Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Human Rights | Kant | Höffe I 306 Human Rights/Kant/Höffe: Kant is, what some interpreters wrongly deny, one of the founders of the modern theory of human rights. Although he does not represent Höffe I 307 a catalogue of human rights, but speaks emphatically of an "original right" - for Kant by virtue of his practical rational nature – the right that "every human being is entitled to by virtue of his or her humanity" (Doctrine of Law, Introduction). He calls it the "innate, therefore inner mine and yours," which has clear precedence over the object of private law, the "outer mine and yours”. Right to freedom: Kant derived the right of every human being from an element equivalent to the categorical legal imperative, the principle of generally acceptable freedom. According to Kant, every human being has a claim to freedom, if it can exist together with every other freedom according to a general law. Criterion: This right to a generally compatible freedom has the rank of a criterion and is therefore in the singular. The question whether certain claims have the rank of human rights is decided by the question whether they meet the criterion of generally compatible freedom. Negative rights: The corresponding human rights are primarily rights of defence against fellow human beings, and secondarily rights of defence against the state, which must not abuse the power it has established in favour of the law. Kant not only developed the criterion for human rights, the principle of generally acceptable freedom. There are four negative liberty rights: 1) (...) the prohibition of privileges and the mirror-image prohibition of discrimination; instead, everyone is to be respected as equal with everyone else. The concepts of freedom and equality, which are often played off against each other, prove to be equally important. 2) (...) the right to be one's own master, and thus a personality of one's own right. It must not be degraded to the status of either serf or slave, but is rather empowered to determine its own life. 3) (...) the right, in legal terms, first to be regarded as blameless, positively said: as legally honourable. The contrary assertion is thus considered to be subject to the burden of proof, which in criminal law amounts to the principle in dubio pro reo (in case of doubt for the accused). 4) (...) the human right to do or not to do anything as long as one does not intervene in the rights of others, namely in their inner mine and yours. I 308 Basic right of public law: every person has the right to a public legal status with its three dimensions: Everyone has the right, first, to live in a state, the nearer of a republic, second, with his state in relation to all other states in accordance with international law, and finally, seen globally, in a cosmopolitan relationship. >Cosmopolitanism/Kant, >Morals/Kant, >Ethics/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Human Rights | Locke | Höffe I 249 Human Rights/HöffeVsLocke/Höffe: Because of its superior rank, Locke's basic goods ("life, liberty and property")(1) could be considered basic and human rights. It is true that in the natural state everyone is entitled to them, but they are not secured there. Locke emphasizes time and again that the necessary violence for the state community that is therefore necessary is ceded to a strong majority, but not distributively and collectively to everyone. VsLocke: Consequently, it is not excluded what contradicts the idea of a veritable basic and human right: that the majority of a minority restricts the rights and refuses tolerance to Catholics and atheists as in Locke's letter of tolerance. >>Toleration/Locke, >State/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, 1689/90, § 93 |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Human Rights | Aristotle | Höffe I 69 Human rights/Aristotle/Höffe: Aristotle did not have institutions like the basic and human rights, like the parties and associations, like the press or even a constitutional court, nor a legislator in the modern modern sense. Elementary inequalities are particularly serious. Although Aristotle defined human beings through language and reason, he did not grant them legal and political equality. On the contrary, he justifies the inequalities of his time, the lack of equal rights for women, slaves and barbarians. >Inequality/Aristotle. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Human Rights | Rousseau | Höffe I 271 Human Rights/Rousseau/Höffe: According to Rousseau, there is no natural law, no law of nature that precedes the civil state. The right arises only in political society and with it.(1) >State/Rousseau. >Natural State/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 Origin/Justification: Because the state takes its origin in an act of freedom, it has legitimacy, which however comes into being exclusively by the means of a free consent, i.e. the >Social Contract. No power, no matter how superior, can create any right. Only an all-sided consensus, an agreement which is not contradicted by any of the parties concerned, empowers to rule lawfully (2). >Justification/Rousseau, >State/Rousseau, >Social Contract/Rousseau. Höffe I 278 Common good: Since [the common good] is oriented towards the good of the whole, both the common preservation and the general welfare, it always and without restriction has normative precedence over the (particular) will of the individuals. The common good is based on the will of those concerned. Höffe: Question: How do you determine this will? A conception of the common will (volonté général) as a thought experiment could lead to a criterion of consentability: The answer could (...) consist in human rights according to this strict understanding, i.e. in rights that are due to a person simply because he or she is a human being. Rousseau/Höffe: Even if one can interpret some references in this sense, Rousseau does not defend such rights in the articles of association. Instead, he votes for an empirical reading of the common will. >General Will/Rousseau. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), 1762 |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Human Rights | Morgenthau | Brocker I 287 Human Rights/Morgenthau: Question: Do morals and customs do what international law is unable to achieve in an age of sovereign statehood? Is there an ethos that is binding across borders, or is there at least a public opinion on a global scale? Morgenthau finds traces in the field of human rights. For him, however, these are not hopeful approaches, but only weak remnants of yesterday's Christian and aristocratic European-dominated world. Their overarching moral unity is lost.