Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 70 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Quine | II 218 QuineVsRussell: VsLogical Atomism (pro Holism) - connection with observation is more complex. II 107 Atomic Facts/Russell: atomic facts are sense data - QuineVsRussell: they are not atomic but composed. Acquaintance/Russell: acquaintance is certain with sense data, everything else is fallible. II 218 Atomism/QuineVsRussell/Quine: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that in my opinion the remaining truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the sentences of observation. Their connection with the observation sentences is more mediated and complex. See also >Atoms/Quine. XIII 14 Def Sensory Atomism/Locke/Hume/Quine: e.g. Locke's "simple ideas", Hume's "simple impressions". This is a mosaic of irreducible sensory bits that can occur repeatedly. Sensibilia/Quine: should therefore again not be considered as atoms, but as types of atoms. Atom/Quine: an atom is then an occurrence (token) of Sensibilia within the experience. Gestalt PsychologyVsSensory Atomism/Form Theory/Quine: thesis: forms tend to come from rough (large) forms (which are not composed of building blocks). XIII 15 Atomism/sensory/Quine: for him again the nature of the neural (neuronal) input speaks. Atom/sensory/Quine: should we then say that they again correspond to types of inputs that then correspond to a receptor? No: Problem: with a number of species one does not get any further here: each person has an unknown and not further interesting number of receptors. Further research would not help the theory here. Perception Atomism/Quine: that would be something one could dream of: a repertory of basic properties. Then properties would be the species. Their occurrences are the atoms. Problem: it was shown that the wavelength of a singular color event does not determine the perceived color, but the respective environment. In addition, it has been found that there are cells which only respond when, for example, a diagonal runs from top left to bottom right, and other cells for corresponding other conditions. XIII 16 Atomism/Technology/Quine: Atomism is important here. Example Halftone in vision/printing: dots and spaces are its atoms. Example television (TV), newspaper printing, etc. Problem: in film there is no limitation of the atoms. On two (b/w) or the basic colors. >Colour/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Cinema | Flusser | I 189 Film/Cinema/Flusser: Films are manipulation of stories. This manipulation takes place during production. I 190 Cinemas are reminiscent of theatres, although they have a completely different structure: in the theatre there is a channel, in the cinema one of them falls onto the screen under numerous broadcast rays. The aspects that make the film so different from photography are not as much about sending as they are about receiving. They are illusions provoked by the sender to the receiver. The gesture of filming is different from that of the photographer. >Photography/Flusser. The photographer is constantly changing his location, while the historical ideologist defends his point of view. The core of the codification of the film is the processing with scissors and adhesive. >Code/Flusser. Unlike the camera, the film apparatus is designed to eliminate decisions. He describes circles, zooms, is the indecisive doubt coagulated to material. The operator does not suffer from his doubts, his doubt is a method of making the tape manipulable. >Doubt. The tape consists of a series of dubious points of view and the operator treats it to make a film, a story out of it. Strictly speaking, the standpoint of cinema is a "transhistorical" standpoint. What the operator has in front of him when he cuts and sticks is the "historical time". The film tape is the "pretext" which is recoded in the apparatus operator system. I 193 The operator can intervene in the event in a way that the transcendent God of Jews and Christians is not entitled to: he can reorganize the events. Cf. >Omnipotence, >God. In Aristotle's case, the God is still the motionless mover, the apparatus in which the operator stands above the story is a motionless narrator (the God of Kafka). >History, >Historiography, >Aristotle. I 194 There are two types of action in the film. The one of the actor supplying the raw material and the one of the operator handling this action. For him, the "actors" are not only actors but also illuminators, scriptwriters, etc. The essential thing about film codes is that they push the linear principle to its limits in order to let it get out of whack and show that linear time is a trompe l' oeuil. From the point of view of the new level of consciousness, the transformation of the acting mankind into marionettes seems to reveal the fact that acting people ("the committed ones") can be nothing more than marionettes, because "freedom" does not consist in acting within time, but in the interpretation of this action. >Action, >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Decision. I 205 Film/Flusser: the cinema has a striking resemblance to Plato's cave. One of the very few places where we are still allowed to concentrate. That, and not the content, is what makes cinema the predominant "art" today: you can concentrate on the film. >Plato. I 206 The cinema is architecturally based on the Roman basilica and not on the theatre. In the present it has two heirs (avatars): the supermarket (profan) and the cinema (sacral). I 207 In the cinema, one sits on geometrically arranged and arithmetically numbered chairs (so Cartesian chairs). >Cartesianism. You do not go to the cinema to dream, but you buy the illusion of seeing tech pictures as if they were traditional pictures or texts. The receiver's playing along is semi-conscious, only mala fide it is believed in them. >Pictures, >Texts. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Civilization | Gandhi | Brocker I 55 Civilization/Gandhi: Gandhi sees a plague in civilization(1). But this refers above all to Western civilization, Indian civilization still rests solidly on its foundation. "Rome perished, Greece suffered the same fate; the power of the pharaohs was broken; Japan was westernized"(2); only India still exists, according to Gandhi. The Gujarati word for civilization means "good behavior"(3). The fulfilment of duties and the observance of morals are the same. It means, Brocker I 56 that you can control yourself. Gandhi presents the Indian way of life as a conscious decision of the ancestors.(4) Cf. >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Nationalism, >Language Acquisition, >Education, >Educational Policy, >Culture, >Cultural Values, >Cultural Tradition, >Culture Shift, >Governance, >Civil Disobedience. 1. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, Ahmedabad 1938 (zuerst 1909). Dt.: Mahatma Gandhi, Hind Swaraj oder Indische Selbstregierung, in: ders., Ausgewählte Werke. Grundlegende Schriften, herausgegeben von Shriman Narayan, bearbeitet von Wolfgang Sternstein, Göttingen 2011, Bd. 3, p. 97, 100 2. Ibid. p. 121 3. Ibid. p. 122 4. Ibid. Dietmar Rothermund, Mahatma Gandhi in: Brocker, Manfred, Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Classics | Gadamer | I 292 The Classic/Gadamer: The Classical is a truly historical category precisely because it is more than an epochal concept or a historical style concept and yet it does not want to be a supra-historical value concept. It does not denote a quality to be ascribed to certain historical phenomena, but rather an excellent way of being historical itself, the historical advantage of preservation, which - in ever renewed proof - lets a truth be true. It is by no means the case that the historical way of thinking wanted to make us believe that the value judgement by which something is distinguished as classical would really be decomposed by historical reflection and its criticism of all teleological constructions of the course of history. Value Judgement/Gadamer: The value judgement that is implied in the concept of the classic gains a new, i.e. its actual legitimation in such criticism: what is classical is what stands up to historical criticism, because its historical rule, the obligatory power of its handing down and preserving validity, is already ahead of all historical reflection and is sustained in it. Example: Hellenism/Droysen/Gadamer: Droysen rightly emphasized the world historical continuity and the importance of Hellenism for the birth and interpretation of Christianity. But it would not have been necessary for him in the first placec to carry out this historical theodicy, if there had not still been a prejudice in favour of the classical and if the educational power of the "classical antiquity" had not held on to it and preserved it as the unlost ancient heritage in Western education. Classics/Gadamer: The classical is basically something different from a descriptive term handled by an objectifying historical consciousness; it is a historical I 293 reality to which the historical consciousness also belongs and is subject. What is classic is not subject to the difference between the changing times and their changing tastes (...). Norm/Classicism/Gadamer: The first thing about the concept (and this corresponds completely to the ancient as well as the modern use of language) is the normative sense. However, insofar as this norm is related retrospectively to a unique past greatness that fulfilled and represented it, it always already contains a touch of timet hat articulates it historically. Classicism/Gadamer: So it was no wonder that with the beginning of historical reflection, for which in Germany (...) Winckelmann's Classicism became decisive, from which in this way a historical concept of a time or an epoch was removed as classically valid, in order to designate a stylistic ideal described in terms of content, and at the same time historically descriptive a time or an epoch that fulfilled this ideal. Epigonism/Gadamer: In the distance of the epigone that sets the standard, it becomes apparent that the fulfillment of this stylistic ideal designates a moment in world history that belongs to the past. I 294 Genres/Ideal/Style Phases/Gadamer: [the authors considered] classical are, as we know, the representatives of certain literary genres. They were regarded as the perfect fulfilment of such genre norms, an ideal visible in the retrospective of literary criticism. If one thinks historically, that is, if one thinks of the history of these genres, the classical becomes the concept of a style phase, a climax, which articulates the history of this genre before and after. Epochs/Gadamer: Provided that the genre-historical highlights belong to a large extent to the same, narrowly defined period, the classical within the whole of the historical development of classical antiquity designates such a phase and thus becomes an epoch concept that merges with the style concept. >Classics/Hegel. I 295 This discussion of the concept of the classic (...) is intended to raise a general question. This is: "Is the historical mediation of the past with the present, as it characterizes the concept of the classical, ultimately the basis of all historical behavior as an effective substrate? >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Kauffman | I 134 Complexity/Kauffman: on the one hand such a high degree of orderliness that stability is guaranteed, but on the other hand much flexibility and surprise potential. >Order, >Stability. Order/complexity/network/Kauffman: e. g. network of light bulbs, green = flashing, red = permanently on or off. "Mental film". I 135 Example N = 1000, K = 20: almost all are green and flashing. Example N = 100,000, K = 2 (approximately human genome): at first most of the bulbs flash and are green. More and more converge to a red, stable state. N.B.: when we ask ourselves whether these red bulbs are connected to each other, we find that they are frozen into a huge cluster! In addition, small and large clusters continue to flash. Only these blinking now make up the cyclic behavior of Boolean networks that are in order. They are all not connected, they are islands in a sea of frozen red bulbs. This happens, if you change the parameter P, the phase transition from chaos to order. >Chaos. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Conditions of Satisfaction | Searle | II 87 Truth Conditions/Searle: example x sees a yellow station wagon. The truth terms are: (a) certain conditions of satisfaction, (b) certain phenomenal characteristics of the experience. The conditions of performance are: that there is a yellow station wagon and that this station wagon causes the experience. The phenomenal characteristics: determine the satisfaction conditions. (So the experience determines these conditions.) >Truth condition, >Experience, >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. II 89 Twin Earth/particularity/satisfaction conditions/Searle: e.g. what if the content of Bill's visual experience is decisive for the fact that the presence of Sally (and not of twin Sally) is one of the satisfaction conditions of his experience? >Twin earth. How can qualitatively identical visual experiences have different particulate satisfaction conditions? It is not the question of how to determine that. Rather, what is decisive about the experience here on earth is that it can only be fulfilled by a special, previously identified woman. (It does not matter whether one can determine this or not). II 105 Apparent paradox: Conditions of performance/house/house façade/Searle: if the conditions of performance of the experience in the case of the house differ from those in the case of the façade and if these conditions are determined by different experiences, then gradually the impression arises as if almost every quality could be the condition of performance of a visual experience. >Barn facades/Goldman, >Causal theory of Knowledge. We not only say "it looks like a house" but also "he looks drunk" or "he looks intelligent". >">Appearance. II 106 The characteristics themselves seem to entail very strict conditions for what can occur as conditions for the fulfilment of visual experiences. It is hard to believe that characteristics such as intelligence should be able to play a causal role in a visual experience. Searle: but according to my theory it should actually be like this. Solution: we need to distinguish between two types of properties: (a) those that are decided by looking, and (b) those requiring further testing. II 107 Features: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence that looking red is not independent of being red. >Properties/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Continuum | Quine | XIII 45 Def Discrete/Discreteness/Quine: an order of numbers or other objects is discrete if each object has an immediate predecessor or successor or both. For example, the integers are discrete. One the other hand: Def dense: fractions are dense and not discrete. Real numbers: are more than dense: they are continuous. Discrete/continuous: here we compare them as opposites. Discreteness: we need it to learn to count by distinguishing the objects. Irrational Numbers/Cantor: Theorem: most will always escape us. Number Theory: deals with integers. Real numbers: are used by the sciences. The contrast of both is illuminated by a pair of theorems: Goedel's Theorem: no proof procedure can encompass all truths of elementary number theory. Tarski's theorem: truth in the parallel theory of real numbers can be checked routinely, e.g. by a computer. N.B.: both systems are identical in their notation! The difference lies in the different interpretation of the variables (or their domains, one time the positive integers with the 0, the other time the positive real numbers with the 0). XIII 47 This leads to a difference in the truth of the formulas! a) real numbers: here the true formulas are a set that can be handled b) elementary number theory: not here. Continuity/Discreteness/Language/Quine: the interaction of the two terms is not limited to mathematics, it also exists in language: phonemes impose discreteness on the phonetic continuum. Discreteness/Quine: also allows yellowed or damaged manuscripts to be returned to a fresh state. The discreteness of the alphabet helps that the small deviations (e.g. yellowing) add up to larger ones. Continuum/Continuity: images, on the other hand, are a continuous medium: i.e. there are no standards for repairing a damaged copy or correcting a poor copy. Technology: here discreteness is often combined with continuity. Example clock: it should give the impression of moving continuously. XIII 48 Film/Quine: Continuity here is due to the weakness of our perception. Similar to the clock or our thinking about atoms over the millennia. Planck time/Quine: here we have the next approach of nature to continuity. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Copyright | Zittrain | I 192 Copyright/Zittrain: The frequent unlawfulness of amateur creativity may be appealing to those who see it as a countercultural movement, like that of graffiti—part of the point of doing it is that it is edgy or illegal. It may even make the products of amateur cultural innovation less co-optable by the mainstream industrial information economy, since it is hard to clear rights for an anonymous film packing in images and sounds from hundreds of different sources, some proprietary. But if prevention of commercial exploitation is the goal of some authors, it is best to let them simply structure their licenses to preclude it. Authors can opt to share their work under Creative Commons licenses that restrict commercial reuse of the work, while permitting limitless noncommercial use and modification by others. (1) I 193 As the capacity to inflict damage on “real world” interests increases with the Internet’s reach and with the number of valuable activities reliant upon it, the imperatives to take action will also increase. As both generative ((s) see terminology/Zittrain) and non-generative devices maintain constant contact with various vendors and software providers, regulators may seek to require those manufacturers to shape the services they offer more precisely, causing a now-familiar wound to generativity. One way to reduce pressure on institutional and technological gatekeepers is to ensure that individual wrongdoers can be held directly responsible. I 195 No one fully owns today’s problems of copyright infringement and defamation online, just as no one fully owns security problems on the Net. But the solution is not to conscript intermediaries to become the Net police. Under prevailing law Wikipedia could get away with much less stringent monitoring of its articles for plagiarized work, and it could leave plainly defamatory material in an article but be shielded in the United States by the Communications Decency Act provision exempting those hosting material from responsibility for what others have provided. (2) 1. See Creative Commons, Choose a License available at http://wwwcreativecommons.org/license/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). 2. As noted in Chapter 6, one might argue in Wikipedia’s case that anyone editing Wikipedia is actually an agent of Wikipedia, and therefore not “another” service provider under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). |
Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009 |
| Criteria | Birnbacher | Metzinger II 719 "Thinking stones"/Birnbacher: for them we have no criterion. >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Brain. Metzinger II 720 Def Criterion/Wittgenstein: "good reasons" to support a hypothesis. Separated from "symptoms". >Symptoms. Birnbacher: Criteria are not strictly logically linked to the term whose fullfilment they indicate, but in the weaker sense of the language game community. >Language game, >Language community. According to Wittgenstein, criteria are not necessary conditions for existence, but they are necessary conditions for attributability. >Attribution. For example, conduct is not a necessary condition of the occurrence of certain internal states, but nevertheless a necessary condition of the attributability of such states. >Behavior, cf. >Supervenience, >Sufficiency. Metzinger II 720 Def Symptom/Wittgenstein: empirical correlate to the criteria. |
