Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Categorization | Gadamer | I 433 Categorization/Gadamer: the logical scheme of induction and abstraction [is] very misleading in that there is no explicit reflection in the linguistic consciousness on what is common between different things, and the use of words in their general meaning does not understand what is named and designated by them as a case subsumed under the general. The generality of the genre and the classificatory formation of concepts are quite far removed from the linguistic consciousness. >Language use, >Generality, >Generalization, >Classification, >Order, >Concepts, >Similarity, >Properties, >Word meaning. When someone transfers an expression from one to the other, he or she is looking at something in common, but it does not necessarily have to be a generic commonality. Rather, he or she is following his or her expanding experience, which preserves similarities, be they of factual appearance or of significance to us. This is the genius of the linguistic consciousness that it knows how to express such similarities. We call this its basic metaphor, and it is important to recognize that it is the prejudice of a non-linguistic logical theory when the figurative use of a word is reduced to an improper use.(1) Cf. >Metaphors. Generalization: (...) thinking [can turn to] a reserve that language has made for it for its own instruction.(2) Plato expressly did this with his "flight into the Logoi"(3). Gadamer: But also the classificatory logic ties in with the logical advance that language has accomplished for them. >Categories/Aristotle. 1. That's what L. Klages saw in particular. Cf. K. Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928, pp. 33ff (and my review in Logos 18 (1929), pp. 436-440; Vol. 4 of the Ges. Werke). 2. This image appears involuntarily and thus confirms Heidegger's statement of the proximity of meaning between legein = to say and legein = to read together (first in "Heraklits Lehre vom Logos" commemorative publication for H. Jantzen). 3rd Plato, Phaid. 99 e. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| de dicto | Logic Texts | Read III 127 Initial problem: Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion. Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina." "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven". Re III 128 Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example. Re III 129 QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements. But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism. >Essentialism. Re III 130 Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote - "7" and "9" is now embedded - so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle - statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true " - the scope is limited. >de re. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Definitions | Carnap | VI 19 Def Implicit definition/Hilbert: here terms are solely determined by which axioms should apply to them - Carnap: this does not define a term, but a class of terms. An "improper term" means an object which is defined ("implicitly") ,by which axioms apply to him - structure: in contrast determines the object clearly. (> description). VI 51 Explicit definition/Carnap: Here the new object is no quasi-object (class, complex) with respect to the old object. - When no explicit Def is possible, we need a > Use Definition: with translation rule for quasi-objects - e.g. introduction of the term "prime" - translation rule: must contain variables, otherwise it would be a statement and not applicable to various objects. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Descriptions | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions- only real names allow the substitution that can be found in the indistinguishability of identical. Improper names: lead to more complex form: E.g. "among the Roman orators there is a major one, and he denounced Catiline that". E.g. "Just one number counts the planets and it is more than seven"/Russell: here is only 7 a real name - hence these sentences may not be sentences in a conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, QuineVs:. problem : range: the marks must be eliminated, so that in the new wording no part corresponds with them. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
