk psychology is to be eliminated mainly because it cannot be reduced to the neurobiology. Robert McCauley/Pauen: the two theories would have to compete on the same level for that. E.g. phlogiston/chemistry.
In contrast, folk psychology and scientific psychology are located on completely different levels. (First/Third Person, Micro/Macro).
I 104
3) E.g. Split Brain Patients/Pauen: Empirical evidence shows that feelings in particular are language-independent, and thus can also be identified pretheoretically. Patients respond, but have no conscious access anymore. The stimuli reach the right, unconscious hemisphere that is incapable of speech. Nevertheless, the patients can give correct information. In doing so, they can rely neither on the generalizations of folk psychology nor on a knowledge of the perceived object.
I 105
This can only be explained if one assumes that emotional states have an intrinsic quality that also allows theory-independent interpretation. Churchland/Pauen: consequently excludes phenomenal states from the elimination. Everyday experience should now no longer be changed by elimination.
VsChurchland: this now differs from the common folk psychology, however, which also includes pain. Before, he himself had still counted pain among the states which have been changed by the elimination of the concepts.
He is also inconsistent when he adheres to the eliminability of cognitive awareness.

I 188
Explanation Gap/Pauen: already recognized by Leibniz in principle. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine. Explanation Gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and folk psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
I 189
forces us to perform huge interventions in previously accepted views and methods. Identity theory: refers to ontology.
Explanatory gap argument epistemically refers to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept the identity theory, we must expect that our respective knowledge can be related to each other.
I 191
Churchland: it would now be a fallacy to try and infer from our present ignorance the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument from Ignorance") VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap that does not need to be plausible!
The representatives do not rely on their own ignorance and do not refer to the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as e.g. water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
I 192
Causal properties play a significant role with these differences. Then, according the representatives of the explanatory gap argument, it must be possible to characterize our natural phenomena designated by everyday concepts characterized by such causal properties:
Levine: then there is a two-stage process:
I 193
1) quasi a-priori process: the concept is brought "into shape" for the reduction through the determination of the causal role. 2) empirical work to discover what the underlying mechanisms are.
I 194
This method fails now when it comes to the explanation of mental and especially phenomenal states. They cannot be translated into causal roles in principle! Unlike in our colloquial speech of physical processes, we obviously do not mean these effects, when we talk about mental states.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Folk Psychology Dennett Vs Folk Psychology Lanz I 300
Dennett: functional explanations make an optimality condition. (The machine uses its energy to carry on their tasks). Similarly, intentional explanations: the agent is rational: he has goals that he should have due to its constitution and its place in the world. Likewise, the opinions that he should have.
Thus, only the physicalist, causal explanation remains.
So one asks, what are the causally relevant factors for the behavior that can be explained functionally or intentionally depending on the interest and complexity of behavior, then only the physical explanation of the information remains.
It follows that it is an illusion to believe that intentional states are in turn causes of further mental states and causes of actions.
Psychological characterizations are merely heuristic and no naturalistic descriptions. (DennettVsFolk Psychology).


Pauen I 135
Psycho Functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in the determination of mental states. Because the binding to everyday language is not necessary it can be abandoned. On the other hand, the functional description can go arbitrarily far, practically down to the individual neuron. All properties can be considered, depending on the objective. V 137 Measuring instruments can be used as well. Problem: to recognize simulation: is in principle not impossible. Representatives: Dennett. (DennettVsEveryday Psychology: simulation impossible to include) V 138 Dennett: in cases of conflict neuroscientific data prevail over self-attribution of the first person! We do not have direct access to our mental states (unlike as semantic functionalism and eliminative materialism).

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
eliminat. Materialism Pro Frank I 578
Rorty per eliminative materialism: is linked to Feyerabend - RortyVsKant, RortyVsDescartes
Fra I 584
Foucault: man disappears, Rorty: the mental disappears).
Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Reduction Churchland, P. Metzinger II 464
Reductionism/Pat Churchland: Thesis: I am a reductionist. This does not mean, however, that a pure "bottom-up" strategy should be pursued.
Pauen I / V 92
Eliminative Materialism/Pauen: Everyday psychology is responsible for our beliefs about the existence of mental states.
Pauen I / V 93
Camp: this was developed by Feyerabend (1963) and Rorty (1965, 1970), as well as Paul and Patricia Churchland following Quine and Sellars. Thesis: mental states are merely postulates of everyday psychology. We will give them up when there will be a better theory. (>Reductionism).
Pauen I / V 100
Churchland/Pauen: their reductionism is an ontological, not only semantic thesis.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001