Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 25 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Change | Simons | I 134 Change/event/Simons: actually events cannot change. Exceptions: e.g. the confrontation became more heated, the wedding party was moved into the house. Solution: in reality, we are talking about the involved continuants. >Events, >Continuants, >Motion, >Temporal identity. I 135 Change/Simons: change in one variable (vector or scalar, e.g. acceleration) is a measure of change, not change in itself... >Measuring. I 176 Change/Simons: ... but it is the whole continuant, not just a part that has these different properties in succession. Attribution/change: it follows that the attribution of properties to a continuant normally must specify the point in time as well. >Attribution, >Properties. I 193 Part/change/flux/shift/SimonsVsChisholm: if a small part is cut off a table, then this is not a table. >Process/Flux. ChisholmVsVs: it is a table because it was there before, it must be a table. Solution/Quine: out of the many simultaneously entangled sums that could all be a table only that one should count as a table which is not embedded in the others. Tables are meant to mutually exclude each other. >Mereological sum. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Simons | Chisholm II 171 Sum/Simons: a sum must exist. Complexes do not have to exist. However, we need both because of the different modal properties aRb and a+b. >Mereological sum. --- Simons I 324 Complex: a complex has different existence conditions than the sum: it exists simply when its parts exist. A complex additionally has a constitutive condition, e.g. for multiplicities, the difference between a class and a group. A complex can stop then, while the sum (by parts) still exists. Sum and complex are thus superimposed, not identical. Modal: e.g. suppose the world could have consisted of the same objects, but with different relations. >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Wholes, >Totality. I 354 Def Complex/Simons: a complex is a structured whole, with certain relations - also characteristic overall relations. Problem: it is unclear what is considered unstructured. >Relations, >Structures. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Continuants | Lewis | IV 41 Modal continuants/Lewis/(s): if individuals can consist of the mereological sum of all their counterparts, they could also be modal continuants. LewisVs: Problem: If I am part of countless different modal continuants, which am I then myself? Solution/Lewis: (see e.g. Methuselah): Instead of identity we take the common sharing of states. Then there is only one individual. Modal continuants/Problem: everything that could have happened does happen. E.g. Humphrey/Kripke: Humphrey thinks: "I could have won" - i.e.: - I am an modal continuant with a world state that wins - i.e. the mC of which a world state is thinking these thoughts has a (different) world state that wins. LewisVs: Humphrey thinks only of himself, so it is pointless to assume that he was "part of the same mereological sum as the winner". >Mereological sum. IV 42 Counterpart theory/Lewis: according to it, Humphrey himself has properties such that he has potential winners as counterparts. >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Counterpart/Lewis. ersatz world: are those in which the same Humphrey just lived a different story. >ersatz world/Lewis. IV 76 Person state/continuant/Lewis: a state is not a permanent person - e.g. a person with a desire is a state - (person state, person-state). >Personal identity. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Endurantism | Inwagen | Schwarz I 34 Endurantism/Van Inwagen/Schwarz: e.g. caterpillar/butterfly: thesis: there is no insect, nothing that exists beyond the pupation. Recombination/mereology/Schwarz: the existence of temporal parts follows directly from the mereological universalism together with the rejection of the presentism. Then there are also example aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower (mereological sum). Socrates is a temporal part of it, which at some point ceases to exist, just as e.g. a dried-out lake that fills up again during the rainy season. Temporal parts/van Inwagen: (van Inwagen 1981)(1) van Inwagen basically rejects temporal parts. >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum. SchwarzVsInwagen: then he has to radically limit the mereological universalism or be a 'presentist'. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Entailment | Bigelow | I 57 Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter. Can deal well with distinctions of differences. Question: Can it cope well with similarities? E.g., what is mass at all? Problem: We need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) that have not been explained yet. --- I 58 Solution: Property 2nd level shared by all massive things. E.g. "to stand in mass relations". Entailment/N.B.: this common (property 2nd level) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of massiveness. Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete. Problem: to explain to what extent some mass relations are more similar than others. Relations/Common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of 2nd stage. --- I 83 Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need them here without modalities. For this reason, we consider once again e.g. methane: We are dealing with a complex pattern of entailments. When a molecule instances methane, it necessarily follows that there are parts of it that instantiate the other universals of hydrogen, etc. --- I 84 Problem: with such a rich pattern of entailments, modal circles threaten. The partial relation is certainly not sufficient. We learn two lessons from David Lewis: Mereology/Lewis: is not sufficient in this case. (1) If a structural universal is composed only in a mereological manner, then methane would only be a mereological sum of hydrogen, carbon, and bond. That gives us our pattern of entailments. --- I 86 Entailment/Lewis/Bigelow: one must not assume it between entities, when one assumes that nothing in the structure of these entities explains why these entailments should exist. Problem/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: to get to our pattern of entailments, we have to accept some kind of magic. Entailments/Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: We have a similar complex pattern of entailments in the sets, (e.g. an object with a specified determinate mass) must also have a determinable mass, while everything with a determinable mass must have a certain determinate mass. Solution: 3 levels. --- I 224 Definition entailment/Bigelow/Pargetter: A class A of sentences entails a sentence a iff. the sentence a is true in every possible world, in which all elements of class A are true. If a is entailed by class A, then a is true in every possible world of a particular class C (of possible worlds) Relevance: the relevant class of possible worlds is specified by the set A of sentences. C. is the class of possible worlds in which all the sentences of A are true. If A entails a, this means that a is true in every possible world in C. Relative necessity: what is necessary here is necessary relative to A and relative to C. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Events | Lewis | V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Existence | Inwagen | Schwarz I 30 Existence/van Inwagen: (1990b, Chap.19)(1) thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. Schwarz I 28ff Object/thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) thesis: parts only become an object when it is a living creature. After that, there are people, fish, cats but no computers, walls and bikinis. >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum, >Ontology. 1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Identity | Wiggins | II 289f Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from (1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)), (2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))] and the superfluous (3)N(x = x) should follow: ( 4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)]. II 292 Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity. Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P. WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work. >Possible worlds, >Saul A. Kripke. --- Simons I 115 Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail). >Tibbles-Example. N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail). Although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split. Process: cannot be split. >Process. There is a difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object. >Modalities, >de re, >Four-dimensionalism. Therefore QuineVsModality de re. Here sum and process differ, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects. >Mereological sum. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Individuals | Lewis | IV 40 Individual/Lewis: can e.g. be the union of myself and all my counterparts - that is a mereological sum. - On the other hand: something else: a cross world individual that is a maximum counterpart-related sum of possible individuals, of whom I am one. It’s only forbidden that an individual is entirely in several worlds - therefore there could be modal continuants. (Lewis ultimately Vs). >Counterparts/Lewis, >">Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Continuants/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 60 Individual/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): points in time and space and space-time points are not individuals. - E.g. Leibniz: it is pointless to imagine the whole world moved three feet to the left. E.g. ((s) if it was now 5 o’clock instead of 6 o’clock, it would only be a different name.) - If time was to be lost, then there would have to be other processes, which would not be affected by the "jump", then shifting of processes, not of points in time - ((s)> Davidson:> "If everything was different...", >Skepticism/Davidson). - ((s) pointless: e.g. "this point in space is different".) - It only makes sense: this object is somewhere else, then show object, not point to point in room. Pointless: this space-time point could have been different. - But makes sense: "this object could have been somewhere else." |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Mereology | Lewis | Schwarz I 79f Mereology: quantities are not the sums of their elements - sum of a single thing A is A the thing itself - but the singleton set {A} is never identical with A. >Singleton, >Unit set. IV 44 Counterpart/Couples/Mereology/Lewis: Example twin brothers Dee and Dum in the actual world. Their pair can be seen as a mereological sum. The couple as mereological sum is a possible individual, not a quantity. Then the counterpart theory can be applied without modification. V 258 Event/Mereology/Logic/Part/Logical Relation/Lewis: we have seen that an event in one sense can be part of another event. 