| Descriptions | Strawson | VII 118/19 Description/Meaning/Strawson: e.g. "He": minimal descriptive meaning. E.g. "Blue Grotto": maximum descriptive meaning. E.g. "The Blue Grotto": middle position, "impure" proper name. (Russell). >Name, >Description, >Improper name. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Emancipation | Beauvoir | Brocker I 306 Emancipation/Beauvoir: How could a way out of the epochal mutual entanglement of the sexes into an improper existence look like? >Gender Roles/Beauvoir, Subject-Object-Problem/Beauvoir. Beauvoir is not convinced of a concept of "equality in difference"(1), since this only threatens to conceal the despotism of men and the cowardice of women. For them, women are the ones who have to change and change their situation(2). In order to realize themselves as autonomous and active subjects in the world, it is indispensable that they secure their economic independence through work. Solution/Beauvoir: a liberation of both sexes(3). Instead of a demigod and his art object "woman", comrades, friends and partners meet who "recognize each other as equals and live the erotic drama in friendship"(4). 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), p. 20. 2. Ibid. p. 882-900 3. Ibid. p. 886 4. Ibid. p. 895. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Future | Dummett | II 86 Real future/Dummett: sentences about the future, true or false, depending on what happens in the future. Improper future: sentences about current tendencies: whether true or false depends on the current assertability conditions. - If the present tense form is decidable, then the truth conditions are manifestable by the speaker. >Manifestation, >Assertibility. Compound sentences about the future: make distinction truth/assertibility necessary - e.g. antecedent in conditional -> Extension of the truth conditions by correctness/incorrectness. III (d) 167 Future/Law of the Excluded Middle/Dummett: the law applies here as well - otherwise one would have to deny real future and allow only improper future: only current tendencies. III (d) 175 Knowledge/Future/Dummett: There are two types of advance knowledge: 1) the prediction based on causal laws 2) Knowledge by intention. If I believe I can predict the non-happening of an event, I cannot also believe I can contribute something to bring it about without falling into contradictions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Mereology | Chisholm | Simons I 187 Chisholm/mereology/Simons: Chisholm's mereology is based on the basic notion of "<<" ("real part") rather than "<"("real or improper part"). Moreover, he does not assume the existence of arbitrary sums. He does not clearly distinguish between expressions for temporal and nontemporal parts. >Mereology/Simons, >Terminology/Simons. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Object | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 34 Object/Wittgenstein: assumes that we only recognize an object, if we are able to think a thought about this object. Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. >">Private language. --- Hintikka I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one of the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus includes the notion that what he calls "objects" does not includes any relations and properties. - Wittgenstein verbally: "to the objects also belong the relations". >Relations. I 55 Indestructibility of objects/Hintikka: - ""Red" cannot be destroyed." I 57 Individuals: Relationships with zero argument places (Tractatus 5.554). >Individuals. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation - Everything that is, can only be described by names, another provision is not possible - neither it is nor that it is not - so the language is an interweaving of names. I 99 Object/property/possession/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. possession is not essential for an object - not even for E.g. my hand - not even for my visual space. It is only subjectively perceived - because the objective space is constructed on its base. - ((s)> extrinsic property). - (PB VII 71, 99f) - so it may be useful to give a hand during repeated use a name. >Names. I 106 Object/acquaintance/Fraud/error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: thesis: because one can be fooled, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects - ("Illusion Argument"). >Acquaintance. I 181 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: even the simplest objects Wittgenstein's are structured. - ((s) (see above) They have a logical form, formed by their possible occurrences in states of affairs.) >States of affairs. I 223 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (average period): improper items: color spots in the visual field, tones etc. - actual objects: elements of knowledge. >Knowledge. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Phenomenology | Chisholm | II 222 Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: is always about possibility, i.e. about the sense, not about truth/Falsehood: E.g. Red cannot be green at the same time. >Possibilitiy, >Necessity, >Sense. II 264 Brentano (Husserl’s teacher) precursor of phenomenology: experience of the object is simultaneously related to itself - reflective attitude. >Experience, >Objects. II 269 "living world": pre-predicative - Science: only descriptive - consciousness: Brentano has never admitted the inscrutability of consciousness - he always insists on the clarity of thought. II 272 Accepts "improper beings" with Meinong ("entia rationis"). Marek, Johann Christian. Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Reason | Hume | I 7 Mind/Hume: the purpose is to make passion socially acceptable. I 24 It is always about the probability calculus and rules. I 117 Mind/reason/Hume: the mind reflects the past on the principle of experience. Imagination: imagination reflects the future according to the principle of habit. Belief: belief is the link between these two dimensions of the spirit. Time: time transforms itself when the subject constitutes itself in the mind. >Mind/Hume. I 21 Reason/Hume: reason does not determine the action - affects determine action! I 25 Treatise/Hume: it is not contrary to reason to want the downfall of the world in order to prevent a crack in one's own finger. I 26 Reason/Hume: reason is applied to a world that had previously been there. ((s) So reason does not create the world because reason, practice and morality are indifferent - not because of the circumstances). I 40 Reason/Hume: reason is sedated affection; it makes us judge the improper components in our affections. True duality exists not between affect (nature) and reason (the artificial), but between the overall context of nature and the spirit that affects this relationship. Association: must not be sedated. >Association/Hume. --- Stegmüller IV 283 Reason/morality/ethics/Hume/Stegmüller: reason can never be the motive for or against an action. Passions and preferences are logically independent of conclusions. However, there are practical and reasonable preferences. Mackie: dispassion also does not allow a clear view of things. >Morals/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Scope | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper names/Quine: (= descriptions). Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. >Name, >Description, >Rigidity, >Substitution. Improper names: they lead to more complex forms: e.g. "There is one greatest among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina". - e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven." Russell: here, only 7 is a real name. Therefore, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical. >Indistinguishability, >Leibniz principle, >Identity. QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that no new constituent will correspond to them in the new formulation. --- Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. --- Read III 133/134 Scope/Descriptions/Possible World/Read: Narrow scope: the description refers to different objects in different possible worlds - wide scope: the same object in different possible worlds - real names: always large scope. >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Singular Terms, >Proper names. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
| Sensations | Democritus | Adorno XIII 200 Sensation Democritus/Adorno: Democritus has solved the problem of sensations in such a way that he assigns all sense qualities to the sphere of appearance, and thus declares them to be ephemeral or improper. In this, his objectivism is once more fully in agreement with radical Platonism and Eleatism. >Platonism, >Appearance/Plato, >Appearance, >Perception/Eleatics, >Perception/Gorgias, >Perception/Aristotle, >Perception, >Objectivism. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Substitution | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions) - Only real names allow the substitution, which finds itself in the indistinguishability of the identical. Improper names: lead to a more complex form: for example, "there is one greatest orator among the Roman orators, and he accused Catilina." - e.g. "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is bigger than seven." Russell: here only 7 is a real name. >Description. Hence, these sentences cannot be upper and lower sentence in a conclusion of the principle of the indistinguishability of the identical. QuineVs: Problem: Scope: the descriptions must be eliminated in such a way that in the new formulation no component corresponds to them. --- Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
