Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Convention T | Davidson | Glüer II 37 Convention T/Davidson: says that a theory must be translating (translational). ((s) Problem: sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" are equivalent.) >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 38 Convention T allows only extensional language. >Extensionality. II 22 Def " Convention T " /Tarski/Glüer: "A definition of "true" formulated in the metalanguage is factually correct if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema follow from it. S is true, just when p is obtained by inserting a name of any sentence in the object language for the symbol "S" and the translation of this sentence into the meta language for the symbol "p". The convention T tests whether a definition of truth for a language L correctly determines the extension of the predicate "true in L". Neither the convention T nor the "T-equivalences" may be confused with the definition of truth itself. >Truth definition. II 28 Def T-equivalence/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer : simply true exactly when the linked propositions have the same truth value under all circumstances. The right side does not have to be a translation of the left side. If, on the other hand, a translation would be required, then 1. the circumstances under which the W-equivalences are true are not arbitrary, and 2. the searched meaning would already be presupposed. Def Convention T*/new/Davidson/Glüer: A T-theory formulated in the meta language for an object language L is appropriate if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema (T) S is true gdw. p is obtained by using for the symbol "S" a designation of any proposition of the object language and for the symbol "p" a proposition of the meta language, which is true exactly when S is it. Glüer: here are equivalences, which are not required to translate the sentence on the right the sentence on the left, true iff. II 29 the linked sentences have the same truth value under all circumstances. DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Whoever wants to apply Davidson's reinterpreted convention T* must therefore know when T equivalences are true. TarskiVsDavidson: with Tarski, you need to know the meaning of both object and meta-language sentences. ((s) To be able to judge whether there is a correct translation). T-predicate/Davidson/Glüer: for Davidson, on the other hand, the T predicate must be interpreted. Davidson/Glüer: thus presupposes a prior understanding of the concept of truth. Truth/Interpretation/Translation/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: a G-theory that fulfils the (new) convention G* can be read as an interpretation theory: it implies for each proposition S of the object language L a T-equivalence derived from its structure, the right side of which indicates the truth conditions under which S is true. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Interpretation | Davidson | Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle). Therefore: DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. Glüer II 29/30 Def interpretative/Glüer: a theory is interpretative if all theory equivalences are to be obtained from the schema T are true. Because truth conditions are given in the recursion to the structure of the sentences. Meaning holism: a sentence only has meaning in the context of the language. >Meaning holism. Thus the problem is "Snow is white iff grass is green is excluded, because such a theory could not imply at the same time a true T-equivalence for the sentences "This is white" or "That is snow". >Meaning Holism. Glüer II 117/8 Interpretation/action/explanation/Davidson/Glüer: an action is only interpretable if it can be described as part of a rational structure - this also applies to speech action - therefore, actions are linked to propositional attitudes - each action is an interpreted action. N.B.: therefore it is no empirical question whether an acting person is rational. - ((s) Because it is presupposed). An event that cannot be described in the language of the propositional attitudes is not an action - (because it is not interpretable). Frank I 645 Mental states/proposition/self-attribution/external-ascription/Davidson: we have to start from sentences or utterances instead of propositions or meanings - otherwise, different types of sources are suggested. Instead: relationships between actors and utterances. There is no different knowledge and no different criteria. Solution : If someone knows that I think of a sentence as correct, he knows what I believe - it would be circular to explain the basic asymmetry by an asymmetry of certainty. >Interpretation. I 648 Interpretation/mental states/external-ascription/Davidson: also the speaker can problematize his sentences. - He can also be wrong about the meaning of his words. - He also needs the Tarski-theory. Asymmetry: the listener/interpreter cannot be sure that the Tarski-theory is the best method for external attribution. The best thing the speaker can do is to be interpretable. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Graeser I 167 Interpretation/Davidson: utterances are verifiable, without the individual propositional attitudes of the speakers being known. Radical interpretation: equality of meaning cannot be assumed, otherwise there is circularity. >Truth conditions/Davidson. Davidson V 139 Truth/Interpretation/Davidson: the contrast between truth and falsity can only occur in the context of interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Interpretation | Dennett | I 237 Artifact/interpretation/Game of Life/Conway/Dennett: Question: are the "Eater", "Glider", etc. designed objects or natural formations? The easiest Glider arises obviously from the rules, no one had to make it. ((s) >Game of Life/Conway; Cf. > Objet ambigu, Paul Valéry). --- Fodor IV 137 Interpretation theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: (Brentano: Thesis: The intentional cannot be reduced to the physical). Dennett: i.e. ontologically, there are no such things as belief, desires, intentional phenomena! Interpretation: they are, however, indispensable as elements of interpretation (epistemic). ((s) That is, that intentionality (or its attribution) is accessible only by interpretation. ("Interpretivism", "interpretativism")). IV 138 Intentional attribution/Dennett: intentional attribution is always wrong. Because there is no intentionality which is ontological (merely as epistemically useful concepts), Vs intentional realism. >Attribution. Principle of Charity/Fodor/Lepore: must be intrinsically holistic, which is also accepted by Dennett. >Principle of Charity. Interpretation theory:/Fodor/Lepore: according to Dennett, there are two schools: 1. Def Projectivism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other the internal states that one would have oneself in the appropriate circumstances. 