1. then, as I suggest, they have a mereology like they all have classes: the parts of classes are the subclasses. (>Subsets). 2. in another sense they have another mereology: regions can be spatiotemporal parts of other regions. Events are classes of regions, the mereology of the elements transfers to the classes, in the sense that events can also be spatiotemporal parts of each other. V 260 Def Overlap/Event/Mereology/Lewis: two events overlap when they have an event as a common part. An atomistic event has no events except itself as part. Def mereological sum/event/mereology/Lewis: an event e is the mS of events f1,f2... then and only if e overlaps all and only those events that overlap at least one of the fs. Principles/Mereology/Event/Lewis: Question: are the principles here a) the same as that of the unlimited mereology of individuals, in which individual individuals always have a different individual as their sum? Or is it b) the limited mereology of e.g. chairs, in which several chairs rarely or never have another chair than their sum? (>subset/>Sets. Lewis: Thesis: Events have a more accessible mereology than e.g. chairs: For example a war can be a mereological sum of battles, For example, a conference the sum of its meetings. But we leave open whether events, however diverse, must always have other events as parts. It depends on whether one allows unlimited sums, so that there is no limit to how large and non-uniform an event may be, or whether one demands a certain unity for it (limited mereological sum). Perhaps the sum provides a property that is formally suitable for regions, but not an event. This is hard to decide. Our events should serve as causes and effects. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Properties | Simons | I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: assuming, we think of any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then there is the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. Def cumulative predicate: if a sum exists, then the predicate which applies to it also applies to the whole, too (whole unequal sum), e.g. mass terms can form any sums. Non-cumulative: e.g. "is a human being". The sum can occupy the same space-time as the corresponding individual, without being identical with it. I 113 Sum/mereology: a sum only exists because its parts exist. ((s) So holistically an individual who exists only exists because other individuals exist.) I 191 Tibbles/Wiggins: thesis: the cat Tibbles is not identical with the sum Tib + Tail. >Tibbles-example. Despite the permanent coincidence, because only Tibbles and not the sum has the modal property to continue to exist, if the tail gets lost. I 266 Sum/identity conditions/Simons: sums have no autonomous identity conditions. E.g. sum Tib + Tail is not identical with the cat Tibbles, although it never loses its tail. The modal property of the "could-get-lost" is critical. This is non-identity despite coincidence. I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happened to it ((s) its life story.) >Mereological sum. I 354 Sum/mereology/Simons: here the structure does not matter. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Inwagen | Schwarz I 28ff Object/thing/van Inwagen: (1990b(1)) thesis: parts only become an object when it is a living creature. After that, there are people, fish, cats but no computers, walls and bikinis. Object/thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions do parts form a whole? Under all! For any thing there is always a thing that they put together. (That is the definition of mereological universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we count in our everyday world as an independent thing? That we do not consider some aggregates as everyday things does not mean that these aggregates do not exist. (However, they exceed the normal domains of our normal quantifiers). But these limitations vary from culture to culture. It is not reality that is culture-dependent, but the part of reality that has been noticed. (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991:79 81). >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum, >Ontology. LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: if only living creatures could form real objects, evolution could not begin. LewisVsInwagen: no criterion for "living creatures" is so precise that it could draw a sharp cut. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: for him this is no problem: the conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic accuracy to which aggregates "living creatures" applies (1986e, 212)(3). LewisVsInwagen: for him, this explanation is not available: for him, the border between living creatures and non-living creatures is the border between existence and non-existence. If it is vague what a living creature is, then existence is also vague. Existence/van Inwagen: (1990b, Chap. 19)((1)) thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsInwagen: (1991(3), 80f, 1986e(2), 212f): if one already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if one says, "something exists to a lower degree". Def existence/Lewis: existence simply means to be one of the things that exist. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Part-of-Relation | Lewis | IV 39 Part-of/part-of-relation/part/Lewis: the part-relation is transitive. >Parts, >Mereology/Lewis, >Transitivity, >Mereological sum/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Parts | Inwagen | Schwarz I 34 Endurantism/Van Inwagen/Schwarz: e.g. caterpillar/butterfly: thesis: there is no insect, nothing that exists beyond the pupation. Recombination/mereology/Schwarz: the existence of temporal parts follows directly from the mereological universalism together with the rejection of the presentism. Then there are also e.g. aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower (mereological sum). Socrates is a temporal part of it which at some point ceases to exist, just as e.g. a dried-out lake that fills up again during the rain season. Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (van Inwagen 1981)(7): van Inwagen basically rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsvan Inwagen: then he must radically limit the mereological universalism or be a presentist. Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis pleads for its contingency. Question/Schwarz: what should be contingent? Should there be possible worlds where the ordinary things have no temporal parts? Or should specific things be atomic in time and never change their form? Lewis seems to allow only the latter. Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/mereology/Schwarz: but if one accepts aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, one could still deny that Socrates himself has temporal parts. Lewis: Lewis also does not assert that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts are not intended to provide an analysis of the enduring existence. Lewis: (1083d(4), 76, similar Armstrong 1980(5), 76): e.g. a child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2, suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schwarz I 35 Perhaps no one notices anything. And there is nothing to notice. Vs: this is not convincing. EndurantismVs: endurantism cannot accept the premises. Van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist strung together, and yet remain different (2000(6), 398). >Mereology, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum, >Ontology. 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel. 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. Peter van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. In [van Inwagen 2001]. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Process/Flux | Simons | I 124f Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process. We have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. >Mereological sum. Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers, absolute space or an introduction of "is co-fluvial with". >Continuants. This could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as". Thus, the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. Error: it is wrong trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged. I125 Time-stage/flux-stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages can be misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man. One does not bath in a flux stadium. A consequent description in four-dimensionalism is only achieved by higher beings. For us, this is not decidable. Terminology: process ontology equals four-dimensionalism here. Simons: this is not impossible, only the language is different. >Four-dimensionalism. I 127 SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: four-dimensionalism is a convenient representation of the Minkowski-space, but representation is not an ontological argument. >Minkowski-space. I 126 Process/Geach/Simons: a process has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts and not the whole process. Hence, there is no change, e.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other. >Timelessness. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Proxy | Simons | I 191 Proxy/to stand for/vouch for/existence of/Chisholm/Simons: only mereologically constant objects can stand for others. >Mereology. Sum/Simons: without mereological constancy, there would be nothing to prevent sums from being variable. >Mereological sum. Total: a total has its parts necessarily - or any other sum, e.g. Tib + Tail but not Tibbles. >Tibbles-exaple, >Totality, >Wholes. Vs: sum of variable parts: e.g. the tail may again consist of different atoms. >Parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Simons | I 102 Russell’s Paradox/solution/Lesniewski: problem: ambiguity of the class poses a problem: a) mereologically: there is the sum, then there is no problem. Each class contains then itself. >Mereological sum, >Mereology. Russell: e.g. members of the set of teaspoons cannot be handles, only teaspoons. >Sets, >Set theory. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Set Theory | Lewis | Schwarz I 75 Set theory/Mereology/Lewis: (Parts of Classes, 1991)(1): are sets simply mereological sums? Set theory proves to be mereologically extended arithmetic, with successor relation, a set relation between thing A and its unit set {A}. Through a structural analysis of this relationship Lewis finally leads the whole mathematics back to the assumption that there are many things. >Mereology/Lewis. Schwarz I 78 Classical set theory/Schwarz: sets form a hierarchical structure (cumulative or iterative). lowest level: things that are not sets "individuals", "primal elements". pure set theory: here the lowest level is empty (no individuals, nothing outside sets, nothing is not a set!) >Individual/Lewis. Omega/ω/Set theory/Schwarz: on ω all sets are located whose elements occur on one of the finite levels. On ω+1 there are sets whose elements are on ω or below etc. up to ω + ω (=ω * ω) followed by ω * 2 + 1 etc. A set that contains itself/Russell's paradox/Schwarz: is excluded by the hierarchy: it must already have occurred at a level below the level at which it occurs for the first time. Then there are also no quantities of all quantities that do not contain themselves, because that would be nothing other than the quantity of all quantities. Cf. >Russellean paradox. Schwarz I 79f Non-naive set theory/Schwarz: here things only form a set if they are not too many, i.e. if they do not correspond one-to-one with all sets. This motivates the selection axiom and the replacement axiom. Schwarz I 79ff Classical Set Theory: set and element (member) are undefined. Schwarz I 80 Set theory/Mereology/Lewis: (Parts of Classes(1), Part 1): Thesis: sets and classes are mereological sums. But the parts are not elements but subsets. >Mereological sum/Lewis. Main thesis: (MT): x is subclass of y, gdw. y is a class and x is part of y. (1991(1),§1,3) Schwarz I 93 Set theory/Properties/VsLewis/Schwarz: Lewis has a similar problem: according to his set-theoretical structuralism, an expression like "{A,B,C}" does not refer to a particular thing, the class of A, B, and C. Classes are relative to single set relations and single set relations are very numerous. According to Lewis, statements about classes - and thus also about properties - are actually plural quantifications about single set relationships (2002a(4), §5, (1986e(2), 52 Fn 39). Quantification via properties would then be plural quantification via ED. For example that a thing is red: that it is one of the red things. Schwarz I 94 SchwarzVsLewis: does not say how this should work for relations. V 346 "Nominalistic Set Theory" (1970d)(3) Nominalistic set theory/Lewis: if one assumes the individual calculus and a relation of the neighborhood between atoms as basic concepts, it is possible to define a pseudo element relation between individuals. 1. David Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1970d]: “Nominalistic Set Theory”. Nous, 4. 4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Set Theory | Simons | I 12 Set Theory: seperate quantities have one element in common: the empty set. Mereology: here, mereology does not exist. >Mereology. Partial order: here, partial order is the common part of the lower bound. >Partial order. Product: a product is the greatest lower barrier: i.e. the individual, that x and y have in common (= average of the set theory, lens in Venndiagram). Stronger: binary sum: the binary sum is the individual who overlaps iff. it at least overlaps one of x or y (Venndiagram: both circles with lens), e.g. a broom is the sum of handle and head. Any two individuals always have a sum. >Mereological sum. I 279 Set Theory/modality/necessity/Simons: there is rigidity of the element relationship: a class can have in no possible world other elements, as it has in the actual world. This is analog to the mereological essentialism for subsets. >Element relation. I 332 Set Theory/mereology/elements/(s): elements are not interchangeable but parts are. >Parts. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Space Time | Simons | I 132 Spacetime/Simons: A spatio-temporal region does not need a frame of reference ((s) it is "completely determined"). >Reference systems, cf. >Four-dimensionalism. Space-region/time-region: space and time regions need a frame of reference. There is no superposition of possible regions. Region/Simons: a region is homogeneous (s) without determining the content.) Therefore, any sums are possible. >Mereological sum. Occuring events, on the other hand, are not homogeneous. >Events. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Sum, mereological | Lewis | IV 44 Mereological sum/set/individual/Lewis: a mereological sum is a (possible) individual and no set! - E.g., The twins Dee and Dum in the actual world. >Possible world/Lewis. --- V 212 Mereological sum/Lewis: no disjunction. Disjunction: Elements of a set: a v b v c .. V 260 Def Overlap/Event/Mereology/Lewis: two events overlap when they have an event as a common part. An atomistic event has no events except itself as part. Def mereological sum/event/mereology/Lewis: an event e is the mereological sum of events f1,f2... then and only if e overlaps all and only those events that overlap at least one of the fs. >Event/Lewis. Principles/Mereology/Event/Lewis: Question: are the principles here a) the same as that of the unlimited mereology of individuals, in which individual individuals always have a different individual as their sum? Or is it b) the limited mereology of e.g. chairs, in which several chairs rarely or never have another chair than their sum? (>subset/quantity). Lewis: Thesis: Events have a more accessible mereology than e.g. chairs: For example a war can be a mereological sum of battles, For example, a conference the sum of its meetings. But we leave open whether events, however diverse, must always have other events as parts. It depends on whether one allows unlimited sums, so that there is no limit to how large and non-uniform an event may be, or whether one demands a certain unity for it (limited mereological sum). Perhaps the sum provides a property that is formally suitable for regions, but not an event. This is hard to decide. Our events should serve as causes and effects. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Totality | Totality, philosophy: an entity that can be described by specifying the characteristics, properties, rules, possible states, the possible actions, possible changes etc.. Impossible are statements about Totalities if it is required that the standpoint for these statements would have to be localized both inside and outside of this totality. See also paradoxes, wholes, set theory, universal class, universal set, mereological sum, systems, exterior/interior. |
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| Totality | Inwagen | Schwarz I 28ff Wholes/object/thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) thesis: parts only become an object when it is a living creature. After that, there are people, fish, cats but no computers, walls and bikinis. Object/thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions do parts form a whole? Under all! For any thing there is always a thing that they put together (That is the definition of mereological universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we count in our everyday world as an independent thing? That we do not consider some aggregates as everyday things does not mean that these aggregates do not exist. (However, they exceed the normal domains of our normal quantifiers). But these limitations vary from culture to culture. It is not reality that is culture-dependent, but the part of reality that has been noticed. (1986e(2), 211-213, 1991:79-81). >Mereology, >Part-of-relation, >Temporal parts, >Mereological sum, >Ontology. LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: if only living creatures could form real objects, evolution could not begin. LewisVsInwagen: no criterion for "living creatures" is so precise that it could draw a sharp cut. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: for him this is no problem: the conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic accuracy to which aggregates "living creatures" applies (1986e(2), 212). LewisVsInwagen: for him, this explanation is not available: for him, the border between living creatures and non-living creatures is the border between existence and non-existence. If it is vague what a living creature is, then existence is also vague. Existence/van Inwagen: (1990b(1), Chap. 19): thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsInwagen: (1991(3), 80f, 1986e(2), 212f): if one already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if one says, "something exists to a lower degree". Def existence/Lewis: existence simply means to be one of the things that exist. >Existence. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Wholes | Wholes, philosophy: the concept of the whole is unique only in connection with further specification. In the mereology the term avoids paradoxes that occur in connection with the universal class (universal set). The whole is not different from its parts in the way a set is different from its elements. See also unity, one, set, universal class, universal set, mereology, parts, part-of-relation, mereological sum, upper bound, totality. |
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| Wholes | Simons | I 214f Whole/ontology/Simons: a whole does not always have to be ontologically overriding to its parts: e.g. pile of stones. Probably contrarily ontological overridingly: is an organism. It survives the flux of its parts. >Order, >Ontology, >Existence, >Mereology, >Mereological sum, >Totality. I 334 Whole/Rescher/Oppenheim: 1. attribute, 2. characteristic relation, 3. certain structure. >Attributes, >Relations, >Structures. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field, H. | Lewis Vs Field, H. | Schwarz I 75 Ontology/Science/Mathematics/Lewis: Philosophy needs to accept the results of established sciences. It would be absurd to reject mathematics because of philosophical reasons. LewisVsField. Lewis: It is about a systematic description, which should be as simple as possible, of the mathematical part of reality. Solution: Reduction on set theory. Set Theory/Mereology/Lewis: (Parts of Classes, 1991)(1): Are sets simply mereological sums? As such set theory manifests itself as mereologically expanded arithmetic, with successor relation, a set relation between object A and its singleton {A}. With a structural analysis of this relation, Lewis establishes the thesis: All mathematics are based on the assumption that there many objects. >Sets/Lewis, >mereology/Lewis. 1. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Mereology | Verschiedene Vs Mereology | Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/Mereology/Schwarz: but if you accept aggregates from Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, you could still deny that Socrates itself has temporal parts. Lewis: does not even claim that necessarily everything that exists over time consists of temporal parts (1986f(1),x,1986e(2),205,1994(3) §1) VsStowe: temporal parts should not provide an analysis of temporal existence. Lewis: (1083d(4),76,similar to Armstrong 1980(5),76): Example: one child, Frieda1 suddenly disappears, while another child, Frieda2 suddenly appears. This may contradict the laws of nature, but it is logically possible. Schw I 35 Maybe nobody notices anything. And there would be nothing to notice. Vs: that is not convincing. Endurantism Vs: cannot accept the premises at all. van InwagenVs: Frieda1 and Frieda2 cannot exist in such a row and yet remain different. (2000(6),398) Schwarz I 36 Thing/EndurantismVsLewis/VsMereology: the objects are not the mereological sum of their parts, because the sum and the parts exist even if the things themselves do not exist (e.g. if they are disassembled or broken). Vs: then the term "part" is not used exactly. The scattered parts are then no longer parts, because the (disassembled) bicycle does not exist at that time. Solution/Lewis: Part of the bicycle is only a past temporal part of the gearshift. Personal identity, temporal identity: we too are not identical with any aggregate of molecules, because we constantly exchange many of them with the metabolism. (1988b(7), 195). 1. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. David Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 4. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 5. David Armstrong [1980]: “Identity Through Time”. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel 6. Peter van Inwagen [2000]: “Temporal Parts and Identity across Time”. The Monist , 83: 437–459. 7. David Lewis [1988b]: “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”. Analysis, 48: 65–72 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Modal Realism | Verschiedene Vs Modal Realism | Schwarz I 61 VsModal Realism/VsLewis/Ontology/Schwarz: (many authors: he mistakes the essence of modality, creates a basis for skepticism, nihilism and moral decay.) Real existence of all these "parallel universes" is completely implausible. LewisVsVs: the problem with common sense is to be taken seriously, but the methodological advantages of theory prevail. (1986e(1): vii) Solution/Lewis: Limitation of quantifiers: because we limit ourselves to our world, it is right to say that there are no talking donkeys. VsLewis: his possible worlds (poss. w.) are epistemically inaccessible. How do we know they exist? In principle, we could never learn anything about them! LewisVsVs: the objection presupposes that knowledge is acquired causally (causal theory of knowledge) ((s) that possible worlds are not researched logically). If that were correct, we would have no mathematical knowledge either. (1986e(1):109). Schw I 62 VsLewis: this applies only to mathematical Platonism (Group: Lewis: mathematical Platonist - FieldVsLewis). Sv I 64 Modal Realism/Possible World/VsLewis/Schwarz: some: Lewis' possible world should be part of reality, because "world" and "reality" are synonymous expressions for the totality of all things. (Plantinga 1976(2), 256f Lycan 1979(3), 290): the idea of real things outside the world is simply inconsistent. Reality/World/LewisVsVs: Lewis distinguishes between world and reality: "real world" refers only to a small part of all things (reality includes world, world only part of reality). Thus the contradictions dissolve. Schwarz: this is a neutral formulation of modal realism. Question: what should the reality of maximum objects in space-time have to do with modality? Modality/van InwagenVsLewis/Schwarz: this is about what our world could have been like, not about what any of our isolated things are like. (1885(4), 119,1986(5), 226, Plantinga 1987(6)). LewisVsVs: Modal operators are quantifiers about such things. Van InwagenVsLewis: the objection goes deeper: For example, suppose there are exactly 183 spatiotemporal maximum objects. This is not analytically wrong. There is also no rigid designator. Schw I 65 So it might be true or it might not. Lewis seems to claim that there can be as many space-time maximum items as there are sets. VsLewis: with it the whole of the worlds has become contingent! Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: he has to avoid this, because he wants to analyze contingency over possible worlds. ((s) i.e. contingency means that there are deviating possible worlds, i.e. not first the set of the Possible World (= maximum objects in space-time) and then say that this is the contingency, because then the contingency is not contingent, because it would be a non-contingent limit, if there are only 183 possible worlds. (van InwagenVsLewis/PlantingaVsLewis). ((s) if it were contingent, one could not simply say "there are 183 possible worlds". In other words: "how many possibilities there are depends on the possibilities": circular - but: e.g. "how long it takes depends on the possibilities: e.g. how many attempts you make. Different and also correct: e.g. how many possibilities there are, depends (not on the possibilities) but on the properties, e.g. how wearable the object is. (Lewis ditto). Contingency/Schwarz: means that there are different possible worlds. But the totality of all possible worlds does not exist in single worlds. Therefore the totality itself cannot be different than it is! (s) The totality is not the object of consideration in a possible world.) Totality/Modal Logic/Lewis/Schwarz: unrestricted statements about possible worlds are unrestricted modal statements ((s) shift of the range then not possible! see above). Schwarz: as such, they elude the influence of modal operators: Example: "There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak" is equivalent to "there is a possible world in which donkeys can speak": "N There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak". And with "M There is a possible world in which donkeys can speak." (s) Logical form: Mp > NMp. (S5). Mp > MMp. (neither T nor S4, reduction law, > Hughes/Cresswell(7) p. 34)). Modal Realism/VsLewis/Schwarz: Problem: how the non-contingency of the possible world fits with its characterization as parallel universes. Contingency/Lewis/Schwarz: either we talk about the totality of reality: then the number of the possible worlds is not contingent - or we talk about reality ((s) Real World), then there is necessarily only one universe (because in every world there is only one, the world itself). Contingency/Schwarz: empirical problem: according to the relativity theory, two universes could be connected by a wormhole. But it is contingent whether this occurs. LewisVs: that is absolutely impossible! ((s) Problem: one would have to claim before the wormhole that there are two universes that can be connected, and that would be a statement about (further) reality and not about (narrower) reality (=Real World) (in which there can only be one universe). (1986e(1):71f) Note: this is the "island universe" (Richards 1975(8),107f, Bigelow/Pargetter 1987(9)). Island Universes/Bricker: (2001(10),35 39): (completely different version: recombination principle: there is a possible world w, which contains a duplicate of the mereological sum of Hume and Lewis and nothing else - also no space-time between the Hume duplicate and the Lewis duplicate. Consequently, w contains two spatially isolated parts. SchwarzVsBricker: this assumes that space-time relations necessarily require substantial space-time. ((s) >Substantivalism). Solution/Lewis/Schwarz: (1986e,72) Replacement Possibility: his theory allows worlds in which several four-dimensional universes are connected only along an additional fifth dimension, but are isolated in the four normal dimensions. If this is not possible, we must loosen the criterion of spatio-temporal connectedness. Schwarz I 66 Two alternatives: (1986f(11), 74f) a) Worlds are connected by relations analog to space-time relations. b) The inhabitants of a possible world stand in any perfectly natural external relation to each other. Schwarz: However, the spatial-temporal distance is the only clear example of this. SchwarzVsLewis: that does not solve the general problem: that things (totality of the possible worlds) could also be different. Schwarz I 68 VsModal Realism/Schwarz: ontological overload. Alternatives: a) "ersatz worlds" - b) fictionalism. Def ersatz world/Ersatzism/Terminology/Lewis: tries to replace possible worlds with sentence sets or facts. Def Fictionalism/VsModal Realism/Schwarz: here no special entities come into play when interpreting sentences about (possible worlds). 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] 3. William G. Lycan [1979]: “The Trouble with Possible Worlds”. In [Loux 1979]: 274-316 4. Peter van Inwagen 1985]: “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity”. In James Tomberlin und Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Alvin Plantinga: A Profile, Dordrecht: Reidel 5. Peter van Inwagen [1986]: “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9. In [van Inwagen 2001] 6. Alvin Plantinga [1987]: “Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”. Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 189–231 7. Hughes, G. E., and M. J. Cresswell. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic. New York, NY: Routledge. 8. Tom Richards [1975]: “The Worlds of David Lewis”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53: 105–118 9. John Bigelow und Robert Pargetter [1987]: “Beyond the Blank Stare”. Theoria, 53: 97–114 10. Phillip Bricker [2001]: “Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality”. In [Preyer und Siebelt 2001], 27–55 11. David Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Event | Lewis, D. | V 255 There may be a theory of events according to which no event implies another. That was my own view until recently! V 260 Event/Mereology/Lewis: Thesis: Events have a simpler mereology than e.g. chairs. A sum of chairs is not a chair itself, but a conference can be a sum of sessions. E.g. war - mereological sum of battles. Event/Lewis: to serve as cause and effect. Sub-event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine. Problem: whether a sub-region is to be determined for a sub-event in which it occurs - in simple cases: yes. V 268 Mental State/Causal Role/Lewis: Thesis: mental states are definable as owners of causal roles. ((s) "whatever the effect has"). Pain/Lewis: Thesis: Then no real event is essentially classified as my pain! |
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| mereological Sum | Simons, P. | I 3 Def mereological sum / mS / Simons: Thesis: one ms arises from the idea of a family of objects that are maximally connected under a certain relation. I 186 Sum / mereology / Simons: E. g. there is no sum of teachers. Here, one must recognize, however, that the problems with temporal sums are not avoided by this denial. |
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