Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | Lorenz | Page numbers here from the German edition: K. Lorenz, Das sogenannte Böse Wien, 1963 II 34 Aggression/Lorenz: two types: A) between different species B) within one species. (Subject of this book). II 36 "Mobbing"/"hate on"/Lorenz: crows, and other birds "hate on" the owl they have discovered by day: (s) They show their fellow-species by gestures where the enemy is. For example a jay follows the fox screeching through the forest. This is a passing on of a non-innate knowledge. II 47 Singing/Birds/Lorenz: Birds share, among others things, also the age. II 58 Aggression/Lorenz: Thesis: More than other properties, the aggressive behavior can be exaggerated by its pernicious effect in the grotesque and unsuitable. For us, it is the inheritance of the intraspecific selection, which has lasted over decades. The evil introspecific selection must be taken. II 72 Stimulus/Reaction/Behavior/Lorenz: Experiments show that (in captivity) the withdrawal of stimuli decreases the threshold for triggering reactions. At the end, a room corner is performed courtship to because it is the only visual point of view. II 81 Aggression/Evolution/Lorenz: The reorientation of the attack is probably the most ingenious source that was created by the species change, in order to divert aggression into harmless pathways. II 91 Behavior/ritualization/Lorenz: e.g. in the insect world, it may be the case that behavior is even be embodied. E.g. robbery or assassination: the suitor hands over a prey to the beloved of the right size so that he can have sexual intercourse with the female during her eating the prey without being eaten himself. II 92 Later generations react only to a corresponding symbol. Congenital understanding. II 93 Behavior/animal/ritualization/Lorenz: it would be a mistake to call ritualized "rushing" an "expression" of love "or the affiliation of the female to the spouse. The independent instinctual movement is not a by-product, not an epiphenomenon of the tie that holds the animals together, but it is itself this tie. A completely autonomous, new instinct. II 103 Rite/behavior/animal/Lorenz: the most important function is the active drive to social behavior. II 104 New function: communication. II 105 The unification of the variable variety of possibilities of action into a single rigid sequence reduces the danger of ambiguity in the communication. II 108 "Good manners" are those that characterize their own group. II 109 Any deviation causes aggression, so the group is forced to act in a unified way. >Aggression. II 123 Behavioral research/Lorenz: in the heroic time of comparative behavioral research, it was thought that only one instinct dominated this, but exclusively, one animal. J. HuxleyVs: Human and animal are like a ship commanded by many captains. Animals have this agreement that only one of them can enter the command bridge. --- Gould I 105 Lorenz's thesis: we do not react to wholenesses or shapes, but to a group of special mechanisms that act as triggers. (Lorenz, 1950 "Ganzheit und Teil") It is well known that birds, in particular, react to abstract features and not to shapes. --- Gould VIII 34 Aggression/Lorenz: (The so-called Evil): Thesis: Aggression is a species-preserving function. Thus only the most suitable individuals are propagated. DawkinsVsLorenz: Prime example for a circular reasoning. It is also contrary to Darwinism, which he does not seem to have noticed. |
Lorenz I K. Lorenz Das sogenannte Böse Wien 1963 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Colour | Wright | I 164 Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things. >Supervenience. This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds. >Stronger/weaker, >Natural kinds. It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts. >Unabiguity, >Colour words. I 169 Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds. That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion. >Best explanation/Wright. Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things. >Generality. This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common! >Similarity, >Properties. The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. >Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >Epiphenominology. --- II 247 Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges). Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be. Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive. >Behaviorism, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Epiphenomenalism | McGinn | I 214 Epiphenomenalism/consciousness: Now, a living thing with the ability to think cannot help also thinking other things than were originally intended. Intelligence expands and extends to areas where it will bring us no benefit. >Consciousness. McGinnVsEpiphenomenalism we should find the theory of the by-product much more surprising than we do and also more enigmatic. It’s really amazing and just quite unforeseeable that reason proves to be able to do the things that it is actually capable of. ((s) Reason makes our lives so complicated) ... that it is a mystery why the genes have not installed a limitation. I 216 By-product/Epiphenomenon/McGinn: in order to take the relevant theory seriously we would have to be able to see a conceptual or theoretical continuity between the problems of understanding that affect the lives of flying or swimming creatures or living beings in underground passages, and the problems of our philosophy. McGinnVsEpiphenomenalism: merely gesturing as long as it is not shown why it should that human reason might extend also in this direction. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Nagel | Def epiphenomenon/Nagel: an epiphenomenon is random product. >Causation, >Intentionality, >Identity theory, >Causes, >Effect, >Coincidence, >Contingency, >Mind Body Problem. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Evolution | Gould | Dennett I 412 Evolution/Gould theory: the key difference in evolution is not simple adaptation but speciation. (DennettVs). Gould: thesis: species are fragile but have unalterable structures. There are no improvements in species, only closed discarding. Correct level: the correct level are not the genes but entire species or clades. Species/Gould/(s): species are not going to be improved, but discarded. Level/explanation/Dennett: as software/hardware: some is better explained on one level, others is better explained on a different level. >Explanation, >Darwinism. Gould I 88ff Evolution/Darwinism/individual/Gould: individuals do not develop evolutionary, they can only grow, reproduce and die. Evolutionary changes occur in groups of interacting organisms. Species are the units of evolution. Orthodox Darwinism/Gould: thesis: gene mutate, individuals are subject to selection and species evolve evolutionary. I 131 Evolution/Gould: Thesis: I do not imagine evolution as a ladder, but rather in the form of a shrub with many branches. Therefore: the more species the better. I 133 The importance of this point can be seen in the development of molecules. The number of differences between amino acids clearly correlates with the time since the diversion of development lines. The longer the separation, the greater the differences. This is how a molecular clock was developed. The Darwinians were generally surprised by the regularity of this clock. After all, the selection should proceed at a noticeably different speed for the different development lines at different times. I 134 VsDarwinism: the Darwinists are actually forced to contemplate that the regular molecular clock represents an evolution that is not subject to selection, but to the random fixation of neutral mutations. We have never been able to separate ourselves from the concept of the evolution of the human being, which puts the brain in the centre of attention. The Australopithecus afarensis disproved what had been predicted by astute evolutionary theorists such as Ernst Haeckel and Friedrich Engels. Tradition: general view: that the upright gait represented an easily attainable gradual development, and the increase in brain volume represented a surprisingly rapid leap. I 136 GouldVs: I would like to take the opposite view: in my opinion, the upright gait is a surprise, a difficult event to achieve, a rapid and fundamental transformation of our anatomy. In anatomical terms, the subsequent enlargement of our brain is a secondary epiphenomenon, a simple transition embedded in the general pattern of human evolution. Bipedality is not an easy achievement, it represents a fundamental transformation of our anatomy, especially of the feet and pelvis. I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. This is because a phyletic transformation does not lead to an increase in diversity and variety, only to a transformation from one state to another. Now that extinction (by eradication) is so widespread, everything that does not have the ability to adapt would soon be destroyed. b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. Large stable central populations have a strong homogenizing influence. New mutations are impaired by the strong previous forms: they may slowly increase in frequency, but a changed environment usually reduces their selective value long before they can assert themselves. Thus, a phyletic transformation of the large populations should be very rare, as the fossil finds prove. It looks different in the periphery: isolated small populations here are much more exposed to the selection pressure, because the periphery marks the limit of the ecological tolerance of the previous living beings. I 266 Evolution/Biology/Gould: evolution proceeds by replacing the nucleotides. II 243 Evolution/Gould: thesis: evolution has no tendency. II 331 Evolution/Gould: official definition of evolution/Gould: evolution is the "change of gene frequencies in populations". (The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency is called definition "genetic drift".) The new theory of neutralism suggests that many, if not most, genes in individual populations owe their frequency primarily to chance. IV 199 Evolution/species richness: the change from a few species and many groups to a few groups and many species would occur even in the case of purely coincidental extinction if every speciation process at the beginning of life's history had been accompanied by average major changes. IV 221 Evolution/Gould: pre-evolutionary theory: a pre-evolutionary theory is "the chain of being": it is the old idea that every organism is a link. It confuses evolution with higher development and has been misinterpreted as a primitive form of evolution, but has nothing to do with it! The thesis is emphatically antievolutionary. Problem: there are no links between vertebrates and invertebrates IV 223 Intermediate form: the theory assumed asbestos as an intermediate form between minerals and plants due to the fibrous structure. Hydra and corals were seen as an intermediate form between plants and animals. (Today: both are animals of course.) Absurd: it is absurd to assume a