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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hermeneutic Circle | Heidegger | Gadamer I 270 Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger writes: "The circle must not be pulled down to a vitiosum, even if it is a tolerated one. Hidden within it is a positive Gadamer I 271 possibility of the most original recognition, which of course is only genuinely grasped when the interpretation has understood that its first, permanent and final task is not to allow itself to be dictated by ideas and popular concepts, but to secure the scientific subject in its elaboration from the things themselves"(1). Gadamer: What Heidegger says here is not at first a demand on practice of understanding, but describes the form of execution of understanding interpretation itself. Heidegger's hermeneutical reflection has its peak not so much in proving that there is a circle here, but rather that this circle has an ontologically positive meaning. Understanding/Gadamer: Whoever wants to understand a text always starts out drafting, he or she throws a sense of the whole ahead, as soon as a first sense appears in the text. Such a sense is only revealed because one reads the text with certain expectations of a certain meaning. In the elaboration of such a preliminary draft, which is of course constantly revised from the point of view of what will emerge in the further penetration of the mind, there is an understanding of what is there. Heidegger/Gadamer: That each revision of the preliminary draft is in the possibility of throwing a new draft of meaning ahead, that rival drafts can Gadamer I 272 exist next to each other until the unity of meaning becomes more clearly defined; that interpretation begins with preliminary terms that are replaced by more appropriate terms: this constant re-drafting, which constitutes the sense movement of understanding and interpretation, is the process Heidegger describes. Objectivity: There is no other "objectivity" here than the probation that a preliminary opinion finds through its elaboration. Method: One has to think of this fundamental demand as the radicalization of a procedure that in truth we always practice when we understand. >Expectations/Gadamer. Gadamer I 298 Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger/Gadamer: Schleiermacher (...) succeeds (...) in establishing harmony with the ideal of objectivity of the natural sciences, but only by [renouncing] to bring the concretion of historical consciousness in hermeneutic theory to the fore. >Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. HeideggerVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Heidegger's description and existential justification of the hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, means a decisive turn. [Schleiermacher's theory culminated in the] doctrine of the divinatory act, through which one puts oneself completely in the author's place and from there dissolves everything foreign and alienating in the text. Heidegger: In contrast, Heidegger describes the circle in such a way that the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of pre-conception. The circle of whole and part is not brought to dissolution in perfect understanding, but is actually accomplished. Ontology/method: The circle is thus not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that guides our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but is determined by the commonality that connects us with the tradition. But this common ground is in constant formation in our relationship with tradition. It is not simply a prerequisite, under which we have always been standing, but we create it ourselves, as long as we understand, participate in what has been handed down and thereby further determine it ourselves. The circle Gadamer I 299 of understanding is thus not at all a "methodological" circle, but describes an ontological structural moment of understanding. >Perfection/Gadamer. 1. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 312ff |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutic Circle | Gadamer | I 296 Hermeneutic Circle/Gadamer: How does the hermeneutic effort begin? What follows for understanding from the hermeneutical condition of belonging to a tradition? >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Tradition/Gadamer. We recall here the hermeneutical rule that one must understand the whole from the individual and the individual from the whole. It originates from ancient rhetoric and has been transferred through modern hermeneutics from the art of oratory to the art of understanding. It's a circular relationship, here and there. The anticipation of meaning, in which the whole is meant, comes to an explicit understanding through the fact that the parts which are determined by the whole, in turn determine the whole themselves. The task is to create concentric circles to expand the unity of the understood sense. Attunement of all details to the whole is the respective criterion for the correctness of understanding. >Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutic Circle | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 193 Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Ast and the entire hermeneutic-rhetorical tradition, when he recognizes as an essential basic feature of understanding that the meaning of the individual is always only ever derived from the context and thus ultimately from Gadamer I 194 the whole. This sentence applies as a matter of course to the grammatical understanding of each sentence up to the point where it is placed in the context of the whole of a literature... or of a work yes, up to the whole of literature or of the literary genre. But Schleiermacher now applies it to the psychological understanding which must understand every thought formation as a moment of life in the total context of that person. It has always been clear that logically seen here there is a circle, provided that the whole, from which the individual is to be understood, is not given before the individual - unless in the manner of a dogmatic canon (as the Catholic and as we saw, to a certain extent also guides the Reformation's understanding of Scripture), or a preliminary concept of the spirit of a time analogue to it (as Ast presupposes