Birn I D. Birnbacher Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Culture | Lash | Gaus I 272 Culture/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: an important (...) consequence of [the] economic, social and political developments (>Capitalism/Lash/Urry) is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: what differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). Accordingly, philosophical postmodernism can be regarded as a symptom of broader cultural developments, which can, in their turn, be characterized in terms of postmodern philosophy. Postmodern culture is 'transgressive' both of intellectual boundaries between 'rational' and 'non-rational' and of aesthetic boundaries between 'high' and 'low' culture. It is suspicious of the distinction (so important for Habermas) between ethical, scientific and aesthetic discourse. Art/aura: Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Lash and Urry describe postmodern culture as 'post-auratic' (1987(1): 286): the work of art is no longer an eternal object of contemplative, almost religious reverence, just another constituent of an 'economy of pleasure', a means of distraction like any other. By implication, postmodern culture is particularly resistant to the discursive forms characteristic of modernity. Communication now occurs more through images, sounds and impulses than through the spoken or written word. Politics: Culture, finally, is an increasingly important medium of political struggle. It is the potential site for the imposition of an 'authoritarian populism' closely identified with the politics of the new right and Thatcherism. On the other hand, developments like the counterculture, popular music and film testify to the alternative possibility of an 'anti-authoritarian radical democracy'. Less clear from Lash and Urry's analysis are the details of this progressive alternative: they offer little guidance beyond the need for a 'genuine dialogue' between 'new social movements' and the old left (1987(1): 312). >Democracy/Laclau/Mouffe. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Culture | Urry | Gaus I 272 Culture/postmodernism/Lash/Urry/West: an important (...) consequence of [the] economic, social and political developments (>Capitalism/Lash/Urry) is the increasing importance of culture as a site of domination and resistance: 'domination through cultural forms takes on significance in disorganized capitalism which is comparable in importance to domination in the sphere of production itself' (1987(1): 14). Postmodernism: what differentiates Lash and Urry most clearly as theorists of postmodernity is their distinctively postmodernist view of contemporary culture. Disorganized capitalism is associated with the 'appearance and mass distribution of a culturalideological configuration of „Postmodemism" [which] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life' (1987(1): 7). Accordingly, philosophical postmodernism can be regarded as a symptom of broader cultural developments, which can, in their turn, be characterized in terms of postmodern philosophy. Postmodern culture is 'transgressive' both of intellectual boundaries between 'rational' and 'non-rational' and of aesthetic boundaries between 'high' and 'low' culture. It is suspicious of the distinction (so important for Habermas) between ethical, scientific and aesthetic discourse. Art/aura: Drawing on the work of Walter Benjamin, Lash and Urry describe postmodern culture as 'post-auratic' (1987(1): 286): the work of art is no longer an eternal object of contemplative, almost religious reverence, just another constituent of an 'economy of pleasure', a means of distraction like any other. By implication, postmodern culture is particularly resistant to the discursive forms characteristic of modernity. Communication now occurs more through images, sounds and impulses than through the spoken or written word. Politics: Culture, finally, is an increasingly important medium of political struggle. It is the potential site for the imposition of an 'authoritarian populism' closely identified with the politics of the new right and Thatcherism. On the other hand, developments like the counterculture, popular music and film testify to the alternative possibility of an 'anti-authoritarian radical democracy'. Less clear from Lash and Urry's analysis are the details of this progressive alternative: they offer little guidance beyond the need for a 'genuine dialogue' between 'new social movements' and the old left (1987(1): 312). >Democracy/Laclau/Mouffe. 1. Lash, Scott and John Urry (1987) The End of Organized Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Data | Mayer-Schönberger | I 8 Data/Digitalisation/Mayer-Schönberger: in 2000, only a quarter of the information stored in the world was digital, the rest was stored on paper, music cassettes, magnetic tapes, film, records, etc. I 9 Today it is estimated that the digital flood flow over every citizen of the world is 320 times higher of what was stored in the library of Alexandria. The amount of stored information is growing four times faster than the global economy, computer performance is growing even faster. (See Moore's Law/Morozov). Between 1453 and 1503 it took 50 years to double the information stored in books.(1) Today, it doubles in about three years. I 45 Large amounts of data are usually not gathered in one place, but spread over many memories and computers. I 46 The Hadoop software used for the investigation assumes that the data remains where it is because there are simply too many to move it. I 47 According to some estimates, only 5% of all data are "structured", i.e. organised so that they can be included in a traditional database. I 101 Data/Mayer-Schönberger: become no less when you use them, unlike most material goods. They are therefore referred to as a "nonrivalising" good. The value of the data is therefore much more than what is extracted the first time it is used. >Public goods, >Commodities, >Markets, >Information. I 103 Mayer-Schönberger thesis: it could be helpful to compare data with the physical concept of energy (potential or stored energy). >Energy. I 104 Innovative use of data: search terms are a classic example of innovative reuse of data. (...) Previously used search terms can become extremely valuable later. >Search engines. I 107 Reuse of data: sometimes different amounts of data are brought together, which were collected for very different reasons. For example, the question of whether frequent use of mobile phones influences the probability of cancer has been investigated. I 108 In the end, there was no correlation. (2) I 113 Comprehensive Data/Data Exhaust/Mayer-Schönberger: "comprehensive data" refers to information about user behavior such as ignoring suggestions, the time spent on a page or subpage, and so on. This data is very valuable and influences what is shown to us by search engines. I 120 Value of data: is very difficult to quantify, as we no longer only have to consider the primary use, but the many possibilities of future reuses. 1. Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge University Press, 1993. 2. Danish Cancer Society study—Patrizia Frei et al., “Use of Mobile Phones and Risk of Brain Tumours: Update of Danish Cohort Study,” BMJ 343 (2011) (http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d6387), and interview with Cukier, October 2012. |
MSchoen I Viktor Mayer-Schönberger Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think New York 2013 |
| Democracy | Habermas | IV 507 Democracy/Capitalism/Habermas: there is an indissoluble tension between capitalism and democracy; two opposing principles of social integration compete with each other for priority. If one trusts the self-image expressed in democratic constitutional principles, modern societies assert the primacy of the world over the subsystems separated from their institutional orders. The normative sense of democracy can be summed up in social theory in the formula that the fulfilment of the functional necessities of systemically integrated areas of action should find their limit in the integrity of the lifeworld (...). On the other hand, the capitalist momentum of the economic system can only be maintained to the extent that the accumulation process is uncoupled from practical value orientations. The driving mechanism of the economic system must be kept as free as possible from life-world restrictions (...). See Capitalism/Habermas, >Deliberative Democracy/Habermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Desire | Appraisal Theory | Corr I 62 Desires/appraisal theory/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: At the top of the motive hierarchy are presumably a set of basic desires which constitute the ultimate sources of human motivation (e.g., Reiss 2000)(1). These assumptions entail that the emotional reaction to a concrete event should be influenced by the degree to which superordinate desires are affected by this event, as well as the strength of these desires. >Motives, >Motivation. A number of tests of this assumption have been made. For example, Sheldon, Elliot, Kim and Kasser (2001)(2) asked participants to recall the single most satisfying event experienced during the last month and to rate the extent to which this event satisfied each of ten candidate basic desires (e.g., the desire for competence, security, relatedness, popularity and personal autonomy). Other research has focused on an intermediate level of the motive hierarchy, where the top-level desires (e.g., the achievement motive) are concretized to more specific desires that represent what the person wants to attain in her current life situation (e.g., getting good grades; see Brunstein, Schultheiss and Grässmann 1998)(3). For example, Emmons (1986)(4) related these intermediate-level desires, called personal strivings, to emotions using an experiencing-sampling method… (for additional information, see Emmons 1996(5); Brunstein, Schultheiss and Maier 1999(6). Corr I 63 Beyond relating positive and negative emotions to desire fulfilment and desire frustration, respectively, appraisal theorists have linked particular emotions to particular kinds of desires (e.g., Lazarus 1991(7); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(8); Roseman 1979)(9). An important distinction in this context is that between wanting versus diswanting a state of affairs (Roseman 1979(9)), or between having an approach goal versus an avoidance goal. Several theorists (e.g., Gray 1994(10); see Carver 2006(11) for a review) proposed (a) that the pursuit of approach versus avoidance goals activates one of two different, basic motivational systems, a behavioural approach system (BAS) or a behavioural inhibition (BIS) system; and (b) that people differ in central parameters of these systems, specifically in the relative strength of their general approach and avoidance motivation. Carver (2004)(12) found that a measure of inter-individual differences in general approach motivation (BAS sensitivity) predicted the intensity of sadness and anger in response to frustration (the non-occurrence of an expected positive event). >Reinforcement sensivity, >Jeffrey A. Gray. 1. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam 2. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y. and Kasser, T. 2001. What is satisfying about satisfying events? Testing 10 candidate psychological needs, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80: 325–39 3. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Grässmann, R. 1998. Personal goals and emotional well-being: the moderating role of motive dispositions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 494–508 4. Emmons, R. A. 1986. Personal strivings: an approach to personality and subjective well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 1058–68 5. Emmons, R. A. 1996. Striving and feeling: personal goals and subjective well-being, in P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (eds.), The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behaviour, pp. 313–37. New York: Guilford Press 6. Brunstein, J. C., Schultheiss, O. C. and Maier, G. W. 1999. The pursuit of personal goals: a motivational approach to well-being and life adjustment, in J. Brandtstädter and R. M. Lerner (eds.), Action and self-development: theory and research through the life span, pp. 169–96. New York: Sage 7. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 8. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Gray, J. A. 1994. Three fundamental emotion systems, in P. Ekman and R. J. Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, pp. 243–8. Oxford University Press 11. Carver, C. S. 2006. Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect and action, Motivation and Emotion 30: 105–10 12. Carver, C. S. 2004. Negative affects deriving from the behavioural approach system, Emotion 4: 3–22 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Determinism | Genz | II 250 Time/Newton/mechanics/Genz: in Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point of time determines the later point of time, but also vice versa the later determines the earlier one. >Isaac Newton. Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws. >Laws, >Natural laws. II 251 Question: are there also purely backwards deterministic laws? Definition Time/Genz: as long as we do not know anything else, we can simply define time as the direction in which deterministic laws of nature apply. This is necessarily identical to the direction in which the order cannot increase. >Time, >Space, >Time reversal, >Time arrow, >Order, >Symmetries, cf. >Chirality. II 252 Deterministic/time/forward/backwards/quantum mechanics/Genz: the deterministic laws of quantum mechanics are deterministic in both temporal directions. II 253 N.B.: but it does not say whether they are the same in both time directions! The fact that they are not the same was first shown directly by an experiment in 1998. Before: the "CPT theorem" had already made the same prediction: CPT-Theorem/Genz: the CPT-Theorem says together with the "CP violation" that backwards deterministic laws of quantum mechanics must differ from forward deterministic laws. Experiment 1998: a K-Meson (neutral) can develop into its anti-particle. This can also be done in the opposite direction, but the process must then proceed more quickly (asymmetry). II 254 N.B.: then we can decide from the laws of nature alone, whether we have a real process that takes place in time, or whether a backwards running film is shown by a physical process. Not time-reversal-invariant: for example, the transformation of a K-Meson into its anti-particle is not time-reversal-invariant. Experiment: has of course not been observed directly, but by observations on numerous particles in the same state. Asymmetry/Genz: asymmetry only applies to the duration of the process, not to it itself. >Asymmetry. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Economic Systems | Rawls | I 265 Economic systems/Political economy/Rawls: Political economy deals with the public sector and institutions that influence economic life through taxes, property rights and market structures, etc. An economic system regulates which goods are produced and by which means, who receives them in return for what compensation and what proportion of social resources is spent on the conservation of public goods (e. g. infrastructure). >Political Economy. Public sector/Rawls: has two aspects: 1. Characteristic: relates to the ownership of means of production. Thus, for example, the public sector in socialism is larger than in capitalism. It is smaller in privately organised systems and mainly affects public institutions and transport. 2. Characteristic: relates to the proportion of resources spent on public goods (infrastructure, etc.). Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. >Politics, >Markets. I 268 For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the scheme. Problem: even in a society of people of justice, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Public goods. 1. See J. M. Buchananan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Emotions | Psychological Theories | Corr I 54 Emotions/personality psychology/psychological theories/Reisenzein/Weber: there is widespread agreement among emotion researchers that the objects of their inquiry are, centrally, the transitory states of persons denoted by ordinary language words Corr I 55 such as ‘happiness’, ‘sadness’, ‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘pity’, ‘pride’, ‘guilt’, and so forth. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies, >Personality traits, >Personality, >States of mind. There is also agreement that emotion episodes normally occur as reactions to the perception or imagination of ‘objects’ (typically events or states of affairs), and that they have both subjective and objective (intersubjectively observable) manifestations. Subjectively, emotions manifest themselves as pleasant or unpleasant feelings that seem to be directed at the eliciting, see Reisenzein 1994(1); Russell 2003(2)). >Intersubjectivity, >Other minds. Objectively, emotions manifest themselves, at least at times, in particular actions. Most classical and many contemporary emotion theorists, following common-sense psychology, identify emotions with the mentioned subjective experiences. However, some theorists (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Scherer 1984(4)) define emotions more broadly as response syndromes that include not only mental but also bodily components, such as facial expressions and physiological arousal. ReisenseinVsScherer/ReisenzeinVsLazarus: This definition of emotions is problematic, however, because the correlations between the mental and bodily components of emotion syndromes are typically low (Reisenzein 2007)(5). Today, the dominant theory of emotion generation is the cognitive or appraisal theory of emotion (e.g., Lazarus 1991(3); Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988(6); Scherer 2001(7); see Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001(8), for an overview). Appraisal theory assumes that emotions arise if an event is appraised in a motive-relevant manner, that is, as representing an actual or potential fulfilment or frustration of a motive (= desire, wish). >Appraisal theory/psychological theories. (…) apart from cognitions in the narrow sense (i.e., beliefs), emotions also presuppose motives (Lazarus 1991(3); Roseman 1979(9); see Reisenzein 2006(10), for further discussion). 1. Reisenzein, R. 1994. Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 525–39 2. Russell, J. A. 2003. Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion, Psychological Review 110: 145–72 3. Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press 4. Scherer, K. R. 1984. On the nature and function of emotion: a component process approach, in K. R. Scherer and P. Ekman (eds.), Approaches to emotion, pp. 293–317. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 5. Reisenzein, R. 2007. What is a definition of emotion? And are emotions mental-behavioural processes?, Social Science Information 46: 424–8 6. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collins, A. 1988. The cognitive structure of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press 7. Scherer, K. R. 2001. Appraisal considered as a process of multilevel sequential checking, in K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research, pp. 92–120. Oxford University Press 8. Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A. and Johnstone, T. 2001. Appraisal processes in emotion: theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press 9. Roseman, I. J. 1979. Cognitive aspects of emotions and emotional behaviour. Paper presented at the 87th Annual Convention of the APA, New York City, September 1979 10. Reisenzein, R. 2006. Arnold’s theory of emotion in historical perspective, Cognition and Emotion 20: 920–51 Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Experiments | Bandura | Slater I 177 Bobo doll study/experiment/aggression/Bandura: (Bandura 1961)(1) 72 children ranging from 37 to 69 months were rated by their teacher and an experimenter on aggressive behavior after having seen a film in which a person called Rocky displayed an aggressive behavior against a plastic doll (“Bobo doll”). [The] children were put into groups of three on the basis of their aggression scores and gender. One member of each triplet was then randomly assigned to be in one of three groups: an experimental group exposed to an aggressive model; an experimental group exposed to a nonaggressive model; and a control group that was not exposed to any model. In each of the two experimental groups, half of the children were randomly paired with a same-sex model, and the other half of the children were paired with an opposite-sex model. Each child in the experimental groups was invited into a playroom and was seated in a corner of the room that was provisioned with supplies for designing pictures with potato prints and stickers. The experimenter then brought the adult model to the rooms opposite corner, which was provisioned with a five-foot inflated Bobo doll, a mallet, and tinker toys. The experimenter then left the room. In the aggressive model condition, the model assembled the tinker toys for approximately one minute and then spent the remaining time aggressing against the Bobo doll. Children might be likely to engage in certain forms of aggression such as punching the Bobo doll, even without witnessing a model first engage in the behavior. To provide children with the opportunity to learn behaviors that they would be unlikely to engage in without imitation, the model engaged in both physically and verbally aggressive acts with the Bobo doll that based on pilot testing) were determined to be behaviors that children would not naturally engage in with the Bobo doll. After ten minutes, the children were brought to another room with toys and a doll set. The child was allowed to play with these objects for approximately two minutes but was then told by the experimenter that these were her best toys and that she would need to save them for other children. The child was brought into an adjacent room that was equipped with a number of toys that tended to elicit aggressive play (e.g., dart guns) or non-aggressive play (e.g., plastic farm animals). The room also contained a Bobo doll and mallet. The child played alone in this room for 20 minutes while being observed through a one-way mirror by trained assistants who coded the child’s behavior. Coding categories reflected several kinds of child Slater I 178 behavior that involved - Imitative aggression - Non-imitative aggression, and - Imitative non-aggression Questions: 1) To what extend engaged in complete or partial imitation of the model’s aggressive behavior 2) Whether children in the aggressive model experimental group engaged in more non-imitative aggression than did the other groups; 3) Whether the sex of the model and sex of the child influenced the child’s engagement in imitative aggression. Ad 1): Participants in the aggressive model experimental group were significantly more likely to engage in imitative aggression. Ad 2): The children who had been exposed to the aggressive model engaged in more non-imitative aggression than did the children who had been exposed to the non-aggressive model. Ad 3): Boys were more likely to reproduce the model’s physically aggressive acts than were girls, but boys and girls were equally likely to reproduce the model’s verbal aggression. Furthermore, boys who were exposed to the aggressive male model were more likely to engage in both imitative and non-imitative aggression than were girls who were exposed to the aggressive male model, whereas girls who were exposed to the aggressive female model were more likely to engage in imitative verbal aggression and non-imitative aggression than were boys who were exposed to the aggressive female model. >Learning/Bandura, >Aggression/psychological theories. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Feminism | Habermas | IV 578 Feminism/Habermas: I differentiate between emancipation and resistance and retreat potentials. >Emancipation, >Civil disobedience. After the American civil rights movement, which has meanwhile led to the particularist assertion of black subcultures, only the feminist movement is in the tradition of bourgeois socialist liberation movements: the fight against patriarchal oppression and for the fulfilment of a promise long anchored in the recognized universalist foundations of morality and law gives feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, while all other movements have a rather defensive character. The resistance and retreat movement is aimed at the containment of formal-organized areas of action in favour of communicative-structured areas of action, not at conquering new... IV 579 ...territories. Of course, feminism has a particularist core in common with these movements: the emancipation of women should not only create formal equality, eliminate male prerogatives, but overturn concrete forms of life shaped by male monopolies. >Equal rights, >Equal opportunities. Moreover, women from the historical heritage of the gender division of labour to which they were subjected in the bourgeois small family have virtues of contrast, a value register that is complementary to the male world and opposite to one-sidedly rationalised everyday practice. >Division of labor. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Freedom | Friedman | Landsburg I 52 Freedom/Friedman/Landsburg: [Friedmans](1) central thesis is that economic freedom is a prerequisite for personal and political freedom. Here economic freedom refers to a system of free markets and private ownership that operates with limited interference from the government. Political and personal freedom encompasses free elections, minority representation, freedom of expression, and the option to choose an unorthodox lifestyle. If you want that kind of freedom, you must also have free markets. >Free markets, >Markets. Landsburg: Writing in 1962, Friedman said he knew of no example, in any time or in any place, of a society that had offered substantial political freedom without also offering substantial economic freedom. Freedom/Economic theories/Landsburg: The Fraser Institute(2) compiles meticulous rankings of personal and economic freedom in 159 countries, using 79 distinct indicators within each country; the methods are spelled out in detail on the Institute’s website. Although such data are suggestive, Friedman was quick to point out that they don't actually prove anything about what might be possible in the future. So the next step is to understand why and how political freedom is always and everywhere undermined by socialism.* >Socialism, >Capitalism. Capitalism/Example: A big part of both political and personal freedom is the right to oppose your government's policies. To do that effectively, you might want to hold rallies, or film documentaries, or publish books, or advertise your blog. For that, you need resources. Where will you get them? Capitalism: In a capitalist society, you can turn to anyone who's willing to fund you. Landsburg I 53 Socialism: Under socialism, you’ve got a much bigger problem. If the government owns the meeting halls, the recording studios, and the Internet providers, or if it heavily regulates their owners, then you’ve got to approach the government - and if they turn you away, there’s no place else to turn. This is a problem even if your government is run by idealists who are dedicated to the principle that everyone has a right to be heard. The problem with that principle is that it’s not clear what “everyone” means. Resources are limited, the demand for those resources is effectively unlimited, and that means someone has to get turned away. As long as one entity controls all the resources, those who are turned away are left with no alternatives. Capitalism: Capitalism doesn’t guarantee you an audience, but it does give you an unlimited number of opportunities to try. Landsburg I 54 State monopoly: Lest you think this is all abstract theorizing, consider the case of Winston Churchill, who spent most of the 1930s trying desperately to convince the British public to take a firm stand against Adolf Hitler and the remilitarization of Germany. Although Churchill was a leading citizen, a current member of parliament and a past cabinet minister, the radio and television networks - all owned by the British government - ruled that his views were too far out of the mainstream and refused to sell him airtime. Capitalism/Landsburg: The reason capitalist societies have a chance of achieving political freedom is that in capitalist societies, economic power is dispersed. There’s always someone else to appeal to. Landsburg I 56 Beyond all this, there’s a separate avenue by which capitalism fosters personal freedom: It makes people richer, and the richer you are, the more freedom you can afford. *Landsburg: Following Friedman, I will use the words capitalism and socialism to mean the presence and the absence of economic freedom. Socialism can include government ownership of productive resources or government control over the decisions made by private owners. 1. Milton Friedman. (1962). [1982, 2002] Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press. 2. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/human-freedom-index-2018.pdf (April 2025) |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Landsburg I Steven E. Landsburg The Essential Milton Friedman Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2019 |