2. Def Normativism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other internal states which he should have in the circumstances. IV 139 There are, of course, close relations between normativism and holism. >Holism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Radical Interpretation | Fodor | IV 70 Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: 1) Radical interpretation specifies empirical evidence. 2) Since different ways of selecting evidence lead to different truth theories, the choice must be justified by the radical interpretation theory. Problem: the truth theory cannot be attributed regardless of the correctness of the meaning theory. VI 72 Evidence/Quine: everything that is accessible to the radical interpretation is evidence (e.g. language learning of the child, stimuli). >Learning, >Stimuli, >Language acquisition. IV 77 Similarity Spaces/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: similarity spaces are not available to the radical interpreter (because different culture must be assumed, other than in language learning). >Radical interpretation. IV 86 Holism/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: his argument for holism is based on his assumption that individual sentences, e.g. "Kurt belongs to the German-speaking Community and Kurt holds true: it's raining on Saturday afternoon and it's raining around Kurt on Saturday afternoon" are law-like (laws). Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the generalizations thereof e.g. (x)(t)(if x belongs to the German-speaking community, then (x holds it rains to be true at t iff it is raining in the vicinity of x at t) do not support counterfactual conditionals and are therefore not law-like according to Davidson's definition of law. There is no support of counterfactual conditionals e.g. the meaning of "it's raining" could be: "the cat is on the mat". Then it does not follow that the cat is not on the mat when it is not raining. IV 87 Solution: for a relation R and every speaker S: is then nomological but not yet a radical interpretation. Lawlikeness: we only had to assume it because of the conventionality of language. Problem: by definition, radical interpretation cannot find out the conventionality. IV 89 Radical Interpretation/RI/Fodor/Lepore: our image of the radical interpretation is much richer than that of Davidson. IV 90 Problem: the nomological approach is not holistic. >Holism, >Semantic holism. IV 88 Conventionality/language/RI/Fodor/Lepore: by definition, conventionality is nothing that the radical interpreter can find out, e.g. non-German speakers do not say "Hund" when the are referring to a dog. >Conventions. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Structural Linguistics | Ricoeur | II 4 Discourse/structural model/structural lingustics/Ricoeur: The eclipse of discourse was further encouraged by the tentative extension of the structural model beyond its birth place in linguistics properly speaking, and by the systematic awareness of the theoretical requirements implied by the linguistic model as a structural model. Extension of the structural model concerns us directly insofar as the structural model was applied to the same categories of texts that are the object of our interpretation theory. Originally the model concerned units smaller than the sentence, the signs of the lexical systems and the discrete units of the phonological systems from which the significant units of lexical systems are compounded. A decisive extension occurred, however, with the application of the structural model to linguistic entities larger than the sentence and also to non-linguistic entities similar to the texts of linguistic communication. As concerns the first type of application, the treatment of folktales by the Russian formalists such as V. Propp(1) marks a decisive turn in the theory of literature, especially as regards the narrative structure of literary works. The application of the structural model to myths by Claude Lévi-Strauss constitutes a second example of a structural approach to long strings of discourse; an approach similar to, yet independent of the formal treatment of folklore proposed by the Russian formalists. II 5 Postulates: First, a synchronic approach must precede any diachronic approach because systems are more intelligible than changes. Second, the paradigmatic case for a structural approach is that of a finite set of discrete entities. The paradigmatic position of systems constituted of finite sets of discrete entities lies in the combinatory capacity and the quasi-algebraic possibilities pertaining to such sets. These capacities and possibilities add to the type of intelligibility instituted by the first postulate, that of synchronicity. Third, in such a system no entity belonging to the structure of the system has a meaning of its own; the meaning of a word, for example, results from its opposition to the other lexical units of the same system. Fourth, in such finite systems, all the relations are immanent to the system. In this sense semiotic systems are "closed," i.e ., without relations to external, non-semiotic reality. II 6 The last postulate alone suffices to charactenze structuralism as a global mode of thought, beyond all the technicalities Of its methodology. Language no longer appears as a mediation between minds and things. It constitutes a world of its own, within which each item only refers to other items of the same system, thanks to the interplay of oppositions and differences constitutive of the system. Discourse/Ricoeur: At this extreme point language as discourse has disappeared. II 81 Structural Linguistics/interpretation/understanding/Ricoeur: [the approach of the structural schools of literary criticism] proceeds from the acknowledgement of what I have called the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference. (>Reference/Ricoeur). The text intercepts the "worldly" dimension of the discourse - the relation to a world which could be shown - in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the discourse to the subjective intention of the author. place. According to this choice, the text no longer has an exterior, it only has an interior. To repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of the literary object into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind of closed system that phonology discovered underlying all discourse, and which Saussure called langue. Literature, according to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of langue. >Langue/Ricoeur. 