Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Compositionality Schiffer I XVIII
SchifferVsCompositionality: we must reject it because we must also reject the theory of relation (without which we cannot have the compositionality). >Frege principle, >Relation theory/Schiffer.
Understanding/Schiffer: understanding must be explained otherwise:
Solution: Schiffer thesis: conceptual role in neuronal lingua mentis without compositionality.
>Conceptual role, >Lingua mentis, >Language of Thought.

I 183
SchifferVsCompositionality: verbs for propositional attitudes can hardly be put into a compositional semantics. In addition e.g. "is a picture of", "true", "big", "toy"(soldier) - adverbs, evaluative terms like "should", "good", pronouns and demonstrative pronouns "everyone", "all" are problematic.
Also counterfactual conditional and modal expressions represent a problem for compositional semantics.
>Counterfactual conditionals, >Adverbs, >Adjectives.

I 183
Compositional truth theoretical semantics/Schiffer: attributes truth conditions to sentences. >Truth conditions.
I 184
Compositionality/SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural language does not need any compositional semantics for understanding. >Understanding.
For new sentences, we are not confronted with new words and even only with known constructions.
Pro Frege: meaning theory must determine compositional mechanisms, but this does not lead to the fact that the meaning theory must be truth-theoretical (must determine truth conditions).
>Meaning theory, >Truth-conditional semantics.

I 208
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: E.g. "and": the everyday linguistic meaning is not captured by the truth value table. >Truth table.
Compositional semantics would require that there is a non-logical axiom for each non-logical expression. - This is not possible.
Propositions by E. Harveys spoken language receive their representational character via the connection with mental representation.
>Mental representation.
Therefore Mentalese does not need compositional semantics.
>Mentalese, >Language of thought.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Psychology Churchland Lanz I 302
Everyday psychology/Churchland: (pro everyday psychology/Sellars - ChurchlandVsDennett): Link to Sellars: Everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. You have to check if A) the everyday psychological predicates actually designate natural species
B) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, which is closely linked to everyday psychology, is plausible. The Churchlands deny a) and b).
Instead, Patricia S. Churchland: "Neurophilosophy":
Ad a): it is remarkable that due to everyday psychology we have not the faintest idea what underlies the psychological phenomena with which we are familiar.
Lanz I 303
Ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution, language is a latecomer. There were intelligent creatures before language came into the world and there are intelligent creatures who are not able to speak. Thus, due to the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes must also be assumed in humans.

I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in: Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Reliability Theory Schiffer I 83
SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought.
I 83ff
Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like).
Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words).
Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary.
We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds.
Cf. >Quaddition.
I 87
Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition,
b) quaddition.
Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible.
>Reliability theory.
I 104
SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis".
Solution: there must be an "designated role".
I 104
Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.)
I 105
Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Churchland, P. Dennett Vs Churchland, P. II 64
Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g.    "X is a weight in grams of 144"
   "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second."
DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g.
  "This goat is worth $ 50".
  And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc.

I Lanz 302
Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species
b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b).
Instead, P.S. Churchland: >"Neurophilosophy":
ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of ​​what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology.
I 303
ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Mentalesese Vs Mentalesese Lanz I 297
Mentalese / lingua mentis (Fodor): the symbols have physical characteristics as well as semantic features. This explains why their causal interaction manifests or fulfilles the characteristics of thinking, reasoning and deciding rational patterns.

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Mentalesese Churchland Vs Mentalesese I Lanz 303
ChurchlandVsMentalese: ad b): VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not good at languages. So because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors one must assume a large number of non-voice-analog cognitive processes even in people.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Stalnaker, R. Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. I 46
The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content).
but probably of
x is a belief. ((s) without content).
1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction".
2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form
(R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p))
for a given specified relation R.
Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe.
Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R )
(FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p.
FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional).
I 47
Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be.
Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?.
"Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok.
(R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations.
Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist.
I 282
Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so
An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists).
Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions.
SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987