similarity between plants and baboons, because plants lose their leaves and baboon babies lose their hair. IV 346 Evolution/Gould: evolution is not developing in the direction of complexity, why should it? |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Explanation | Dennett | Rorty VI 144 Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological. This is why it seems to be the case that there is a difference between thinking that something seems to be pink, and that something really seems to be pink. I 137 Explanation/Model/Dennett: models must be neither too difficult nor oversimplified. E.g. it is not about following all the electrons in a calculator. Model/pattern/explanation/Dennett: why are we considering this model and not a different one? In order to justify that we must not only take the real into consideration but also the possible. I 335 We need to develop an idealization of degrees of possibility. Explaining evolution: > Properties: E.g. you ordered a green car and it comes on time: the question is not why this car is green, but: why is this (green) car here. ((s) consider the car as a whole, the green car would otherwise be elsewhere). > "wrong question". Just-about-stories: E.g. Lake Victoria. Unusually many species of perch. Only (conventional) explanation: Too many ponds dried out. But besides the properties of the animals you have no evidence for that. I 416 Dennett: all these stories are "too good to be true". But Gould does not adopt the Pangloss principle when he considers them to be true until the opposite is proven. Coincidence/Evidence/Dennett: e.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 424 Cambrian Explosion/DennettVsGould: here again suddenness is no evidence of coincidence. I 102 Explanation/Justification/Evolution/Dennett: e.g. the advantages of sexuality cannot be taken as a reason for why they are there. The evolution cannot foresee its path. Consequence: the sexuality must have survived as a side effect (>epiphenomenon). |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Mind Body Problem | Danto | I 252/3 Def epiphenomenalism: (Def epiphenomenon: side effect). Thesis: No effect comes from the mind. The mind is unable to cause any event. >Epiphenomenalism. Causality only leads from the physical to the physical event or from the physical to the mental but never from the mental to the mental or from the mental to the physical event. >Causality. I 253 Def Parallelism: on the contrary, the view that there are parallel series of events that occur in the two independent substances that cannot interact. For example, pain is not an effect of the hot stove, only a coincidence. It is produced through the mediation of God. This presupposes the constant action of God. (Seventeenth century). I 253 Def Occasionalism: Version of parallelism: two clocks displaying the same time, but without a causal link. I 253 Def Monades/Leibniz: The world consists of an infinite number of causally separated substances, the monads. >G.W. Leibniz. I 254 Spinoza: there can only be one substance of which mind and body (thinking and expansion) are modes. And in such a way that the order and connection of ideas is quite the same as the order and connection of things. >Substance/Spinoza, >B. Spinoza. Each of these teachings is completely superfluous if you give up the substance itself. >Substance,k, cf. >Substrate. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Natural Laws | Lewis | V 171 Laws of nature/LoN/Lewis: May not be sacrosanct - i.e. it must be possible to violate them - otherwise one would have to change the entire past in order to avoid a side effect (epiphenomenon) - if they were sacrosanct, the smallest counterfactual assumption (the smallest change in the present) would be only conceivable when assuming a completely different story - but there is no reason why a later deviation required more injury than an earlier one. Cf. >traces/Lewis. V 191 Laws of Nature/LoN/regularities/Lewis: cause nothing themselves. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Self- Consciousness | Maturana | I 70 Self-consciousness/I-conscoiusness/Maturana: is no neurophysiological phenomenon, just focus on yourself. >Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Therefore it is an epiphenomenon. >Epiphenomenon. It is not explanable by physiological factors such as excitation, inhibition, network structures, coding etc. I 205 Self-consciousness/Maturana: is outside of the physical! It belongs to the range of interactions as a way of co-existence. >Operation/Maturana, >Body. I 276 It is found only in the language - Condition: distinction of oneself from others who could be oneself. >Language, >Intersubjectivity. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Supervenience | Armstrong | Martin II 132 Supervenience/Martin: we can assume"cum" instead of supervenience. MartinVsArmstrong/VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa). - Not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa. - Rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect. Solution/Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. Salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change. >Dispositions, >Properties. Martin III 167 Supervenience/Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd. >Microstructure, >Parts, cf. >Mereology. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Supervenience | Davidson | Glüer II 142ff Supervenience/Davidson/Glüer: no difference in the one set without any difference in the other. Glüer: the mental should not be a mere epiphenomenon of the physical. All mental events are physical, but not reversed. (S1) There can be no two events, which are the same in all physical aspects but differ in a mental aspect. - or: (S2) An object cannot change in a mental aspect without changing at the same time in a physical aspect. Problem: Individuation of objects - Davidson: beliefs are not supervenient in relation to neuronal states, because they get partly individuated externalistically with respect to objects - E.g. twin earth: Brain states identical/mental states are different. >Twin earth, >Mental states, >Brain states. Glüer II 144 Davidson: a further conception of supervenience: "that does not mean that mental states are not supervenient in relation to physical states, for somewhere there must be a physical difference when psychological states are different." (Here, for example, water/twin earth - thus externalistic) - "worldwide supervenience". >Externalism. (S3) A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S if and only if P does not distinguish entities that also cannot be distinguished by S. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Epiphenomenalism | McGinn Vs Epiphenomenalism | I 216 McGinnVsEpiphenomenalism: we should preceive the theory of the by-product as much more surprising than we do and as more enigmatic. It's really amazing, only quite unforeseeable that the reason proves to be capable of the achievements that it it is actually capable of. ((S) Reason makes our lives so complicated) ... it is a mystery why the genes have not installed a limitation. By-product/Epiphenomenon/McGinn: to take the relevant theory seriously we ought to see a conceptual or theoretical continuity between understanding problems affecting the lives of flying or floating creatures or beings in underground passages and the problems of our philosophy. I 217 McGinnVsEpiphenomenalism: bare fiddling around. as long as it is not shown why it should be such that human reason might extend in this direction. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Psychologism | McGinn Vs Psychologism | II 113/114 Def panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back in the material world (VsHyperdualism). ("Elvis Is Everywhere"). He states that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through space. II 115 a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, think about dinner - and electrons and stars do the same. McGinnVsPanpsychism: 1. this is obviously not the case. Regular matter doesn't show any sign of thirst or pain. II 116 2. The problem with panpsychism is that it makes our mind look like an epiphenomenon! Since our mind is allegedly composed of all the states of mind that were intrinsic to matter before being formed into our brains. II 117 3. If all matter had mature thoughts and feelings, why do organisms then need nervous systems and brains to be able to think and feel? b) Soft panpsychism: obvious that atoms do not have mental states, but could they not contain the mind in a diluted form or on a lower level? McGinnVsPanpsychism (soft form): Problem: It is difficult to define what that means. If dilute states should be approximately like the consciousness before falling asleep, that leads back to the hard version. Stones would therefore have something like "proto mental" states, defined as any property of matter that allows for consciousness. II 118 McGinnVs: this theory is empty. It is true of course that matter has this or that property. And of course, matter must have the ability to give rise to consciousness, because it does so constantly. b) brain plays an active role: the brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by virtue of its particular structure in consciousness. McGinn pro! McGinn pro panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-create consciousness because in the matter of which the brain tissue is constructed there is nothing really special (!). Ultimately, all traces of matter can be traced back to the Big Bang. |
C. McGinn I McGinn Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens, Stuttgart, 1996 II McGinn Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie?, München 2001 |
| Regularity Theory | Lewis Vs Regularity Theory | V 160 LewisVsRegularity: there are still problems: Regularity tends to blur causation with various other causal relations: For example, if x belongs to a minimal set of conditions that together are sufficient for e, (given the laws) then c can very well be a real cause of e - but e may just be an effect of c! Effect/impact/Lewis: something that - given the laws and some circumstances - could have been caused differently than by c. Epiphenomenon: is then a more or less effective effect of causal history. Or something could be a preempted cause: something that was not cause here, but it would have been if something else had been missing that was the real cause here. Lewis: I can't prove regularity as analysis must fail, but the prospects are bleak. I am concentrating here on the counterfactual analysis of causality. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Epiphenomenon Epiphenomenalism | Versus | Schiffer I 152 MaterialismVsEpiphenomenalism / materialismVsBelief Properties: (Jackson 1982, 135): b.p. (as epiphenomena) do not explain anything they just soothe the intuitions of dualists, it s a mystery how they should fit into science - epiphenomenalism : argues only to ensure that qualia are epiphenomena. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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