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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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|---|---|---|---|
| Facts | Duhem | I XII Fact/Duhem: The concept of facts has lost its independence because facts are always impregnated in theory. Duhem seeks to control between Skylla of inductivism and the Charybdis of apriorism. The concept of the experimental law serves as a steering wheel. Symbols cannot be called true or false, at best appropriate. This also applies to theories as purely symbolic representations. Duhem, however, assigns empirical content to empirical laws, which purely theoretical laws cannot claim. An experimentum crucis (whose failure would disprove the whole theory) is rejected. (> Holism). I 180 By increasing the accuracy of measurement, we have reduced the set of theoretical facts. E.g. Geodetic lines on an infinite surface (I 182). There are those who return in themselves, and those who do not, although they do not move away infinitely (surface: infinitely extended ~ bullhorn) Nevertheless, theoretically, the initial conditions can be determined accurately without obtaining ambiguities, for example when a sphere is to move on a geodetic line. I 183 However, it is quite different when, instead of the theoretical, practical initial conditions are given. Unlimited set of different initial conditions. I 184 If the initial conditions are not mathematically known, but determined by physical methods, and even if they are exact, the question posed will remain unanswerable. I 199 Facts/Duhem: Concrete, very different facts can be confounded when interpreted by the theory that they are only form a single experiment and are represented by a single symbolic expression. One and the same theoretical fact can correspond to an infinite number of practical facts. But also the same practical fact can correspond to an infinite number of theoretical facts, which are logically incompatible with each other. (> Quine,> Quine-Duhem thesis). An experimenter might say: E.g. An increase of the pressure by 100 atmospheres increases the electromotive force by 0.085 volts. He could have said with the same authority: by 0.0844 or 0.0846 volts. For the mathematician the statements are contradictory. For the physicist, whose possibility of differentiation is limited because of the measurement accuracy, they have the same meaning. Difference between mathematics and physics: deviating measurement results are no formal contradiction. > distinction analytic/synthetic/Quine. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Hypotheses | Duhem | I 32 Hypotheses/Duhem: A considerable group of experimental laws was established by observers. Theorists reduce them to a small number of hypotheses. But one can draw an unlimited number of conclusions from these hypotheses. If, in theory, we are more likely to see a natural classification, we are inclined to anticipate and bet on their experience. A theory, which we regard as a purely artificial system, will be seen as refuted by new emerging facts. I 279 Hypotheses/Criterion/Duhem: Certain fundamental hypotheses cannot be refuted by any experiment because they form in reality definitions, and certain expressions used by the physicist only receive meaning through them. I 280 E.g. free fall cannot be refuted. When a heavy body falls free, its acceleration is constant. This cannot be disproved in the experiment because it is the definition of what one understands under free fall. >Theories, >Experiments. Le Roy: "Laws are not verifiable if they are taken strictly, because they themselves constitute the criterion." >Laws, >Natural laws. I 281 Duhem: the words "free fall of a heavy body" now have a twofold meaning: for those who do not know the theories, they have a real meaning, for the physicist they have a symbolic meaning. Duhem: the theory would not have fulfilled its task if the second sense was not the expression of the first. Only that the symbolic sense does not have the accuracy of the real and concrete case we observe. >Symbols. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Law and Economics | Sullivan | Parisi I 78 Experimental Law and economics/Sullivan/Holt: (...) experimental law and economics is objectionable for the (...) important reason of being descriptively under-inclusive. To the extent that it suggests the application of experimental economics to topics in the traditional domain of law and economics, it conveys only part of the potential scope of experimental economics in law. >Experimental economics/Economic theories, >Experimental economics/Vernon Smith. Parisi I 79 What it omits are the many possible contributions experimental economics stands to make beyond the traditional boundaries of law and economics, in topics within the domain of general legal scholarship and even actual legal practice. Painting in broad strokes, experimental economics finds an analytical foothold in at least three archetypal areas of legal scholarship and practice. 1) (...) it can be used to explore the functioning of legal institutions, such as settlement bargaining, jury deliberation, and alternative dispute resolution. 2) (...) it can be directed to the study of legal doctrines, such as those relating to property-rule liability, damages doctrines, and the negligence standard. 