Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indirect Speech | Indirect speech: Statements attributed to speakers by other speakers on an occasion that does not coincide temporally with the utterance situation. Sentences in indirect speech are grammatically altered, so it becomes clear that it is not the original utterance itself. |
||
| Indirect Speech | Castaneda | Frank I 459ff Indirect speech/Frege: different senses (intensions) - direct speech: common reference object (extension) - Castaneda with Kant: "I think" is the only real oratio recta - anything else is open to the linguistic design - each "I" that comes afterwards is open to individual design, as well as any other object. >Indirect Speech/Frege, >Proper Speech, >Odd sense, >Odd meaning. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Indirect Speech | Cresswell | II 42 Indirect speech/that-clause/Cresswell: Problem: what level of sensitivity to structure is the right one? E.g Melissa said that there are 7 + 5 km from Motueka to Upper Moutere. Should the order be important? - E.g. map: shows sections. >That-clause, >Predication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Indirect Speech | Foster | I 22 Indirect speech/paratactic analysis/Davidson: "The earth moves, Galileo said this." (makes "this" from "that"). FosterVsDavidson: paratactic analysis is not suitable for a meanting theory: a translator would have to swing the reference to his own statement - which provides a translation theory, but no meaning theory. >Paratactic analysis. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Indirect Speech | Frege | Dummett III 7 Indirect speech/subordinate clause/Frege: here the singular term does not stand for the subject matter, but for its meaning. This is the only case where a clause stands for the proposition. Tradition: subordinate clauses are not truth-functional. FregeVs. >Fregean sense, >Singular terms, >Objects, >Sense, >Thought, >Clauses, >Truth functions, >Propositions, >That-clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Indirect Speech | Geach | I 171f Indirect speech/Geach: these phrases should be replaced by direct speech in order to avoid propositions. >Propositions, >Indirect speech, >That-clauses, >Intensions, Intensionality, >Opacity. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Indirect Speech | Lyons | I 177 Indirect Speech/Lyons: in antiquity (Latin), it was quite possible that a whole speech was reproduced as indirect, whereby each section must be understood as separate according to the traditional view. All are individually dependent on a "verb of saying". I 257 Indirect Speech/Tradition/Lyons: e.g. Dico te venisse (I say you came) can be created in two steps: 1. direct form: Tu venisti 2. indirect form through "dico". Chomsky: (see below) it is not the sentence itself, but the (Tu) venisti underlying deep structure that is "embedded" as an object to dico. >> embedding, >Deep structure. Embedding/indirect speech/Latin/Tradition/Ambiguity/Lyons: it is known that embedding in indirect speech can lead to ambiguity: Example: Dico Clodiam amare Catullum. ((s) Everyone can be subject as well as object). Neutralization/Problem: both nouns are in the accusative. >Quotation. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Castaneda, H.-N. | Boer Vs Castaneda, H.-N. | Frank I 387 Castaneda: Thesis: both the singular indexical reference of the first person and the quasi indexical reference corresponding to it are conceptually irreducible. Boer/LycanVsCastaneda: I 388 (1) Armand believes that he (himself) is happy. (1.A) [The triadic relation] BELIEF connects Armand, an empty sequence of objects, and [the demonstrative] THAT > [which refers to a type of sentence that has the same general behavioral role in every language as our sentence] "I am happy." Arrow: Showing/pointing action of the speaker In square brackets: the analyst's comment concerning the following expressions. THAT: implements Davidson's theory of indirect speech: it points to a sentence produced by the speaker placed merely phonetically or graphically beside the psychological verb. Role of the sentence: (according to Sellars): in Def "point quotation marks": this signals the role that tokens of this type play in the behavioral economy of the speaker: Example "red" (in dot quotation marks) denotes the same role as a "rouge" placed in dot quotation marks. This is a gain in knowledge. ((s) Language independent! unlike Tarski). This is a nominalistic analysis of "himself". (>Nominalism). Castaneda: Question: 1. (diagonal argument from 3. I 337): propositions have truth values, problem: are there enough propositions to describe infinite properties? 2. Realism: asks: how can objects and cases of behavior be distinguished from each other without qualities or relations providing classification criteria and role characteristics? Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Disquotation | Cresswell Vs Disquotation | Cresswell I 99 VsQuotational theory/Belief/Cresswell: other problems: 1. Belief de re, or quantification in into belief contexts. possible world semantics/Semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: Advantage: it allows such quantification. Problem: it does not help in hyper-intensional cases (where the sets of possible worlds l are too coarse). 2. VsQuotational theory/Self-reference/Cresswell: Richmond Thomason: Thesis: indirect speech cannot be quotational. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Donnellan, K. | Searle Vs Donnellan, K. | IV 160 Referential/attributive/reference/regard/referring/Donellan: two different uses of descriptions. >Attributive/referential. Most philosophers VsDonnellan: both are referential in the sense that is spoken to them about objects, the only difference is the extent to which this intention is made explicit. Def attributive/tradition: specifies truth conditions laid only against a background of assumptions. IV 162 SearleVsDonellan: even after his own account is not correct, because there are counter-examples: E.g. Smith died of natural causes, but was recently attacked, and the trail of destruction leave us to call the "murderer of Smith" insane. Then we can say that the finding was true, although no descriptions were met (but that would have been a (possible) attributive use, and thus the distinction is threatened). DonellanVsVs: in such cases is "near miss", but that it still had something else as truly referential uses. It goes just nearly wrong when the single thing was a little misdescribed. Only in referential cases it may "go wrong for miles." IV 165 Reference/SearleVsDonnellan: how is it at all possible for speakers to talk about objects? Reference can be made by a variety of syntactic means: descriptions, proper nouns, pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, etc. The point is that the speaker has a certain relationship to them. He must have some linguistic representation. This representation may represent the object from one or another aspect. IV 166 Then under any aspect the speaking is always done. In the absence of knowledge it can then be that the term does not express the aspect exactly. (E.g. that he thinks Smith will be pronounced "Schmidt"). But that must be distinguished from a real confusion. Distinction Meaning/To Mean. Donnellan's cases are quite simple: under any aspect you have to speak, but you are only choosing exactly this aspect. In indirect speech acts they say even a bit more. It is only necessary that the speaker and hearer can identify the subject because of the aspect. (That even works if both think the aspect is incorrect! IV 168 E.g. Both speak of the "king" although they consider him an usurper). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Cresswell Vs Fodor, J. | II 53 Meaning/CresswellVsFodor: Cannot be a representation of any kind. Although this is a strong tradition in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and AI (artificial intelligence research). propositional attitude/Fodor (Fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): These propositional attitudes must be understood as relations between organisms and internal representations. Cresswell: This can be construed in two ways. For this I use the attitude verb "to say". --- II 54 CresswellVsFodor: his focus on belief may have obscured his view to the fact that there are two different problems with propositional attitudes Object/Fodor/Cresswell: when Fodor speaks about objects of propositional attitudes he does not say that in the semantic sense (meaning as an object) but rather in the sense that the objects of indirect speech are the sentences that have been expressed if the whole sentence is true. CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong. Fodor/Cresswell: but he is right in that if (1) Is true, there is a relation that exists between an organism and a representation. But that’s then an external one, not an internal one. Fodor: for him it is about psychology, not to semantics. I.e. it is about what goes on in the activity of discourse (parallel to the speech act theory). In particular, he is concerned with beliefs and desires. --- II 55 Paul ChurchlandVsFodor: (1981) Fodor/Cresswell: so for him it is so about how the expression is related to the rest of the behavior. That’s a very different approach than that of semantics. Semantics/Meaning/that sentence/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: (semantic approach) to learn the meaning of an attribution of propositional attitudes it’s not about the behavior nor about what is going on in Ambrose’s head. If this were the question, it would have to be about the spirit of the speaker of the whole sentence (1). Vs: but even that is not plausible, because we want the meaning of (1), Regardless of who uses it! CresswellVsFodor: because it is so much about the subject for him, he obscures the distinction between the semantic question of the meaning and the psychological one of the organism that has an attitude. Contents/Object/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: the distinction between content and object of an attitude is important, because there may be many different objects (sentences) whose content is the same. ((s) a belief may be expressed differently than in indirect speech). Mentalese/propositional attitudes/Fodor: Thesis: a belief is a sentence in the thought language of the speaker. CresswellVsFodor: Problem: then the original speaker and the speaker of the the attribution would have to have the same sentence in Mentalese in their internal system; E.g. (2) Beatrice believed what Callum said Causal role/Fodor/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that faith and desires play in behavior. This understands in terms of the manipulation of formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) this does not account for semi-conscious and unconscious attitudes. --- II 56 Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: What entities would that be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Suppose meanings were internal representations. Problem: (3) Can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning! If we do not assume this, there is no problem at all with propositional attitudes/Cresswell: Problem: how the meaning of an attribution sentence of propositional attitudes is based on the embedded sentence. ((s) That means how the original meaning is preserved with non-verbal substitutions and different contexts). CresswellVsFodor: If meanings were really in your head (as representations), then e.g. the same representation that Fodor has when he says (4) Meanings are in the head and must also be in my head when I utter (3) ((s) the total set). Then Fodor’s object of belief is in my head! That would not have to be a problem, but: Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: Problem: How can the representation in