the spirit of antiquity in the manner of presentiment). Solution: Schleiermacher, however, explains that such dogmatic guidelines cannot claim any prior validity and are therefore only relative limitations of the circle. Basically, understanding always means moving in such circles, so the repeated return from the whole to the parts and vice versa is essential. In addition, this circle is constantly expanding, as the concept of the whole is a relative one, and its placement in ever larger contexts always affects the understanding of the individual. Gadamer I 296 Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: [Schleiermacher differentiated the] hermeneutic circle of part and whole according to its objective as well as its subjective side. Just as the individual word belongs to the context of the sentence, so the individual text belongs to the context of the writer's work, and the latter to the whole of the literary genre or literature in question. On the other hand, however, the same text, as a manifestation of a creative moment, belongs to the whole of the soul life of its author. Only in such a whole, both objective and subjective, can understanding be completed. Dilthey: Following this theory, Dilthey then speaks of "structure" and of "centering in a center" from which the understanding of the whole emerges. He thus transfers to the historical world what has always been a principle Gadamer I 297 of all interpretation of texts: that one must understand a text from within oneself. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: But it is questionable whether the circular movement of understanding is so adequately understood. Here we have to go back to the result of our analysis of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. (>Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher). What Schleiermacher has developed as a subjective interpretation may be put aside completely. 1 GadamerVsSchleiermacher: When we try to understand a text, we do not put ourselves in the author's mental state, but if we want to speak of putting ourselves in the author's place, we put ourselves in the perspective under which the other person has come to his or her opinion. That means nothing else but that we seek to accept the factual right of what the other person says. We will even, if we want to understand, try to reinforce his or her arguments. 2. GadamerVsSchleiermacher: (...) also the objective side of this circle, as Schleiermacher describes it, does not get to the heart of the matter (...): The goal of all understanding and comprehension is the agreement on the matter. Thus hermeneutics has always had the task of establishing absent or disturbed agreement. The history of hermeneutics can confirm this, if one thinks, for example, of Augustine, where the Old Testament is to be communicated with the Christian message(1), or of early Protestantism, which was faced with the same problem(2), or finally of the age of Enlightenment, where it admittedly comes close to a renunciation of consent, if the "perfect understanding" of a text is to be achieved only by means of historical interpretation. It is now something qualitatively new when Romanticism and Schleiermacher establish a historical consciousness of a universal scope by no longer allowing the binding form of the tradition from which they come and in which they stand to be a firm foundation for all hermeneutic endeavour. Gadamer I 298 Schleiermacher (...) succeeds (...) in establishing harmony with the ideal of objectivity of the natural sciences, but only by [renouncing] to bring the concretion of historical consciousness to the fore in hermeneutical theory. HeideggerVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Heidegger's description and existential foundation of the hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, means a decisive turn. >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger. 1. Cf. for this: G. Ripanti, Agostino teoretico del' interpretazione. Brescia 1980 2. Cf. M. Flacius; Clavis Scripturae sacrae seu de Sermone sacrarum literarum, lib.II, 1676 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Davidson, D. | Fodor Vs Davidson, D. | IV 68 Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like! IV 69 Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well. Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side. QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT). This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof". This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem. E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives. That seems to be a holistic consequence. Vs: but that is premature. Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation! I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all! Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior: 1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible. IV 74 Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions. From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle). These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc. IV 84 Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language! IV 98 "Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true! IV 100 Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions, 2) are syntactically atomistic. The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts. IV 101 We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable. > Behavior/wish IV 120ff. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Gadamer, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Gadamer, G. | I 21ff Signs/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by notes (explanations). Notes are sentences which contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meaning of these signs has been detected (VsHermeneutic Circle/WittgensteinVsGadamer), 4.12 "To be able to represent the logical form, we would have to position us with the sentence outside the logic, that is, outside the world." --- I 22 Wittgenstein: the meaningful sentence comprises both the punctuation, as well as its "projective relation to the world". (3.12) The projection method is "the thinking of the sentence meaning". (3.11) |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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