3) (...) it can contribute to the practice of law, for example, by informing how the presentation of probabilities is handled at trial, or how damages claims or other complicated legal theories are demonstrated to the trier of fact. >Experimental economics/Economic theories, >Experiments/Experimental economics, >Auctions/Holt, >Induced value theory/Economic theories, >Settlement bargaining/Experimental economics. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Laws | Duhem | I 23 Definition Experimental Law/Duhem: Summary of experimental experiences that allow for predictions. ((s) Only predictions about future experiments, not about reality). >Predictions, >Reality, >Nature. I 24 Instead of remembering the various cases of the refraction of light, we can reproduce or simulate all those occurring instances immediately. >Generalization, >Experiments. I 26 Experimental physics gives us the laws as a whole group, unsegmented. The theorist classifies the variation that opposes the observer. Wherever there is order, there is also beauty. >Experiments. I 187 The goal of every physical theory is the representation of experimental laws. I 189 The physical law is not only the essence of a myriad of experiments. I 217 Laws/Duhem: In the same way as the laws of ordinary understanding are based on the observation of facts by the natural resources of man, the laws of physics are based on the results of physical experiments. Almost everything we have said about the experiments can be extended to the physical laws. E.g. the law of the ordinary mind: Every man is mortal. This law certainly combines abstract expressions. But these abstractions are by no means theoretical symbols. >Symbols, >Theoretical terms, >Observation language, >Observation sentences. I 219 Abstractions/Duhem: E.g. Abstraction of the ordinary mind: Before the thunder is heard, one sees the flash. The concepts are abstract, but the sensory rumbling and twitching is recognizable. This is no longer the case with the laws of physics. E.g. at constant temperature, the volumes occupied by the same gas mass are inversely proportional to the pressures under which it is placed. The notions are not only abstract, but symbolic to boot, and the symbols get a meaning only through the physical theories. The relations are by no means immediate; they are only produced by means of instruments. Now there are theories which in a certain way exclude each other, or components, which are assigned in different ways depending on the theory. I 221 E.g. Law: All gases compress and dilate in the same way. Now we ask a physicist whether the iodine vapor follows this law or not. A physicist argues that the iodine vapor is a simple gas. The density relative to the air is constant. The experiment now shows that the density of the iodine vapor relative to air depends on the temperature and the pressure. He now concludes that iodine vapor does not correspond to the given law. According to another physicist, iodine vapor is not a simple gas, but the mixture of two gases. Then the law is no longer valid that the density is constant with respect to the air, but rather that it varies with temperature and pressure. Our second physicist now concludes that iodine vapor is no exception to the rule. I 222 Thus the two physicists have completely different opinions as to a law which they both pronounce in the same form. They utter the same word and mean different theorems. In order to compare this expression with the reality, they carry out calculations so different that the one can find that the law is confirmed by the facts while the other considers it to be disproved. Definition Physical Law/Duhem: a symbolic relationship whose application to concrete reality demands that one should know and accept a whole group of theories. I 233 ... It will be said that an original law was by no means overturned by the later attempts, but the experiments had merely shown that the new law must be added. But those who say this must recognize that the primitive law must be given with special conditions, so that it does not lead to serious errors. The old law can no longer stand alone! The physical laws are therefore all provisional, since no revisions can be ruled out for the future. I 234 E.g. the gravitational law is violated by capillary phenomena. So that it is not disproved, one must change it. One may consider that the formula according to which the attraction is inversely proportional to the square of the distance is not an exact, but only an approximate one. >Idealization. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Observation | Duhem | I 264 Observation/Duhem: is always leaded by theories. No experimental law can serve the theorist before it is subjected to an interpretation that transforms it into a symbolic law. This transformation involves the recognition of a whole group of other theories. >Theories/Duhem. --- I 266 Under different translations, the theorist must choose the one that gives a fertile hypothesis without the experiment somehow leading his choice. A chimera is pursued by separating any hypothesis of theoretical physics from the other assumptions on which this science is based, in order to place it isolated in the control of observation. The only experimental control which is not illogical consists in the complete comparison of the whole group of experimental facts with the complete system of physical theory. >Experiments/Duhem. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Science | Duhem | I 294 Science/Logic/Duhem: Which logical conditions must be fulfilled in the hypothesis selection? Does the logic require that our hypothesis be, or at least be in harmony with a cosmological system? Not at all! Our physical theories do not place their pride in being explanations (metaphysical). They are not assumptions about the actual nature of material things. They have only the economic summary and classification of the experimental laws as their goal. They are independent and independent of any metaphysical system. >Systems, >Models, >Theories, >Observation, >Experiments. I 295 Does logic require that the hypotheses by induction be generalized experimental laws? No: logic cannot make impossible demands. We are therefore not reluctant to include postulates under the foundations of physics which were not supplied by the experiment. Logic also does not dictate us to introduce our hypotheses individually and to control them individually before application. That would be absurd because of holism. What conditions must now be fulfilled according to logic in the choice of hypotheses? 1. No self-contradictory theorem is acceptable. 2. No reciprocal contradiction. 3. The conclusions which the mathematical derivation can draw from the totality are, to represent the totality of the experimental laws with reasonable approximation. >Idealization. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Theories | Cartwright | I 96 Theory/Duhem: is an abstract system for summing and logical classification of a set of experimental laws. - Does not explain the laws. >Laws, >Experimental laws. I 97 Theory is an organization of our knowledge. Theories/Cartwright: are abound - their explanations are not all needed. >Explanation. I 100 Theory/Cartwright: Prediction: lies in the fundamental laws. Content: lies in the phenomenological laws. I 133 Theory Entry: preliminary state: "unprepared description": left of the as-if-operator. 1st order prepared description: requires equation. 2nd order: Investigation of the prepared description with principles. - E.g. a laser can be described quite differently. (With or without memory). According to the decision, there are bridge principles that say which equations are to be applied. >Bridge laws. Hacking I 362 Theory/Cartwright: includes no truth itself. - If truth, then by approximations! >Idealization, >Truth. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Theories | Duhem | I XIII Theory/Duhem: Thesis: The goal of physical theory formation is not the knowledge of reality, because it would move in a metaphysical field of concepts, but the design of a formal system that has optimal order properties for the world of phenomena. >Physics, >Phenomena, >Goals. The structure of science is a holistic context, not a combination of single sentences whose truth values are determined in isolation. Only the whole of science can be compared with the totality of facts and examined. Observations are "theory-laden". >Observations, >Theory-ladenness. Theories are not inductively gained knowledge of experience, but designs of the human mind, agreements of a formal nature, whose empirical utility is found only in practice. Conventionalist science-perception, nevertheless Poincaré: it is not the definitive status of the fundamental laws, which deprives them of the revision, such revisions, even of the fundamental laws, can become necessary and meaningful, they cannot be forced experimentally. I XVII Delimitation from metaphysics, which does not allow refutation by observation. (Also Popper, 1934) autonomy of physics. Today one would say: theory is supposed to explain phenomena. The performance of theories or laws can be characterized by the logical link with verifiable statements. For Duhem (in contrast to today's language usage): "Description". "Explanation"/Duhem: reserved for the metaphysicians' claim for knowledge. Metaphysics: (DuhemVs): Premises must be distinguished ontologically, they must concern "things in themselves". Observable properties are "explained" in such a way that they are attributed to another (unobservable) reality layer. E.g. "ether", heat: atomic movement. This is the Cartesian concept of explanation, which Duhem does not grant physics. His physics conception is antimetaphysical, unlike Mach, but he does not consider metaphysics to be pointless. I 22 Definition Physical Theory/Duhem: A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical theorems that are derived from a small number of principles and have the purpose of presenting a group of experimental laws as simple as they are complete and accurate. I 22 A correct theory does not explain reality, but presents a group of experimental laws satisfactorily. A false theory is a set of equations that do not agree with the experimental laws. (Comparison with reality would be metaphysics). >Metaphysics, >Reality. I 29 Revision of a theory: the relationships remain, but their nature is understood differently. I 37 Theories/Duhem: consist of 2 parts A) descriptive B) explanatory The explanatory part is by no means the adequate basis of the descriptive. It is not the seed or the root. >Method, >Explanation. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Explanation | Versus | Cartwright I 96 Explanation: DuhemVsExplanation? - Duhem per Wittgenstein? - ((s) WittgensteinVsExplanation). I 96 Theory / Duhem: is an abstract system for summation and logical classification of a lot of experimental laws, without explaining these laws. Explanation / Duhem: is not something that pulls a "veil" of reality. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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