1. V. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1958). |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Terminology | Dennett | Fodor IV 139 Def Interpretation Theory/Dennett: thesis: beliefs, desires, etc. are not real (ontologically), but only epistemically useful concepts. Dennett I 520 "Tower of Generation and Testing"/Evolution/Consciousness/Dennett: for a summarizing realization the price of idealization has to be paid. On higher floors we become more efficient in finding new tracks. The ground floor contains the Def Darwinian creatures: (hard wired) that fly out of the test. On the first floor: Baldwin effect: "Plasticity of the phenotype": at birth not completely like the ancestors. Second floor: Def Skinnerian creatures: try blind, reinforcement, next time the creature chooses the right one. Third floor: Def Popperian creatures: have an inner, selected environment, they act foresighted the first time, not coincidentally. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Terminology | Fodor | IV 1 Def anatomical/Fodor/Lepore: a property is exactly anatomical if it is has anything, that at least a second thing has as a property ((s) but not all things, so unlike holism, e.g. twin but not male twin). Def atomistic: properties that are not anatomical are atomistic, e.g. "... ate the last one...". IV 13 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. assuming anatomical propositions would also be holistic. Then it could turn out that, e.g., no language would have an expression for "the pen of my aunt" if it did not also have expressions that correspond to the following expressions, e.g. "two is a prime". IV 134 E.g. Belief/shmelief/faith/shfaith/Fodor/Lepore: shmeliefs: are like beliefs but without charity being analytic for them, then the majority could be wrong, but beliefs must usually be true. IV 140 Projectivism/Fodor/LeporeVs: 1) Projectivism must assert that there are no beliefs on the twin earth. 2) It cannot explain the element of interpretation of intentional attribution. IV 148 Interpretation Theory/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: the interpretation theory states that there are no intentional states (Dennett pro?). Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: if intentionality does not exist, interpretation cannot attribute any properties to it. "If there are no beliefs and wishes, there can be nothing for what they are selected." IV 197 State space semantics/Churchland/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: the technical apparatus does not help if you do not understand the everyday concepts, e.g. "marriageable" is not explained by a dimension of marriageability. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Truth | Davidson | I (c) 56 Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me. The truth predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true". >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. Object language and meta-language should contain the predicate "true". >Expressiveness, >Richness, >Truth theory. Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "truth theory". DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) - Convention: truth is not sufficiently empirical. >Convention T. The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world. Glüer II 131 VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism". Rorty VI 51 Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional". A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensional concept. Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. >Interpretation theory. Horwich I 443 Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 189 Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Theory | Davidson | II 34 Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. >Truth values. Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. II 35 FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson ditto). >Meaning theory. II 37 Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that the ability to interpret does not equal translation. >Interpretation, >Disquotation scheme. I (e) 111 Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. l (e) 111 Tarski: proceeds formally, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable). Glüer II 28f Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition Truth-Equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truth value under all circumstances. Glüer II 29 Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention truth (provides only true equivalences) when truth-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and meta-language sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the meta-language must be known - truth-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his truth-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the truth theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a truth-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. Glüer II 45 Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). >Truth conditions. Glüer II 54/55 Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. >Intensions. Glüer II 56 Truth Theory: in principle, only for certain occasions correct - problem: for a theory of competence: there is no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interpretation Theory | Fodor Vs Interpretation Theory | IV 128 Interpretation: the actual objects of interpretation are propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc., not representations. Representations: their content seems to depend on causal or nomic relations of objects in the world and neurological states,... IV 129 ...to which the interpreter usually has no access. Anyway, they are by definition inaccessible for radical interpretation. Fodor/LeporeVsVs: the representation theorists should bite this bullett. It is plausible that there are no interesting relations between the epistemic situation of the interpreter and the facts on which the content metaphysically depends. This is, of course, not to deny the the supervenience of the intentional on the physical. Only the interpreter does not have access (Fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory). God knows what representations mean. And he is physicalist without doubt! Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: even the radical interpreter does not have access to all the physical facts. They are limited to the "behavioral" behaviorist facts. Interpretation/representation/Fodor/Lepore: the notion that only representations have original intentional content does not deny that there is indeed interpretation. The idea is rather that the semantic properties of the propositional attitudes and speech acts depend on hidden things which only God knows. Therefore, the inferences on which the interpretation depends are contingent! (?). Fodor/LeporeVsInterpretation Theory: it is not obvious that we have original intentionality (which the interpreter needs) in the first instance (i.e. representation, uninterpretable). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Interpretation Theory | Wittgenstein Vs Interpretation Theory | I 249 Interpretation/symbol/WittgensteinVsInterpretation: "Interpretation of symbols" is misleading, instead "use of symbols". |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Projectivism | Fodor Vs Projectivism | IV 139 Fodor/LeporeVsProjectivism/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 1) Projectivism is not able to construct existence quantifications that go beyond the contents of propositional attitudes. (In contrast to sentences that quote the content). E.g. Smith’s three-year-old hears his father talk about the distinction between analytic/Synthetic. He repeats later: "blahblahblah, analytical synthetical, blahblahblah". For the projection theory this is self-contradictory, because the state that is attributed by the (three-year-old) speaker is not a mental state after all!. IV 140 E.g. Twin Earth/TE: Suppose the people on the Twin Earth have already found out that what they call "water" is not H2O. Therefore, the belief they express with "water is wet" is not of the belief that water is wet! Because they are not in the correct causal relationship with water (but to XYZ). Perhaps you would like to say that there are at least one or two other beliefs which are expressed by the use of this expression (formula) by its twin. Fodor/Lepore: But how can they say that if you know (and you do) that the belief which it expresses is none that you could express at all? ((s) in order to make the projectivist speaker attribution). 1) VsProjectivism: must assert that there are no beliefs on the Twin Earth! Conversely, your twin would have to deny them any belief. These are not just technical difficulties. If projectivism is right, what you believe depends on the interpreter. Vs: but if anything is metaphysically independent from something else, then it is the fact that the repertoire of potential beliefs of a person is independent from the potential speech acts of someone else is. 2) VsProjectivism: cannot explain the "element of interpretation" of the intentional attribution. On the other hand, it does count as a variety of the interpretation theory. Why should the projectivist not assume the reality of the intentional after all. IV 141 Albeit one who rejects the usual assumptions about several-digit predicates of propositional attitudes? I.e. Projectivism: four-digit relation: 1) creature, 2) mental state, 3) propositional object 4) interpreter. |
Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 |
| Verificationism | Davidson Vs Verificationism | II 18 Davidson: understanding a sentence means: knowing under which conditions it becomes true. For that, you need not to know whether it is true nor how to determine that, but you just have to imagine what would be the case if it were true: >truth-conditional semantics. Accordingly: Interpretation Theory: specification of >truth conditions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Radical Interpretation | Davidson, D. | Avra I 83 Radical Interpretation/Davidson: Thesis: cannot assume sentence meaning as evidence of complex intentions typically associated with the sentence. Glüer II 81 Propositional Attitude/Understanding/Interpretation/Radical Interpretation/Davidson: Thesis: Knowing the propositional attitude of a person means understanding the person to the extent that the propositional attitudes are of an explanatory nature. II 151 Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Glüer: summary: Starting from the thesis that meanings and propositional attitudes are publicly accessible, Davidson argues that we can only interpret the words of a speaker if we understand interpretation as a "holistic" undertaking, if we also regard non-verbal actions as meaningful in a broad sense. The radical interpreter sees only the most necessary at his disposal. Monism: attempts to obtain a uniform ontology with the help of an event ontology underpinned by arguments of interpretation theory. Fod/Lep IV 73 Language/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Quine: Thesis: Nothing can be a language that is not accessible to radical interpretation! Newen/Schrenk I 62 Radical Translation/Quine/Radical Interpretation/Davidson/Newen/Schrenk: Aim: to show that word and sentence meanings can ultimately be obtained purely empirically. Empirical Adequacy: to be guaranteed by empirical research. For this we exclude common roots of the foreign language with ours. |
D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Interpretation | Dennett, D. | Fod / Lep IV 139 Def Interpretation Theory / Dennett: Thesis: there are beliefs, desires, etc. but they are not really (ontologically). They exist only as epistemically useful concepts. |
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| Standardinterpr. | Leeds, St. | Horwich I 378 Field: (1972): Thesis: we need an standard interpretation theory of truth and reference (that a standard interpretation is always available), and this theory is also available. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/LeedsVsField). Truth/Field: Thesis (analogous to valence): despite everything we know about the extension of the term, there is still a need for physically acceptable reduction! Leeds: what Field would call a physically acceptable reduction would be what we call the standard interpretation theory of truth: that there is always a standard interpretation for "true" for a language. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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