(1) >Human rights. 1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948. Dt.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963. Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Pol Morg I Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948 German Edition: Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Human Rights | Agamben | Brocker I 828 Human Rights/Agamben: Democracy (see Totalitarianism/Agamben) does not abolish sacred life in such a way (as one should assume), but "fragments it, scattering it in every single body to be used in political conflicts". (1) (See also Life/Agamben, Biopolitics/Agamben). Arendt had already investigated and uncovered this logic in her book on totalitarianism about the Déclaration des Droits de l'homme et du citoyen of 1789. (2) Starting from the paradox that the very person - the stateless refugee who "was only human" - who actually had to make use of human rights had no right to these rights, the failure of these rights becomes clear, which apply de facto exclusively as the rights of the citizen. Thus the title of the declaration already takes account of the impossibility of granting rights to humans as such, to the naked life, the "homo sacer", which are not secured by the nation state. >Human rights. 1. Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 132. 2. Hannah Arendt, Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft. Antisemitismus, Imperialismus, totale Herrschaft, München/Zürich 1998. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Agamben I Giorgio Agamben Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Human Rights | Kelsen | Brocker I 139 Human rights/Kelsen: Kelsen's rejection of absolutist worldviews also includes the rejection of the assumption that human rights can be regarded as pre-political norms that must be recognised by politics but are not produced by it. >Natural Justice/Kelsen, >Democratic theory/Kelsen, >Democracy/Kelsen. VsKelsen: Interpreters who see Kelsen as a liberal follow him gladly in the rejection of dictatorship, but have trouble with his criticism of fundamental and human rights. Marcus Llanque, „Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Human Rights | Church | Brockman I 242 Robots/human rights/George M. Church: Probably we should be less concerned about us-versus-them and more concerned about the rights of all sentients in the face of an emerging unprecedented diversity of minds. We should be harnessing this diversity to minimize global existential risks, like supervolcanoes and asteroids. Brockman I 243 Very practically, we have to address the ethical rules that should be built in, learned, or probabilistically chosen for increasingly intelligent and diverse machines. We have a whole series of Trolley Problems. At what number of people in line for death should the computer decide to shift a moving trolley to one person? Ultimately this might be a deep-learning problem—one in which huge databases of facts and contingencies can be taken into account, some seemingly far from the ethics at hand. >Trolley Problem/Church. Brockman I 244 Questions that at first seem alien and troubling, like “Who owns the new minds, and who pays for their mistakes?” are similar to well-established laws about who owns and pays for the sins of a corporation. Brockman I 248 Robots/Weizenbaum/Church: In his 1976 book Computer Power and Human Reason(1), Joseph Weizenbaum argued that machines should not replace Homo in situations requiring respect, dignity, or care, while others (author Pamela McCorduck and computer scientists like John McCarthy and Bill Hibbard) replied that machines can be more impartial, calm, and consistent and less abusive or mischievous than people in such positions. George M. ChurchVsJefferson: (…) as we change geographical location and mature, our unequal rights change dramatically. Embryos, infants, children, teens, adults, patients, felons, gender identities and gender preferences, the very rich and very poor—all of these face different Brockman I 249 rights and socioeconomic realities. One path to new mind-types obtaining and retaining rights similar to the most elite humans would be to keep a Homo component, like a human shield or figurehead monarch/CEO, signing blindly enormous technical documents, making snap financial, health, diplomatic, military, or security decisions. >Laws of Robotics/Church, George M. Brockman I 250 Mirror test/self-consciousness: The robots Qbo have passed the “mirror test» for self-recognition and the robots NAO have passed a related test of recognizing their own voice and inferring their internal state of being, mute or not. Free will/computers/Church: For free will, we have algorithms that are neither fully deterministic nor random but aimed at nearly optimal probabilistic decision making. One could argue that this is a practical Darwinian consequence of game theory. For many (not all) games/problems, if we’re totally predictable or totally random, then we tend to lose. Qualia: We could argue as to whether the robot actually experiences subjective qualia for free will or self-consciousness, but the same applies to evaluating a human. How do we know that a sociopath, a coma patient, a person with Williams syndrome, or a baby has the same free will or self-consciousness as our own? And what does it matter, practically? If humans (of any sort) convincingly claim to experience consciousness, pain, faith, happiness, ambition, and/or utility to society, should we deny them rights because their hypothetical qualia are hypothetically different from ours? Brockman I 251 Do transhumans roam the Earth already? Consider the “uncontacted peoples,” such as the Sentinelese and Andamanese of India (…). Brockman I 252 How would they or our ancestors respond? We could define “transhuman” as people and cultures not comprehensible to humans living in a modern, yet untechnological culture. The question “What was a human?” has already transmogrified into “What were the many kinds of transhumans?. . . And what were their rights?” 1. Weizenbaum, J. Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976 Church, George M. „The Rights of Machines” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Human Rights | Policy of Russia | Krastev I 78 Human Rights/Policy of Russia/Krastev: Wladimir Putin: (on the Munich security Conference on February 10, 2007): Putin's rhetoric became especially truculent when he touched on the conceit that all countries outside the West were morally obliged to adopt the 'international human rights norms' of the West. The duty of all mankind to strive for liberal democracy was an offensive Western conceit. The Americans justified 'interfering in the internal affairs of other countries' by invoking the worldwide desirability and imitability of their own political and economic system. While lecturing the world about human rights, democracy and other lofty values, Western leaders were all the while pursuing their own countries' selfish geopolitical Krastev I 81 interests. Krastev: Such a shameless resort to double standards had, by this time, become one of Putin's gnawing obsessions, matched only by his resentment at the lack of 'respect' with which he believed Russia was routinely treated by the West. |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Human Rights | Kymlicka | Gaus I 251 Human rights/Kymlicka/Kukathas: Traditional human rights doctrines, Kymlicka suggests, simply give us no guidance on these questions: Official language/education: these included questions about which languages should be recognized in the parliaments, bureaucracies and courts; whether any ethnic or national groups should have publicly funded education in their mother tongue; Internal boundaries: whether internal boundaries should be drawn so that cultural minorities form majorities in local regions; whether traditional homelands of indigenous peoples should be reserved for their benefit; and what degree of cultural integration might be required of immigrants seeking citizenship (1995a(1): 4—5). Human rights/Kymlicka: (...) unless they are supplemented with a theory of minority rights, human rights theory will not enable us to address some of the most pressing issues confronting us in places like Eastern Europe, where disputes over local autonomy, language, and naturalization threaten to leave those regions mired in violent conflict. Kymlicka's ambition, therefore, has been to develop a liberal theory of minority rights that explains 'how minority rights coexist with human rights, and how minority rights are limited Gaus I 252 by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice' (1995a(1): 6). >Minority rights/Kymlicka. 1. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Human Rights | International Political Theory | Gaus I 293 Human rights/International political theory/Brown: (...) an account of universal principles based on the rights of individuals rather than on the rights of collectivities was instituted by the UN Charter of 1945, and, more specifically, by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. There is, as might be expected, a very large literature on the international human rights regime; (...) (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999)(1). (...) one important feature of the human rights regime[:] although it purports to impose universal standards upon states, it has been, until very recently, itself statist in origin and modes of operation. It comprises declarations made by states, covenants signed and ratified by them, and institutions subordinated to them. Only in one case, that of the European Convention on Human Rights, can it be said that effective mechanisms exist for ensuring that states live up to their treaty obligations. Interventions/Problems: In the last decade or so practices have emerged that have challenged this situation. 1) In the first place, groups of states have, on occasion, taken it upon themselves to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of another state, in the interests of its inhabitants; 2) second, more radically, developments in international law have begun to undermine the prin- ciple of sovereign immunity. As to the first of these changes - humanitarian intervention - the record of the 1990s has been mixed (Mayall, 1996(2); Moore, 1998(3)). (...) although there have been developments of international law in this area, it may be premature to talk of an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, as Nicholas Wheeler does (2000)(4) in the best book on the subject. >Inequalities/International political theory. Gaus I 295 Economic rights/social rights: Economic and social rights are often described as 'second generation', political rights being 'first'. 'Third-generation' rights are the rights of peoples, which include such general notions as a right to self-determination, but also more specific sets of rights such as those of indigenous peoples (Crawford, 1988)(5). Problems: There is a conceptual problem here; the notion of human rights is associated with the promotion of universal standards and equality of treatment, but the rights of peoples can only be meaningful if they endorse a right to be different. Indigenous peoples, for example, demand the right to be governed in terms of their own customs and mores, which may well not sit easily with universal norms; this is a well-recognized issue in the politics of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995(6); Parekh, 2000)(7) (...). However, in international Gaus I 296 relations, the most striking manifestation of this problem arises in the context ofa wider challenge to the notion of human rights: the argument that the international human rights regime is based on specifically Western values, an argument most clearly articulated by a number of East Asian states, hence often referred to as the 'Asian values' debate (Bauer and Bell, 1999(8); Bell, 2000(9)). Religion/family: The core argument is that the human rights identified in the 1948 Declaration and subsequently are related to a specifically Western conception of the individual and the public sphere; Asian values, it is argued, are oriented towards the family and the collectivity, stress duties and responsibilities rather than rights, and place a greater emphasis on religion. 1. Dunne, T. and N. Wheeler, eds (1999) Human Rights in Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Mayall, J., ed. (1996) The New Interventionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Moore, J., ed. (1998) Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 4. Wheeler, N. J. (2000) Saving Strangers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Crawford, J. , ed. (1988) The Rights of Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Kymlicka, W. , ed. (1995) The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 8. Bauer, J. and D. A. Bell, eds (1999) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Bell, D. (2000) East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| |||
No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.