| Syntax | Geach | I 116 Syntax: replacing salva congruitate: the word chain remains correct when it is replaced. QuineVs: Replacing changes syntax: e.g. Copernicus was a complete idiot, if and only if the earth is adisk. - different ranges: a) Copernicus with predicate + sentence b) complex predicate. Then there is no ambiguous word chain, but different analyzes are possible. Ambiguity: "An astronomer is a great idiot iff the earth is flat" can be seen as an operator (like negation). Different brackets are possible. Syntax/Quine/Geach: Quine's 1st Syntactic insight: spurious names: these are a problem of range - for real names the problem does not exist. >Names/Quine, >Range/Quine, >Improper names. GeachVsQuine: he, himself blurs the distinction by regarding names as abbreviations of certain descriptions. >Descriptions/Quine. I 120 3rd Syntactic insight of Quine: E.g. "lx (2x² + 3x³)". This function of a number: twice its square plus three times its third power - such complex descriptions can be eliminated by usage definition. (Russell):> Relative-clause. I 126 4th Syntactic insight of Quine: Introducing a predicate by a schema letter F. >Schematic letters/Quine. Problem: E.g.: "Every sentence or its opposite is true" must not become "(Every sentence is true) or (Every sentence is not true)". Solution: "F() is then -__ or __s opposite is true". Geach: sub-clauses (relative-clauses) and pronouns are not mere substitutes. - This is even a mistake in modern logic books. >Clauses, >Substitution, >Proxy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Terminology | Heidegger | Decease: improper form of death (fear of decease, fear of death) Ordinariness: (Average) The starting point for all investigations (from the ontic to the ontological) Fear: Fear of being in the world - Fear of being about the world (can lead to the actual being in the world) - the "what" of fear is "nothing and nowhere" but always "already there" Outstanding: e.g. debt. Death does not stand out, but is always there (factually) Obtaining: Everyday dealing with witness (caution) but also "being of existence to the world" Stock: non-substantiality of a substance, but independence of the existing self Apprehension: Being-character of the ZUHANDENEN, reference, service, usability, ontological determination of being-the inner-worldly being Cogito sum: not "I think" but "I think something" Existence: Being of the human The others: not: "the rest of the rest", but those from which one does not differ usually Ecstasy of temporality: future; past; present ("outside oneself", "actually and for oneself" "on to" "back to" "being met by") End: end of existence not "maturity"; also not "complete" Discovered-ness: does not refer to the existence-like things Determinateness: the totality of existence: anxiety-ready designing itself specifically in terms of guiltiness (not acting!) - Fear-expecting, futile grounding (GRUNDSEIN) of nothingness Openness: situated understanding Evidence: does not open up Existential: concerning the structures of being Existentials: (instead of categories) concerning the existence Existential: concerning the being Factual: always so and so decided Factuality: In fact, in the world, inner-worldly skill (including seclusion and obscurity), "already being there" Fear: (mode of mental state) approaching within the near (fear of everyday things, e.g. danger) - of inner-worldly being Caring: Being-character of being-with consideration, indulgence Birth: existentially the birth has not passed away, and death is not outstanding Speech: isolations of Man Historicity: (actual) »return of the possible« history does not provide a measurement for truth Violence: conquest of being against tendency to obscurity Expecting: improper form of the future (procure) makes the expectation possible Past: as long as existence exists, it has never passed, but has always been Conscience: Creation of the most personal can-being (openness) "good conscience" is not a conscience phenomenon at all Gewissenhabenwollen: existentielles Wählen einer Wahl Entschlossenheit - sich selbst wählen; Übernahme der Gewissenlosigkeit Gewissheit: resultiert aus dem Vorlaufen der Evidenz aus Vorhandenem überlegen Geworfenheit: Tatsache, dass wir uns die Existenz nicht selbst gewählt haben. Geworfenheit des Seins in sein »Da«: »dass es ist« (ohne woher und wohin) Geworfenheit: Tatsache, dass wir uns die Existenz nicht selbst gewählt haben Grund: Boden der bereiteten Möglichkeiten, aus dem man wählen muss Jemeinigkeit: »ich bin«, »du bist« Bedingung der Seinsmodi - eigentlich/uneigentlich, Unmöglichkeit der Vertretung im Tod Kategorien: nur auf Vorhandenes anwendbar »Man«: »Subjekt« der Alltäglichkeit, Daseinsweise der Alltäglichkeit (Existential) Metaphysik HeideggerVsMetaphysik: es gibt grundsätzlich kein »Dahinter« Mitdasein: Dasein wesenhaft Mitdasein Mitsein: existential ontologische Bestimmung des Mitdaseins (Dasein umwillen Anderer) Möglichkeit: steht höher als Wirklichkeit Neugier: Entspringen der Gegenwart (uneigentliche) Form der Zeitigung Nicht: Existentialer Sinn der Geworfenheit Nichtigkeit: nicht auch wählen können (Entwurf, Geworfenheit) - nicht Mangel; gehört zur Möglichkeit eigensten Seinkönnens Ontisch: Frageweise der positiven Wissenschaften, die Existenz betreffend Ontologisch: Frage nach dem Sein es seien den (ursprünglicher) das Existenz Verständnis betreffend Ruf (Gewissensruf): Anruf des Daseins auf sein eigenstes Selbstseinkönnen. Aufruf zum eigenen Schuldigsein (Modus der Rede) sagt nichts aus. »Es ruft« Schicksal: das in der Entschlossenheit liegende fortlaufende Sichüberliefern an den Augenblick Schuldig: Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit (Seinsart des Daseins) ursprünglich erst Verschuldung im alltäglichen; das Sein soll sich aus der Verlorenheit zurückholen Selbstheit: Weise zu existieren, nicht vorhandenes Seiendes Selbstsein: Modifikation des Man Seyn: Schreibweise im Spätwerk, Vs traditionelle Ontologie Situation: Das je in der Entschlossenheit erschlossene Da. (Eigentlich) - (Entschlossenheit bringt das Sein in die Situation) Sorge: Beweisweise des Daseins (Sinn)/ sich vorgenommen sein des Daseins zum Sein können, dass es ist. Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Freiseins Sterben: Dasein stirbt, solange es existiert in der Seinsweise des Verfallens Stimmung: Zurückbringen auf Subjekt/Objekt: bei Heidegger höchstens als Hilfsbegriffe verwendet (statt dessen Dasein und Vorhandensein) Substanz: Existenz ist die Substanz des Menschen Substanzialität: Seinscharakter der Naturdinge Tod: Eigenste, unbezüglichste, unüberholbare Möglichkeit - Eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, als äußerstes Noch nicht immer schon einbezogen Uneigentlich: (Seinsmodus) Verfallenheit, »Unbewusstes« (kein benutzter Begriff) - Alltägliches Dasein (besorgend statt sorgend) Geschäftigkeit, Genussfähigkeit (nicht wertend) Verenden: Tiere verenden, sie sterben nicht Verfallenheit: Zustand des Daseins in der Alltäglichkeit (z. B. dem Gerede glaubend) Verschlossenheit: Geworfenheit, vor die das Dasein eigentlich gebracht werden kann, bleibt verschlossen kein Nichtwissen, sondern sie konstituiert die Faktizität des Daseins Vertretbarkeit: Seinsmöglichkeit des Miteinanderseins, geht nicht im Falle des Todes Vorhandensein: alles andere Sein Vorlaufen: Ermöglichen der Möglichkeit (Möglichkeit der eigentlichen Existenz) Wahrheit: Nichtübereinstimmung, sondern Hervortreten des Verborgenen (Aleithia, Apophansis) »Welt«: ontologisch: Charakter des Daseins selbst - ontologisch: das All des Seienden das innerhalb der Welt - vorhanden sein kann Welt: ontisch: »worin« man lebt (öffentlich und privat) Werden : z. B. Reifen einer Frucht Wiederholung: eigentliches Gewesensein (uneigentliches Vergessen) Zeitigung: kein Nacheinander der Ekstasen; Zukunft nicht später als Gewesenheit, diese nicht früher als Gegenwart Zeitlichkeit: Ursprünglich ontologischer Grund der Existenzialität des Daseins Zirkel: Grundstruktur der Sorge; Zuvor Seiendes in seinem Sein bestimmen müssen und auf diesem Grund die Frage nach dem Sein erst stellen. (Heidegger verwehrt sich gegen den Vorwurf des circulus vitiosus) Zuhandensein: Zeug (was im Besorgen begegnet) Zukunft: eigentlich endlich (gewisse Priorität gegenüber Gegenwart und Gewesenheit) auf sich zu |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Thinking | Brentano | Chisholm II 272 Entia rationis/A.Goudin/Hedwig: the thesies of Goudin was received by Meinong and Brentano: it is about "improper beings" E.g. Nineveh, possibilities, an "imagined thinker who thinks of a thinker"... Cf. >Objects of thought, >Objects of Belief, >Mentalism. Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Veil of Ignorance | D’Agostino | Gaus I 245 Veil of ignorance/Rawls/D’Agostino: what the veil of ignorance prevents the use of is, precisely, information that it would be morally improper to use as a basis for the assessment of alternative basic structures. It prevents the use of information that people would, characteristically, use in a self-interested way. As Rawls says, '[o]ne excludes knowledge of those contingencies which set men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices' (1973(1) 19). Blocking the use of such information forces individuals to think impartially, i.e. ethically, about the terms of their association with one another. On the other hand, the information about themselves that is available to individuals deliberating about the basic structure does, according to Rawls (1993(2): ch. Il, s. 6), represent them as (potential) citizens of a specifically liberal state, especially in acknowledging their identities as free and equal moral agents. Normalization/D’Agostino: There is, then, nothing arbitrary, according to this reasoning, about the reductions of diversity effected by deployment of the veil of ignorance. Such normalizing devices are, then, one liberal response to the conundrum which is posed by the fact of diversity and by the endorsement of this fact by various pluralist doctrines and arguments. ((s) For problems in relation to diversity see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino.) 1. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Way of Givenness | Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference. |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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