my head play a causal role in Fodor’s head? VsVs: you could say that’s unfair. Because his object is still in his head. CresswellVsFodor: But that does not help, because if (3) Is really true, then the belief that I attribute to him must be exactly the same as the one he has. --- II 159 Content/Representation/CresswellVsFodor: I’m not at all convinced that representations are involved in content of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Hintikka, J. | Verschiedene Vs Hintikka, J. | Cresswell II 40 T-Predicate/Cresswell: Thesis: We should identify the semantic truth predicate with the truth predicate for indirect speech: because of the existence of sentences of the following kind: (18) Jeremy believed that the proposition expressed by Miriam and that which Mary implied was equivalently true. Problem: here we are definitely dealing with paradoxes and have to deal with them. Solution/Hintikka: has developed an epistemic logic that deals with it. But it only applies in a community of logically omniscient people. Richmond ThomasonVsHintikka: Such a community cannot exist if knowledge is conceived that way. Logical Omniscience/Cresswell: then in any case only "that0" is needed. Prior I 84 Preface Paradox/Prior: (similar to Moore's Paradox). Variants: a) Preface b) simply book as a whole The author says in the book that p and he says in the book that q and that r etc.. and in the preface that either not p, or not q or not r etc... and that is inconsistent. The whole set cannot be true together. This can also be formulated as a paradox of belief. Rationality/Belief/Hintikka: "Rationality of belief" should avoid the preface paradox. MakinsonVsHintikka: it can be very rational to represent contradictory beliefs at the same time. I 85 This may be about probability: it may be rational to believe that two things are more likely than their non-existence, but their combination is less likely than their non-existence. VsHintikka: rationality should not be equated with consistency! |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Kenny, A. | Prior Vs Kenny, A. | I 167 Names/Lejewski: for him, names can either be singular or empty, but not plural. "Non plural names": can be logically be complex (normal names cannot). For this, a special functor is needed with its own axioms. This functor could be e.g. the Lesniewskian individual identity, the form "a = a", which is true if "a" is applied to an object, and false if not. Names/Aristotle: can be singular or plural, but not empty! If complex names are introduced here, then it needs to be ensured that the composition is not empty. E.g. Even if "a" and "b" have applications, "a and b" need not! If "Socrates" is not plural, it does not follow that "Not Socrates" is not plural either. E.g. there could be a million "Not Socrates". Solution/Lejewski: introduces a "definition frame": Only allows only names like "He who alone is not Socrates". Point: nevertheless, the verb "is not Socrates" be applied to many objects! I 168 Names/Kenny/Prior: Kenny outlined a very different theory of non-plural names: These names are logically without structure (like Russell). Def Names/Kenny: N is a name iff. the user intends to refer to one singular object B. If the object does not exist, it can only be said that the speaker only means B with a sentence that contains B, and that B is mentioned in the sentence. Names, even if they are empty, are generally not mere abbreviations of Russell's defined descriptions. Although the speaker has to have some kind of particular description in mind! They are abbreviations of defined descriptions in sentences of the form: "B exists" or "B does not exist". Names/PriorVsKenny: I cannot find any clue in Kenny as to how it should work in indirect speech: E.g. "Paul thinks Elmer is a fellow traveler." According to Kenny, Paul will use the word "Elmer" as name, but the reporter who covers Paul's opinion will generally not use it as a name and could even make his statement if he knew that a person like Elmer does not exist! Question: how does the reporter use the word then? According to Kenny, he would have to use it as covert description. E.g. if he says "there is no such person as Elmer". Problem: e.g. if he knows that Elmar does not exist, but says "Paul thinks Elmer is a fellow traveler", does he use the name as covert description then? If not, then Kenny does not tell us what he does instead, bit if yes, then the reporter does not report correctly what Paul thinks! PriorVsKenny: this is not a peripheral problem, but infects Kenny's entire theory. I 169 E.g. if I myself (as Kenny) say: "what Paul thinks is not that such and such is his fellow traveler, but Elmar", how am I (as a theorist) using the word "Elmer" here? If the theorist himself uses it as a covert description, he himself does not make the distinction it is about for him! I can still use it as a name! Because I cannot intend to refer with it, because ex hypothesi I cannot do that if I know that a person like Elmer does not exist. Paul means Elmer with "Elmer", but what does Kenny mean with "Elmer"? And what does Kenny mean when he says Paul means Elmer with "Elmer"? Ex hypothesi Kenny cannot intend to mean Elmer. But if he uses the name as a covert description, then he says that Paul the means such and such, and we can do that a) with quotation marks b) without quotation marks. Then we say with this that Paul means that a single such and such is meant by Paul, to which he thus puts himself in relation. But ex hypothesi it is not. a) with quotation marks: then we say that with the word "Elmer" Paul means that which is meant by the expression "such and such". But according to Kenny's own theory, Paul does not use the word as a covert description! (Only in forms such as "B exists"). Names/Prior: Thesis: what does not exist, simply cannot be named, just as it cannot be pushed with the foot. Neither by someone who believes in the existence, nor by someone who does not believe in it. In circumstances where the object x is absent, x cannot be used as a proper noun in sentences and there are no facts with x. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 |
