Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Functionalism Fodor Dennett I 292 ff
Fodor/Dennett: the necessity of an organism to work smoothly at any stage imposes iron restrictions on its subsequent properties.
Fodor IV 127
functionalist: causal role distinguishes desires and beliefs ((s) internal in the mind) - SemanticsVsFunktionalism: Relationship mind-world determining.
IV 127
semantic properties/Fodor/Lepore: functionalism: the semantic properties derived from the functional (causal) role - so beliefs and desires are distinguished by the causal role - on the other hand semantics: the semantic properties are derived from the relation of mind/world.
Frank I 61 ~
FodorVsFunctionalism: does not grasp the qualia, nothing would be a token of the general type of pain, even if it were linked typically with all other psych. states - Arg. of the missing qualia: the organism could behave without them jsut the same - Shoemaker: Failure of qualia unthinkable because of networking.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Inverted Spectra Pauen Pauen I 143
Inverted spectra/DennettVs inverted spectra/Pauen: behavior and phenomenal experience cannot be separated because they are interwoven on the neural level. - With that consciousness and behavior are inseparable.
I 184
Inverted spectra/missing Qualia/Pauen: common thesis of both arguments: it is impossible to establish a connection between phenomenal and physiological knowledge - so neurobiological theories would be fundamentally unsuited for knowledge of phenomenal processes. - Nevertheless, causal effectiveness of mental properties possible. - No epiphenomenalism.
I 186
Phenomenal states/Vs Inverted spectra/Pauen: the specific quality of a phenomenal state is rarely determined only by its location within a frame of reference - so there is probably no sensation of red itself. - One cannot talk reasonable of differences of the spectrum between people. Maximum change in a person.
I 187
Inverted spectra/Vs inverted spectra/Pauen: the spectrum is not symmetric. - This is noticeable in our discernment. - Primary colors and mixed colors would be displayed on each other in different numbers. - Orange and Red are turning both into Brown, if they are darkened. - Solution: could be corrected, if one sets exactly the mirror axis through the axis of orange/brown. - Problem: that would display secondary colors on primary colors. - Pauen: therefore the thought experiment fails through the imaginability.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Qualia Chalmers I 251
Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does!
We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either!
---
I 252
Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines.
BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example).
---
I 253
Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. ---
I 254
ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. ---
I 256
A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... ---
I 257
...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible.
---
I 261
ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. ---
I 262
Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981). So something must be wrong with the argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented.
2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips.
---
I 263
A system like this would be rational in any case. ---
I 266f
Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... ---
I 267
1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences.
Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers).
Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time.
---
I 268
After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference!
---
I 269
A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes!
---
I 270
The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle:
Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism.
---
I 271
VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... ---
I 272
...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... ---
I 273
...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument.
Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible.
Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded.



1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980.
2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44
3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43
4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Qualia Jackson Pauen I 179
Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike Nagel. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum.
E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space.
Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences.
2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism).
I 180
Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand.
JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people.
What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not.
Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities.
I 181
LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected.
A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson.
I 182
Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all.
N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states.
LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities.
Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions!
I 183
This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible".
Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios.
In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity.
VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena.
   1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties.
I 184
2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Systems Chalmers I 247
System/Function/Functional Organization/Consciousness/Chalmers: which functional organization may be necessary for consciousness? And what is functional organization? Definition Functional Organization/Chalmers:
1. A number of abstract components
2. For each component, a number of different possible states
3. A system of dependency relations that determine how the state of each component depends on previous states of all components and inputs in the system, and how outputs of the system depend on previous states of the components. The nature of the components and the states remain open.
---
I 248
Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Such an organization can be realized not only by the brain, but also by electronic systems. Levels: such a system will have different levels, depending on how finely we distinguish the elements. If we want to assess cognition, we need at least a system that is able to change its own behavior.
---
I 249
Definition Principle of organizational invariance/Chalmers: a system with the ability of conscious experiences will have qualitatively identical experiences if the fine-grained organizational structure remains the same. ((s) VsChalmers: Only if the inputs remain the same and the system has no time register.) Chalmers: that's what I call my non-reductive functionalism. It can be viewed as a kind of combination of functionalism and property dualism.
VsChalmers: 1. Some authors believe that there must be a certain biochemical equipment to make consciousness possible so that there will be no conscious electronic systems.
2. Other authors believe that robots may have consciousness but that their experiences will not be comparable to ours. (> Missing Qualia).

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Block, Ned Shoemaker Vs Block, Ned Block I 188
Block: And if there are no homunculi, they cannot be identical with a qualitative structure. ShoemakerVsBlock: asserts that the
Def "argument of the missing qualia" is logically impossible.
That means it is logically impossible that two systems are in the same functional state but one has a qualitative state, the other, however, does not! (I 218) (BlockVs).
ShoemakerVsBlock: the problems with brains in the tank can be avoided if we introduce the concept of a "paradigm embodied person". Thus, a functioning sensory apparatus and a will control over movement is assumed.
Then you can extend it to the functional character of non-paradigmatic:
a physical structure that is not part of a paradigm embodied person, then passes as a realization of mental states, if it can be included without changing its internal structure and the types of relations between their states into a larger physical system, namely the body of the embodied paradigmatic person.

Frank I 61
FodorVsFunctionalism/BlockVsFunctionalis/Frank: the so combined F. does not capture the Qualia, that is the actual mental states. E.g. inverted spectra: functionalism then no longer explains this consciousness experiences.
((s) For him, the inverted spectrum would be identical to the non-exchange?).
Fodor/Block: nothing would be a token of the general type of state of pain, even if it was linked to all other mental states at all typical ways for pain.
Fra I 62
"absent qualia argument"/argument of the missing qualia/Block/Fodor: even more fatal: the organism could behave exactly like that without qualia. ShoemakerVsBlock: defends the compatibility of the concession of qualia with functionalism.
Qualia are intuitive for the consciousness, given without a transmission of a perception and their becoming a feeling is a completely adequate identification of their existence.

Shoemaker I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Exchanged Spektra Pauen, M. Pauen I / V 184
exchanged spectra / missing qualia / Pauen: joint hypothesis of both arguments: it is impossible to establish a connection between phenomenal and physiological knowledge - than neurobiological theories would be fundamentally unsuited to knowledge of phenomenal processes - still possible: causal efficacy of mental properties - no epiphenomenalism.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001