| Freedom | Steiner | Gaus I 127 Freedom/negative freedom/luberty/Steiner/Gaus/Mack: (...) the left libertarianism of Hillel Steiner advocates a radical version of negative liberty. Building his theory on a Hobbesian conception of negative liberty, Steiner holds that 'Broadly speaking, it suggests that a person is unfree to do an action if, and only if, his doing that action is rendered impossible by the action of another person' (1994(1): 8). If, am free to X if and only if I cannot be prevented by another from X-ing, then it follows that I am free to X if and only if none of the locations and objects necessary to X-ing are controlled by others, or would be controlled by others should I attempt to X. Thus 'Freedom is the possession of things' (1994(1): 39). ((s) Hillel SteinerVsVan Parijs). But to have a right to freedom requires more: it is to have a title to a domain of locations and things: it is to have property rights (1994: 81). Thus all rights to freedom are property rights, and all property rights are rights to freedom, a claim made by many in the liberty tradition (....). Steiner claims that his account of liberty as property rights has a virtue lacking in competing theories of rights: compossibility. If rights are defined in terms of intentional actions - e.g. I have a right to see a film tomorrow and you have a right to wreck a building tomorrow - they can conflict (...). >Justice/Hillel Steiner, >Rights/Hillel Steiner. 1. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| History | Vico | Gadamer I 226 History/Nature/Vico/Gadamer: In response to the Cartesian doubt and the certainty of mathematical knowledge of nature founded by him, Vico [has] claimed the epistemological primacy of the man-made world of history (...). Gadamer I 231 Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: But the question is whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey thereby gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsVico: Is Vico's often mentioned formula [of "epistemological relief"] (...) even correct? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak of "making", i.e. planning and execution in the face of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier for its completion in historical knowledge? Gadamer I 378 Historism/Gadamer: It is the seduction of historism to see in [a] reduction the virtue of scientificity and to see in understanding a kind of reconstruction that repeats, as it were, the origin of the text.He thus follows the Gadamer I 379 known ideal of knowledge from knowledge of nature, according to which we understand a process only when we can induce it artificially. GadamervsVico: Vico's sentence is [questionable], according to which this ideal finds its purest fulfilment in history, because there the human encounters his or her own human-historical reality. On the other hand, we have stressed that every historian and philologist must anticipate the fundamental impossibility of closing the horizon of meaning. >Horizon/Gadamer, >Experience/Gadamer. |
Vico I Giambattista Vico Prinzipien einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinsame Natur der Völker Hamburg 2009 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Imagination | Evans | Evans I 313 Reference/Significance/General Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we constantly use general terms, of which we have only the darkest idea of the conditions of fulfilment. e.g. chlorine, microbiology etc. But it is wrong to say that we say nothing when we utter sentences containing these general terms. I 314 Evans: For example, to express the idea that there are people with eleven fingers, general terms are sufficient. If the psychological state (mental state) includes an object, a general term will appear in its specification. This could be linked to the concession that there are certain objects to which one could refer more directly: the theory must even accept this, because otherwise it could not allow what appears to be possible: reference in a symmetrical or cyclical universe. EvansVsDescription theory: This idea of psychological attitudes directed towards objects obviously owes a lot to the feeling that there must be something we can say about what is meant, even if no suitable object can be found. >Reference, >Non-existence, >Meaning, >Objects of thought, >Meaning (intending). Frank I 515 Imagination/Evans: regardless of the ways to gain knowledge on the subject. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Information Production | Benkler | Benkler I 35 Information Production/Benkler: There are no noncommercial automobile manufacturers. There are no volunteer steel foundries. You would never choose to have your primary source of bread depend on voluntary contributions from others. Nevertheless, scientists working at noncommercial research institutes funded by nonprofit educational institutions and government grants produce most of our basic science. Widespread cooperative networks of volunteers write the software and standards that run most of the Internet and enable what we do with it. I 36 Because welfare economics defines a market as producing a good efficiently only when it is pricing the good at its marginal cost, a good like information (and culture and knowledge are, for purposes of economics, forms of information), which can never be sold both at a positive (greater than zero) price and at its marginal cost, is fundamentally a candidate for substantial nonmarket production. I 37 Incentive: Authors and inventors or, more commonly, companies that contract with musicians and filmmakers, scientists, and engineers, will invest in research and create cultural goods because they expect to sell their information products. Over time, this incentive effect will give us more innovation and creativity, creativity, which will outweigh the inefficiency at any given moment caused by selling the information at above its marginal cost. Nonrivalry (…) is not the only quirky characteristic of information production as an economic phenomenon. The other crucial quirkiness is that information is both input and output of its own production process. >Information/Arrow. I 38 If we pass a law that regulates information production too strictly, allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high on today’s innovators, then we will have not only too little consumption of information today, but also too little production of new information for tomorrow. >Information/Economic Theories, >Intellectual Property/Benkler, >Intellectual Property/Economic Theories. I 39 Where does innovation and information production come from, then, if it does not come as much from intellectual-property-based market actors, as many generally believe? The answer is that it comes mostly from a mixture of (1) nonmarket sources - both state and non state - and (2) market actors whose business models do not depend on the regulatory framework of intellectual property. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Intentionality | Searle | Davidson II 112 SearleVsDavidson: Davidson suggests to distinguish two types of intentions: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action". Intentional acts only occur when the first, causes the second. --- Dennett I 281 SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". (see below) --- Dennett II 67 Definition derived intentionality/Searle: definition derived intentionality is a limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. E.g. a shopping list, whether written or memorized, likewise, mental pictures, something internal - these things are still an art product. --- Searle I 67 Intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary. Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality are intrinsic. The Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative. I 178 Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Aspect/Searle. I 266f Intentional phenomena: regulating consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts, causality only arises through interest-based descriptions here. Rules are no cause of action. >Rule following. Objects of intentionality need not to exist: hope, belief, fear, wishes - there is no record of them, one just has them. >Object/Searle. --- II 208 Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act. - Double level of intentionality: a) mental state b) level of intention. --- III 156 As-if intentionality/Searle: the as-if intentionality explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude". >Intentionality/Dennett. --- Graeser I 124 Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional. Derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves. >Speech act. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Intentions | Frith | I 189 Intention/Frith: thesis: movements betray intent, e.g. small children were more surprised by a film in which something jumped over a non-existent barrier. I 190 12 months old children know about the goals of simple actions. >Developmental stages, >Goals, >Actions, >Understanding. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Intentions | Strawson | Meggle I 24ff Intention/StrawsonVsGrice: may be hided complicatly by courtesy, nevertheless can hint at something etc. - modification: the n-th part-intention of S is that H should recognize that S has the (n-1)th part-intention. Meggle I 30 Re-definition: 1. H shows R (reaction) 2. H believes that S (1) intends 3. Hs fulfillment of (1) is based on Hs' fulfilment of (2). Meggle I 31 SearleVsGrice: (> >Convention. Meggle I 33 Grice E.g.: An Arab trader invites a tourist who doesn't speak Arab to enter his shop: "You damned ...": one can say that the trader thinks the customer should come in, but the sentence does not mean it. Lemon example: not the sentence but the situation is decisive. >Situation, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intentions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Interpretation | Ricoeur | I 20 Expounding//interpretation/Freud/dream interpretation/psychoanalysis/Ricoeur: Interpretation refers to any understanding of meaning that is specifically directed at the ambiguous expressions: interpretation is the understanding of the double sense. >Sense/Ricoeur. I 21 Interpretation/Symbol: we define each one in relation to the other. The symbol is a ambiguous linguistic expression that requires interpretation; interpretation is a work that aims to decipher the symbols. I 24 Interpretation/sign/Ricoeur: (...) I will not claim to interpret the sensual sign if I understand what it says. The interpretation refers to an intentional structure of the second degree, which presupposes that a first sense is already constituted, where something is primarily meant, but this something refers to something else, which is only meant by it. >Sign/Ricoeur. I 33 Interpretation/Tradition/Ricoeur: tradition [recommends] two different applications [of the concept of interpretation]; one proposes an interpretation concept that is too "short", the other is too "long"; these two variations in the extension of the concept of interpretation roughly reflect those variations we have considered in defining the symbol. >Symbol/Ricoeur. A. Peri hermenias/Interpretation/Aristotle: provides a "too long" interpretation term: I 34 Interpretation is every sound produced by the voice and carrying meaning - every phoné semantiké, any phoné semantiké. In this sense, the noun in itself is an interpretation, and so is the verbum, because we say something with it; but the simple saying (phásis) is taken from the total meaning of the logos; the full meaning of the hermeneia appears, therefore, only with the complex saying, the sentence that Aristotle calls logos, and which includes the command, the wish, the request as well as the meaningful speech. The hermeneia, in its full sense, is the meaning of the sentence. I 35 The fraction between the designation and the thing has already been made with the noun, and this distance marks the place of interpretation. Not every speech necessarily remains true; it does not adhere to being; (...). (...) the path for a hermeneutics of double meanings [seems] to be blocked; the concept of meaning demands the unambiguity of meaning: the definition of the principle of identity in the logical and ontological sense demands this unambiguity of meaning; (...). I 37 Def Interpretation/Aristoteles: "to testify something about something". Ricoeur: his discussion of the multiple meanings of being breaks through the purely logical and ontological theory of unambiguity. B. Biblical exegesis/interpretation/tradition/Ricoeur: "short" concept of interpretation: Hermeneutics/Tradition/Ricoeur: hermeneutics in this sense is the science of the rules of exegesis, whereby this is understood as the special interpretation of a text. (...) what has traditionally been called the "Four Senses of Scripture" forms the core of this hermeneutics; (...) In particular, the terms analogy, allegory, symbolic meaning were developed here; (...). This second tradition thus combines hermeneutics with the definition of the symbol through >analogy, without, however, reducing it exclusively to this. What limits this definition of hermeneutics by exegesis is first of all that it refers to an authority, be it monarchical, collegial or clerical, e.g. in biblical hermeneutics as it is practiced within Christian communities; (...). I 38 Middle Ages: The tradition of exegesis, however, offers a good starting point for our company: the concept of text itself can indeed be understood in an analogous sense; the Middle Ages could speak of an interpretatio naturae, thanks to the metaphor of the Book of Nature; (...). This concept of "text" frees us from that of writing. >Interpretation of dreams/Freud/Ricoeur. Nietzsche: with him, the entire philosophy becomes interpretation. Ricoeur: This path is connected with the new problem of imagination. NietzscheVsKant/Ricoeur: It is no longer about the Kantian question whether a subjective idea can have objective validity. I 39 Freud: for him it is not only a "script" of interpretation, but any set of signs that can be considered as a text to be deciphered, i.e. a dream or a neurotic symptom as well as a rite, a myth, a work of art, a content of faith. Must we not therefore return to our concept of symbol as a double sense, without already knowing whether the double sense is concealment or revelation, a lie of life or access to the sacred? >Sense/Ricoeur, >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur. I 46 Interpretation as exercise of doubt: [the 'school of doubt' is dominated by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud]. It is relatively easy to see that these three undertakings have in common with each other to question the primacy of the "object" in our conception of the sacred as well as the "fulfilment" of the goal of the sacred by a kind of analogia entis, which is supposed to link us to being by virtue of an assimilatory intention. Looking back at their common intention, one finds in it the decision to regard consciousness as a whole as "false" consciousness. From here, each in a different area, they take up again the problem of the Cartesian doubt, in order to carry it to the centre of the Cartesian Fortress itself. After the doubt, we have now entered into the doubt of consciousness. >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Interpretation of Dreams | Ricoeur | I 17 Interpretation of dreams/Freud/Ricoeur: (...) it is not only because of its cultural interpretation that psychoanalysis stands within the great contemporary debate on the Language. By making the dream not only the main object of his research, but a model in a sense, (...) of all the hidden, substituted and fictitious expressions of the human desire, Freud challenges us to seek in the dream itself the entanglement of desire and language, in many different ways: first of all, it is not the dreamed dream that can be interpreted, but only the text of the dream narrative; this is the text that the analysis wants to replace with another text, which, as it were I 18 would be the original language of desire; the analysis moves from one sense to another sense. It is not the desire as such that is the focus of the analysis, but its language. >Sense/Freud/Ricoeur, >Dream/Ricoeur. I 27 The analyst... replaces [the narrative of the waking] with another text which, in his eyes, is the thought of the wish, what the wish would say in a prosopoe without compulsion; one must acknowledge (...) that the dream itself is close to language, since it can be told, analysed, interpreted. I 103 Dream interpretation/Freud/Ricoeur: To find the dream "thoughts" again means indeed to take a certain retrograde path, which - beyond the actual body impressions and emotions, beyond the awake memory or the remains of the day, beyond the actual desire for sleep - discovers the unconscious, that is, the oldest desires. It is our childhood that gets on the surface, with all its forgotten, suppressed, repressed urges, and with our childhood that of humanity, which is repeated in the individual's childhood, in a way abbreviated. The dream provides access to a fundamental phenomenon, (...) : [the] phenomenon of regression, whose aspects are not only temporal but also topical and dynamic. >Regression/Ricoeur. I 104 The interpretation, which is not yet identified with the deciphering work corresponding to the dream work and which is linked more to the psychological content than to the mechanism, nevertheless gradually acquires its own structure; and this structure is a mixed structure. A) On the one hand, interpretation, within the framework of meaning, is a movement from the manifest to the latent; to interpret means to shift the origin of meaning to another place. But already on this first level it is no longer possible to take interpretation for a simple relation between coded and decoded speech; one can no longer be satisfied with the proposition that the unconscious is another speech, an incomprehensible speech. The disguise, which pursues the interpretation from manifest content to latent content, reveals another disguise, namely that of desire in pictures, to which Freud dedicates Chapter IV. To use an expression from metapsychological essays: the dream is already a "drive fate" (Triebschicksal). B) Dream work: This second task requires, even more clearly than the first, the assembling of two worlds of speech, the speech of meaning and the speech of power. To say that the dream is the fulfilment of a repressed desire is to bring together two concepts that belong to two different realms: 1. fulfillment, which belongs to the speech of sense (as the relationship with Husserl testifies), and 2. repression, which belongs to the speech of power; the concept of disguise, which unites both, expresses the fusion of the two concepts, since disguise is a kind of revelation and at the same time the disguise that distorts this revelation, the violence done to the sense. The relationship of the hidden to the shown, as given in the disguise, thus demands a deformation that I 105 can only be formulated as a compromise of forces. To this mixed speech also belongs the concept of "censorship", which corresponds to that of adjustment: adjustment is the effect, censorship the cause. >Censorship/Freud/Ricoeur, >Symbol/Freud. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Isolation | Sen | Rawls I 267 Isolation/Economy/Public Sector/Public Goods/A. K. Sen/Rawls: Second feature of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself/herself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. For example, also environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market.In this way, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here, there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. >Public goods, >Externalities, >Markets, >Environmental damage. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation in this case. >Infrastructure, >Freedom. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Interests. I 269 Rawls: the distinction between the problems of isolation and those of insurances is made by Amartya K. Sen. (See A. K. Sen,"Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 81,1967). Isolation: Problems arise here when the result of many individual isolated decisions is worse for everyone, even if each individual decision was completely rational. For example, the prisoner's dilemma: the classic example of this is Hobbes' natural state. (See R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, New York, 1957, ch. V, esp pp. 94-102; D. P. Gauthier,"Morality and Advantage", Philosophical Review, vol 76,1967). >Prisoner's Dilemma. I 270 Insurance Problem/A. K. Sen/Rawls: here the goal is to achieve with what unanimity has been achieved. Each contribution of an individual depends on the contributions of others. To this end, we need to introduce a superordinate scheme for the application of penalties and restrictions, which creates a situation that is better for everyone than if this scheme is lacking. |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Law | Hobbes | Habermas IV 122 Law/Hobbes/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Coercion, >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >Order, >Legitimacy. Höffe I 222 Validity/Law/Laws/Hobbes/Höffe: Because of the authorization, the Höffe I 223 authority to make decisions does not stem from " his own grace". Because of the social contract, in Hobbes' case it is also not "by the grace of God", but ultimately "by virtue of the consent of all those affected", all those with legal rights. Thus, a second level of authority, legitimacy, is added to the moment of legality. In any case, the succinct formula "validity by virtue of authority" reads fully developed: "validity by virtue of a power authorised by each person concerned", or in shorter form: "validity by virtue of freely recognised authority" or "validity by consensus". >Legal Positivism/Hobbes. In the case of theories of validity, two basic forms are often opposed to each other, the theories of power and the theories of consent or recognition. Although Hobbes is usually assigned to the power theorists because of his "validity by virtue of authority", in reality he is to be assigned to both groups of theories because of the basic recognition of the persons concerned. And because the authority is authorized over the basic recognition, his theory of law belongs additionally to a third theory group, the empowerment theories. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Law | Honneth | Brocker I 798 Law/Honneth: Following on from Hegel (see Law/Hegel), Honneth works out the sequence of stages of a productive continuation of the struggle for recognition in modernity within the legal sphere: the material content and the social scope of status as a legal person are expanded. Liberal freedom rights, in turn, result in successive political rights of participation and finally social welfare rights. (1) Thus, a social dynamic is inherent in the sphere of law, in which each stage of recognition that has been achieved generates new struggles for the fulfilment of as yet unfulfilled claims to equality and against forms of disregard, in particular structural forms of "deprivation of rights" (2), thus contributing to moral progress in social development. Problem: the moral potential of the sphere of law is also limited. Honneth follows Hegel by concluding from the self-contradictions a transition to a new level of recognition problems. (3) Problem: since in law "every person, as the bearer of the same claims, is equally respected, it ((s) the law) cannot serve precisely as a medium for respecting the particular life history of every individual". (4) 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 185-195 2. Ibid. p. 216 3. Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, Berlin 2010, p. 44 4. Honneth 2014, p. 95. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Learning | Behaviorism | Upton I 6 Learning/Behaviorism/VsBehaviorism/Upton: One area that behaviourist theories do not explain is the type of learning that takes place when someone learns by observing a model. Upton I 7 Social Learning/Bandura: Called social learning by Albert Bandura (1963)(1), this is the process by which someone imitates the behaviour observed in another person when it appears to have reinforcing consequences, and inhibits such behaviour when the observed consequence is punishment. >Reinforcement sensivity/psychological theories, >Punishment/Behavioral economics, >About Behaviorism. 1. Bandura, Albert/Ross, Dorothea/Ross, Sheila A. (1963): Imitation of film-mediated aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, S. 3-11. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Literature | Gadamer | I 138 Literature/Fiction/Gadamer: For the poet, free invention is always only one side of a mediocrity bound by given validity. He does not freely invent his fable, no matter how much he imagines it. Rather, to this day something remains of the old foundation of the mimesis theory. The free invention of the poet is the representation of a common truth which also binds the poet. Other forms of art are not different, especially the fine arts. The aesthetic myth of the freelance imagination, which transforms experience into poetry, and the cult of the genius that belongs to it only attest to the fact that in the 19th century the mythical-historical traditional good is no longer a self-evident possession. >Fiction/Gadamer, >Mimesis. But even then the aesthetic myth of imagination and ingenious invention represents an exaggeration that cannot withstand what is real. Still, the choice of material and the design of the chosen material does not originate from a free will of the artist and is not merely an expression of his inwardness. Rather, the artist appeals to prepared minds and chooses for it what promises him effect. He himself is in the same tradition as the audience he means and collects. In this sense, it is true that he is not an individual, a thinking consciousness that needs to know explicitly what he is doing and what his work says. It is never just a strange world of magic, intoxication, dream, to which the player, creator or viewer is enraptured, but it is still his own world, to which he is actually transferred by recognizing himself deeper within it. There remains a continuity of meaning that unites the work of art with the world of existence and from which even the alienated consciousness of an educational society never completely detaches itself. I 165 Literature/Gadamer: The specific presence of the work of art is a "coming-to-representation" of being. >Artworks/Gadamer. [In literature] there seems to be no representation at all that could claim an own existence-valence. Understanding: (...) all understanding reading always seems to be a kind of reproduction and interpretation. Emphasis, rhythmic structure and the like also belong I 166 to the quietest reading. The meaningful and its understanding is apparently so closely connected with the linguistically corporeal that understanding always contains an inner speech. Certainly, literature and its reception in reading shows a maximum of detachment and mobility(1). The fact that one does not need to read a book in one go already testifies to this, so that staying with it is a separate task of resumption, which has no analogy in listening or looking at it. But it is precisely this what makes it clear that "reading" corresponds to the unity of the text. Reception: The concept of literature is not without reference to the recipient. Rather, literature is a function of intellectual preservation and transmission and therefore brings its hidden history into every present. I 167 History: Only the development of historical consciousness transforms this living unity of world literature from the immediacy of its normative claim to unity into the historical question of literary history of literature. >History, >Historiography. Tradition: (...) the concept of literature [is] to be conceived much broader than the concept of literary works of art. All linguistic tradition has a part in the mode of being of literature, not only the religious, legal, economic, public and private texts of all kinds, but also the writings in which such traditional texts are scientifically processed and interpreted, that is, the whole of the humanities. Yes, the form of literature belongs to all scientific research in general, as long as it is essentially connected with linguistics. I 168 Literary work of art: the essential difference [between literary and, for example, scientific language] lies in the difference in the claim to truth. >Reading. 1.Excellent analyses of the linguistic stratification of the literary work of art and the mobility of vivid fulfilment that the literary word has, can be found in: R. Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk, 1931. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Metaphors | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 41 Metaphor/Concepts/Nietzsche(1): the concepts that built up a rigid and regular world covered a fundamental "drive to metaphor formation" - the anthropomorphic activity, which is also the basis of ... Pfotenhauer IV 42 ...science, but hidden, it then would become productive on the basis of this drive. New "transfers, metaphors, metonymies"(2) would be added. Continually, the desire to redesign the existing world of the awake human being so colorfully and irregularly, incoherently, and eternally new as the world of dreams is. Pfotenhauer: He no longer finds consolation in an art exercise that is above all of them, the aesthetic game has become the moment of a life's fulfilment.... In this conception, the change of emotions and the causality of the mental processes has replaced the exuberant view of aesthetic possibilities. >Aesthetics/Nietzsche, >Literature/Nietzsche, >Language/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW, III, 2, p. 380ff 2. Ibid. p. 381 --- Danto III 53 Metaphor/Nietzsche/Danto: (cf. Truth/Nietzsche (F. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense(1)). We are talking about metaphors. Cf. >Truth/Nietzsche. Note that here metaphors are linguistic means of expression for experiences and not for things. This makes it almost inevitable that the expression of an unconventional experience will be almost incomprehensible. (See Experience/Nietzsche), cf. >Analogies. Danto III 58 DantoVsNietzsche: Problem: If all sentences are merely metaphorical, then the thesis that sentences are merely metaphorical, is just metaphorical as well, i.e. it is not literally true. ((s) See the argument VsInterpretation Philosophy, VsAbel, G.). Danto III 62 Besides: The first sentences ever articulated cannot have been metaphors. 1.F. Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, KGW1/III, 2, S. 374f. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Micropolitics | Deleuze | Gaus I 51 Micropolitics/Deuleuze/Guattari/Bennett: Postmodern theorizing draws attention to the socially transformative potential of micropolitical practices. It insists upon the connections between micropolitics and macropolitics. >Postmodernism, >Politics. Def Micropolitics/Deleuze/Guattari: Deleuze and Guattari use the term micropolitics to name a realm of activities that have public effect – that help to shape the tenor of collective life – but which do not fit into the traditional paradigms of political action. Micropolitical activities are not official acts of presidents or parliaments and they are often not aimed directly at elections or legislative agendas. Rather, the key agencies of micropolitics are television shows, films, military training, professional meetings, worship services, clubs, neighbourhood gangs, and Internet mobilizations; and its key targets are bodily affect, social tempers, political moods, and cultural sensibilities. The emphasis upon micropolitics issues from the belief that there is an indispensably somatic and affective dimension to political (and all other human) action, including macropolitical action. Partly a response to Marxist criticisms, the notion of micropolitics is a more intersubjective and collectivist version of Foucault’s notion of technologies or practices of the self, which he defined as the means through which humans effect ‘a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts, and way of being, so as to transform themselves’ (1988: 18)(1). Moods and affects are also said to be relevant to public life in that they may provide the motivational energy required to enact intellectual commitments or political priorities – to transform them into actualities. 1. Foucault, Michel (1988) Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Volume III. New York: Random House. Jane Bennett, 2004. „Postmodern Approaches to Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Deleuze I Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Paris 1991 German Edition: Was ist Philosophie? Frankfurt/M. 2000 Hum I G. Deleuze David Hume , Frankfurt 1997 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Photography | Barthes | Röttger-Denker I 25 Photography/Barthes: through its absolutely analogical nature and the paradox of a "message without code", photography enhances the utopian character of denotation. Depoliticization and "denunciation". Röttger-Denker I 106 > Röttger-Denker I 112 Photography/Sartre: photography is meaningless in magazines, since the persons were captured, but without existential creation. Sartre: "We have consciousness, in some way, to revive the photo, to give it its life, to make a picture of it." Röttger-Denker I 113 Barthes: he did not deepen this question of the "pathetic" in the photo. Instead: I see, so look, so watch, so I think. >Seeing, >World/Thinking. Röttger-Denker I 113 Photography/Barthes: Adventure of the image: good photography is like a classical sonata: two themes: study and punctum. Studies: »To like, not to love« (half-hearted desire). "Punctum": emerges from the scene, not from the viewer. A wound is inflicted on me. For example, in the photograph »Portrait de la famille« a shock is triggered by the woman's buckle shoes. Paradox: even only a detail fulfills the whole photography. Röttger-Denker I 114 "Third sense" (troisieme sens): the third sense is a signifier without signified. (The films of Eisenstein). Photography/Barthes: despite the chemical development: the non-developable, also the note writing of a haiku cannot be further developed, deepened. Everything is already given. Röttger-Denker I 119 Photography/Barthes: "What I see is not a memory, no imagination, no part of the Maya, how art has enchanted them, it is the reality in the past state. In one the past and the real. This aspect of the photo makes me wonder: how come I live here and now? Röttger-Denker I 120 Photography/Barthes: in contrast to the fictionality of language, it does not invent anything. Röttger-Denker I 123 Photography/Barthes: due to the force of the evidence the photo cannot be deepened, cannot be pierced through. Looking at it is safe - unlike the text. Röttger-Denker I 127 Photography/Barthes: Not art, but magic, emanation of the past. The power of photography does not refer to the object, but to the time. The pathos and melancholy of photography lies in being without a future. Time halts. The time of the picture, the object and the viewer are bundled. The simultaneity prevents a wandering of the thoughts, a dreaming. |
Barthes I R. Barthes Mythologies: The Complete Edition, in a New Translation New York 2013 Röttger I Gabriele Röttger-Denker Roland Barthes zur Einführung Hamburg 1997 |
| Photography | Flusser | I 102 Photography/Flusser: Photographs are not the photographer's attempt to get a picture of the world, but rather attempts to get an impression of concepts the photographer has regarding a picture. Cf. >Technoimages/Flusser, >Terminology/Flusser, >Understanding, >Images. Pre-alphabetic images are supposed to mean the world and technical images are supposed to mean texts, which mean images, which mean the world. Def Techncal image/Techno image/Flusser: should mean texts, which mean images, which mean the world. >Code/Flusser. The photographer stands behind the writer, who stands behind the drawer who stands behind the world. To draw, you have to distance yourself from the world, etc. I 181 ff Photography/Flusser: Historically, photographs are the oldest technical images. The gestures of the operator are determined primarily by the search for a suitable location. It is a four-dimensional space time question: the shine of the woman's teeth, but also objective factors such as the quality of the film. It has nothing to do with the distinction between "subjective" and "objective". >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. The photographer does not only look for the function of the scene to be depicted and the imaging apparatus, but also the function of the future recipient. I 184 Unlike the video camera, the device does not allow "fluid" searching. The search is quantized, the structure of the photographic world is quantized. >Continuum, >Process. I 185 Photography/Flusser: The techno-imagination works arithmetically with photos. There is no point in trying to distinguish between the operator and the apparatus, both are in a complex movement. The decisions made in this respect are neither "human" nor "mechanical". Freedom for the photographer means deciding in function of the apparatus. An apparatus is not a tool because it does not move to change the world, and in this sense it does not do any work. There is no point in revolutions against apparatuses because they are not production means. The photographer faces such considerations without understanding, unhistorically. For him, freedom is a question of functioning. Unlike the blacksmith, he is not a worker but a functionary. I 186 This does not mean that the photographer would not change the world. Only you cannot call that work. >Labour. He acts: he asks his wife to raise her arm, to smile. These actions are motivated differently than work: Definition Work/Flusser: is called changing the world because it is not what it should be. The photographer is not interested in how the world should be, but in how photography should be. He changes the world in function of the symbol he creates. The photographer changes the world to photograph it, i.e. to "explain" it. >Explanation, >Interpretation. If one wants to define "truth" as a meeting of the observed and observation, photography is "true", not if it depicts an unaltered world, but if it depicts the changes that the photographer has made in the world and in the apparatus. >Truth. I 187 The photographer's motif is neither ethical nor epistemological. What does the photographer do in his search? >Ethics, >Epistemic/ontologic. I 188 He is looking for a point of view from which someone else can see the world as he sees it himself. The photographer does not want to "make beautiful pictures" (like the painter) he wants to have someone there who sees with his eyes. >Perspective, >Aspects. The apparatus is equipped with a mirror. In this mirror, the photographer sees what the image would look like if he pressed the shutter release button in a given moment. These mirror images are projects, future designs and simultaneously visions of the past. The sum is all sorts of photographed objects. >Past, >Present, >Future, >Utopia, >Fiction. Above all, however, such mirror images are not images of scenes but of points of view. They can be called images of concepts of images. On the basis of such technical images supplied by apparatus, the photographer decides to press the shutter release button. That is what makes photographs "beautiful": that they are reflexive and speculative, and that they are extraordinarily "abstract" symbols representing concepts. >Concepts, >Abstractness, >Abstraction. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Picture (Image) | Flusser | Blask I 26 Picture/Flusser: Thesis: The human forgets that he was the one who created the pictures. Imagination turned into hallucination. >Imagination, >Hallucination. --- Flusser I 111 ff Picture/Flusser: Specific definition: (sur)face covered with symbols. Definition Picture: A picture is a reduction of the "concrete" four-dimensional relations to two dimensions. Cave paintings in Lascaux, for example, can be regarded as "prospective projections": their intention was probably not to depict "concrete situations" (such as anatomy lessons) but to create desired situations: to serve a hunting magic. They do not want to show what ponies are like, but what you have to do to hunt them. On the other hand, for example, there is little magic on a street map: it does not show how roads should be, but how they really are. And yet it has a "value", showing the driver what to do to get into town. Then they're good pictures. I 112 For example, Lascaux: they are "good pictures" if they help to a successful hunt, and they do so if they reproduce the anatomy of the ponies correctly. Many pictures are pleasingly designed surfaces, neither streets nor ponies, and these are commonly referred to as pictures. I 135 Picture/Flusser: Technical images/techno-images: Pictures that do not mean scenes, but texts: For example, equations that lead to atomic bombs consist of unimaginable symbols. Therefore, the text that these equations cannot be regarded as meaningless. But the atomic bomb itself is unimaginable in a strange sense. And the same applies to the TV, the car, in short, to most of our technical products. If such texts work, they lead to even more insane codes. I 137 ff Technical Images/techno-images: We believe we criticize films, we think we understand TV programs: this is a dangerous mistake. Decryption is much more difficult. Traditional Picture: Scene picture < human Techno-images: Scene > Picture > human Traditional pictures are made by people, technical pictures are made by devices. I 138 In the traditional picture, the causal chain between scene and picture is interrupted by the human being. The technical images' causal chain is not interrupted, the technical image is a direct consequence of the scene, but there is no causal chain between reality and picture. The naïve belief that one does not have to learn to decipher cinema posters or advertisements contributes to the alienation that these pictures cause. Technical Text ↔ Apparatus Operator ↔ techno-image >Alienation, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Interpretation("Deutung"). I 139 Def techno-images/Flusser: technical images are (sur)faces covered with symbols, which mean symbols of linear texts. For example, an X-ray of the broken arm is for the doctor both a map and a model of how the arm is to be treated, i.e. "prospective" and it is "beautiful" insofar as it is true and good. >Symbols, >Text. The specificity of the technical images is not to be found in the method of production (by apparatus) nor in the material (cathode tubes). Technical images are like all images symbols, but they do not mean scenes like traditional images, they mean concepts. Def techno-images: means terms, means texts. >Concepts. In this respect, traditionally created pictures are also technical images insofar they mean concepts: blueprints, diagrams, curves in statistics, etc. Strange kinship of technical images with ideograms: both are images that mean concepts. However, "concept" does not have the same meaning in both cases. >Meaning, >Meaning/intending. For example, one "feels" that the number "2", i.e. an ideogram, is a completely different kind of symbol than e.g. the photography of a bra in advertising, i.e. a technical image, although both terms mean. The essentially important of the technical codes always melts between the fingers. Ideogram translation into alphabetical code. "Two and two is four" and 2+2=4: the first seems to be the description of the second. We have the tendency to see to see pictorial scriptures in ideogrammatic codes, although they are linear. "2+2=4" is not the picture of a linear situation, however! It is the description of a scene! >Numbers, >Numerals. I 141 Ideograms: are not images but symbols of the type "letter". Def Scene: non-linear. Def Text: linear. Def ideograms: concepts which mean pictures. I 142 Ideograms are like technical picture above language. For example, you can also be translated with "Two and two makes four" and "Buy a bra!". Traditional pictures are "under language". They're being discussed. Although people can communicate with images, the belief that they are "generally understandable"is wrong. I 143 techno-images: the translation of technical images lies in a completely different direction beyond the spoken language than the translation of H20 into "water". "P", for example, means "Parking permitted" at first glance, but this new type of code has to destroy the alphabet over time. >Translation. Even if the "P" is replaced by the pictogram of a car. It could also be replaced by a reproduction of the Mona Lisa. >Convention. The way we learn to follow them is a different way than the way we learn mathematical formulas or alphabetical texts. >Learning. I 146 Technical pictures mean texts. For example, photography in the electron microscope depicts physical texts, the film depicts relationships from a film script, the statistical curve depicts relationships that set up economic texts with regard to an economic tendency. Technical codes a) Posters: directly understandable b) X-ray image: must be decoded. For example, when we hit the brake at a red traffic light, we do not pretend to read a text, but to see a picture where a foot hits a brake pedal. (See also Code/Flusser and Technology/Flusser). I 162 Techno-images/Flusser: only archeologists or biologists, astronomers or physicists use technical images "correctly", namely as symbols of concepts. Picture/Flusser: Video art does not provide technical images. Because they are not images there for concepts. I 163 Misbelief: technical images are codes of the mass media. Society is only interested in technical images that are broadcast amphitheatrically, and is left completely cold by the art discussion. >Society, >Art, >Aesthetics. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Picture (Image) | Millikan | I 82 Graphics/Diagram/Syntax/Millikan: Graphics and diagrams have describable syntactic structures. E.g. Drawings of impossible rooms: can be described as breaking through syntactic rules. >Syntax. I 125 TV picture/TV/Millikan: here the case is quite different from the case of machine signs such as the e.g. fuel gauge. There are no pre-established characteristics as a model, and the interpreter is not expected to learn such standards! The images are rather produced by the model of natural signs. Interpretation: does not happen here according to a program designed for reading intentional icons, but it is about an ability that is either innate or has been developed for reading natural signs. ((s)> film). --- I 126 Watching Television/loudspeaker/TV/radio/Millikan: this is not a question of establishing or developing a cooperation as a normal condition for the proper operation of the loudspeaker. Malfunction: is not interpreted as a "false statement". Picture/TV picture/TV: what the TV picture is a picture of is not something the interpreter would accept - if it functions normally - but the one in the world to which it is to be adapted. ((s) Realistic rendering, realism, not communication). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Politics | Morozov | I 103 Politics/Internet/Morozov: the German Pirate Party was accused by the Green Volker Beck of discussing contents of other parties in its Liquid Feedback System in a way that suggests that they are the Pirate Party's own contents. This happened because these contents had been downloaded from the Internet (1) I 106 Morozov: In the American context, Liquid Feedback is a solution to a problem that does not exist; both parties already rely on sophisticated microtargeting tools to uncover and address our most secret desires and needs. >Internet/Morozov. I 111 Politics/Internet/Zuckerberg/Morozov: In 2008 Mark Zuckerberg announced: we are now at a point where a lot of these applications are efficient enough for people to have a voice without needing a large organization with millions of others and a million dollar endowment to fight for a particular thing. (2) Morozov: this quickly led to projects like ruck.us, co-founded by Nathan Daschle son of former Democratic senator Tom Daschle. This website is intended to replace the two ((s) large U.S. -american) parties in order to make "the internet" the main mouthpiece of political expression. Ruck.us/Morozov: works like this: with the registration on the site you answer some questions about your political preferences, such as whether the government should play a role in the organization of education. Afterwards, the user's "political DNA" is created and checked to see which other users he/she agrees with. Similar to Netflix that recommends a film, depending on the classification of the profile.(3) I 113 Dave KarpfVsRuck.us/KarpfVsDaschle: such approaches all have the same error: they treat politics as a kind of market. But the two-party system does not form a market.(4) >Markets. I 134 Politics/Internet/Morozov: the most obvious is the contempt that geeks have for politics, while at the same time respecting administration in an interview with Bill Maris, the head of Google's risk fund (5) According to Maris, politicians spend most of their time in politics without incentives for real change. 1. Westervelt, “A Party on the Rise, Germany’s Pirates Come Ashore,” NPR, June 6, 2012, http:// www.npr.org/ 2012/ 06/ 06/ 154388897/ a-party-on-the-rise-germanys-pirates-come-ashore.; “Sinking Ship: Voters Growing Disillusioned with Germany’s Pirate Party,” Der Spiegel, October 25, 2012, http:// www.spiegel.de/ international/ germany/ german-voters-grow-disillusioned-with-pirate-party-a-863234. html. 2. Mark Zuckerberg in an interview with Sarah Lacy at SXSW 2008. Video is available at http:// allfacebook.com/ mark-zuckerberg-sarah-lacy-interview-video_b1063. 3. Alex Fitzpatrick, “Ruck.Us Breaks Up Party Politics on the Social Web,” Mashable, May 11, 2012, http:// mashable.com/ 2012/ 05/ 11/ ruckus. 4. Steve Freiss, “Son of Democratic Party Royalty Creates a Ruck.us,” Politico, June 26, 2012, http:// www.politico.com/ news/ stories/ 0612/ 77847. html. 5. David Ewing Duncan, “Why Do Our Best and Brightest End Up in Silicon Valley and Not D.C.?,” The Atlantic, May 6, 2012, http:// www.theatlantic.com/ technology/ archive/ 2012/ 05/ why-do-our-best-and-brightest-end-up-in-silicon-valley-and-not-dc/ 256767. |
Morozov I Evgeny Morozov To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014 |
| Positive Psychology | Maslow | Corr I 14 Positive Psychology/ Maslow: Empirically, some researchers describe pathology from a trait perspective as extreme scores on various traits (e.g., Eysenck 1994(1); Markon, Krueger and Watson 2005(2); O’Connor 2002(3)).Purely descriptive trait measures, of course, beg the question of whether the developmental origins and dynamic implications of those measured traits are comparable in the normal and abnormal populations. Humanists, including Abraham Maslow (1976)(4), advocated studying the healthy personality, not only those who are disturbed. Recent trends mark a fulfilment of this mandate. The popular movement called positive psychology continues the theme from humanistic psychology, focusing on healthy and creative human potentials (Gable and Haidt 2005(5); Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000(6)). The approach strives to understand and promote such individual strengths as happiness and creativity, and desirable societal conditions such as peace. >Humanism, >Personality traits, >Personality, >Autonomy, >Behavior, >Actions. 1. Eysenck, H. J. 1994. Normality-abnormality and the three-factor model of personality, in S. Strack and M. Lorr (eds.), Differentiating normal and abnormal personality, pp. 3–25. New York: Springer 2. Markon, K. E., Krueger, R. F. and Watson, D. 2005. Delineating the structure of normal and abnormal personality: an integrative hierarchical approach, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 139–57 3. O’Connor, B. P. 2002. The search for dimensional structure differences between normality and abnormality: a statistical review of published data on personality and psychopathology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 962–82 4. Maslow, A. H. 1976. The farther reaches of human nature, 2nd edn. New York: Viking 5. Gable, S. L. and Haidt, J. 2005. What (and why) is positive psychology?, Review of General Psychology 9: 103–10 6. Seligman, M. E. P. and Csikszentmihalyi, M. 2000. Positive psychology: an introduction, American Psychologist 55: 5–14 Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Principles | Rorty | II 43 Principles/validity/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "inner validity" of the principles will not arise. Especially not whether it is "universally valid". The only thing that prevents a society from taking the institutionalized humiliation of the weak for granted is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. >Cf. >Validity/Habermas, >Validity claims/Habermas, >Society/Habermas, >Inequalities/Habermas. VI 120 Principle/rationality/background/Searle/Rorty: (with Wittgenstein): for the Western rationalist tradition there are principles that do not function as a theory (Rorty pro). Rather, they function as a background. >Backgrund/Searle, >Background/Habermas, >Rationality. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Promises | Rawls | I 344 Promises/Fairness/Rawls: the principle of loyalty to promises (principle of fidelity, fiduciary duty) is a special case of the principle of fairness. A promise is an action defined by a public system of rules(1). I 345 Rule of Promise/Rawls: should be that we keep our promise, unless there are circumstances that justify an apology. It is thus at the same level as game rules as well as legal rules and statutes. Like these, they exist in a society if you keep to them more or less regularly. Justice: whether the rule of promise is just depends on how the excusing circumstances are defined. This includes full consciousness and voluntariness. The principles of justice are applied to the practice of promise as well as to other areas. I 346 Def bona fide promise/Rawls: is present when the rule of promise and the practice it represents are fair. The fidelity principle means that bona fide promises must be kept. Rule: is just a convention - on the other hand, the principle of loyalty is a moral principle that follows from the principle of fairness. The role of promises corresponds to what Hobbes ascribed to the sovereign (ruler): Ruler/promise/Hobbes/Rawls: just as the sovereign stabilizes and maintains the system of social cohesion, so the private individuals stabilize their enterprises through their mutual word. I 347 Problem: preliminary work, contracts: here it is the promise that should close the gap between an agreement and fulfilment. Circumstances that are conducive to the company are assumed. Co-operation is being stabilised through this(2). I 348 The discussion of promises shows that no moral requirements from institutions follow on their own. Nor does the rule of promise alone lead to moral obligations. For this we still need the principle of fairness as a premise. 1. See R. Searle, Speech Acts, (Cambridge, 1969) pp. 33-42, especially with regard to promises: ch. III, pp. 57-62. 2. See H. A. Prichard, "The Obligation to Keep a Promise", in Moral Obligation (Oxford, 1949), pp. 169-179. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Properties | Searle | I 153 Fulfilment conditions/Searle: properties of objects are fulfilment conditons of my experiences, therefore they are difficult to distinguish from the properties of the experiences (but these are always perspective). >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Perspective/Searle. II 105/6 Properties: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence, to look red is not independent from being red. V 155 Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essentially predictive: one can just as well refer to them by singular nominal expressions. >Predicate, >Attribution, >Singular term, >Predication. V 153 Reference/implication/property/SearleVs: from the fact that my statement implies the existence of a property, it does not follow that I referred to a property with the statement. >Implication. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Public Sector | Rawls | I 266 Public sector/Rawls: has two aspects: 1. the first relates to the ownership of means of production. Thus, for example, the public sector in socialism is larger than in capitalism. It is smaller in privately organised systems and mainly affects public institutions and transport. 2. characteristic: relates to the proportion of resources spent on public goods (infrastructure, etc.). Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. --- I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). --- I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself/herself, even if he/she will never be exposed to this infection. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. (1) See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. (2) Buchanan, Kap. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. (3) See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Public-Private Partnership | Crouch | Brocker I 950 Public Private Partnership/Crouch: According to Crouch, the most important reason for post-democratic change (>Post-Democracy/Crouch) is the privatization of state tasks and the economization of political processes. The cause is not so much the market principle(1) as the effort to save money and resources. Citizens' claims lose their intrinsic character and are no longer treated as inalienable values, but as public goods comparable to other goods on the market and traded accordingly. >Markets/Crouch. Brocker I 951 With the withdrawal of politics from the responsibility of fulfilment, the delegation of services of general interest to private service providers and the commercial restructuring of the administration, according to Crouch the state has no choice but to become itself a "government entrepreneur", a government entrepreneur who more or less successfully imitates the success strategies of corporations through marketing and branding(2). 1. Colin Crouch, Postdemocrazia, Rom/Bari 2003 (engl.: Oxford 2004). Dt.: Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie, Frankfurt/M. 2008, p. 103 2. Ibid. p. 131 Ludger Heidbrink, „Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolCrouch I Colin Crouch Henry Farrell Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004 PolCrouch II Colin Crouch Post-democracy London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Regulatory Economics | Peltzman | Henderson I 8 Regulatory economics/Peltzman/Hilton/Henderson/Globerman: Tradition: The traditional economic justification for government regulation of private sector businesses is that regulations are needed to protect consumers against business abuses such as monopoly pricing, cheating on the quality of products sold, the sale of hazardous products, and misleading consumers through false advertising claims or by failing to disclose important information such as the true annual interest rate on an automobile Ioan. >Interest rates, >Loans, >Monopoly price. Regulation: In the idealized view of regulation, the regulators are informed public-spirited people who work only to promote the social good. PeltzmanVsTradition: Peltzman and Hilton debunked this idealized view of regulatory behaviour by documenting how regulators pursue their own interests in carrying out their activities and showing that the interests of regulators are often at odds with the social interest. In particular, regulation often stifles competition, resulting in higher prices. Henderson I 9 Even when enlisting expert advice, it is extremely diffcult for regulators to form a complete and accurate picture of how specific regulations will affect the behaviour of the many individuals and organizations affected. It is impossible, for example, for regulators to forecast how new technologies and new uses of existing technologies will undermine the intent of the regulator. Hilton: Hilton noted that the regulatory experience is replete With examples of how the noncompetitive price structures imposed by regulators encouraged the use of new technologies to circumvent, and ultimately render unsustainable, existing regulatory decrees. Henderson I 10 Regulatory economics/competition/market: (…) regulators cannot extinguish the incentives of market participants to create economic gains for themselves by providing cheaper and/or more convenient goods and services for customers, and efforts by regulators to thwart the pursuit of those incentives perpetuate economic ineffciencies that make society as a whole economically poorer. In particular, many consumers pay more for the relevant goods and services than they would have paid if markets were deregulated, while established firms often earn higher profits than they would have earned in an unregulated competitive market. >Incentives, >Profit, >Markets. Henderson I 83 Regulatory economics/Peltzman/Henderson/Globerman: A key conclusion of Peltzman’s model is that the outcome of the supply and demand process is that producers need not emerge as the sole beneficiaries of the regulatory process. >Regulation/Peltzman. Costs and benefits: Rather, because the cost of organizing into a cohesive lobbying group is only one factor influencing who will obtain favourable regulatory outcomes, the distribution of benefits and costs from regulatory decisions is likely to be more diffuse than the concentrated/dispersed paradigm predicts. Henderson I 84 Example: the Canadian Radio and Television Commission (CRTC), Canada's version of the US Federal Communications Commission. The CRTC restricts foreign broadcasters from supplying Canadians with broadcast services sent directly from outside of Canada. This protects Canadian broadcasters from competition with foreigners, allowing them to charge higher prices for advertising. Cf. >Mercantilism. However, the CRTC does not allow Canadian broadcasters to capture all of the financial gains from the protection they are provided. In particular, they must produce and distribute a significant amount of "Canadian content." Broadcasters must favour Canadians who work in the film, television, and music industries, even though it would be cheaper and more profitable for Canadian broadcasters to license foreign programming, mainly from US copyright holders. >Copyright. Cross-subsidization/profits: In short, the CRTC engages in cross-subsidization. In exchange for protection from foreign competition, Canadian broadcast distributors must "share" some of the higher profits that they earn from the effective monopoly position created by the regulator With Canadian producers, performers, writers, and other contributors to domestic programing. The "losers" are Canadian consumers who pay higher prices for their subscriptions to cable and satellite distributors, and (indirectly) higher prices for products that are advertised on Canadian distribution outlets. |
Peltzman I Samuel Peltzman Political Participation and Government Regulation (History, Culture, and Life) Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Religion | Weber | Habermas III 235 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber examines the religious foundations of rational living in everyday consciousness, e.g. of Calvinists, Methodists, Pietists, Anabaptist sects. Main features are - Radical condemnation of magical means - loneliness of the individual believer - Secular fulfilment of professional duties as an obedient instrument of God - Transformation of Judeo-Christian world rejection into an inner-worldly asceticism. - Principle-led autonomous lifestyle. >Calvinism, >Judaism, >Christianity, >Religious belief. Habermas III 273 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber thesis: there is a commutated rationalization of all world religions. According to F. H. Tenbruck, Weber was thus in the group of evolutionism at that time.(1) >Rationalization. Tenbruck: "The rational constraints that religions are to follow arise from the need to receive a rational answer to the theodicy problem, and the stages of religious development are the ever more explicit versions of this... Habermas III 274 ...problem and their solutions. (2) >Theodicy. Monotheism/Weber/Tenbruck: for Weber, monotheism was an idea that first had to be born, but then had far-reaching consequences. Punitive God: the idea of a rewarding and punitive deity was also new, as was the sense of mission, according to which the human had to understand himself/herself as an instrument of God. Protestantism/Weber/Tenbruck: added to this the predestination. (3) >Protestantism. Habermas III 274/275 R. DöbertVsWeber: Weber does not distinguish enough between the problematic content and the structures of consciousness that emerge from the ethicization of world views. (4) Contents: reflect the various solutions to the theodicy problem. Structures: can be seen in the statements on the world, which are determined by formal world concepts. >Worldviews. Habermas III 281 Weber: The world religions try to satisfy "the rational interest in material and immaterial balance" by explanations that increasingly meet systematic demands. (5) Habermas III 293 Disenchantment/World Images/Religion/Modernity/Weber/Habermas: Weber observes de-enchantment above all in the interaction between believers and God. The stronger this is designed as communication, Habermas III 294 the more strictly the individual can systematize his/her inner-worldly relations under the abstract aspects of morality. >Disenchantment. This means a) The preparation of an abstract concept of the world b) The differentiation of a purely ethical attitude in which the actor can follow and criticize norms c) The formation of a universalistic and individualistic concept of persons with the correlates of conscience, moral accountability, autonomy, guilt, etc. The reverent attachment to traditionally guaranteed concrete orders of life can thus be overcome in favour of a free orientation towards general principles. Habermas IV 281 Religion/Weber/Habermas: Weber has shown that the world religions are dominated by a fundamental theme, namely the question of the legitimacy of the unequal distribution of happiness among people. Theodicy/Weber/Habermas: the theocentric world views designed theodicies to reinterpret and satisfy the need for a religious explanation of the suffering perceived as unjust into an individual need for salvation. Cosmocentric worldviews: offer equivalent solutions to the same problem. Common to religious and metaphysical worldviews is a more or less pronounced dichotomous structure that makes it possible to relate the socio-cultural world of life to a background world. The world behind the visible world of this world and phenomena represents a fundamental order; such worldviews can assume ideological functions if the orders of the stratified class society can be represented as homologies of this world order. >Metaphysics. 1.F.H. Tenbruck, Das Werk Max Webers, KZSS, 27, 1975, p. 677 2. Ibid p. 683 3. Ibid p. 685 4. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt 1973. 5. M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I Tübingen, 1963, p. 253. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Religious Belief | Ricoeur | I 42 Religious belief/Ricoeur: 1. First of all, see in the concern for the object, the characteristic of every phenomenological analysis, the first trace of that belief in a revelation through the Word. As we know, this concern takes the form of a "neutral" will for a description and for an edition. One reduces by explaining by causes (psychological, social etc.), by genesis (the individual, historical etc.), by function (the affective, ideological etc.). One describes by working out the (noetic) aim and its (noematic) correlate: the meant something, the object implied in rite, myth and belief. >Epoché/Ricoeur, >Beliefs/Ricoeur. I 43 2. According to the phenomenology of religion, there is a "truth" of symbols; in the neutral attitude of the Husserlian epoché, this truth means nothing other than the fulfilment of the momentous intention. For the phenomenology of religion to be possible, it is necessary and sufficient that there be not only one, but several ways of fulfilling the different intentions of meaning, depending on the different object realms; the "verification" in the sense of logical positivism is only one type of fulfilment among others and not the canonical way of fulfilment. This type is required by the corresponding object type, namely the physical object and, in another sense, the historical object - but not by the concept of truth as such (...) by the call I 44 for fulfilment in general. Because of this diversity of "fulfillment", phenomenology speaks of religious experience in a weakened, neutralized way, not by analogy, but according to the specific type of object and the specific mode of fulfillment in this field. >Epoché/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur, >Symbol/Eliade. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Representation | Searle | Brandom I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Contents, >Intentional Contents, >Use, >Use theory. Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth and characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic but derived from the intentionality of the mind. The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves. >Intentionality, >Signs. Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he/she does not use his/her ideas and beliefs and desires: he/she simply has them. Belief: belief is a representation. It consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> More autors on representation). Representation needs background of non-representational skills. The compositionality principle without background is not sufficient. >Compositionality. Searle I 271 Pattern: patterns play in functional terms a causal role, but do not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality). II 28 f Representation: speech acts and intentional states have this in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. Key to understanding: are the fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology. Recognition needs not to contain representation. >Speech acts, >Ontology. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. III 197f Representations are private, language is public. >Language. I 195 Existence: is a truth condition. Possible existence: comprehensibility condition. >Existence/Searle. Graesser I125 Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rights | Steiner | Gaus I 127 Rights/Hillel Steiner/Gaus/Mack: Steiner(1) claims that his account of liberty as property rights has a virtue lacking in competing theories of rights: compossibility. If rights are defined in terms of intentional actions - e.g. I have a right to see a film tomorrow and you have a right to wreck a building tomorrow - they can conflict: „Whether my seeing a film tomorrow afternoon, and your wrecking a building then, are or are not jointly performable actions depends inter alia on whether the building you are to wreck is the cinema I'm to attend. If and only if we each have a duty to do these actions, those two duties are incompossible and so are the respective rights which they correlatively entail.“(1994(1):91—2) Gaus: Steiner thus argues that a system of rights can be guaranteed to be compossible - the performance of all the correlative duties are necessarily jointly possible - only if rights are defined in terms of property over a 'set of extensional elements' (control over objects, locations in time and so on). >Freedom/Hillel Steiner, >Justice/Hillel Steiner. 1. Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Sanctions | Habermas | IV 417 Sanctions/Communication/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Problem: under conditions of sanctioning, the actor cannot take his/her own yes to a validity claim (consent to an assertion, recommendation, etc.) seriously. >Validity claims. The sanction scheme can only include modes of interaction that are about empirical efforts to continue an interaction. Solution/Habermas: one can attribute a general receptiveness of alter to individual sources of ego's reputation or influence in such a way that the empirically, by incentive and deterrence motivated bonds can be distinguished from the rationally, namely by justified agreement motivated trust. Either one is guided by penalties and rewards, or one has sufficient knowledge and is sufficiently autonomous to guarantee the fulfilment of the communicatively raised validity claims. >Knowledge/Habermas, Autonomy/Parsons. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Self-Respect | Rawls | I 440 Self-respect/Rawls: Self-respect is perhaps the most important of the primary goods. This must be declared as rationality according to the concept of goodness. We can define respect for ourselves as consisting of two aspects: a) A sense of one's own value, the certain belief that one's own conception of the good, one's own life plan is worth to be carried out. b) Confidence in the fact that one's own intentions are to be implemented within the realm of what is possible by the person himself/herself. This also means that these intentions are not perceived as something unimportant. Therefore, self-esteem is also one of the factors that promote the execution of human planning. Circumstances of self-respect: 1. having a rational life plan and 2. to realize that one's actions are respected by others. Planning/Rawls: a rational life plan should also include the fulfilment of the Aristotelian principle: (I 426 Def Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and to a greater extent, the more these abilities are realized and the more challenging (complex) they are(1)(2)(3)(4)). I 442 Communality/Rawls: it is necessary that every person belongs to at least one community of people who share their interests and respect their aspirations. 1. Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5. 2. See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV. 3. G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp.76-78. (4) R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“, Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Sensations | Dennett | II 82 Sensation / Dennett: there was never a proper definition of "sentience" (sensitivity) , but you summed up as the lowest form of >consciousness on. II 83 Sensitivity: needs, other than feeling, no consciousness. E.g. protozoa, >thermometer, light sensitive film, plants, >fuel gauge. The question of what distinguishes sensation over the mere sensitivity, has never been satisfactorily answered. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Social Goods | Rawls | I 92 Public goods/social goods/Rawls: primary social goods are rights and freedoms, opportunities and powers, income and prosperity. These goods are social because of their connection with the basic structure of a society; freedoms and powers are defined by the rules of the larger institutions; income distribution and prosperity are regulated by them. Rawls: The theory of common goods goes back to Aristotle and is shared by such diverse authors as Kant and Sidgwick. It is also controversial between utilitarianism and contract theory. >Contracts, >Contract theory, >Utilitarianism, >I. Kant, >H. Sidgwick. I 93 Goods/Rawls: a good is the fulfilment of a rational interest. We can assume that a rational individual has a plan that can fulfill different desires without mutual interference. Def rational plan/Rawls: be a plan that cannot be improved. I. e. there is no other plan that is preferred. >Planning. Def primary goods/Rawls: are those that all need, even if their plans differ. For example, intelligence, prosperity and opportunities are means of achieving goals that a person could not achieve by other means. In the initial state (of a society to be established), where people do not yet know what role they will play, these goods are what they know they are striving for. >Veil of ignorance. Problem: to create an index of available primary social and natural resources. Our principles, when processed in lexical order, help to do this. >Principles/Rawls. I 266 Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. I 267 This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods: 1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3). >Free riders. I 268 2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. >Externalities. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest. >Environmental damage. I 270 Economic form: the proportion of public goods in the economy as a whole is independent of the economic form - be it socialist or private - because the proportion of social resources spent on their production is independent of the question of the ownership of the means of production. >Socialism, >Capitalism. 1. See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX. 2. Buchanan, ch. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II. 3. See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Social Learning | Bandura | Upton I 11 Social Learning/Bandura/Upton: According to Bandura’s social learning theory (1963)(1), people learn through observing others’ behaviour and attitudes, using this as a model for their own behaviour. Conditions: Attention: in order for the behaviour to be learned, the observer must see the modelled behaviour. Retention: the observer must be able to remember the modelled behaviour. Reproduction: the observer must have the skills to reproduce the action. Motivation: the observer must be motivated to carry out the action they have observed and remembered, and must have the opportunity to do so. Motivation may include seeing the model’s behaviour reinforced, while punishment may discourage repetition of the behaviour. Upton I 12 Behavior/BanduraVsWatson/Bandura: the observer will imitate the model’s behaviour only if the model possesses characteristics that the observer finds attractive or desirable. Therefore, we do not always imitate others’ actions. We choose who to imitate – learning is not an automatic response but depends on internal processes as well as environmental ones. Social learning theory/Upton: has sometimes been called a bridge between behaviourist and cognitive learning theories because it encompasses attention, memory and motivation. >Attention, >Memory, >Motivation, >Learning. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1963). Imitation of film-mediated aggressive models. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66(1), 3–11. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0048687 |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Spectrum Allocation | Coase | Kiesling I 27 Spectrum Allocation/Coase/Kiesling: „Certainly, it is not clear why we should have to rely on the Federal Communications Commission rather than the ordinary pricing mechanism to decide whether a particular frequency should be used by the police, or for a radiotelephone, or for a taxi service, or for an oil company for geophysical exploration, or by a motion-picture company to keep in touch with its film stars or for a broadcasting station. Indeed, the multiplicity of these varied uses would suggest that the advantages to be derived from relying on the pricing mechanism would be especially great in this case.“ Coase (1959)(1), p. 16. Kiesling: An important policy application of Coase’s ideas on institutions, property rights, and transaction costs is the allocation of radio spectrum using spectrum license auctions. More specifically, Coase’s work has led to market-based allocation of radio spectrum rather than administrative allocation, and to the liberalization of the property rights that are conveyed in those licenses. This liberalization has enabled extensive innovation and market complexity. >Property rights/Coase, >Transation costs/Coase, >Law/Coase. Kiesling I 29 (…) Coase(1) asked if there was a feasible way to allocate the use of radio spectrum to create the most possible value out of it, which the then-current public interest hearings method did not accomplish. The policy objective should be not to minimize interference along the spectrum, but to maximize output from the spectrum, treating interference as a constraint to be managed (or something that innovation would reduce). Property right: Why not define a property right in a specific part of the spectrum for each user, and make those rights tradable? Coase here followed the suggestion of Leo Herzel (1951)(2), who proposed defining spectrum ownership rights and allocating them through auctions. Coase claimed that despite arguments to the contrary, the scarcity of spectrum does not necessitate its administrative allocation, ongoing regulation, or government ownership. >Property rights/Coase. Kiesling I 30 Coase identified the core of the spectrum allocation problem as ill-defined property rights, and drew analogies between spectrum and land: „We know from our ordinary experience that land can be allocated to land users without the need for government regulation by using the price mechanism.… If one person could use a piece of land for growing a crop, and then another person could come along and build a house on the land used for the crop, and then another could come along, tear down the house, and use the space as a parking lot, it would no doubt be accurate to describe the resulting situation as chaos. But it would be wrong to blame this on private enterprise and the competitive system. A private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless property rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears; and so does the government except that a legal system to define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary.“ (1959(1): 14) Markets/Coase: Why use markets? Markets reveal the opportunity cost of the license and factor that opportunity cost into the decision-making of incumbent and entrant license holders. A right to use a frequency would have to be defined precisely in order to be transacted (Coase, 1959(1): 25). >Auctions/Coase. 1. Coase, Ronald H. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics 2: 1-40. 2. Herzel, Leo (1951). “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation. University of Chicago Law Review 18, 4: 802-816. |
Kiesling I L. Lynne Kiesling The Essential Ronald Coase Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2021 |
| Spirituality | Psychological Theories | Corr I 154 Spirituality/personality traits/psychological theories/Five-Factor Model/McCrae: Spirituality has (…) been proposed as a sixth factor [to the FFM] ((s)>Five-Factor Model of personality traits) (Piedmont 1999)(1). The Spiritual Transcendence Scale includes facets assessing Prayer Fulfilment, Universality and Connectedness, and these three defined a separate factor in a joint analysis with the facets of the NEO-PI-R (see below). Problem 1: One might question whether spirituality is in the domain of personality at all, or whether it is better regarded as an attitude or practice. Problem 2: All the items in this version of the Spiritual Transcendence Scale are positively keyed, so their intercorrelation may be inflated by acquiescent responding, the tendency to agree with items regardless of content. (NEO-PI-R facet scales are balanced, with roughly equal numbers of positively- and negatively-keyed items, so acquiescence is not relevant to their structure.) VsPiedmont: Some evidence for this hypothesis comes from analyses of a different instrument, the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) (Cloninger, Przybeck, Svrakic and Wetzel 1994)(2). McCrae: keyed. A joint factor analysis of the twenty-five TCI scales with the five NEO-PI-R factors yielded clear N (>Neuroticism) , A (>Agreeableness) and C (>Conscientiousness) factors, a factor defined by both E (>Extraversion) and O (>Openness), and a separate Self-Transcendence factor (McCrae, Herbst and Costa 2001)(3). However, when acquiescence was assessed and statistically controlled, the full FFM appeared, with the three Self-Transcendence scales loading on the O factor (evidently measuring something like Openness to Spiritual Experience). Cf. >Mind/Davidson. Corr I 155 NEO-PI-R: has thirty facet scales, six for each factor. They were chosen to represent the most important constructs in the personality literature, while at the same time being maximally distinct.(Costa and McCrae 1995a)(4). 1. Piedmont, R. L. 1999. Does spirituality represent the sixth factor of personality? Spiritual transcendence and the Five-Factor Model, Journal of Personality 67: 985–1013 2. Cloninger, C. R., Przybeck, T. R., Svrakic, D. M. and Wetzel, R. D. 1994. The Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI): a guide to its development and use. St. Louis, MO: C.R. Cloninger et al. 3. McCrae, R. R., Herbst, J. H. and Costa, P. T., Jr 2001. Effects of acquiescence on personality factor structures, in R. Riemann, F. Ostendorf and F. Spinath (eds.), Personality and temperament: genetics, evolution, and structure, pp. 217–31. Berlin: Pabst Science Publishers 4. Costa, P. T., Jr., and McCrae, R. R. 1995a. Domains and facets: hierarchical personality assessment using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory, Journal of Personality Assessment 64: 21–50 Robert R. McCrae, “The Five-Factor Model of personality traits: consensus and controversy”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Sympathy | Hume | Rawls I 186 Sympathy/observation/order/society/Hume/Rawls: in Hume, an impartial observer can enjoy observing a social system, depending on how much pleasure he/she finds in those who are subject to the system1. Rawls: if we regard this pleasure as fulfilment, the classical benefit principle is applied. According to Hume, however, sympathy is not a strong feeling. >Ideal observer. 1. D. H.: A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. II, pt. I, sec. XI, and bk. III, pt, I, sec. OI, and sec VI. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Synonymy | Habermas | IV 28 Synonymy/Habermas: an identical meaning (no longer just a coincident meaning) exists when ego knows how alter should react to a significant gesture. It is not enough to expect that alter will react in a certain way. >Understanding, >Agreement, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas This is achieved in the different development stages of the interaction: a) First, the interaction participants learn to internalize an excerpt from the objective sense structure to such an extent that both can combine identical interpretations with the same gesture. b) Then they learn what it means to use a gesture with communicative intent and to enter into a reciprocal speaker/listener relationship. c) Thirdly, the attribution of an identical and no longer only congruent meaning of gestures is added. IV 32 Meaning Identity/Habermas: this cannot mean the same thing as the identity of an object that can be identified under different descriptions. This already requires an understanding of singular terms. >Description dependency. In contrast to this: Symbolic meanings constitute or create identity in a similar way to rules that create unity in the diversity of its exemplary embodiments, its various realizations or fulfilments. Meaning identity is explained by conventional regulation. >Symbols/Habermas. IV 33 Equality/Rule Following/Wittgenstein/Habermas: according to Wittgenstein, the equality of meaning is connected to the following of a rule, namely the identical rule by all communication participants. >Rule following/Wittgenstein, >Rule following. However, keeping the rule the same is not empirical, but is based on intersubjective validity, i.e. on the fact that a) subjects can deviate from their rule-guided behaviour and b) can criticise their deviating behaviour as a rule violation. (1) >Rules/Habermas. 1.Vgl. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Schrifen Bd I, (1960) S. 382. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Technology | Flusser | I 148 Technology/Flusser: Apparatus - Operator Def Apparatus: "Tool for generating technical images". Def Operator: "Technician for apparatus". >Terminology/Flusser, >Techno-images/Flusser. I 151 The function of the apparatus and the operator are merged. The apparatus neither "frees" the photographer nor "enslaves" him. Rather, they are mutually dependent. >Media. The operator or "apparatchik " is a "human being" in the new posthistorical sense. Neither is he "active", an acting person, nor "suffering" (a treated, a tolerating person) but he functions in function of functions. The complex apparatus operator becomes a historical memory. You can see Caesar and the moon landing again and again. >History, >Historiography. I 166 Technology/Flusser: Definition Apparatuses: are historical products, products of linear texts. Apparatuses are designed by texts and generate technical images. (techno-images, >Image/Flusser). First reading: Texts lead to cameras, which produce pictures that provoke texts again, but which no longer mean photographs, but are meant by photographs. Second reading: Ditto, but emerging texts are (with films) film critiques. These texts do not mean films but are meant by films. Nevertheless, they can still influence future filmmaking. (> Meaning). Third reading: the text that has just been read is itself one that originates from the technical image (Fig. I 166), is meant by it, but can nevertheless lead to a change in the illustration, i. e. it can "mean". I 169 The situation is indeed anthropomorphic, because human beings (operators) function in the apparatuses, and it is indeed mythical (in the sense of superhuman) because the operators functioning in the apparatuses can no longer be regarded as human beings in the conventional sense. It seems we all have to think like scientists. But that is not true, because it is just historical thinking. Every epistemological effort is also a political and aesthetic one, because these three parameters cannot be separated in concrete life. >Theory of knowledge, >Politics, >Aesthetics. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Terminology | Benjamin | Bolz II 12 Paris Passages/Benjamin: the Paris Passages are documents of a society in which the economic order has assumed the function of the old myths. Flaneur: he looks at the goods and becomes the goods themselves. Reincarnation of Odysseus. Consideration of everyday objects like in a dream. Bolz II 13 Glass Palaces: glass palaces are the continuation of the precariously shaping of the relationship between inside and outside from time immemorial, it is the mythical constitution of our nature-degenerate thinking. Bolz II 15 Primordial experience/Benjamin: Cave, Underworld, Labyrinth, Chaos, Ruin. In them the understanding of the present is articulated. Allegory/Benjamin: the mythical spell of the allegory breaks through the power of the chock and the discontinuity. Benjamin hopes to bring the momentum of the historical dialectic to a standstill. Benjamin: "Anthropological materialism": the misguided reception of technology in the 19th century and in the First World War compels us to think of the relationship between human and nature not as a mastery of nature through the human, but as a mastery of the entire relationship. >Critique/Benjamin. Bolz II 36 Teaching is abolished critique, critique is inverse theology and religion is the "concrete totality of experience". Bolz II 38 The origin of the German tragedy: the image of the baroque world is born from the absolutely evil. It turns into an allegory of resurrection. >Baroque. Bolz II 42 Magic/Benjamin: The communicability of the mental being is limited by the linguistic nature. Immediate knowledge by naming the name. >Names, >Cognition. Bolz II 52 Tragedy: "idea", a "linguistical". Essence: the form, in the language, not through the language. Language is the essence of the German tragedy. >Language/Benjamin. Bolz II 55 The bourgeois world is developing into totalitarianism. Baroque: the topos of transience is central. Fear: To be overthrown at the Last Judgment. There is no Assurance in the Baroque. Baroque: is quoted in the 19th century (ruin, labyrinth). Bolz II 56 Tragedy/Benjamin: the German tragedy, unlike the Greek tragedy, knows no cosmic order, which reconciles the human with his destiny. Bolz II 56 Allegory/Benjamin: Grief, Transience, Descriptive Representations of an Abstract Concept. "One of the strongest motives in the allegorical is the insight into the transient and that concern to save things into the eternal." The power for this salvation has been discovered by the Baroque. It is only possible if the organic and the living have been destroyed before. The object becomes allegorical in the sight of melancholy. Bolz II 60 Allegory: (literally: "to say something else" introduces incompatible opposites, e.g. the abstract and the sensibly perceptible antithetical.) Tendency from the general to the particular (derogatory). Allegory constitutes a totality in which the extremes are preserved. Baroque allegory reacts to a crisis experience. Unreconciled unity of opposites (e.g. city). Bolz II 60f Baroque: Antiquity remains a contrast to Christianity. Bolz II 62 Allegory: an allegory has an analytical meaning and relationship between dream and being awake:> Paris (compared with Babylon) capital, in which all the languages of the world are spoken. At the same time hell. Nothing degrades things as much as the world of things itself. (> Passages). Underworld/Marx: the underworld has hidden place of capitalist production: "unauthorized access is prohibited". Bolz II 67 Labyrinth/Benjamin: (large city): "the right way for the person who always arrives at the destination early enough." Bolz II 69 "Dialectic at a standstill": not reaching the goal. The movement continues, but on the spot. Eternal passage. "Nu": "The past thing is connected flashingly with the "Now" into a constellation." Bolz II 70 Fashion: Eternal return of the same. Bolz II 71 Ruins/Baroque/Benjamin: fascination, not by nostalgia, but in which the fragment is seen as a necessary counterpart to the whole. Bolz II 72 Baudelaire/Benjamin: for Benjamin, he represents most clearly the ruinous development. He is not a pessimistic, but an allegorical artist. In the original sense, he is a melancholic, torns the objects out of their context and gives them meaning. Bolz II 73 "Profane Enlightenment"/Benjamin: profane Enlightenment is to be inspired by the phenomena themselves. Destruction of the modern myth. Bolz II 85 Montage/Benjamin: montage makes a never-written story readable. "To quote art without quotation marks". The > name stands "lonely and expressionless". (This was already tried by the early Romantics: the past should be cited so that it would become the historical condition of the possibility of present-day knowledge.) Bolz II 90 One-way street/Benjamin: is an ancient delirium experience of the cosmos, returns disfigured in the bloodlust of the war. Bolz II 91 "Profane Enlightenment": to oppose the rapture of technique with the technique of rapture. Intelligible structure. Bolz II 96 Mass/Bernjamin: the mass is a good, the latest asylum of the outlaw. The collective body is technically organized. "To act with films and radio on such collectives is one of the greatest peoples psychological experiments now being done in the giant laboratory of Russia". Bolz II 98 In the fascist ornament, the masses look themselves in the faces, but they do not meet. Mass: Benjamin still sees utopian features of the mass behavior, which is characterized by panic, terror and horror, as in the world war. Unconscious exercise in collective maturity. Bolz II 100 Three related thinking figures: a) Surrealism: the bourgeois individual disintegrates into creature and collective body b) in the form of Baudelaire and the film actor, he illustrates how the self-alienation of man can be productively used. c) To Brecht, he prepares the "destructive character" for Loos and Salomon Friedlaender. Destructiveness is the ideal solution from the mass of the petty bourgeoisie to the collective body of a renewed humanity. (This idea was very common in the twenties (> Heidegger, Freud). Bolz II 101 Benjamin: "Destructive Humanity": "The destructive character knows only one slogan: creating space, there is only one activity: clearing up, its need for fresh air and free space is stronger than any hate, the destructive character is young and cheerful." It does not think of anything. It is ready for reconciliation in its core. Bolz II 102 "Election": election is for Benjamin in principle only an apparant freedom. Bolz II 103 Reconciliation: (essay on the elective affinities: reconciliation can only be with God; it can only be achieved if in it "everything is destroyed, in order to find it first before God's reconciled face." Bolz II 106 Majesty of the allegorical intention: "destruction of the organic and living extinction of appearance." |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Time Reversal | Feynman | I 657 Time Reversal/Movement Reversal/Reversibility/Feynman: E.g. A movie played backwards: here entropy is not as high as you might think, since all elements have exactly the right speed to return to their starting point. >Symmetries/Feynman. Reversibility/Irreversibility/Physics/Time Inversion/Feynman: E.g. retarded electric field: t: time, r: distance from the charge: field corresponding to the acceleration at the time t r/c and not t + r/c. Consequently, it appears that the law of electricity is not reversible. Vs: but in fact Maxwell's equations are reversible! In addition, we could take the advanced field instead of the retarded field and everything goes the same way. This also means that an oscillating charge in a closed container (black body) will lead to an equilibrium. >Equations. I 729 Time Reversal/Time/Backward Movement/Film/Reversibility/Feynman: e.g. movie playing backwards: if we were able to see the individual molecules, we could not see if the machine was moving forward or backward. Nothing contradicts the physical laws. On the other hand, if we do not see all the details, it will be clearly detectable, e.g. as a forward movement. For example, if we looked at the individual atoms of an egg, we could not determine whether the egg was bursting or assembling. At the level of the individual atoms the laws look completely reversible. >Atoms/Feynman, >Natural laws. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Time Reversal | Genz | II 254 Time reversal symmetric/Genz: for example, "angle of incidence" = "angle of reflection" is time reversal symmetric, i.e. it would not be possible to determine whether a film with billiard balls runs backwards. II 255 Reflection/time reversal/Genz: the same applies to all reflection processes, forward as well as backward deterministic n. >Symmetries. II 256 If there was a law: "angle of reflection = half angle of incidence", we would have no time reversal symmetry and we could see a film running backwards. II 256 Time inversion invariant/Genz: e.g. Newton's laws of planetary motion: the directions in which the planets move could be reversed. Therefore, a film running backwards would not be recognizable. >Laws/Newton. Quantum mechanics/not time inversion invariant/Genz: the laws for elementary particles are excellent in one direction. >Quantum mechanics. II 259 In the last 200 years, the Earth was 4 hours slow, if one wanted to calculate a solar eclipse. Eventually the moon will stand still for the earth in the sky. N.B.: in a backward running film, the tides would have the opposite effect that the earth rotates faster instead of slower! Thus the time directions have become distinguishable. By comparing the two processes. N.B.: but we cannot tell from them which one is the real one and which one is the manipulated one. Tides: the laws of the tides cannot be fundamental like those of the K mesons. They do not include the origin of deformations. They are not time-reversal symmetric. Time-reversal symmetric: are fundamental laws about the collisions of molecules. Time reversal symmetry/problem: how can symmetric laws of nature lead to processes that are not symmetric themselves? Asymmetry/Genz: it is not the laws that are responsible for them, but the initial conditions or circumstances. Order/Law/Genz: the superordinate law in such cases is that order cannot increase. >Order. II 258 Asymmetry/time reversal/Genz: asymmetry is much more pronounced in macroscopic (tides) than in microscopic (K mesons). Tides: the law that the rotation of the earth slows down is forward deterministic, but not backward deterministic! For example, because it is not possible to tell from a standstill how long ago the rotation came to rest. >Tidal force. There are many ways in which it has come to a standstill, but only one more to rest. The direction of time cannot be inferred from the observation of the standstill. II 260 This does not mean absolute rotation, which is marked by centrifugal forces, but relative to the moon. Friction/Genz: friction leads to time reversal asymmetry. (If you brake until standstill). Then we see in the backward running film a course of events prohibited by the laws of nature. II 261 Statistical fluctuation/Genz: statistical fluctuation does not indicate a time direction. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time Travel | Vollmer | II 238 Time reversal-invariance/T-invariance/irreversibility/Vollmer: E.g. equations that contain a (first or higher) derivative with respect to time. - E.g. equation for motion with friction - E.g. movement under radiation damping. - E.g. Fourier equation for heat conduction. - But these are not yet the basic equations - E.g. friction consists of many shocks. >Equations, >Formulas, >Natural laws, >Entropy. II 243f Time reversal-invariance/T-invariance/time asymmetry/asymmetry/time/time direction/Vollmer: single injury in nature: the decay of neutral kaons (K02 mesons) due to the weak interaction. - N.B.: the asymmetry occurs here also in the fundamental equation. - That is, it is the dynamic law that distinguishes between past and future and so distinguishes a time direction. - (As the only in nature). II 245 Time reversal/Physics/Vollmer: can only mean a reversal of all the processes - E.g. electrodynamics: here, too, the currents and the magnetic fields must be reversed. - Then their equations are also T-invariant. >Processes, >Invariance, >Symmetries, >Asymmetry. II 254 Time reversal/film/backwards/Vollmer: if we were in a movie and it would run backwards, we would not notice because all time arrows would be reversed. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Truth Conditions | Searle | II 87 Truth conditions/Searle: there are a) certain fulfilment conditions and b) certain phenomenal properties of the experience. Fulfilment conditions: that there is a yellow wagon, and that this wagon causes the experience. Phenomenal properties: phenomenal properties determine the fulfilment conditions - so the experience determines the conditions. --- IV 101 Truth condition/Searle: truth conditions have a literal meaning - but only against background assumptions. >Terminology/Searle, >Truth/Searle, >Fullfillment condition/Searle, >Fullfillment/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Twin Earth | Searle | II 89 Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? Answer: qualitatively identical visual experiences. How to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on earth before, may fulfill the conditions. SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person. >First Person. ad II 255 Twin Earth/Putnam: the twin earth is ((s) not a different type of water (tradition)) but a different type of liquid. II 283 Self-reference/Searle: self-reference is shown, but not seen. Twin Earth: "this man" has a different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical. >Selfreference. Perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged. Self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired). >Sense/Frege, >Fregean Sense. II 316 Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects. SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough. >Reference. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Video | Flusser | I 196 f Video/Flusser: relatively new element in the codified world. One cannot predict yet how they will work. They are "dangerous" because it is still possible to distract them from the intention for which they are designed. They are "revolutionary" such as cars are "revolutionary", which are used for sexual intercourse instead of car traffic. >Revolution/Flusser. I 197. The video tape cannot be edited, it rolls off as it was recorded. A completely new kind of repetition of history. The video can make time spatial by displaying "earlier" on the tape as "behind". ((s) Flusser wrote at a time when videos were recorded on tape and could not be manipulated because they were in cassettes that could not be opened.) The video will not be cut. You can "erase" the time, just like texts written on a blackboard with chalk. Different superimposed layers of time can be eliminated so that a hidden time layer becomes visible, a process known as "emergence" from psychoanalysis and archaeology. >Time, >Psychoanalysis. Instead of a mirror: a monitor that is in the middle of the scenes and has a kind of dialogue with itself. I 198 It is not a classic mirror with right/left inversion and therefore does not provide a mirror image. Since cathode light is a very rare light that does not come directly or indirectly from the sun, the monitor is bathed in an extraordinary and revolutionary light. I 199 The TV works like a window through which things are shown beyond the horizon, the monitor acts like a mirror of current or past events. >Television. The family tree of the video is divided into water surface, mirror, microscope, the one of the film in cave walls, house wall, framed picture, and photography. >Image/Flusser, >Cinema/Flusser, >Photography/Flusser. Video is essentially dialogical. You can watch something from the end or a little bit delayed. I 200 ff Television/Flusser: the operation is simple, but the reasons why the box works are opaque. Such systems are structurally complex and functionally simple. >Complexity. On the contrary: systems whose structure is transparent, but which are difficult to handle. Like chess. >Chess. I 201 Television is characterized through the fact that the person playing with them becomes a match ball him-/herself, the game swallows him/her. >Play. It is a common opinion that the family sits in a semicircle around the box, which therefore occupies the place formerly occupied by the mother or teacher. Wrong: The box is not a transmitter, but the end point of a beam. The semicircle is a segment of a gigantic circle that is invisible to the people occupying the space. Images and sounds are received as if they were traditional pictures and sounds. For the receiver, they mean "scenes". The recipients suppress their nebulous knowledge of the apparatus, he is not a bit of a good believer, but works (with a bad conscience) with the intended deception that the signs are signs for scenes. >Signs. In fact, there is a specific image for decoding all other images: the "announcer" of this image "announces" whether the following images are facts, fictions (e.g. TV games) or imperatives (advertising). >Facts, >Fictions, >Imperatives. I 202 These differences cannot be deduced from the pictures themselves. The "announcer" can also be fictitious, e.g. an actor who mimics an announcer. As a result, the recipient is indifferent whether he or she is informed factually, fictitiously or imperatively. Since he/she pretends as if "images of the world" would be pouring out of the box, it is not important to him/her whether this world is factual or imperative. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bohr, N. | Barrow Vs Bohr, N. | I 244 Measuring: Major problem with the Copenhagen interpretation: What is a measurement? Bohr: a measurement is done when the infinitely spreading wave function "collapses" at a certain place at a certain but unpredictable state. (E.g. double-slit). Question: Does the wave function of the neutron collapse when it hits the photographic plate, which plays the role of inanimate observer, or does it collapse, because a physicist observes the entire system of the interaction of the wave function of the neutron with the film? Where and when does the wave function actually collapse? VsBohr: the problem of Bohr's interpretation is that it does not really pretend to describe what quantum states and measuring devices are, but only how they relate to each other. The only thing that is clear is that the measurement process has properties that are diametrically opposed to those that are present when no measurement is made. I 245 While the wave function is deterministic, linear, continuous and local, and does not know any determinate time direction, the measuring process is almost random, non-linear, discontinuous, non-local and irreversible. Schrödinger never accepted the Copenhagen interpretation. E.g. Schrödinger's cat: a cat is locked into a steel chamber together with a Geiger counter and a weak radioactive source. If the counter registers one of these decay coincidences within an hour, it releases poisonous gas that kills the cat quickly. If during that hour no atom falls apart, the cat survives. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, as Schrödinger asserts, the cat is a mixture of dead and alive before we look into the steel chamber. When and where changes the state of neither alive nor dead to either one or the other? (Variant of the example with a space capsule in which the cat has been dead for years from one moment to another.) I 246 Schrödinger wanted to show that the quantum theory does not fully describe the reality. We should see our knowledge of the cat in a confused state, not the cat itself. BohrVsSchrödinger in contrast would have claimed that there is no such thing as "the cat itself". The only existing reality is our knowledge about the cat. In addition, the macroscopic scale reduces the importance of the example. Vs: We could argue that we do not know whether a cat is in a mixed state if we see one. Now, if lasers could be made to show us mixed states, they would not be macroscopical, however. Eugene Wigner, John v. Neumann: Thesis: only certain instruments can collapse the wave equation, namely those that have a consciousness similar to that of humans. (Somewhat surprising for logicians). This could be construed as an argument against quantum computers. Barrow: before we have those, we cannot say anything about them... +... I 247. Paradoxically, if conscious observers are split into microscopic particles, we reach levels of the quantum structure, at which only an observer can give meaning. (.. + ..>Consciousness) >Consciousness means that we do not have to learn by trial and error. I 247 Wheeler: almost all astronomical observations are made with radiation, quantum waves whose wave function is collapsed by the detectors and astronomers. Does this mean that we bring these astronomical objects and the universe itself to life, in a way, if we observe them today? VsBohr: main problem is that he attributes a special role to measurement. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Dummett, M. | Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M. | I 253 Meaning/assertion/Dummett/Tugendhat: Example Game: assertion action, assertion and counter assertion, "yes"/"no" corresponds to "true"/"false" one wins, one loses. This schema should be the basis of every utterance of every assertoric sentence! I 254 The speaker gives a guarantee, which is doubted by the listener. (Searle quite similar, see above). I 255 New: it is said vice versa: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is correct. This presupposes: 1. That the conditions in which the expression is used are indifferent to the correctness of the use. 2. That the conditions on which the correctness depends are those the fulfilment of which is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions of its correctness (truth) are fulfilled! The equivalence "p equi that p is true" is based on the fact that the person who claims something has always asserted its correctness. I 256 Speaker: Conditions and presence together guaranteed. Listener: separates both and questions it separately. (Asymmetry). I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or proposition are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a proposition are indicated by a proposition. Of course, this presupposes that for the explanation of a proposition there is always already another proposition available. Meta Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used as the second, it is necessary to show under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every assumption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric proposition, which is a pseudo explanation. II 231 TugendhatVsDummett: "Meaning" in Frege should not be translated with "Reference"! II 232 Justified only where Frege considers sentences as proper names! II 247 Reference/Tugendhat: through my criticism of translation, meaning = reference, I have not questioned the primacy of truth over objects. DummettVsTugendhat: it is not enough to explain the meaning of names merely as truth-value potential: 1. The meaning could then be understood as a mere equivalence set of expressions. TugendhatVsDummett: correct with sentences and predicates, with names one does not have to be content with it. DummettVsTugendhat: 2. That two names "a" and "b" have the same meaning, if they have the same truth-value potential, applies only to extensional predicates. But with which criterion can extensional ones be distinguished from intensional predicates? It presupposed that we had a criterion for the equality of meanings of names, which is not first determined by Leibniz's law. II 248 Leibniz's Law/Dummett: cannot be understood as a definition of "=", but is based on the fact that when we predetermine something from an object, the truth value of the assertion must be independent of the way it is given! TugendhatVsDummett: not so with Frege: Dummett himself points out that he understood Leibniz's law as definition of "=". Tugendhat: we cannot explain what we mean by identity with the law. Tugendhat pro Dummett. TugendhatVsDummett: with sentences as equivalence classes one has not lost touch with the world: it is only about very specific equivalence sets, which of course are determined by the nature of the world. Dummett: sentences do not equal names! (VsFrege). II 249 Reference/Dummett: semantic role. Tugendhat: this is exactly the same as my "truth-value potential". ((s) Cf. > semantic value, >semantic role). II 250 Reference/Frege: he never spoke of reference Predicate/Frege: he never said that the meanings of predicates must be understood as "quasi-objects". Dummett/Tugendhat: the justified core of Dummett's criticism: it does not yet follow from the truth-value potential that the meaning of a name is an object. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Endurantism | Lewis Vs Endurantism | Schwarz I 32 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points. Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd. Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116). Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time. Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5) e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away. Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation. Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation. Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance. Schwarz I 33 Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them. 1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42. 3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] 4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. 5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Habermas, J. | Rorty Vs Habermas, J. | Brendel I 133 Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals. Brendel I 134 Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either. Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality. Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths. Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness. Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community. Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto). Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community. Brendel I 135 RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests. Rorty II (b) 50 RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism". II (b) 29 French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers, Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity." II (b) 43 Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters. II (d) 94 Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence. II (d) 94/95 Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves. II (d) 96 RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship. III 113 Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas). III 119 RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower. III 120 RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of 'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language". III 231 Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste". III 232 Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?" V 9 World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Harré, H.R. | Nozick Vs Harré, H.R. | II 121 Inegalitarian Theories/IGT/Inegalitarianism/Existence/Explanation/Nozick: IGT: they assume that a situation or a small number of states are privileged or natural, and therefore require no explanation, while other states or situations have to be explained as deviations from them. E.g. Newton considered idleness or uniformity of movement of the natural state, and everything else had to be explained by the assumption of forces. Aristotle: Idleness. Nozick: but that is not limited to theories of motion. (Footnote). IGT: distinguish two classes of states or situations: 1) those requiring an explanation 2) those that do not need an explanation, and do not allow one! IGT: are particularly suitable for questions such as: "why does X exist and Y not?" That also means that there is rather a non-N state (not nothing) than an N state. IGT: leave two questions unanswered: 1) Why should N be the natural state, and not perhaps a different species, a species N'? 2) Given N be the natural state, why are there forces that are assumed to be F and should provide deviations, and not other forces, perhaps '? Natural State/Nozick: to assuming something as nZ also means attributing a specific content to it! But here one should be careful with a priori arguments in favor of certain content. II 122 Declaration/R.Harré: Thesis: that something remains the same does not need to be explained: that is the most fundamental principle. (1970, p 248) NozickVsHarré: But do we not need an explanation of why one thing is considered as the same for the purposes of this principle, but another is not? The principle is trivialized if we say that what is always assumed as not needing no explanation, is thought to be constant with respect to a set of concepts that are fitting. ((s) circular). IGT: the question of "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" is set against the backdrop of an assumed IGT. If there was nothing, the question would have to be asked just as well (even there were nobody to ask it). "Why is there nothing instead of something?" Problem: then any causal factor that is in question for the nothing is itself a deviation from nothing! Then there can be no explanation as to why these forces F exist which does not introduce these Fs itself as explanatory factors (circular). II 123 Nothing/Nozick: now we might assume that there is a special force that produces nothingness, a "nothinging power". In the film "Yellow Submarine" there is a vacuum cleaner that absorbs everything and also absorbs itself in the end. Then there is a "pop" and a multicolored scenery emerges. According to this view, nothingness has produced something by destroying itself. Nozick: perhaps nothingness only destroys a little and still leaves room for a force for real nothing. Let us imagine a nothinging force that operates at an angle of 45°, and alternative stronger and weaker forces ...+... II 124 the nothinging force will eventually take over itself and slow itself down or this is somehow prevented... Problem: even if there was an original nothinging force, the question is still, at which point it became effective and at what angle it operated! Somehow, a 45° curve seems less random, but that is only because of our representation system: on logarithmic graph paper it looks completely random! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Kant | Stroud Vs Kant | I 145 Def Reality/Real/(Kant: "whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real". (A 376)). I 146 StroudVsKant: but he does not go into detail how we can distinguish reality from appearance in individual cases where the question might arise. I 159 Skepticism/transcendental/StroudVsKant: does he really refute skepticism with his transcendental philosophy? Is it a better answer than others? 1. We can only understand his answer if we understand and accept his transcendental approach. We must then also accept his idealism. I 160 Understanding/Stroud: we should do best when we observe people and their behavior (>Behaviorism). But that would be an empirical study. It would be about language, language behaviour and language acquisition. StroudVsKant: we understand his argument only if we understand his concept of a priori knowledge. And this investigation presupposes that we accept transcendental idealism. That seems circular! (Circle): to understand idealism again, we must understand the particular nature of the investigation that makes idealism transcendental. I 161 2. StroudVsKant: (this would even be Kantian reasons VsKant): according to Kant, thoughts are only possible if they are applied to what categories can be applied to. But this is only possible within the framework of possible experiences. The concepts must be able to have an empirical application. ((s) So they must be learned in empiricism). StroudVsKant: then how is it possible that we can have (transcendental) thoughts at all that are not determined by empirical conditions? a) empirically: For example, if expressions such as "directly perceive" and "independently of us" are given in everyday empirical use, then we see ((s) according to Kant!) that the sentence "We perceive independent things directly" is true. Empirically understood this simply means: e.g. without mirrors or screens. b) transcendental: other language use: here the sentence "we perceive independent things directly" does not express truth. ((s) Beware, Stroud does not say that he is wrong according to Kant). StroudVsKant: with the transcendental meaning we thus move away from everyday language. KantVsStroud: would reply that this use must be understandable for us, otherwise knowledge about the world would not be possible. I 162 StroudVsKant: this leads to two problems: 1. Suppose we accepted Kant's transcendentalism: Question: why would the rejection of idealism at the transcendental level be more attractive than accepting it at the empirical level? Why does Kant reject empirical idealism? ((s) "Condition"/empirical/(s): a condition cannot be understood empirically. But their fulfilment > Fact. But one cannot see that a fact is supposed to fulfil something.) Solution: making a corresponding sentence true. (But this sentence must be expressed first). StroudVsKant: if the argument is that our knowledge would otherwise be limited to the things we know are dependent on us, why should we then seek "refuge" in the view that our knowledge is limited to things we have recognized as (transcendently spoken) dependent on us? Skepticism/StroudVsKant: is so painful precisely because it does not allow knowledge of independent things. Why should Kant's solution be less painful just because it is transcendental? Empirical Idealism/KantVsStroud: cannot be true. 2. Question about the strength of the guarantee that Kant's transcendentalism exists: This corresponds to the question why Kant rejects transcendental realism. KantVsTranscendental Realism: would not be a correct explanation of our knowledge because - if it were true - we could never directly perceive things independent of ourselves and therefore could never be certain of their existence. Transcendental realism thus opens the way for empirical idealism by perceiving external things as something separate from the senses. Problem: we can then be aware of our representations, but we do not know if something existing corresponds to them! StroudVsKant: he rejects these attitudes for the only reason for which transcendental explanations can be rejected at all: that they provide no explanation, how is it possible that we know something? StroudVsKant: why does he think that empirical idealism paves the way for transcendental realism? Probably because he believes that the only things we can directly perceive are the things that depend on us. And he does not assume this as an empirical thesis, but only as a transcendental one. The sentence "everything we perceive is dependent on us" is true when understood transcendently. Kant/Stroud: probably he assumes this because he does not understand how perception is possible without the perception of a "representation" or something "in us". StroudVsKant: this is how the thesis of the "epistemic priority" appears here again: I 164 shifted from the empirical to the transcendental level. Perception/Kant/Stroud: he can only accept direct perception of independent things empirically spoken because he does not accept them transcendently spoken. StroudVsKant: important: that this is the only point he rejects. Kant: if we treat external things as things in themselves, it is impossible to understand how we can arrive at knowledge. StroudVsKant: Suppose Kant were right that transcendental realism leaves our knowledge of external things unexplained. Question: why is that alone sufficient to make our theory wrong, transcendentally speaking? Couldn't it simply be transcendentally true that things cannot be known? Kant/Stroud: would say no, as he understands "transcendental" as following: transcendental knowledge is part of the explanation of our knowledge. Direct Perception/Kant: is only possible of dependent things (representations etc.). Transcendental Realism/Kant/Stroud: would then have to say that there are also independent things. Namely, those that correspond to these representations. But then we would be forced to conclude that all our representations (sensory experiences) would be inadequate to establish the reality of these things. (A 369). The outer things would then be separate from the things we are aware of. StroudVsKant: the only problem of transcendental realism is that it prevents our explanation of "how knowledge is possible". I 165 Problem: then there is no independent way to determine his truth or falsehood. The only test of his acceptability is whether he makes an explanation possible. Transcendental Aesthetics/Transcendental Idealism/Kant/Stroud: Transcendental idealism is integrated into transcendental aesthetics: (A 378), independent of these consequences. StroudVsKant: but it is not bound differently than transcendental or a priori as an a priori condition of an investigation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. And this is the only way how a transcendental theory can be founded at all: that it is the only possible explanation of our synthetically a priori possible knowledge in geometry and arithmetic. Skepticism/StroudVsKant: so there is no independent possibility to justify a transcendental theory. ((s) than that it is the only explanation for something else). Then one has to ask whether skepticism has been refuted at all. I 166 Skepticism/StroudVsKant: there are at least two ways in which an explanation of our knowledge of the outer world can fail: If skepticism were true; Kant claims to have at least empirically refuted this, but only by putting in place a transcendental version of the same description. Understanding/StroudVsKant: if we understand transcendentalism (transcendental use of our words) at all, this use is not satisfactory. It still represents knowledge as limited to what I understand to be dependent on me. I am once again a prisoner of my subjectivity. Transcendental Idealism/StroudVsKant: is ultimately difficult to distinguish from skepticism. I.e. not that it is the same as empirical idealism, but that it is unsatisfactory as an explanation, namely on the empirical level! I 167 Transcendental Idealism/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant would say: "I won't lose anything if I accept it". My knowledge is not limited to the things that are empirically dependent or are only empirically subjective. I am theoretically able to deliver the best physics, chemistry and other sciences. I am in a better position than Descartes. StroudVsKant: but then, according to Kant, all our scientific knowledge is still subjective or dependent on our human sensitivity. I 168 Knowledge/Explanation/StroudVsKant: but we could also do without an explanation in another way: not because skepticism was true (and thus nothing could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be conclusively posed! (>Carnap, see below). Kant/Stroud: N.B.: pleads in a way for a limited ("deflationary") view that corresponds to this critique. ((s) deflationary here: not aimed at the most comprehensive framework, see below). KantVsDescartes: if its question could be asked coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: but he does not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Schiffer Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 175 Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/SchifferVsKripke: Paradox/Schiffer: Solution: Usually, by showing that one of the propositions must be rejected. Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: we represent so canonically: (P1) (1) Yesterday Clem meant addition instead of quaddition with "plus". (2) But there is nothing in Clem's past, which could find that he meant the one in place of the other, there is simply not a fact. (3). But (1) and (2) are incompatible: if there was not a fact that it stipulated, then it is not that he meant addition instead of quaddition in the past. (P2) The same for the present. I 176 Schiffer: if (P1) and (P2) are paradox, then also (P3): (1) Clem believes that there are lions in Africa (2)But there is nothing in Clem's past, which specifies that he believes that. There is no fact of belief about Clem, specifying this. (3) Because (1) and (2) are incompatible, it is not the case that he believes that there are lions in Africa. ((s) difference to Kripke's Wittgenstein: there it says in (3) that he believes either addition or Quaddition (wherein Quaddition can be any deviation). But in (P3) it is said that he cannot believe that there are lions in Africa, and even Clem itself would have to notice that.). So that it is not possible at all to have an attitude is something different than the inability to determine the exact content of the attitude). Schiffer: Here too it can be said that there is neither a "reducible" nor a "irreducible" fact. Pointe: Pointe: if there is a solution to (P3), it could also be used for Kripke's Wittgenstein. How would the solution look like? "Direct solution"/Kripke's Wittgenstein would ultimately be a physicalist reduction. That many want. But that is impossible. We cannot reduce "to mean". Fact/Schiffer: if we are talking about the fact, then from the non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact, that, however, does not exist for Kripke's Wittgenstein. Kripke’s Wittgenstein/solution/Schiffer: both (2) and (3) are ambiguous in terms of "fact", it can be read here pleonastic or non-pleonastic. pleonastic: here (3) is true and (2) false: Clem meant addition and believes that there are lions in Africa, so it is a fact that he does. ((s) in the "superfluous", non-ontological sense of "fact".) non-pleonastic: here (2) is true and (3) false: there is indeed no objective language-independent fact which stipulates that Clem thinks or believes this and that. Nonfactualism/solution: there is no property that is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. I 177 Belief-predicate/propositional attitude: E.g. "means by "plus" the addition" E.g. "believes that there are lions in Africa". SchifferVsKripke/Kripke's Wittgenstein: the fact that there are no non-pleonastic facts regarding belief and meaning, does not conclude that you cannot mean anything. Conclusion/Schiffer: (a) Clem means addition and believes that there are lions in Africa. (b) the propositions about Clem's meaning and belief are not reducible to propositions without semantic, Intentional or Mentalese vocabulary. (They are irreducible intentionalistic). (c) there is no non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact or property in respect of meaning or belief, that is in relation to the predicate "means addition" or "believes that lions ..." as the name "Greta Garbo" to Greta Garbo. Schiffer: which makes the way for the ontological physicalism. VsSchiffer: it could be argued: E.g. Clem died yesterday after he has used "plus" for 50 years. Now we have a complete sound film his life along with complete records of its neurophysiological life and his stream of consciousness. I 178 Then we can formulate two empirically adequate hypotheses which exclude each other: 1. Clem meant addition, 2. Clem meant Quaddition. That is a mystery, isn't it? SchifferVsVs: this is indeed a mystery. Here I have another one: there are two empirically adequate hypotheses about myself, one that my sensory experience originates from physical objects, 2. that they are caused by Descartes evil demon. ((s)> brains in a vat). Nevertheless, I believe in physical objects. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Various Authors | Locke Vs Various Authors | Danto I 112 LockeVsInnate Ideas: God created us so that we can acquire the basic ideas with our senses, therefore it would be superfluous to provide us with innate ideas. Locke I 78 Second Treatise Law/LockeVsFilmer: Adam did not obtain an absolute right of dominion over his children or the world either by paternity law or by God's positive gift. Had he possessed this, his heirs would not have possesed this. If these had attained it, there would be neither a determination of the natural nor the positive right from which it could be seen who was entitled to the right of inheritance. I 79 Legitimacy/Locke: claims to derive political violence from the "true origin": the state of nature without power. Locke I 159 Law of Nature/LockeVsGrotius: unthinkable without God's existence (Grotius: but thinkable, even if the assumption would be a great crime!). Locke II 195/196 Language/LockeVsArtificial Language: (fashion of the time, according to Leibniz, according to the algebra model): instead, analysis of the use of language, critical discussion of its function. An individual cannot reform his or her mother tongue. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Background | Searle, J.R. | I 198 Compared to my earlier books, there are significant changes. The thesis of the background originally referred to the meaning meant by the speaker, even to all forms of intentionality, linguistically or not linguistically. It says the following: intentional phenomena such as meaning, to mean, understanding, believing, desiring and experiencing function only in interaction with a set of background abilities that are themselves not intentional. I 200 The thesis of background is now a very strong assertion: 1. Intentional states do not function autonomously. 2. A network of other intentional states is required. 3. Even the network is not sufficient. It only works in conjunction with a lot of background capabilities. 4. These abilities are not further intentional states or components of any intentional state. 5. The same intentional content may lay down different fulfilment conditions. Example background: think of Wittgenstein's example with the picture of the man walking uphill. It could be interpreted as a picture of a man sliding downhill. Nietzsche may not have been the first, but he was aware that the background does not have to be as it is. Bourdieu's concept of the Habitus (1979) is closely related to my concept of background. I 214 Thesis from the background: new: all conscious intentionality: thinking, perceiving, understanding, etc. establishes truth conditions only in relation to certain abilities which neither belong nor could belong to the respective state of consciousness. The actual intentional content in itself is not sufficient to determine the conditions of fulfillment. New as old: still a lot of background ability is needed to interpret thoughts, belief etc.. But new: such a network has no real existing reality! VI 142 Searle Thesis: the concept of literal meaning has at all only relative to a set of background assumptions an application VI 147 if certain background assumptions are missing, the sentence has no certain truth conditions that is a weaker thesis than that of the freedom of context of literal meaning. |
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