| Lakoff, G. | Searle Vs Lakoff, G. | IV 199 Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean) IV 201 Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself. IV 202 They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule. Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained. IV 203 Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features. IV 204 SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?"). Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 191 Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist: I 192 "Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated. I 222 Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology. I 223 Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in? I 225 RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences: 1) There is such a thing as an ontology. 2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status. 3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning. 4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point. 5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference. RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism. I 226 Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles. I 231 RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of the idea" than necessary. I 250 Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants. IV 24 RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network. VI 212 RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Wessel Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 352 Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Differentiation Intension/Extension: does not help with the problems. Just the hint that these are intensional contexts is not enough. Extensionality Rule/Wessel: according to it, only occurrences of linguistic entities as terms or as statements can be replaced by identical meanings, but not arbitrary graphical parts. Therefore it cannot be said that it is only valid here to a limited extent, because it is not applicable at all! The wrong view is taken because in intensional contexts logical rules apply due to their definitions, which are very similar to the extensionality rule and which, possibly under additional conditions, also allow to replace mere occurrences of graphical parts by certain terms and statements. I 353 Wessel: but in general you cannot say that: Example "a said the statement A" this phrase is used in two different meanings: one is the exact word and letter sequence, the other only the information (indirect speech). Planet Example/WesselVsQuine: he does not use the relation of the meaning equality of terms and the substitutability for meaningful terms, but the identity propositions "evening star = morning star" and the substitutability rule for identities. Wessel: our formulation with equality of meaning is more general. But it also applies to identities. Quine: does not distinguish between an occurrence as a term and as a mere graphic part! Quine interprets all the propositions in connection with the planet example as logical modalities. (Therefore Stegmüller speaks of the peculiarity of the copula "is" and doubts the possibility of a modal logic). Modal Logic/Quine/Wessel: the modalities occurring in Quine's statements can be interpreted as both alethic and epistemic modalities. I 354 WesselVsQuine: this concludes from a wrong premise: Ms(9 ' 7) > ~Wit(9 ' 7). (Ms if the state of affairs is possible, ~Wi: = not refutable) Morning star/evening star/simple/composite/Wessel: one can regard both as simple terms, then the paradox dissolves: ta '_' tb or a = b). (The morning star is the same object as the evening star). 2. as compound terms: then it applies that: ~(ta '_' tb) or ~(a = b). They are then not identical in meaning. WesselVsQuine: in this case one of its prerequisites is wrong. Quine replaces in his construction the paradoxical parts of expressions, which do not occur as terms, but only as graphical parts. VsVs: but the objection has little weight, since additional rules of substitutability can be proven for modal contexts. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Realism | Idealism Vs Realism | Frank I 467 "I think"/Kant/Castaneda: "I think" puts everything into indirect speech! Consequence: VsFrege: according to Kant all his reference objects are not part of the semantics of singular terms! ((s) According to Frege, embedded sentences do not have a reference object of their own, but only denote the meaning of an object. Conversely, according to Kant, Frege's objects can only function as transcendent objects. (IdealismVsRealism). Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983), pp. 313-327. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Various Authors | Lycan Vs Various Authors | Cresswell I 104 Def Inscriptionalism/Terminology/Cresswell: Thesis: that sentences about propositional attitudes can be analyzed as a relation between persons and linguistic units ((s) sentences or propositions > Relation Theory/SchifferVs)). 1. BoerVs Inscriptionalism/LycanVs Inscriptionalism: (Boer and Lycan, 1986, Lycan 1986, Appendix): Indirect Speech/Cresswell: the theory I want to discuss is this: "saying" means a relation between a person and a class of sentences. They do not have to belong to the same language. I 113 Relation Theory/Belief/Cresswell: if so, my argument is of course not applicable, because I have nothing against the thesis that the meaning of "believes" relates a person to a meaning. CresswellVsInscriptionalism: only Vs propositional attitude as relation to linguistic things, thus things that have meaning. (CresswellVsRelation Theory). |
Lyc I W. G. Lycan Modality and Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| |||